Canada and NATO Operations

Examining the 'middle power' narrative and its influence on Canadian foreign policy in NATO's Afghanistan and Libya operations

Wolfraim, Zachary Aidan

Awarding institution:
King's College London

Canada and NATO Operations:

Examining the 'middle power' narrative and its influence on Canadian foreign policy in NATO's Afghanistan and Libya operations

by

Zachary Wolfraim

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the Department of War Studies – King's College London

Acknowledgements

Whilst in many ways a solitary exercise, the act of writing a PhD is facilitated by so many around us that, at the end, it is hard to describe it in such a fashion. With that in mind I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisors Dr. Petra Dolata and Dr. Richard Ned Lebow without whose guidance, support and candid advice I would not have arrived at this point. Moreover, the helpful feedback from both my examiners, Dr. Alister Miskimmon and Dr. Martin Thornton have also helped make this a more complete, rounded and altogether stronger piece of scholarship. Similarly, I'd like to acknowledge some last minute advice from Ambassador David Wright and Dr. Kim Nossal concerning 'middle powers.' Additional thanks of course goes to my friends and colleagues Karolina MacLachlan, Kathleen McInnis and Heather Williams who at different times and stages have acted as thoughtful and supportive sounding boards, experts and editors.

I would also extend my deep gratitude to NATO and my former supervisor, Michel Soula, to whom I owe not only my previous work experience but placed his contacts, colleagues and the Alliance at my disposal. The same goes for the numerous colleagues and friends who assisted in various capacities with their contacts, advice and support for this undertaking. All the interviewees from this process also have my deepest gratitude for their time and their frank exchanges.

To all other friends and colleagues not mentioned by name, this is not for lack of appreciation but merely because I am fortunate to still have such a long list of people who have indulged my years of whinging, griping and to say the least, grumpiness. For the sake of brevity I can't list them all here but their patience and understanding is continually appreciated; for maintaining my sanity, assuaging my existential anxiety and reminding me of the world outside of Canadian foreign policy, I am deeply indebted.

Finally, I cannot express enough gratitude to my parents, my grandparents, my brother, and my girlfriend, Alex Floyd, without whose patience, love and support I would not have been able to undertake this exercise, let alone complete it.

Table of Contents

Abstract

This study seeks to examine the role that a national narrative has on policymaking with regards to motivating and understanding 'non-strategic' state behaviour. Building on relevant scholarship, this study will look at the role that a popular, foundational narrative plays and how this shapes the moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations that contribute to Canada's foreign policy behaviour in NATO. By extension, it will also chart how attempting to change a core foreign policy narrative can affect the influence and perception of Canada in NATO. This study explores competing interpretations of Canada's 'middle power' narrative, both in Canadian foreign policy literature as well as among policymakers to understand how it influences the practice of policymaking. Through constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis and Role Theory, this study will illustrate how Canada's 'middle power' narrative as articulated at the individual level, generates roles which shape and routinize its foreign policy behavior. In doing so, this narrative acts as a multidimensional pressure on its policymaking options as they relate to NATO operations. This study will not seek to invalidate competing explanations of Canada's foreign policy behaviour, but rather seeks to expand on alternative examinations of policymaking practice. To do so it will survey Canadian foreign policy in the context of two of NATO's major operations between 2001 and 2011 in Afghanistan and Libya. By using interpretivism to construct an institutional 'story' about the narratives articulated by Canadian policymakers, both in Parliament and in NATO this study explores how these narratives are interpreted and transmitted in the Canadian media and as well as by foreign policymakers in NATO. This study adds a new theoretical dimension to the study of Canadian foreign policy and depth to the 'middle power' narrative, while also exploring the motivations and pressures which shape national foreign policymaking behaviour.

Introduction

> Nous ne devons pas perdre de vue le fait que l'OTAN n'est pas une institution multilatérale. Nous sommes une alliance. Il y a une différence qualitative – ou du moins il devrait y en avoir une. – Peter MacKay, 2009 [1]

This statement made by Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay in 2009 was meant to inspire greater solidarity among the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to solicit greater troop contributions towards the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so, it suggested an adherence to a particular narrative on the part of the Conservative government regarding its view of NATO and the conflict in Afghanistan. This narrative sought to emphasise the common values which underpinned NATO membership, and by extension was meant to highlight Canada's unwavering commitment to those values. In articulating his conception of foreign affairs and Canada's place in the world MacKay's remarks reflected the principles of the Conservative government that sought to remind NATO members of the sacrifices Canada had made in support of the Alliance, while also shaming other member states into contributing more to the Afghanistan mission.[2] This type of statement in Canada's foreign policy is not new, as former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed in 1966 (paraphrasing William Wordsworth) that listening to Canadians discussing foreign affairs reminded him of the "stern daughter of the voice of God."[3] Indeed, as will be explored in this examination, there are certain themes, such as morality, which often run through Canadian foreign policy and frequently still appear in foreign policy statements. Nonetheless, while not uncommon for a Defence Minister to discuss his country's relationship with NATO, the way in which MacKay seeks to inject morality into the requirements of the Alliance in an address to a foreign audience raises questions about Canada's relationship with NATO. Moreover, given Canada's participation in NATO's

---

[1] Peter MacKay, Munich Security Conference, 8 Feb 2009, https://www.securityconference.de/veranstaltungen/munich-security-conference/msc-2009/reden/peter-mackay/, accessed 15 November 2011.

[2] It should be noted that 'Alliance' and 'Allies' are used to refer specifically to NATO and NATO member states, while 'allies' refers more generally to countries with whom Canada is aligned.

[3] Norman Hillmer and Jack L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 217.

Afghanistan and Libya operations between 2001 and 2011, MacKay's statement takes on greater importance as it points to a way in which the Canadian government perceives the utility of NATO and the ways in which interpretation of foreign policy narratives shape foreign policy behaviour. This opens a number of avenues of inquiry both with regards to the analysis of foreign policy and the examination of multidimensional forces; from individuals, domestic and international levels on the formation of foreign policy. This study is interested in how foreign policy narratives interact, shape and influence foreign policy behaviour and the mechanisms by which it does so. Given the importance of these various elements to the study of International Relations (IR), this raises deeper empirical questions about the ways in which identities, narratives and policymaking become linked, interact with and ultimately, affect states' behaviour.

Using a constructivist interpretation, this study examines Canada's 'middle power' narrative which historically represented a short-hand description of its foreign policy tradition and how this has influenced successive governments to get involved in and remain in conflicts which did not necessarily threaten Canada's strategic interest as defined by traditional IR theory. In this case, the middle power narrative represents a number of elements, namely a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. The elements informing this narrative are elaborated upon in detail further on, however, this offers a starting point for this analysis and Chapter 2 will explore how this has become intertwined with Canadian foreign policy tradition.

More specifically, this examination queries what the links are between national narratives, the roles they articulate and how these shape international behaviours. This is important as it lends a deeper understanding to the forces shaping policymakers' preferences and decisions which in turn, affect state actions in international affairs. This also addresses how these behaviours then affect Canada's ability to shape NATO's policy and operations. While first and foremost an empirical examination, in exploring Canada's role in the Afghanistan and Libya operations this study will seek to reconcile how a foreign policy narrative interacts

with the practice of policymaking and the extent to which it constrains or enhances how that policy is made manifest, thus generating behaviour which reinforces its foreign policy narrative. Through the use of Role Theory as part of a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach, this study is concerned with the options and decisions that were made, rather than examining what foreign policy decisions should have or could have been considered.[4] In undertaking this type of examination it makes a contribution to the literature on Canadian foreign policy by refining and integrating newer theoretical innovations into the discipline.[5] Both of these aspects will be elaborated upon through the course of this work.

This study contends that, with regards to NATO operations between 2001 and 2011, successive Canadian governments' interpretations of elements of the middle power narrative had a clear effect in shaping Canada's foreign policy behaviour. The importance of this narrative and its attendant behaviours also shaped the expectations of its allies in relation to Canada's international role in these conflicts.[6] As such the middle power narrative informed the decisions of Canadian policymakers and thus contributed to Canada taking significant roles in the interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. This middle power narrative is relatively complex and requires deeper examination, but nonetheless invokes a historically informed interpretation of Canada's foreign policy and behaviour often closely linked to peacekeeping, multilateralism and diplomacy. In short, it allows

---

[4] Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 61. Breuning makes the distinction between empirically focused and normatively focused models of rationality. As will be explored in the next chapter, this helps us to better understand the process and context of policymaking.

[5] For an overview of the FPA field see Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). As it relates to national identity and narratives, it is important to look at K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), 233-309 for the foundational work. Additionally, Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), provides more conceptual clarity to the interaction between identity formation and the influence on policy. Highlighting some of the shortcomings in this field of study, Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," *Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium*, Ed. Jean A. Garrison, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5 (2003), 155–202. As an example of some of the work being done to better highlight the work linking cognitive interaction with policymaking, Rose McDermott, "The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), 691-706.

[6] Noting the utility and perils of using narrative as an analytical device see, Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, "Narrative in Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (June 1998), 315-331.

policymakers to construct narratives of their country's international role that helps them to understand their experiences and how these experiences fit with their own interpretation of Canada's foreign policy identity.

This study also examines how policymakers articulated their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative as a role that defined Canada's behaviour and contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. As Canadian foreign policy has changed between 2001 and 2011, it has disrupted the traditional narrative informing Canada's international behaviour and as a result diminished Canada's influence in NATO while nonetheless, still levying an expectation of Canada's international engagement in future interventions. This will also explore the various changes to Canadian foreign policy under the Liberal governments of Prime Minister's Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, as well as that of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In doing so, one can also see how the interpretation of a narrative influences foreign policymaking as different governments articulate different motivations and thus priorities for foreign policy. Indeed, as will be explored, there has been increasing examination of foreign policy under the Harper government which many have contended represents a marked departure from previous Canadian foreign policy practices.[7] Both the current fields examining Canadian foreign policy and FPA will be addressed, as both often focus on issues of identity and narrative as well as actor-specific social actions.[8]

Each chapter will explore how multidimensional forces flowing from the middle power narrative, including both internal and external sources, informs the way Canadian policymakers create policy. Certainly, Canadian participation in Afghanistan was contested at the domestic level in Canada and as such it is important to see how a dominant interpretation of this manifested in its Afghan role,

---

[7] John Ibbitson, *The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada's Foreign Policy*, CIGI Papers, No. 29 (April 2014); Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[8] Social action in this context is based on the Weberian model, though this study implies a rational actor, it will not delve into the surrounding literature on the broader IR debate surrounding the interpretation of social actions. Found in, Max Weber*, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Free Press, 1964).

as well as in Libya.[9] Using the middle power as an independent variable one can examine how the narrative influenced policymakers across multiple levels. The final concluding chapter will then tie all the various threads together to chart how the middle power narrative is intimately tied to the practice of Canadian foreign policy and thus influences Canadian foreign policy behaviour in NATO by informing responses to events. Moreover, it charts how while many of the central tenets which have defined Canada's foreign policy narrative have been de-emphasised under the Conservative government, it nonetheless informs the context against which Canadian foreign policy action is measured and as such, remains a benchmark of continuity when assessing past, present and future foreign policy actions. As a result, it forms a central part of the way in which Canadian policymakers construct a narrative of Canadian foreign policy.

Methodology and theory

This analysis is derived primarily from three main primary sources for qualitative analysis, Canadian Parliamentary *Hansard* records including debates from both the House of Commons and the Senate, Canadian news media and semi-structured, focused, interviews with relevant individuals in NATO, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Canadian Department of National Defence. Additionally, the memoirs of Prime Minister's Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin will also be incorporated. It should be noted that the majority of interviews were conducted anonymously as this encouraged candid responses and assisted in attaining further interviews in NATO headquarters and elsewhere. Moreover, by getting off-the-record responses this allows a much more frank exchange that avoided talking points and also protected the interviewees from any possible professional repercussions that could arise from these exchanges. Given the wide range of personnel interviewed only the most relevant remarks will be cited. Taken together, these different sources provide a way to undertake a narrative analysis of Canadian foreign policy as articulated by Parliamentarians, as well as felt by

[9] Matthew Willis, "An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission: The Origins of Kandahar 2005," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec. 2012), 979-1000.

Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers within NATO.[10] Through the media chapter it is possible to then see Canadian foreign policy as a subject of examination given that the reportage on Canadian foreign policy is not the same as policymaking itself. In this way it constructs a narrative of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and Libya and whether this echoes the middle power narrative more generally.

To explore these different sources, this study will utilise an interpretivist, *Verstehen*-informed approach to inform a qualitative analysis exploring the translation of narrative into practice.[11] This is due to the fact that it is more concerned with *understanding* social action rather than *explaining* it, and as will be explored further in the theoretical chapter, does not offer a positivist examination of this subject.[12] In this circumstance this study is concerned with the meaning ascribed to narratives rather than examining how these narratives are created, nor does it assume a direct causal link between narrative and action. Indeed, this recognises the inherent challenge of analysing a narrative as it is reliant on the interpretation of the researcher to construct meaning from the research at hand and recognising as Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe do, that narratives and experience are mediated by our understanding of the world.[13] Drawing on the work of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes on interpretivism, the qualitative analysis undertaken here will examine social actions as identified by this research, how these are ascribed meaning

---

[10] Non-Canadian is preferred to foreign as these interviews take place in the confines of an international institution in which all members are ostensibly 'foreign' and potentially aware of, but unfamiliar with each other's foreign policy narratives. As a result, 'non-Canadian' simply acts to highlight that they are not Canadian, without prejudicing their familiarity with Canada.

[11] *Verstehen* is largely drawn from Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, Eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). Fundamentally this concerns itself with the understanding and the meaning attached to social action. In reference to this Paul Furlong and David Marsh, "A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., 3rd Ed., (London: Palgrave, 2010). This stands in contrast to *Erklären* focusing on explanation of natural phenomenon and is inherently positivist based on observation. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).

[12] See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, Eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

[13] Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, "Narrative in Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (June 1998), 328.

and in doing so become narratives which inform future actions (reflexivity).[14] This method has been criticised as lacking empirical foundation, particularly noted by Hendrik Wagenaar and though Bevir and Rhodes have responded to the complaint, it serves as a caution and an inducement to ensure a standard of empirical rigour.[15] Indeed, while elite interviews provide an important empirical component, it should be noted that these work in concert with the other sources as a way to help ensure that these narratives are triangulated and, as much as possible, provide the aforementioned rigour.[16] As mentioned, social actions in this instance are concerned with the rendering of preferences into foreign policy. This draws, in part on Hans-Georg Gadamer's work in philosophical hermeneutics and its relationship to interpretivism as a way to reconcile the reflexive interaction between the subject and the observer.[17] While Colin Hay identifies a potential issue with regards to interpretivism's potential privileging of agency, this can be rectified through Giddens' observations about the two, namely that they are mutually reinforcing.[18] Thus both structure and agency are not considered external to actors, but abstractions which both constrain and enable behaviour, meaning agents drive structure and sustain them through individual preferences.[19] As noted previously, the issue of agency *does* remain a critical concern for this study insofar as it is interested in understanding the factors which inform agents. Similarly, Hay's assertion that interpretivism helps to illustrate constructivist and institutionalist change that arises

---

[14] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149; There has been a significant expansion with regards to the volume of work done on this as outlined in a literature review conducted by the authors' in 2012 in Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 201-208.
[15] Hendrik Wagenaar, "Dwellers On the Threshold of Practice: The Interpretivism of Bevir and Rhodes," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), 85–99; Response in Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 201-208.
[16] Colin Hay, "Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of Public Administration," *Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 173.
[17] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 1960, Translated Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (London: Bloomsbury Academic), 2013.
[18] Colin Hay, "Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of Public Administration," *Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 175.
[19] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

in the process of policymaking is, as will be explored, congruent with previous work focusing on constructivist examinations of foreign policy.[20]

In keeping with a constructivist focus and an FPA approach, it is necessary to go into some depth on the foreign policy decisions through the analysis of key texts that can provide insight into decision-making and its attendant processes by way of preferences, articulated through reference to specific narratives. This will be further explored by speaking to relevant individuals to examine awareness of these narratives and their expression in policy. Consequently, this study will need to examine a variety of sources including Canadian Parliamentary *Hansard* records, government sources and other media to try to identify and examine the presence of a distinct Canadian middle power narrative in both the Afghanistan and Libya campaigns.[21] These texts will be interpreted through a hermeneutic approach in order to dissect how policymakers articulate Canada's role in these operations and its relationship to the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy. In particular, it utilises Elizabeth Kinsella's hermeneutic approach which,

> (a) seeks understanding rather than explanation; (b) acknowledges the situated location of interpretation; (c) recognizes the role of language and historicity in interpretation; (d) views inquiry as conversation; and (e) is comfortable with ambiguity.[22]

Adopting these criteria helps to establish an integrative way in which to examine both the content of what is being said but also to critically examine the context and continuity of the policymakers' actions. Using a hermeneutic approach allows the examination of the context and the continuity of actions without assuming, as Friedrich Kratochwil suggests, that the observations are reducible to scientific principles or laws.[23] In this regard, it must be acknowledged that this type of examination does not provide a quantitative analysis of what constitutes national

---

[20] Colin Hay, "Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of Public Administration," *Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 180.
[21] This includes relevant releases, briefings and interviews from the Prime Minister's Office, Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT/DFATD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
[22] Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, "Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities Within the Art of Interpretation," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 (May 2006), 13.
[23] Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22.

narratives. Rather, it looks at the ways in which a specific narrative is invoked as a component of the policymakers' understanding of Canada's place in the international system and how their interpretation of this narrative shapes foreign policy behaviour. As previously mentioned, this study will examine a variety of media and conduct interviews with relevant policymakers in government and in NATO to establish the dominant narrative.[24] While a quantitative analysis could establish the frequency with which certain descriptors are used, this does not adequately account for the context surrounding the use and perception of these terms by the audience, or similarly, how other policymakers could use different terms to describe the same phenomena. Given that this is an examination of how the middle power narrative interacts with both individual and systemic levels it is important to remain adaptive and comfortable with a degree of ambiguity, particularly in the role of perception of this narrative at the individual level.[25] A narrative analysis approach embraces this ambiguity while offering a way to understand the interaction between understandings of a narrative at an individual level and the ways in which they can shape foreign policy preferences. Ultimately, it is necessary to examine these individual preferences and thus the attendant national roles as expressions of a desire to maintain continuity with foreign policy traditions.

Sources and analysis

In examining the *Hansard* records, it will be necessary to note the political party affiliation of each speaker referencing the middle power narrative as they relate to Afghanistan and Libya, in order to account for potentially different interpretations. In this process it will also be important to recognise individual speakers' consistency with regards to narratives and by extension, language.[26] There will also be a section on the Senate Debates on Afghanistan and Libya, though it should be noted that

---

[24] To that end, this study views them as 'elites' the challenges of which are outlined in Susan A. Ostrander, "Surely You're Not in This Just to Be Helpful: Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three Studies of Elites," *Studying Elites using Qualitative Methods*, Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber, Eds., Sage Focus Edition, (London: Sage, 1995).

[25] This recognises that the middle power narrative and its influence over individual policymakers will vary and thus may manifest in a variety of ways. As such it is necessary to not only establish awareness of this narrative but to determine if it levies expectations on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy both by Canadian diplomats as well as foreign policymakers.

[26] This will prioritise the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Party Leaders, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and their respective critics. It does not, however, exclude relevant remarks by other MPs.

given that the Senate serves as an unelected body, the interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative and its influence is mediated by the fact that its ability to actually shape policy is circumscribed by Parliament. As will become evident, the impact of discussions on foreign policy in the Senate is negligible and receives little coverage in the news. Nonetheless, discussions on Afghanistan can reflect the same elite understandings of Canada's foreign policy narrative. It is possible that depending on political orientation (i.e. right-wing, left-wing), variations may exist with regards to the interpretation of Canada's middle power narrative. However, this does not rule out the possibility that there may be some consensus on some of these competing narratives, however, in accounting for political party affiliation this helps to determine whether this is a substantive redefinition of the Canadian foreign policy narrative by the various governments rather than simply contestation due to "narcissism of minor differences."[27] Analysis of each House of Commons debate will be done sequentially in order to better chart how each separate debate reflects not only different context, but also allows us to chart the progression, or lack thereof, of the Canadian foreign policy narrative as it reflexively adapts to the reality of Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Analysis for the Senate debates will be done at the end of that section reflecting the much more limited influence the Senate has on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, Senate debates are often much more frequent and wide-ranging rather than issue specific debates conducted in the House of Commons.

Alongside the Prime Ministerial memoirs, these narrative analyses will focus on descriptor terms for middle power and aim to categorise how they relate to narratives explored in Chapter 2 as a way of helping to construct the dominant narrative related to Canadian foreign policy. For example, terms such as 'peacekeeping' used in relation to middle power and depending on the context of the article, can be seen as contributing to the Canada-as-peacekeeper middle power narrative. Conversely, an article equating Canada's middle power narrative to a 'staunch ally' could be construed as an alternative narrative with an emphasis on alternative military-focused behaviours.

---

[27] Sigmund Freud, "The Taboo of Virginity," has since entered foreign policy discourse; see Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience*, (London: Penguin, 1997).

In doing this however, it is vital to account for the context in which these remarks are made, and similarly, how they reflect the narrative and the preferences of the policymaker articulating it. This allows this study to try to construct distinct motivations founded in the wider middle power narrative explored in Chapter 2 that inform how policymakers seek to characterise Canada's international behaviour. In order to link this with FPA it will seek to integrate Role Theory with the work done on 'ontological security' as a way of helping to examine motivations and how they shape roles.[28] Specifically, ontological security draws on analyses done by R.D. Laing and further integrated into IR by Antony Giddens which posits that actors seek stability by maintaining a coherent biographical narrative which is derived from how they interpret the actions and events in one's life.[29] While the ontological security research agenda examines how narratives and identity shape state behaviour, as will be explored in the next chapter, it remains a flawed research agenda. Nonetheless, Brent Steele's *Ontological Security in International Relations* attempts to examine how state narratives interact with policymaking and provides a loose structure by which one can assess and parse, approximately, which motivations dominate at different times; in his case using honour, moral and humanitarian as terms by which patterns of behaviours are constructed and thus try to interpret how preferences shifted between different governments.[30] In adapting some of the elements of ontological security it will provide greater clarity into the way in which the interpretation of narratives translates into foreign policy behaviour. Whilst there is overlap of some terminology between the competing understandings, by accounting for context and critically examining the sources this should reveal a dominant interpretation which can be compared with the extant scholarship. This helps to understand the way in which narratives shape policy and by extension, foreign policy behaviours.

Following the same qualitative narrative analysis as the *Hansard* records, it will also examine news media and will be cross cutting in its examination of sources from the mainstream political spectrum, whilst also remaining within a manageable

---

[28] As will be explored in the next chapter this framework has some serious flaws which make it challenging to apply to this study. However, some of the conceits fit well with an individual level analysis and will be incorporated into the FPA analysis.
[29] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 3.
[30] *Ibid*, 44.

scope for one researcher.[31] Indeed, the examination of Canadian media can be useful in highlighting foreign policy narratives as observed by Nathalie Frensley and Nelson Michaud in their examination of Canadian coverage of US foreign policy statements.[32] In relation to this study, the media offers a way in which to view the contestation of different competing narratives in public discourse, beyond the policymaker level and thus help establish the dynamic process through which narratives are constructed at a wider, national level. As Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin and Laura Roselle note, journalists and editors can serve as gatekeepers, promoting or minimising a narrative and thus they shape the public understanding of foreign policy outside of the (elites) policymaking circle.[33]

Rather than attempting to cover 10 years of all media, this study undertakes succinct examination of major Canadian newspaper and magazine outlets[34] and their coverage of Canada's participation in Afghanistan and Libya operations with a specific focus on articles which employ the term middle power. The newspapers and magazines examined in this analysis provide a cross section of high circulation publications thereby offering further insight into the ways in which foreign policy is discussed outside of policymaking circles on wider scale. Additionally, this will also include the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) which as a government agency, possesses and disseminates a narrative about Canada, though it remains at arm's length from government oversight. In looking at the descriptive terms used to discuss Canadian foreign policy in Afghanistan and Libya it is possible to ascertain what kinds of narratives are constructed and transmitted in the popular news media. This provides insight into how the Canadian foreign policy narrative is constructed and shared with the public as well as foreign policymakers and how this dynamic also shapes the domestic policymaking process.

---

[31] Mainstream political spectrum refers to sources from Canada's mainstream news media reflecting the viewpoints which dominate Canadian political discourse with a significant readership, in this case with a circulation ~800,000 upwards. See Newspapers Canada, http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/daily-newspaper-circulation-data, accessed 23 October 2015.

[32] Nathalie Frensley and Nelson Michaud, "Public Diplomacy and Motivated Reasoning: Framing Effects on Canadian Media Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy Statements," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 2006), 201-222.

[33] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 157.

[34] This will examine a subjective cross section focusing on *The Globe and Mail* (National), *The National Post* (National), *La Presse* (Quebec), *Montreal Gazette, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, Calgary Herald, The Province* (British Columbia).

Augmenting these sources, semi-structured, focused interviews have been conducted, largely between 2012 and 2013, in order to demonstrate a relationship between policymakers' preferences related to a Canadian middle power narrative and policymaking behaviour and thus, the practice of policymaking. Responses from Canadian policymakers in NATO including members of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD – formerly Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, DFAIT), the Department of National Defence and Canadian members of NATO's International Staff will be included alongside the examination of the *Hansard* records to help to shed some insight into the ways in which the foreign policy narrative espoused by policymakers in Ottawa are interpreted, shared, negotiated and potentially conflict with the reality of policymaking in NATO headquarters. Responses from non-Canadian diplomats and members of NATO's International Staff will be compared with the findings of the media to examine the transmission and negotiation of narratives and their related behaviours. In turn, this study will then attempt to establish the reflexive process by which this potentially shapes Canadian policymakers' actions as NATO policymakers generate a set of expectations. Specific or ambiguous responses are integrated into the broader research project given the variety of possible answers and specific roles played by the interview subjects.[35] As such, this does not provide an easily quantifiable result and recognises that the ambiguity derives from individual experience of the questions being asked; nonetheless this is to be expected, particularly with such an inherently subjective topic focused on experience and preference formation.

In speaking with elites and experts in this field, issue-specific responses are not generalisable but rather, focused on Canada's role in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya.[36] The purpose of these interviews is to gain understanding as to the way in which the narrative about Canada's involvement in these operations reflected policymakers' understandings of Canadian foreign policy. Interviews were not undertaken in Canada due to funding constraints and issues with access to relevant individuals serving in government at the time. The interviews used in this

---

[35] Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 205.
[36] Ariadne Vromen, "Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., 3rd Ed., (London: Palgrave, 2010), 259.

analysis were undertaken in NATO Headquarters and consisted of semi-structured discussions aimed at establishing the subject's knowledge of Canadian foreign policy and how this was linked to the middle power narrative. The researcher had a pre-existing working relationship with many of the subjects as well, which provided an avenue by which to build rapport and encourage candid responses. Some interviews were recorded and transcribed, while others, due to security restrictions and bans on recording devices, were transcribed directly through short-hand notes. Indeed, NATO Headquarters maintained strict regulations about the use of recording equipment in the building and most delegations forbid their use. Additionally, a key challenge was the issue of anonymity of the responses, as the majority of interview subjects did not want to be fully identifiable. Given that they were commenting on or criticising an active member of NATO in an unofficial capacity, i.e. not as spokespeople for NATO; but rather in their personal and to an extent, professional capacities. Moreover, given the recent timeframe of this analysis many of the individuals interviewed continue to work in NATO and having their name published alongside criticism would potentially threaten their ability to continue to work reliably with Allies.

In conducting these interviews, the researcher sought to draw out responses related to, but not limited to, the subject's understanding of Canada's middle power narrative, Canada's policymaking within NATO and what attributes they most associated with Canadian diplomacy. Responses reflected not only the policymaking process, but also the presence of preferences and awareness of a number of behaviours which are commonly associated with Canada's middle power narrative. This was accomplished by examining the language used in response to the questions, particularly in the descriptions of Canada's role in NATO, its middle power narrative and how these terms correspond to the narrative found in the media, *Hansard* records and other previously outlined sources. As with the other sources, analysing these interviews qualitatively establishes context, as much as possible while allowing, in many cases for anonymity of the interviewee. In part, responses will, where possible identify the interviewees' relationship to Canada and NATO Operations. What are the behaviours they associate with Canada? Are they aware of a middle power narrative? If so, do they perceive a link between Canada's policymaking efforts in NATO and that narrative? These were then interpreted via the aforementioned

hermeneutic approach to gain a better understanding of Canada's policymaking in NATO.

During interviews, responses appear in relation to the behaviours associated with Canada's middle power narrative. This will be explored in greater depth to see how this links with the relationship to shaping Canada's foreign policy behaviour with regards to NATO Operations. While they may be non-attributable they do constitute a cross section of staff ranging from senior positions such as Ambassadors, Assistant Secretary Generals down to NATO Staff members. These interviews are vital in that they establish that an awareness of a middle power narrative is present beyond Canadian policymakers or at the very least, that non-Canadian policymakers associate and expect a certain set of behaviours to Canada. This offers some insight into the ways in which narratives are also received and interpreted by other actors in the policymaking process. As such it is possible to observe an association between Canadian foreign policy and certain behavioural roles that goes beyond simple correlation between the two. While subjective, the hermeneutic approach recognises that, this data, in relation to the other sources used, helps provide context to establish how the narrative informs policymaking practice. Thus interviews also elucidate the presence of Canada's middle power narrative as a factor in the policymaking process which can shape policy choices.

As discussed, this will not use a coding method but remains interpretive. Namely, this focuses on the middle power narrative of Canadian foreign policy as a way to identify disjunctures in the time period examined and allows a wide range of sources to be utilised as a way to explore the Afghanistan and Libya cases. The context of the relevant articles, newspapers and the viewpoints espoused by the authors help to understand not only the narrative but also how it affects the practice of policymaking. By examining how this narrative in the media compares to the previously explored strains in Canadian foreign policy literature and subsequently comparing them with Canada's foreign policy behaviour, it is possible to gain a much clearer insight into the ways narrative and behaviour interact. Interviews with relevant individuals then help to link the middle power narrative and its related preferences with the practice of policymaking, allowing an immediate way to see how this is a manifest consideration during the process.

In combination, the examination of these sources will look to establish the broad narrative of Canada as a middle power, the dominant interpretation of which, constitutes the shaping of policy preferences.[37] This requires an historical examination of the events leading to and during the operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Indeed, as seen in the analysis of the study of Canadian foreign policy and the middle power narrative in Chapter 2, the lenses used to interpret Canada's diplomatic history often shape the perception of its national narrative.[38] It is necessary, in part, to turn to diplomatic history as a way of interpreting and synthesising the events which occurred and how they can be interpreted in such a way to explore the middle power narrative and NATO. Given the period of time examined, it is useful to have an understanding of the historical context and as a result, it is important to recognise that these are interpretations of historical policy decisions. As Robert Schulzinger observed, when examining history, policymaker's memory acts as a framing device which helps determine what is important during decision-making.[39] Consequently, this is not a strictly historical approach, but it will, where necessary draw upon the relevant diplomatic historical elements in order to help interpret how the different recollections interlink with the timeline of events and policies. Indeed, history also helps to construct a narrative in and of itself and the interpretation of history is vital to the construction of a national foreign policy narrative. Indeed, such iconic works in the FPA canon are linked closely with diplomatic history, such as Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* or, given its examination of the views of individual policymakers and thus more closely linked to this analysis, Robert Jervis' *Perception and Misperception*.[40] Thus, incorporating

---

[37] Shaping policy preferences refers to both the preferences held by elites in the policy formulation process, but also expectations levied by allies. The process of feedback between the two sides thus links with the concept of reflexivity in an awareness of state policymakers of their position in the international system and thus making policy which reflects this. Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149.

[38] For representative examples of Canada's diplomatic history and associated challenges see, Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007) or Adam Chapnick, "Where Have All of Canada's Diplomatic Historians Gone?" *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer 2010), 725-737.

[39] Robert Schulzinger, "Memory and Understanding in U.S. Foreign Relations," *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd Ed.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 336-352.

[40] See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) and Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), 454-479.

elements of diplomatic history provides a way in which to interpret events whilst remaining cognisant of how those events are being simultaneously shaped by the processes examined in this study.

Utilising qualitative analysis these sources provide an empirical basis upon which to examine differing interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative. This helps us to construct the characteristics of the dominant foreign policy narrative informing Canadian policymakers and, in turn, the extent to which this shapes Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Examining the existing texts through a hermeneutic, interpretative approach allows this study to account for both context and meaning in the use of words and phrases, whilst relating them to the policymaking process. As a narrative analysis, this study is not just aiming to unpack the middle power narrative but also establish the motivations foreign policy behaviours which emerge from interpretation of this narrative. Rather than a clinical approach that would focus on frequency of word use and code for specific phrases, this allows a more organic categorisation which can provide insight into the complex processes which shape policymaking. The addition of a diplomatic history component allows this study to provide some insight into the interpretations present in Canada's middle power scholarship and the perceptions that shape these competing interpretations. Indeed, the concern with the context and continuity in which policymaking occurs means that it is important to understand how history helps to shape the foreign policy narrative. The qualitative analysis of this material also contributes to the FPA constructivist interpretation by providing some empirical, actor-specific insight into how the use and interpretation of language constructs and shapes preferences and thus by extension roles and behaviours. In doing so, the researcher must interpret the data in such a way as to develop the presence of the middle power narrative and link behaviours explicitly to this tradition in foreign policy. As will be explored further on, this is not meant to invalidate or dispute other approaches to this topic, but rather, expand and develop FPA's Role Theory in which empirical study has thus far been lacking. Ultimately, it will also shed light on the ways in which foreign policy narratives can encourage commitment to military action.

Why NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya?

As the most active international organisation involved in military operations during the previous decade, NATO has demonstrated its relevance as a key actor in the fight against terrorism and a vital component in shaping the contours of international security and defence. Canada has played an instrumental role in the organisation since NATO's formation in the immediate post-Second World War era. Canadian diplomat Escott Reid attested to the vital role that Canada played in building the organisation's architecture and his position as a negotiator in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty.[41] Some of Reid's contemporary writers coming out of the Canadian Department of External Affairs such as John W. Holmes[42] and James Eayrs[43] also reflect positively on the role that Canada played in the formation of these post-war institutions and the importance it imparted to Canada. This importance continues into today. Scholars from the various schools of thought in Canadian foreign policy such as David Haglund and Frédéric Mérand have argued that NATO is the main vehicle by which Canada can implement its security policy within a stable, multilateral institution.[44] Michael Lawless also noted the organisation's role as a transatlantic forum and an avenue for Canada to constrain American behaviour beyond what it can accomplish alone.[45] Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky have also noted the importance of the NATO Alliance as an avenue for exercising greater

---

[41] Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-49*, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1977). Reid further elaborates on Canada's role in shaping Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty in Escott Reid, "The Art of the Almost Impossible: Unwavering Canadian Support for the Emerging Atlantic Alliance," *NATO's Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s*, Andre De Staercke, Ed. Nicholas Sherwen, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
[42] John W. Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[43] James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).
[44] David G. Haglund, "In Considerable Doubt? Canada and the Future of NATO," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2011), 1-18; see also David G. Haglund and Frédéric Mérand "Transatlantic Relations in the New Strategic Landscape: Implications for Canada," *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Winter 2010-2011), 23-38.
[45] Michael J. Lawless, "Canada and NATO: A Starving Fish in an Expanding Pond," *Canadian Military Journal*, (Summer 2006), 6-14.

influence compared to coalitions of the willing.[46] This is a sampling of literature reflecting the view that Canada needs to continue its engagement in the Alliance, though the nature of the various scholars' analyses varies in its perceived utility for Canadian foreign policy more generally. The literature on Canadian foreign policy will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 2, however, it is worthwhile to have a brief justification as to why these two operations are useful in assessing how narratives shape foreign policy behaviour.

Canada was an active military contributor to NATO's Afghanistan and Libya operations and had a very proactive role in shaping both the military and political aims of these operations.[47] Neither of these conflicts threatened Canada's direct strategic interests internationally supporting the possibility that alternative factors informed its decision to participate.[48] Specifically, from a material point of view, Canada had no strategic military or public sector assets based in Afghanistan and though there had been some Canadian-based private sector investment in Libya, there was no direct threat to Canada's overall economic, political or security interests.[49] While it could be suggested that Canada's participation in Afghanistan was strategic in that it was undertaken in order to curry favour with the United States (US), however, this still neglects the extent or length of Canada's contribution. Indeed, in both Afghanistan and Libya, Canadian participation in these missions was far more robust than many other participating NATO nations, including those with greater military capacity. Moreover, it was the Canadian Permanent Representative at NATO who, in part, prompted the declaration of Article 5 in support of the United States, authorising NATO action.[50] Similarly, Canada took part in operations in Afghanistan in 2002 as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom.[51] Following

---

[46] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out…and the Country Secure," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2009).
[47] Interview 5, 17 October 2012.
[48] David S. McDonough, "Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada's International Security Policy?" *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2007), 620-641.
[49] CBC News, *CBC News Business*, "Canadian Companies in Libya," 2 Mar 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/02/28/f-canadian-companies-in-libya.html, accessed 10 March 2013.
[50] Matthew Willis, "An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission: The Origins of Kandahar 2005," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), 979-1000.
[51] Canada's participation in Operation Enduring Freedom took place under the name Operation APOLLO as authorised by UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and in the context of NATO's Article V.

a re-deployment in 2003, Canada supplied roughly 2,000 combat troops annually from the start of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission until the end of 2011 and played a leading role in military operations in the dangerous Kandahar province.[52] Canadian forces suffered the third highest number of troop losses of any of the ISAF contributing nations.[53] Similarly in Libya, Canada was vigorous in its denunciations of then-dictator, Moammar Gaddafi and imposed sanctions against his government shortly before the start of hostilities.[54] Furthermore, Canada played an important role as one of only 10 NATO nations who contributed significant military assets of ships, planes and personnel to Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya as well as undertook air strikes against Gaddafi's forces.[55]

These two operations have been chosen due to Canada's role in each one, respectively, allowing this study to examine the relationship between the operations as part of the NATO structure and Canada's popular narrative as a middle power. ISAF's broad mandate represents the first time NATO has led such a large-scale, wide-ranging, kinetic operation involving elements of reconstruction and development alongside counterinsurgency.[56] Unlike ISAF, OUP was a heavily circumscribed aerial and naval operation with a relatively narrow mandate.[57] Each of these operations was very different in its scale, mission and duration as well as the international context under which they took place. Taken together, these operations while outside Canada's direct strategic interest, as outlined previously, can be linked

---

[52] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan*, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/afg-timeline.page, accessed 24 November 2014.
[53] Taken from http://icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx (7 March 2013) as compared to the next two highest casualty figures, UK and US respectively.
[54] "Canada Imposes Wide Range of Sanctions Against Libya," *The Globe and Mail*, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-imposes-wide-range-of-sanctions-against-libya/article568609/, accessed March 26, 2013.
[55] Department of National Defence, "Archived - Operation MOBILE," http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile.page, accessed 24 November 2014.
[56] ISAF was a product of nine UN Security Council Resolutions but is a coalition of the willing under the authority of the UN Security Council. NATO took command of this mission in 2003 at the request of the UN and the Afghan Transitional Authority. For reference see, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html, accessed 24 March 2013.
[57] UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011)*, 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6ce9742.html, accessed 26 February 2013; see also UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) [On the Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]*, 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d885fc42.html, accessed 26 February 2013.

as behavioural manifestations of the popular middle power narrative ascribed to Canada's foreign policy. This study will explore how this narrative is embedded in the ways that Canadian policymakers understand and formulate foreign policy and thus highlights a possible avenue through which narrative becomes behaviour. Additionally, in examining the middle power narrative it offers a way to understand the ways in which the Conservative Party of Canada's interpretation of the Canadian foreign policy narrative have affected Canada's NATO policymaking. By charting Canadian foreign policy in NATO during the Afghanistan and the Libya operations it is possible to observe the re-interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative by the Conservative government and its effect on its relationship with the institution. While these operations are very different, they present empirical puzzles against which one can test how Canada's actions with regards to NATO, are ultimately influenced and shaped by policymakers interpretation of Canada's middle power narrative.

The Canada-EU relationship and NATO

As will be explored in the Chapter 2, the mixed and expansive use of the middle power narrative as it relates to Canada obviously poses a number of challenges for its use in this analysis. Given the broad sweep of Canadian international relations that are tied up in this narrative it is critical to narrow the scope and focus on the critical components for this study. This is contextual and helps to understand the factors which help shape the system in which the middle power narrative is formed. While the Canada-US relationship is a key theme in Canadian foreign policy scholarship as will be explored in Chapter 2; the EU and the European relationship remain an underdeveloped area of study.[58] While there is a deep historical foundation to Canada's relationship with Europe, particularly around the Canada-United Kingdom (UK) connection, this has not been carried forward as robustly due to the importance of the US in Canadian affairs.[59] As such, for the sake of thoroughness this section

[58] For the 'strategic culture' overview, see Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Vandenmoortele, "Europe's Place in Canadian Strategic Culture (1949-2009), *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 2011), 419-438.

[59] See Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), for a pro-British view of Canada's pre-WWII history. For Canada's post-war realignment with the US see; Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007).

will very briefly touch on Canada's relationship with Europe and the European Union (EU).[60] This is to establish the importance of NATO as a link between Canada and Europe but also to reflect on the various elements which place more importance on the NATO relationship. Moreover, it also helps to establish the scope for the rest of this study's analysis.

As this narrative relates to NATO, Canada is often classed as a middle power, neither a small nation like Luxembourg, Iceland or Latvia nor a major power like the United States, France or the UK. Rather it bears a closer similarity to the NATO nations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway as based on the military's size, capability, mission caveats and participation in Alliance operations, with a particular focus on Afghanistan and Libya. Canada also occupies a unique position as the other North American member and one of the few non-EU middle powers in NATO, though it is often lumped in among them. Critically, it does not possess the unilateral military strength of the United States or the second largest military force possessed by non-EU NATO member, Turkey.[61] As regards the differentiation from other non-EU NATO Allies, Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013. Albania is gradually undergoing the process of accession into the EU; likely to be completed some time in the intermediate future and its ability to participate in EU and NATO operations is already fairly circumscribed by its economic and limited military capabilities. Norway, of course, is the other non-EU member of NATO though it has access to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the European Defence Agency through an Administrative Arrangement.[62] Interestingly, Canada has also concluded an agreement with the European Union for participation in CSDP operations in December 2005 allowing Canadian participation in EU crisis management missions.[63] Over the past decade, Canada has participated with the EU in the

---

[60] For the sake of clarity and the country's commitment to NATO, this study regards Turkey as part of Europe.
[61] Chapter 4: Europe, "Turkey," *Military Balance*, Vol. 111, No. 1, (2011).
[62] Norwegian Mission to the EU, "Norway Signs Co-operative Arrangement with EDA" 8 June 2009. http://www.eu-norway.org/ARKIV/newsarchives/Norway_signs_co_operative_arrangement_with_EDA/, accessed 15 August 2012.
[63] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Agreement Establishing a Framework for the Participation of Canada in EU Crisis Management Operations," 23 September 2013, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/stabilisation_reconstruction.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 24 November 2014.

Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestinian Territories, Guinea Bissau and Haiti among other places. Authors such as Frédéric Mérand have pointed towards a closer relationship between Canada and the EU as a way of developing alternative security frameworks.[64] NATO nonetheless remains *the* central way by which Canada can exert, influence and contribute meaningfully to international security. Unfortunately, the area of study concerning Canada's relations with the European Union, particularly with regards to security remains relatively underdeveloped, as noted by Donna Wood and Amy Verdun and lacks a comprehensive examination.[65] Indeed, as Stormy-Annika Mildner observed, Canada's relationship with the EU on trade issues is often characterised as a side note to US-EU trade negotiations as an "add-on."[66] Nonetheless, Canada concluded, in principle, a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in 2013 that remains to be ratified and implemented which has garnered the issue more attention.[67] In the security realm outside of NATO, there is the concern that Canada would be excluded from future discussions between the US and the EU.[68] However, the utility of the CSDP and, by extension, the EU as an international security organisation, remains severely constrained by a number of factors.[69] As a result, Canada remains more reliant on multilateral organisations such as NATO as a route to implement defence policy.

Iraq

Finally, it should be clarified why this study does not examine the Iraq War (2003-2011), another major conflict that occurred during the same time frame being

---

[64] Frédéric Mérand, "NATO, ESDP and Transatlantic Security: Where Does Canada Fit?" *Policy Paper*, Montreal: Université de Montreal. http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/Merand-PolicyPaper-esdp.pdf, accessed 22 August 2012.
[65] Donna E. Wood and Amy Verdun, "Canada and the European Union: A Review of the Literature from 1982 to 2010," *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Winter 2010-2011), 9-23.
[66] Stormy-Annika Mildner, "Junior partner Canada: Transatlantic Trade Relations under Germany's EU Presidency," *International Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer 2008), 651.
[67] Government of Canada, "Canada Reaches Historic Trade Agreement with the European Union," *Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Act*, 18 October 2013, http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/en/news/ceta-aecg/canada-reaches-historic-trade-agreement-european, accessed 25 June 2014.
[68] Frédéric Mérand and David Haglund, "Transatlantic Relations in the New Strategic Landscape: Implications for Canada," *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Winter 2010-2011), 23-38.
[69] Robert Gates, "Future of NATO," Security and Defence Agenda, July 2011 see also Jolyon Howorth and Jean Monnet, "NATO and ESDP: Institutional Complexities and Political Realities," *Politiques Étrangere*, No. 4, (2009); Isabelle François, "NATO and the Arab Spring," *Transatlantic Current*, No. 1 (Oct. 2011).

examined. This action to dislodge and disarm the Ba'athist regime led by Saddam Hussein, unilaterally spurred by the Bush Administration did not involve Canada in any significant way and occurred outside of the NATO structure. The Iraq War was not authorised by the UN Security Council and as such, a multinational force of willing nations rather than a formal alliance structure invaded and occupied Iraq. The Canadian government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien failed to articulate a coherent message towards the Iraq War and as a result, created significant confusion in Canada and the US as to whether Canada would provide support.[70] That being said, it does inform the discussions surrounding Canada's deployment to Afghanistan.

In their 2007 account of Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan conflict, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang contend that Canada's robust engagement in the NATO-ISAF operation was in large part, due to a desire to appease the US after opposing the invasion of Iraq.[71] Whilst the concern over the Canada-US relationship is certainly vital to Canada's foreign policy and trade considerations, this view neglects the possibility that Canada's non-participation was also due, in part, to deeper trends in Canadian foreign policy. Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky note that there are a multitude of historical reasons which pointed to Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and similarly observed that other countries which did support the US in Iraq only did so for a matter of months before pulling out their supporting forces.[72] Indeed, Jockel and Sokolsky allude to factors which actually prolonged Canada's commitment in Afghanistan going beyond national considerations but are instead, tied to sentimental views of Canadian history.[73] Similarly, in his account of the lead up to the Iraq War, Andrew Richter notes that the Canadian government sent mixed signals about its participation and ultimately refused its support due to its "intuitive

---

[70] Donald Barry, "Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2005), 215-245.
[71] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Press, 2007), 65.
[72] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's Odd Man Out Steps Forward," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr. 2008), 100-115.
[73] *Ibid,* 113.

support of multilateral initiatives."[74] Neither of the accounts by Jockel and Sokolsky or Richter goes into great detail about what makes this sentimental support intuitive and the mechanism that relates this to Canadian foreign policymaking behaviour but nonetheless, point to factors beyond the Canada-US relationship which informed the decision to participate in the Afghanistan operation. Some of this will be explored in the chapter examining parliamentary debates and the narrative articulated there. Thus this study can provide greater clarity by illuminating how the key middle power narrative informs and shapes Canadian foreign policy behaviour.

This narrative runs deeply through Canadian foreign policy literature and comprises a powerful lens through which Canadians see their place in the world, as will be explored in Chapter 2. The commitment to Canada's middle power foreign policy tradition informed the decision to stay out of Iraq, alongside the practical considerations concerning overstretch of the Canadian military forces. Furthermore, speaking on the ten-year anniversary of the invasion, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien affirmed that the decision to stay out of the war was important for Canadian independence as well as maintaining that the UN was a vital institution not to be circumvented.[75] As such, not only did the Iraq War go against the broader narrative of Canada as a middle power and, by extension, challenge its role in the international system, there were concrete domestic considerations within Canada that made participation unpalatable to Canadian leadership. Thus, in not participating in the Iraq conflict, Canadian policymakers avoided triggering a discontinuity with its larger middle power narrative. As this falls outside of the NATO structure it also goes beyond the remit of what is being examined. While this study recognises the importance of the debate surrounding the war in Iraq, to explore the Canadian reaction to it would not significantly add to the exploration of the Afghanistan and Libya deployments.

Chapter outline

---

[74] Andrew Richter, "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbour: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment," *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 471-502.

[75] Kim Mackrael, "Canada Has Lost International Stature, Chrétien Says," *The Globe and Mail,* 12 Mar 2003, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-has-lost-international-stature-chrtien-says/article9707000/.

Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework on which this study is built as well as expands on its links with FPA. It also highlights how this works well with the study of Canadian foreign policy given that it also shares a focus on issues of identity, continuity and narratives. Chapter 2 is an analysis of the field of Canadian foreign policy which will provide an overview of the middle power narrative as well as an examination of peacekeeping as a vital component of any Canadian foreign policy discussion. Indeed, this middle power narrative provides some definitional challenges that will require deeper clarification and specificity. Moreover, it will also look to the deficiencies in Canadian foreign policy scholarship, particularly when it comes to adopting new approaches and engaging with new theoretical frameworks. Chapter 3 will examine the Parliamentary *Hansard* records from 2001 to 2011 to explore how or whether the middle power label is invoked in relation to Canada's participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions and in what context. This focus is ultimately on the Canadian policymakers inside and outside of NATO as agents who are translating Canada's foreign policy narrative into foreign policy behaviour. This includes Members of Parliament, Senators and Canadians working in NATO both as diplomats and members of NATO's international staff. Chapter 4 will then turn to media sources to chart the usage of the middle power label, as well as the coverage of Canada's missions in Afghanistan and Libya and how Canadian foreign policy decisions were reported and examine how the narrative of Canada's foreign policy is constructed and communicated. Additionally, it will incorporate interviews from non-Canadian NATO personnel and diplomats to see how Canada's foreign policy narrative is transmitted and interpreted by policymakers and how these shape the expectations of Canadian foreign policy behaviour. This provides clarity as to how the re-interpretation of a foreign policy narrative by different governments have an actual impact on the practice of policymaking.

In order to fully examine these deployments, it is important to first examine, the theoretical underpinnings of this study and the middle power narrative whilst also integrating it into a constructivist FPA approach through the use of Role Theory. From there it is possible to turn to dissecting the Canadian foreign policy literature and the middle power narrative in order to then look at how this has affected the policymaking in Canada's Afghanistan campaign and the later Libya operation.

Chapter 1 – Theoretical foundations

In order to explore Canada's foreign policy narrative and its relationship with policymaking in NATO this study will explore the concept of the middle power in Canadian foreign policy. This is done utilising a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach and in doing so, situates it within broader discussions in the discipline. In particular, this study builds on the examination of roles in foreign policy or Role Theory which, as will be explored examines the relationship between individuals and their understandings of history and foreign policy behaviour. In doing so, it will allow this study to better establish the links between foreign policy narratives and foreign policy behaviour while also maintaining a focus on the individual policymaker. As a qualitative examination, this study is seeking to not only conduct a narrative analysis but also how this is linked with policymaking practice, rather than a quantitative analysis of political language. This chapter will first establish what constitutes a narrative and then examine narrative formation. This is then followed by an exploration of the link between narratives, the policymaker and the state through the exploration of the ontological security research agenda and its weaknesses. This will, in part, clarify how the individual interpretation of foreign policy narrative links with the creation of foreign policy routines and elaborates this study's interpretivist approach. Following this there is a brief review of the constructivist FPA literature to establish how Role Theory can highlight, through policymakers, the ways in which foreign policy narratives translate into foreign policy behaviour. Role Theory situates this analysis within the work being undertaken on national roles and policymakers while also making an important contribution to Canadian foreign policy scholarship. It then examines the link between the case study selection and how some ontological security components are integrated into this study's FPA approach.

What are narratives?

Building on the previously mentioned sources, it is necessary to establish what exactly this study refers to when discussing Canada's middle power narrative and how this links with role theory. Indeed, narrative in and of itself can be difficult

to conceptualise but is nonetheless actor-specific given that it relies on individuals to generate and propagate. Similarly, narratives exist over time and in the case of the middle power narrative, can be charted from its early stages until the present as will be done in Chapter 2. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle note that narratives contain an implicit sense of time, i.e. beginning, middle and end and can be distinguished as separate concepts from frames and discourses, though not unrelated to these ideas either.[1] In particular, they note that discourses and frames lack the ability to actively shape outcomes or behaviours, though they do shape the ways in which narratives are understood.[2] Discourses and framing remain incidental to this study and its focus remains purely on the foreign policy narrative itself. This study is distinguished from Miskimmon *et al*'s work in that narratives are examined from an ontological standpoint of the subject, rather than suggesting that there exists an ideal end-state or outcome to be achieved through these narratives.

As Steele explores while building on the work of Antony Giddens, narratives consist of a collection of stories that give actors a sense of meaning to the events in their lives or in broader terms a 'Self' but do not necessarily articulate an end state in itself.[3] As Gearóid Ó Tuathail suggests, "[s]torylines are sense-making organisational devices tying the different elements of a policy challenge together into a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative."[4] Indeed, not only are these stories linked with the foreign policy narrative, as noted by Bevir and Rhodes, "[s]tories explain past practice and events and justify recommendations for the future."[5] Rather than interrogating the stories, which constitute these narratives, it is useful to understand how they contribute to the development of an overarching narrative. Moreover, it is important to remember that these interpretations may not all be mutually agreed upon. Lebow

---

[1] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 6-7.
[2] *Ibid*, 7.
[3] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* London: Routledge, 2008, 3.
[4] Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia," *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Jun. 2002), 617.
[5] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 205.

interrogates this aspect while exploring identity suggesting that while there are competing understandings of narratives, rather than existing as static entities or fixed points they can change to suit the circumstances of the moment.[6] Indeed, narratives can shift and change over time, similarly they can be used to shape conversations about a subject or define courses of action. Nonetheless, understandings of these narratives can still be contested and are malleable. None of the works mentioned so far sufficiently explains why some narratives are dominant, have greater staying power than others, or the mechanism by which they shape behaviours.

Narrative Formation

As noted in the introduction, this study utilises an interpretivist framework to dissect the role of social action and behaviour in the construction of narratives and will privilege the ontological over epistemological ramifications.[7] This is not to suggest that there are not epistemological issues worthy of exploration, however, to explore these would require a deeper examination of narrative formation. Indeed, in his Foucauldian examination of the middle power David Bosold suggests that the belief in the middle power narrative and the ontological security derived from this is from a distinct interpretation of diplomatic history.[8] This approach is novel as it seeks to deconstruct the concept of middle power itself rather than apply it to specific foreign policy behaviour. While more concerned with the epistemological ramifications of the middle power narrative, it nonetheless underlines that as a constituent narrative of Canadian foreign policy, it is deeply woven into the fabric of how many Canadian policymakers think about foreign policy. This points to the important role of historical context in the creation of narratives, however, rather than explaining their foundation. As the next chapter will explore, the history of the middle power narrative's

---

[6] Richard Ned Lebow, *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25.
[7] See Max Weber*, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Free Press, 1964).
[8] David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

relationship to Canadian foreign policy reflects a dynamic interplay between elites in academia and policymaking with each contributing different components to the understanding of this narrative. Moreover, there is an important element related to the way the media propagates this narrative which is then reflected back to the policymaking sphere. This study echoes Bosold's examination in its use of Role Theory and the examination of the middle power narrative but has gone further in seeking to actually explore the mechanisms by which behaviour and narrative interact, particularly at the individual level. Fundamentally, this study is concerned with *context* and *continuity* as they relate to the individual Self; while the interpretation of a foreign policy narrative may vary, its construction remains rooted in the individual interpretation of diplomatic history.

It is necessary to be clear about not only which kind of narratives are being examined as well as which actors are of primary interest. As stated previously, this study is concerned with the relationship between foreign policy narratives and behaviours as they are understood by elites. That said, it is important to also recognise that while elites may be the crucial actors for this study, there are other pressures which can shape or affect narratives. In particular, public opinion can be a factor as a way by which foreign policy behaviours and narratives interact as Laura Roselle explored in her paper on the strategic narratives employed during war.[9] Roselle suggests that specific language can be used to induce specific behaviours as in the case of alliances, particularly in relation to the US and Britain's involvement in Afghanistan and how the media was used to shape the public conversation about this conflict.[10] Steele notes that in Kosovo, public opinion actually hampered the ability to act

---

[9] Laura Roselle, "Strategic Narratives of War: Fear of Entrapment and Abandonment During Protracted Conflict," presented at the Standing Group of International Relations, Stockholm, 2010, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Strategic%20Narratives%20of%20War.pdf; See also, George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, "Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Narratives, Elite Responsiveness and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006-2010" *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online Version published June 2014; See also Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina de Simone, "The War That Wasn't There? Italy's "Peace Mission" in Afghanistan, Strategic Narratives and Public Opinion," Online Version published Jun. 2014.

[10] Laura Roselle, "Strategic Narratives of War: Fear of Entrapment and Abandonment During Protracted Conflict," presented at the Standing Group of International Relations, Stockholm, 2010, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Strategic%20Narratives%20of%20War.pdf

decisively in the face of possible genocide but in so doing, threatened the 'liberal' narrative of the NATO member states.[11] Domestic pressures within states force policymakers to generate options founded in national narratives and behaviours that reflect these narratives. This generates a process of contestation by which the policies adopted, generally must resonate with popular understandings of the foreign policy narrative. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle go into detail about the process of narrative contestation and the importance of creating narrative which ultimately 'convinces' its target audience.[12] This study differs somewhat in that while there is a process of contestation over the popular understanding of Canada's foreign policy narrative, as will be explored, it is comparatively divorced from public opinion given the elite consensus which forms about Canadian foreign policy.[13] Rather than seeking to further critically dissect narrative formation, the next chapter will instead largely focus on the historical role of the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy and how this has shaped policy in the past, informing both domestic and international policymaking. As such, this is not focusing on a communication theory rooted approach, but is a much narrower narrative analysis of elite understandings of a specific foreign policy narrative.

It must also be recognised that there are competing interpretations of this narrative between policymakers and academics that seek to try and emphasize different behavioural outcomes. This will be explored as narratives can also be used as *ex post facto* rationalisations for policy decisions which are arguably disruptive. That being said, the fact that policymakers feel the need to explain actions in relation to previous actions points to the force that narratives exert and thus suggest the need to explore how this affects the policymaking process. As Anthony Lang suggests, "[t]he diplomat does not just combine elements of national power in his presentation of the state…he represents the national

---

[11] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 118.
[12] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 110.
[13] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.

purpose, the historical record of the state, a historical record that embodies the political and ethical ideals of the community."[14] As such, this study will also endeavour to find the way in which certain roles as articulated by policymakers flowing from this narrative become dominant. Indeed, policymakers' internal vision of Canada's narrative carries with it a vision of what Canada can *do* internationally, therefore articulating a role gives them agency with which to conduct foreign policy behaviour.

Foreign policy narratives, the State and the 'Self'

It is useful to develop the difference between wider foreign policy narratives and strategic narratives a bit further given that there is a notable divergence in terms of the two phenomena. While the two are interrelated, it is necessary to make a distinction between the strategic narratives which articulate end-states and defined political goals, against the broader concept of interpreted foreign policy narrative.[15] As Lawrence Freedman suggests these types of narratives "are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current."[16] In their examination of this issue, Miskimmon, O'Laughlin and Roselle break down narratives into different categories; system narratives, identity narratives and issue-specific narratives and are more concerned about how these differing elements interact to shape behaviours and outcomes in specific circumstances.[17] Whilst there is some overlap between this study and the work of Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle this study is more concerned with the overarching narrative of Canadian foreign policy and how policymakers' actions in

---

[14] Anthony Lang, *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention*, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 18.

[15] Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin, "Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives," *Working Paper No. 7*, (Feb. 2010) (Brighton: Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex), 6; See also Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin, "Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power," *Media, War and Conflict*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Apr. 2014), 70-84. The work on strategic narratives has considerable overlap including examination of elites, however, its focus on end-states is not immediately compatible with the approach in this study which is concerned with the contextual narratives that inform policymaking.

[16] Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 379, (London: Routledge, 2006), 22.

[17] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013).

Afghanistan and Libya fit within this, rather than the state-level which these authors examine. Moreover, their work on strategic narratives focuses on the use of language and theory of communication, exploring discourses, framing, language and influence in order to achieve specific outcomes.[18] In contrast, this study is not examining the strategic narrative of Canada in NATO, but rather with how Canada's participation in the Afghanistan and Libya operations fit with the middle power narrative of Canadian foreign policy more broadly. While this study is examining narrative in the context of two NATO operations and their relationship with Canadian foreign policy, it is more concerned with the ways in which policymakers articulate the related narratives and their relationship more generally to concepts of Canada. Given the focus on the policymaker, it is, as observed by Ned Lebow, concerned with the process by which "[n]arratives tell people who they are, what they should aspire to be and how they should relate to others."[19] By focusing on individuals, this allows the parsing of a specific narrative from the broader framework of identity and its relationship with state behaviour rather than focusing overly on specific policy initiatives or immediate political ends.[20] As this study is examining narrative, it is focused on the ways in which policymakers understand and articulate their understanding of Canadian foreign policy in relation to its traditions, stories and routines. This allows us to focus on the narrower field of Canadian foreign policy and the individual interpretation of this narrative in order to examine how this influences policymakers to articulate and adhere to roles in foreign policy behaviour.

Utilising Anthony Giddens' structuration theory others such as Jeffrey Huysmans, Jennifer Mitzen, Bill McSweeney, Ian Manners and Brent Steele have sought to explore the importance of narratives and identity in shaping state

---

[18] *Ibid*, 180-181.
[19] Richard Ned Lebow, *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 46.
[20] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 563; Lebow notes the utility of disaggregating identity as a unitary concept and examines constituent components recognising that 'identities' are variable between and within actors.

action through the exploration of what is broadly termed 'ontological security.'[21] Others such as Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giergerich, Stuart Croft, Amir Lupovici, Ayşe Zarakol and Bahar Rumelili have also sought to develop this area of study.[22] This study shares some commonalities with this research area in that it examines how policymakers within states act outside of what can be seen as their strategic interest in order to maintain consistency with their conception of their state's narrative.[23] However, this study's FPA approach differs from the ontological security research programme as it privileges the individual level of analysis over the state level and does not assume a unitary state identity.

While there are some useful elements from the ontological security research programme, in particular the examinations of narrative, there are a number of problems with the way in which it is analysed. In order to borrow concepts from ontological security analyses it is necessary to explore its weaknesses in further detail to separate out the more useful components. In

---

[21] Jeffery Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 4 (1998), 226-255; Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities, and Ontological Security," *Journal of European Public Law*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), 270-285 and "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2006), 341-370; Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity, and Interests*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ian Manners, "European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security," COPRI Working Papers, 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/wps/mai04/mai04.pdf, accessed 20 March 2013; Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008).

[22] Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giergerich, "From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the end of the Cold War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010), 407-452; Stuart Croft, "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain's Muslims," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Aug. 2012), 219-235; Amir Lupovici, "Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel's Unilateral Steps Towards the Palestinians," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct. 2012), 809-833; Bahar Rumelili, "Identity and Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological Security and Physical Security," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, advance online publication 20 September 2013, 1-23.

[23] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 55. In referencing biographical narrative here I am more interested in the continuity that policymakers seek in reinforcing particular state narratives, rather than suggesting that states' themselves have narratives. Highlighting some interesting avenues in exploring a wide range of issues see: David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*, (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1992); Others have examined their use in constructing storylines like, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia," *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Jun. 2002), 601-628. Others yet have also sought to examine similar phenomena such as Christopher Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland*, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008).

particular, the concept of a state as having a Self is problematic, if only because states are not people and as such this study cannot ascribe any unitary identity or human characteristics. This remains a challenging issue for the IR scholarship on ontological security; in seeking to ascribe agency, it is fundamentally *individual* policymakers, acting as part of a corporate whole, who arguably strive for ontological security.[24] Examining the interpretation of narratives at the individual level helps to work around the construction of Self and Other by focusing on the narratives generated within the state itself as opposed to narratives generated in opposition to an external influence.[25] Moreover, there is often a reification of the state as *the* vital agent, and while not neglecting the importance of this level of analysis there is rarely enough granular detail in distinguishing that the individual and the state reactions to disruptions of ontological security may be quite different. Additionally, it is also important to recognise that foreign policy narratives are also interpreted and negotiated by agents *outside* the state (in this study NATO policymakers) and that these too affect the ways in which policymakers shape behaviour. As Stuart Croft noted, "instead of reifying the state, ontological security studies should be based in understanding the intersubjective framing of the insecurities of individuals."[26]

Similarly, in examining the Self in the context of the broader ontological security scholarship it is important to acknowledge that this is and remains as Ayşe Zarakol notes, situated in a fundamentally Western foundation.[27] In this vein, the examination undertaken in this study is one rooted in the Western discourse, building as it does on work done by Giddens, Heidegger, Kierkegaard

---

[24] For exploration of this see Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos, "Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the State Personhood Debate by Means of a Pragmatist Ontological Model for International Relations Theory," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct. 2010), 1057-1077.
[25] Bahar Rumelili, "Identity and Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological Security and Physical Security," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, advance online publication 20 September 2013, 1-23.
[26] Stuart Croft, "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain's Muslims," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Aug. 2012), 225.
[27] Ayşe Zarakol, "Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Crimes: Turkey and Japan," *International Relations*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar. 2010), 4.

and Weber as well as the broader IR and FPA scholarship.[28] Trying to reconcile or explore these further goes beyond the scope of this analysis but nonetheless recognises this foundation and how it informs both the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings. As noted in the introduction, this remains a fundamentally qualitative empirical study and examines the relationship between national narratives and the ways they have shaped recent examples of policymaking. In exploring Canadian parliamentary debates, news media and interviewing Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers, this study will add some granularity to the study of how policymakers fundamentally shape their own 'corporate' or constitutive foreign policy narrative and the related roles that are articulated. This also means that this study will not aim to ascribe any universality to the middle power narrative explored here as it remains inherently concerned with the *individual* experience and interpretation of foreign policy. In this case, this is rooted in a fundamentally Canadian experience.

Rather than relying on the psychological interpretation of this individual experience however, this study can instead rely on the examination of social actions as a way for policymakers to maintain a consistent narrative.[29] In this case an interpreted consistent narrative of self-identity routinises foreign policy actions, thus creating a set of behaviours which other actors recognise as predictable and by extension, reduce anxiety both in the Self (either the state/policymaker) and the Other (foreign states/policymakers).[30] In doing so, this creates a stable sense of Self which facilitates the process of foreign policy creation and by extension, informs identity. Frequently invoked to clarify the Self/Other dichotomy in IR, identity has been a fertile field of study and is often

---

[28] Antony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), originally published 1927; Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. W. Lowrie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Max Weber*, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[29] Max Weber*, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[30] Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalisation and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), 741-767. Kinnvall expands on the structuration premise of narrative construction and their role in 'identity' construction. This study is concerned with the 'consistent' narrative, while recognising that since they are open to interpretation, remain inherently labile between individuals.

used as shorthand in order to describe collective behaviours, usually among states, in order to explain and understand the mechanisms driving these behaviours.[31] IR scholarship frequently focuses on the dynamic interplay between the Self and Other, however, this is not the only factor driving foreign policy, rather as noted already, there are also internal forces within actors that are important.[32] However, this again remains focused on the state-level and fundamentally, these elements are concerned with the individual interpretation of these narratives and behaviour. As noted already, this study takes issue with the proposition or assumption of a unitary state Self or identity in IR and instead chooses to focus on the constituent narratives which underpin these ideas.

As will be explored in the next section the dissection of identity is problematic, however, the interrogation of the links between narratives and foreign policy behaviour presents a much more approachable and empirically examinable avenue. Moreover, as Ayşe Zarakol observes, ontological security subordinates the intersubjective understanding of social identities to the study of narratives emanating from within the state, about itself.[33] As such, with the vital role these narratives play it is important to also recognise that narratives about foreign policy are contested between individuals within states and that while at certain times, some interpretations dominate, and they are not necessarily the same as the dominant narrative. This means that narratives shift in relation to the individuals articulating and interpreting them and as such, this study should look to examine how this affects behaviour. In order to make sense of how these narratives influence policymakers it is necessary to look to associated emotions

---

[31] For a subjective overview of some related articles see William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Jun. 1994), 384-396; Iver Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jun. 1996), 139-174; Richard Ned Lebow, "Identity and International Relations," *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec. 2008), 473-492.

[32] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 32.

[33] Ayşe Zarakol, "Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Crimes: Turkey and Japan," *International Relations*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar. 2010), 7.

and why they are important.[34] The triggering of emotions helps to link the interpretation of narrative with foreign policy behaviour and thus realises the agency of the policymaker and, in effect, reinforces a state's narrative. To borrow from Brent Steele's framework this renders moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations rational actions, as they are guaranteeing future stability of the state's interpreted self-identity.[35] By applying these three motives to three different case studies, Steele suggests that self-interrogative reflexivity is the key method by which states arrive at conclusions about how the maintenance of ontological security shapes their behaviour and by extension, find ways in which to reinforce specific preferences that support this.[36] In particular, this study will note the presence and importance of shame as a factor which shapes actors' responses to narratives and the ways in which this ultimately affects behaviours and routines.[37] Bill McSweeney notes, social actions are inherently reflexive, as actors seek to create routines which make these actions comprehensible to others.[38] In this case, this study will seek to understand this reflexive action in the context of how policymakers are influenced by their interpretation of a national narrative when articulating foreign policy roles rather than examining the more state-level action as Steele does.

Resolving issues of agency

By seeking to critically examine the relationship between Canada and NATO, a structure-agency issue is implied due to the way in which this study examines

---

[34] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 515. Others are increasingly exploring the role of emotion in foreign policy. See Rose McDermott, "The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.2, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), 691-706; Irving Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*, (New York: Free Press, 1977).

[35] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 44.

[36] *Ibid*, 152. Steele's use of reflexivity is built on Stefano Guzzini's critical examination of constructivism where he sought to deconstruct the central trends in the evolving Constructivist framework with an emphasis on the role of reflexivity as a central component. See Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000), 147-182.

[37] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 54.

[38] Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity, and Interests*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 140.

how agents within a systemic context, exercise agency. With regards to this study, the actors involved are policymakers in Canada and NATO who exercise agency within the broader structure of the international system. Similarly, this agency is shaped by the narrative, which can be considered another structure affecting this interaction. In shaping policy, policymakers exert agency within the NATO framework constrained by a multitude of structures in order to shape events at the broader systemic level. Given the wide variety of structures that exist (normative, ontological, epistemic, etc), there remains considerable uncertainty within the field of IR, over the interaction between agents and structures.[39] As this debate relates to this study, it falls back on to Giddens' structuration theory. Thus both structure and agency are not considered external to actors, but abstractions which both constrain and enable behaviour, meaning agents drive structure and sustain them through individual preferences.[40] As a result, this creates a mutually reinforcing relationship between structure and agent rendering an examination of the dynamic between the two largely outside the purview of this study. This study is more interested in the policymakers-as-agent, given that they are both representing and interpreting state narratives and will steer away from the state-as-agent tendency in IR.[41] This also reflects Giddens who eschews categorising collectivities as agents.[42] As noted previously, fundamentally, the phenomena examined here are not experienced by the state, but instead by the elites and as such they are the critical focus. Nor should one only focus on the state leader and implicitly link the state narrative with the leader's interpretation of what that should be. While leaders articulate foreign policy preferences, it is important to recognise that narratives inform this

---

[39] Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), 245-270.
[40] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 1984).
[41] See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7th ed., (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005) for an iconic instance where Morgenthau articulates the state as *the* vital entity in international relations. Subsequent IR analyses place emphasis on the state as the key unit when examining international relations.
[42] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration,* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1984), 220-221.

process as well and moreover, these preferences are often contested, in this case in Parliament as well as among diplomats.[43]

It is a frequent conceit in the field of IR to regard the state as an agent and then associate certain motivations to its actions as a way to simplify variables during analyses. This unitary-actor assumption presents a problem when trying to ascertain the rationality linked with these narratives.[44] As noted already, this study takes issue with this contention in that it does not sufficiently account for the individual interpretations of those narratives and moreover, fails to adequately articulate how states themselves seek to maintain ontological security or take any other form of action. It is the policymakers within these states who do this and they are the ones who create institutions and practices which reinforce and reproduce these routines, not the state. Rather than trying to ascribe the interpretation of a distinct national narrative to a 'state-agent' this study is more interested in how individual policymakers are influenced by said narrative and how this shapes their policymaking. As such, this study is looking at the various influences on policymaking that derives from a state's narrative on the agents, in this case policymakers, which generates behaviours within NATO. As the analysis in the next chapter will highlight, this middle power narrative is deeply ingrained among Canadian policymakers. However, as will be explored, this narrative is not uniquely interpreted by Canadians but also exists among NATO policymakers who interact regularly with Canadian policymakers in NATO.[45] The resultant effect on Canadian policymakers' agency is exerted across multiple levels as narratives are interpreted, reinterpreted and reflected

---

[43] This is explored in a slightly different fashion in Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 140. While this is meant as a way of exploring how strategic narratives construct international order its contention remains applicable in that *all* narratives are contestable.

[44] For the sake of reducing variables in Foreign Policy Analysis, governments are often seen as unitary-actors however, this is rarely the case and indeed, there are important dynamics at play *within* the domestic level. For the iconic work on this see Robert J. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 427-460.

[45] Interview 5, 17 Oct 2012.

upon.[46] This narrative then influences agents' action due to Canadian policymakers need to reinforce their understandings of this phenomenon, thus helping us to understand Canadian foreign policy behaviour in NATO. So while this does concern Canada's agency within NATO, the conditions surrounding that agency do not derive solely from a systemic structure but rather from Canadian policymaker's need to maintain consistency with their understandings of Canadian foreign policy behaviour.[47] This assertion does not deny the existence of national interest at these different levels nor does it suggest that it is not a motivating factor. While national interest can also be regarded as subjective it carries with it a different set of preferences that tend to favour more strategic ends. A close interrogation of the differing conceptions of national interest goes beyond the scope of this study, rather, it seeks to focus on foreign policy decision-making as it relates to two operations where Canadian policymakers could determine the level of contribution. Canada's robust participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions implies that this would convey some benefit, as compared to the token contribution of many other NATO nations, raising questions as to why this was the case. Thus as noted, this study will seek to reconcile how a foreign policy narrative interacts with the practice of policymaking and the extent to which it constrains or enhances how that policy is made manifest, thus generating behaviour which reinforces its foreign policy

---

[46] This builds on concepts elucidated by Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jun. 1988), 427-460. Peter Katzenstein develops further the role of identity in influencing state choices at the systemic level in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Additionally, there has been work on how the domestic shapes foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), 479-512.

[47] Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), 264. Carlsnaes warns that Foreign Policy Analysis scholarship has a tendency to overlook the implications of agency-structure on its analysis and touched on a rich vein of meta-theoretical discourse.

narrative.[48] As will be explored in the next section this become clearer through the examination of constructivist FPA work.

Constructivism, FPA and links to Role Theory

This study draws upon constructivist FPA scholarship, as it actively examines the production and reproduction of a popular narrative at the actor level and how this corresponds to national behaviour in international security policy. This is not to suggest this is the only course of examination as there are other potentially applicable constructivist models within the broader discipline of IR, such as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde's work on the 'securitization' of issues which outlines that through speech acts, states can legitimate action to solve perceived existential security problems including those to identity.[49] However, Bill McSweeney has noted, most relevantly to this study, that this approach reifies concepts like identity, treating them more as social facts rather than as evolving and changing subjects.[50] Indeed, Buzan, Waever and Wilde's framework fits poorly with this analysis due to its largely static view of identity formation. As outlined earlier, this study is interpretivist and as such steers away from a static interpretation of state action which is more unidirectional, i.e. identity determines behaviour; in favour of a reflexive approach and the dynamic interplay between the two.[51] As this study steers away from identity and is more concerned with narrative, it will attempt to avoid this pitfall by recognising that the impact and the narratives themselves are variable and, ultimately, constructed by the agents involved. They only have as much meaning and weight as the individual policymaker is willing to accept.

---

[48] 'Pragmatic' refers to what would be considered realist considerations of economics and military strength. I use this term as it has a pre-existing relationship in the literature concerning Canadian foreign policy. For the foundational work of pragmatism in Canadian foreign policy see: John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957*, Vol. 1 (1979) and Vol. 2 (1982), (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) as well as John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour*, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1970).

[49] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

[50] Bill McSweeney, "Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Waever," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan. 1998), 137-140.

[51] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149.

Writing on the broader construction of social norms, Nicholas Onuf noted the importance of culture as an endogenous factor in creating rules that, in turn, shape responses.[52] Alexander Wendt expanded on the relationship between identity and culture to further examine state interaction in an anarchic system, though in doing so, introduced a relatively reductive and systemic view of identities (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian).[53] These important constructivist works reflected deeper questions about the relationship between discourse and action in the international system but their remit was far beyond the reach of this specific analysis. Similar to McSweeney's criticism of Buzan, there are criticisms of constructivism such as those elaborated by Maja Zehfuss who in her postmodern criticism of Wendt, Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil, suggests that each reifies different elements of international politics which undermines the idea that reality is socially constructed.[54] However, this model steers away from the normative side of Kratochwil's theorising and remains cognisant of and aims to avoid the problem of reification. With regards to the ontological security model specifically and reflecting the criticisms highlighted earlier, Alanna Krolikowski notes that it also reifies identity, particularly at state level by expressing state personhood, however, as noted previously, given the focus on policymaker as actor this study aims to avoid this pitfall.[55] Nonetheless, Zehfuss' criticism of constructivism serves to highlight, that fundamentally, theorising at the systemic level remains fraught, particularly when ascribing characteristics grounded in other areas of social sciences, be they identity, rules or norms.

Strategic culture and its weaknesses

One of the more popular routes of examination which touches on many of the same themes as this study relies on the analysis of the normative frameworks

---

[52] Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 127.
[53] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[54] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[55] Alanna Krolikowski, "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008), 109-133.

which inform how nations approach conflict, broadly termed 'strategic cultures.'[56] Beyond the constructivist views of Onuf and Wendt, other scholars, namely Jack Snyder, Alan Ian Johnston and Colin Gray tried to refine and deepen the links between 'culture' and strategy.[57] There remains a definitional issue in strategic culture in which the author must adequately define not only their distinct views of 'strategy' and 'culture' but also their interpretation of how these two interact. Indeed, there remain serious challenges with the concept, as Edward Lock noted in 2010 while seeking to find a more empirical way of examining the issue, much of the theorising about strategic culture remains focused around the debate between Alan Ian Johnston and Colin Gray.[58] This has generated a body of literature on strategic culture ranging across a number of issues, but it largely remains static due to the theoretical impasse between Gray and Johnston; Gray views strategic culture as contextual and inseparable from the cultural milieu in which it is developed whereas Johnston sees it as behavioural.[59] As they relate to Canada, Justin Massie (behavioural) and David Haglund (contextual) have both sought to define Canadian strategic culture and identity to examine how the country approaches conflict.[60] This theoretical impasse cuts to some of the central challenges in social sciences, as David

---

[56] Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[57] There is a vast amount of material on strategic cultures. The idea of 'strategic culture' focusing on elites was first articulated in, Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, RAND Corporation, 1977. Others who followed focused on broader society-based strategic cultures, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Others focus on anthropological factors, see Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example", *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn 1981), 21-47.

[58] Edward Lock, "Redefining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul. 2010), 685-708.

[59] *Ibid*, 690.

[60] For further reading on the challenges posed by strategic culture in Canada see: Justin Massie, "United West, Divided Canada? Transatlantic (Dis)unity and Canada's Atlanticist Strategic Culture," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jun. 2010), 118-138 see also, David Haglund, "Relating to the Anglo-sphere: Canada, 'Culture', and the Question of Military Intervention", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), 179-198. David McDonough has sought to take this further looking at broader questions of "grand strategy" suitable for a middle power in David S. McDonough, "Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol. 13, No. 4 (2011) http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/425. From a *Québécois* perspective see Stéphane Roussel, *Culture Stratégique et Politique de Défense: L'Expérience Canadienne*, (Montreal: Athena Editions, 2004).

Haglund notes, looking at *Verstehen* and *Erklären* or interpretivism and positivism, while noting that future analysis may need to incorporate both.[61] Haglund's contention goes beyond the remit of this study moreover, this study is clearly in the vein of interpretivism/*Verstehen* in order to highlight the importance of factors such as 'identity' and narrative in shaping policy. It can be argued that the constructivist research agenda should not be one that is couched in a positivist framework and should avoid engaging in a positivist-based analysis.[62] As a result, while recognising the value in both approaches, this study does not seek to bridge the interpretivist-positivist divide.

Focusing more on the aspect of state-level culture, Peter Katzenstein examined the role of culture in the formation of security policy norms and their central role in policymaking and in doing so, gives more depth to the strategic culture debate.[63] Nonetheless, the continued conflict over what actually constitutes strategic culture limits its utility and furthermore, the literature tends to sustain its focus at the systemic and domestic levels but lacks the granularity and multidimensional focus on individual policymakers. This presents a challenge when trying to chart how the forces exerted by narratives flow back and forth *between* the domestic and international sphere. It should be stressed that this study is not meant to invalidate or deconstruct broader questions of strategic culture but rather, complement their focus and lend an alternative theoretical explanatory framework to Canadian foreign policy. This is not to neglect broader relations of culture and the construction of foreign policy; worthy of note here is Ned Lebow's *Cultural Theory of International Relations*,

---

[61] David Haglund, "What Good Is Strategic Culture?: A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept," *International Journal*, Vol. 59 (Summer 2004), 489. As noted previously; *Verstehen*: an empathic understanding of human behaviour; interpretivist. *Erklären*: explanatory basis for behaviour based on observation; positivist.

[62] There is a notable debate within constructivism as to whether constructivism necessarily needs to adopt positivist methodology to assert its place within the social sciences. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 171-200; for a good accounting of the foundational debates regarding constructivism's relationship with positivism see Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000), 147-182.

[63] Peter Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* Peter J. Katzenstein Ed., online at http://www.ciaonet.org /book/katzenstein/katz01.html.

where Lebow explores fundamental elements of constructivist scholarship as drawn from historical examples, though as a framework it does not offer the empirical depth that this study requires.[64] Nonetheless, his work explores some of the underlying elements and supports some of the important motivations driving ontological security as a theoretical framework, particularly the role of self-esteem in generating the quest for honour and standing.[65] Moreover, his work also categorises Canada's behaviour as an international peacekeeper as one founded in an honour-based approach to the international system.[66] While Lebow ultimately disagrees with much of the ontological security programme for many of the same reasons outlined in this chapter, his work offers clear insight into the expression of motivation behind policymaking particularly as it relates to moral and honour-driven motivations linked with Canada's middle power narrative.[67] As will be explored further in Chapters 3 and 4, Lebow's work gives greater depth to the vital role that the individual relationship with the state narrative plays. It also provides a way of examining the dynamic interplay between the policymaker and state behaviour and will be drawn on to elaborate a number of these conceits. Nonetheless, it is important to look at alternative models within the FPA constructivist framework that further develop the conceptual tenets of this theoretical model and thus help to better explore the relationship between narrative and behaviour. It is worthwhile to briefly examine the field of FPA to gain a clearer understanding of the approach and why it fits well with this analysis.

Adapting FPA

FPA is said to have diverged from the wider IR scholarship in the 1950s and since then, has proceeded at arm's length from the broader discipline.[68] Vendulka

---

[64] Richard Ned Lebow, *Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[65] *Ibid*, 26.
[66] *Ibid*, 501.
[67] Richard Ned Lebow, *Identity and International Relations (Book forthcoming)*, Draft chapter, 2014. See also Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); to develop the idea of honour.
[68] Vendulka Kubálková, "Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism," *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, Vendulka Kubálková Ed., (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 3.

Kubálková suggests that the divergence between systemic international politics scholarship and more behaviourally oriented FPA work remains challenging due to the focus on systemic by one and individual by the other.[69] Nonetheless, this agenda has been carried forward as David Houghton outlined, there is a definite synchronicity between FPA and broader constructivist theory as a way of expanding the way in which this study can examine foreign policy decision-making and the various elements informing those decisions.[70] Indeed, as Marijke Breuning suggests when examining foreign policy, "decision-makers are products as well as representatives of their society."[71] However, it should be noted that there are different interpretations of how to examine the role of identity, culture, narratives and other socially constructed elements of foreign policy.

There has long been a recognition that there are important social factors shaping foreign policy, such as the role of public opinion and national identities, narratives or perspectives as explored by Philip Converse and carried forward by other scholars such as Thomas Risse-Kappen, Mark Peffley and John Hurwitz and continued more recently, to Timothy Hildebrandt.[72] Similarly, scholarship has also looked at the decision-making roles of leadership and elites, notably by Robert Jervis, Irving Janis and Graham Allison carried into more recent

---

[69] *Ibid*, 3.
[70] David Patrick Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2007), 27.
[71] Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 127.
[72] For a subjective overview, see Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent,* David Apter Ed., 1964 as well as Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul. 1991), 479-512; Ole Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1992), 439-466, Mark Peffley and John Hurwitz, "Models of Constraint in International Affairs," *Political Behaviour*, Vol. 15, No.1 (1993) and most recently relating to current interventions, Timothy Hildebrandt, Courtney Hillbrecht, Peter M. Holm and Jon Pevehouse, "The Domestic Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology," *Foreign Policy Analysis* (Jun. 2012), 1-24.

scholarship by Janice Gross Stein.[73] Alongside this, Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett have done seminal work on the interactions between international organisations and states and while their analysis is broadly systemic, they categorise the ways in which these organisations construct the international order in a useful way for FPA.[74] As noted previously however, this study is not as concerned with the institutional side as much as the policymaker. While the institutional framework in which this study takes place is important, the interaction between narratives and behaviour, rather than the institution itself offers greater opportunities for analysis. Furthermore, Barnett's work on role position versus role preference offers an interesting way in which Role Theory can bridge different levels of analysis by connecting the individual interpretation of foreign policy with the domestic and systemic pressures.[75] Barnett's distinction is vital in that it helps determine how to interpret the ways in which different roles can be categorised and understood in context and parsing how individuals form their understanding of their national role. This broad cross-section of authors covers a variety of perspectives within the constructivist field and across the systemic, domestic and individual levels. Nonetheless, they provide a solid foundation on which to form a constructivist FPA approach.

Looking elsewhere in related scholarship Jeffrey Checkel has noted the need for greater clarity on the role of ontology at the individual level by constructivists as a way of encouraging social constructivists to elaborate

---

[73] Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr. 1968), 454-479; Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). For more current views there is greater interest in the cognitive, individual level see Janice Gross Stein, "Psychological Explanations of International Conflict," *Handbook of International Relations,* Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth Simmons, Eds., (London: Sage, 2002). See also, Vaughan Shannon and Paul A. Kowert, Eds., *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2012).

[74] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organisations in Global Politics*, (London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 31.

[75] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.

implicit cognitive models in their analyses.[76] This study will endeavour to give some clarity to Checkel's proposition whilst fulfilling the hallmarks of FPA examination as outlined by Valerie Hudson, namely viewing foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented and actor-specific.[77] This study's actor-specific focus on the individual policymaker provides a clear convergence with FPA and as a result draws upon constructivist ideas that, in part, seek to bridge the gap between FPA and wider IR constructivist theory.[78] This study utilises these theoretical frameworks due to their affinity for examining, as Juliet Kaarbo noted in a symposium on FPA scholarship, "the questions 'Who are we?' and 'How are we perceived by others?'… [as possibly] prominent factors influencing the external behaviour of these states and their internal policymaking processes."[79]

There are currently a number of different avenues through which FPA's actor-specific focus provides routes of analysis. Indeed, there has been interesting work in trying to expand quantitatively rooted cognitive approaches such as Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer's work relating priming and framing to salience and metaphor as ways to understand decision-making.[80] Others have looked to go further with Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott who sought to examine the link between political violence behaviour and genetics.[81] These approaches, unlike this study, are fundamentally quantitative, nonetheless point to interesting avenues related to the examination of the policymaker and

---

[76] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist−Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), 473-495; this article is informed by Andrew Moravscik's interesting criticisms of Checkel's assertions about the weaknesses of constructivism, see "Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet" *European Union Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jun. 2001), 219-249 and Checkel's counterpoint in the same issue.
[77] Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), 1–30.
[78] David Patrick Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2007) 24-45.
[79] Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jun. 2003), 159.
[80] Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer, "Thinking Alike? Salience and Metaphor Analysis as Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan. 2013), 39-56.
[81] Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott, "A Neurobiological Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis: Identifying Individual Differences in Political Violence," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr. 2012), 111-129.

decision-making at this level. However, as noted previously, these run into issues when operationalised on a wider scale, or in this case with policymakers. An interpretative approach as part of this narrative analysis offers an alternative way of constructing links between narratives and behaviour at the individual level through a more organic process. In this case, this study speaks directly with Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers as a way of exploring their understanding of Canada's middle power narrative and its relationship to Canada's foreign policy behaviour. However, it is necessary to add further granularity to this analysis and recognise that when discussing narratives it is important to ensure that their multidimensional character is sufficiently explored. Indeed, narratives while generated at the individual level, are important factors at the domestic and international levels.

Thus far, the theoretical frameworks discussed are focused mainly on systemic level or state level. Given that this study is looking at how the state level and systemic level interact however, it is necessary to find a multidimensional theoretical framework which is more capable of bridging the gap between the domestic and international while also incorporating the vital role of the policymaker. In examining narratives and how they become linked with foreign policy, the individual is critical as they are the ones who effectively construct these narratives, stories and traditions. It is in this way that FPA and constructivism offer a clear way in which to explore how narratives and foreign policy intertwine through the construction of roles. However, as Chris Alden and Amnon Aran have noted, constructivism remains somewhat overlooked by FPA scholars, while nonetheless speaking to many of the same key themes and ideas.[82] Of particular note is how Alden and Aran examine the foreign policy change and constructivism in transitional states and importance of ideas in

---

[82] Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 116. There is a considerable amount of literature examining foreign policy change, however, it does not sufficiently examine the role of narratives. For some examples see, Frederik Doeser, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish 'Footnote Policy'" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Jun. 2011), 222-241, Michael Mattes, Brett Ashley Leeds, "Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun. 2014), 280-290.

driving this.[83] While they largely focus on the state-level of analysis in transitional states, it does point to the need for greater understanding of this process of change in FPA by looking at the role of the individual's construction of narratives and how this influences behaviour.

Roles, narratives and Canadian foreign policy

There has been some work in blending FPA with constructivist theory building on concepts articulated by Kalevi Holsti in his 1970 article, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" which imported the terminology from elsewhere in the social sciences to give greater clarity to policy formation during the Cold War.[84] In building this model of analysis, Holsti borrows the concept from other social sciences, namely psychology and anthropology in order to develop how actors in international relations but acknowledges that the definition of 'role' remains somewhat nebulous.[85] However, as with Holsti, one can consider roles to refer to behaviours and actions specifically.[86] As noted previously, this study is then concerned with how roles and narratives interact with each other, and by extension, can affect each other.

Since Holsti's initial analysis, the Role Theory approach has expanded considerably, notably by Stephen G. Walker, Philippe G. LePrestre, as well as Cameron Thies and Marijke Breuning.[87] While elements of their research inform this analysis, the interaction between roles and narratives remains an underdeveloped area. As a result, it is necessary to further develop the specific linkages between narratives and roles. Consequently, this section will first expand on how roles and identities interact and then further expand on the ways

---

[83] Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 106.
[84] K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), 233-309.
[85] *Ibid*, 239.
[86] *Ibid*.
[87] For comprehensive work on quantitative elements of Role Theory see, Stephen G. Walker, "Part I" *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States Leaders and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2011). Also, Philippe G. Le Prestre, *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition.* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997). See also, C. G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No.1 (Jan. 2012), 1–4.

in which these elements are interlinked. In doing so it will clarify how this ultimately affects foreign policy behaviour.

There have been some more sophisticated attempts at expanding Role Theory to incorporate identity. William Bloom sought to try and formulate a more comprehensive view of the role of identity in IR utilising social psychology methods to examine how citizens reconcile the state's relationship with broader national identities.[88] This has been further explored through the works of Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson and Suzette Grillot, who link policymakers' ideas about national roles with broader state self-identities and thus creating a psychological line of inquiry both about how states function and how leaders conceive of those states, but also how these identities can shift over time.[89] Lisbeth Aggestam expanded this concept further and conducted an examination of cognitive and cultural factors which inform leader's foreign policymaking in the context of post-Cold War European policymaking.[90] Whilst the psychological and cognitive areas of decision making present an exciting avenue for future exploration, this study will look less to the political psychology elements. These tend to focus on the role of leaders or small groups whereas this study focuses on bureaucratic policymakers as well as leaders. As a result, this makes cognitive psychological analysis more challenging due to the variety of responsibilities and viewpoints on the policies in question.[91] Additionally, in the case of this examination it is too challenging to operationalise this kind of research as it requires much more comprehensive psychological examinations of policymakers in order to develop cognitive models.

---

[88] William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[89] Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson and Suzette Grillot, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), 727-757.
[90] Lisbeth Aggestam, 'Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy', *ARENA Working Paper,* No. 8, (University of Oslo, 1999), http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers1999/wp99_8.htm, accessed 15 March 2013.
[91] Janice Gross Stein, "Psychological Explanations of International Conflict," *Handbook of International Relations,* Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth Simmons, Eds., (London: Sage, 2002), 293.

Role Theory, while reflecting many of the similar considerations related to identities and influence on foreign policy does not sufficiently account for internal divisions or motivations about what those roles are.[92] Juliet Kaarbo and Cristian Cantir note that,

> [w]hile some within a state may believe that a certain role is what the nation or state should play on the world stage, and these domestic actors may want or assume that there is a national consensus on this role, this may not be the case. Internal divisions can exist over what should be pursued at the national level. One actor's assertion of a national role is not synonymous with national-level agreement.[93]

This presents a challenge for an analysis of anything related to Canadian identity, narratives or roles, as there is a significant amount of discourse on the various regionalisms and the issue of Québécois nationalism, nested within Canadian policymaking.[94] Canada provides a challenging example when discussing issues of identity and cultures due to its heterogeneity (English-French dichotomy specifically), which while not unique amongst nations, presents difficulties when looking at issues of identity. Moreover, there are other regionalisms in Canada which could also be explored, such as the East-West divide and different strategic cultures identified by Justin Massie or the 'Laurentian consensus' which John Ibbitson popularised.[95] While these are interesting avenues worthy of greater scrutiny, the exploration of elite consensus is more interested in examining how these different attitudes are subsumed and incorporated into the

---

[92] See Sebastian Harnisch, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts," *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, (London: Routledge, 2011). This outlines many of the key concepts of the framework.

[93] Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan. 2012), 2.

[94] For the iconic cultural account of this challenge see Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes*, (Toronto: Collins, 1945). Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather Smith note the dearth of Québécois voices in Canadian Foreign Policy literature "The Practice, Purpose, and Perils of List-Making: A Response to John Kirton's '10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy'" *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2010), 751-762. Sjolander expands on this further and the danger of 'we' when referring to Canada's foreign policy in Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Two Solitudes? Canadian Foreign Policy / Politique Étrangere Du Canada," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan. 2007), 101–108.

[95] Justin Massie, "United West, Divided Canada? Transatlantic (Dis)unity and Canada's Atlanticist Strategic Culture," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Jun. 2010), 118-138; John Ibbitson, "The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada's Foreign Policy," *CIGI Papers*, No. 29 (Apr. 2014).

foreign policy decision making process.[96] Nonetheless, cognisant of the challenges this poses, it goes beyond the remit of what this study seeks to accomplish. To note David Campbell's post-structuralist perspective, "[w]hichever Foreign Policy practices are implemented, they always have to overcome or neutralise other practices that might instantiate alternative possibilities for identity."[97] More broadly, Campbell suggests that while foreign policy is a global discourse of power, legitimated by the national level, one must be careful equating foreign policy decisions with national identity and vice versa as these are discourses generated to support the ends of those who create them.[98] The post-structuralist approach to national identity fails to resonate with this study's view of interaction between policy and practice due to the focus on epistemic frameworks. However, a meta-theoretical viewpoint reminds us of the need to be cautious, not only about ascribing unitary identity to a national foreign policy and critically, pay attention to where the discourse is generated when examining roles. Indeed, in discussing Role Theory, Cantir and Kaarbo note that roles are contested between elites, masses and decision makers, thus making nationally-specific roles more indeterminate and subject to a number of factors.[99]

As such, in examining Canadian and NATO policymakers in NATO and the multidimensional forces that shape the relevant foreign policy behaviours in support of a narrative it is necessary to focus on specific decision-making units and how they conform to certain roles in foreign policy making.[100] Roland Paris has recently sought to use Role Theory as a way to examine the relationship between the Harper government and public opinion in Canada and how this links

---

[96] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[97] David Campbell, "Foreign Policy and Identity: Hobbesian Strategies," *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. II, Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini, Eds., (London: Sage, 2011), 101.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan. 2012),19.
[100] Elites are a variable concept which will be elaborated on. For an overview of decision-making units see Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini, Eds., (London: Sage, 2011); Decision-making units are explored further in Chapter 2.

to what he suggests is Canada's liberal internationalist tradition.[101] While not focused explicitly on identity, Paris does not discard the concept either and his examination of roles is nonetheless tied closely to public opinion, rather than an examination of elites, unlike this study. Indeed, as this study avoids discussing identities it becomes easier to bridge the gap between domestic and systemic by making the discourse on narrative explicit amongst foreign policy elites, in this case policymakers in Canada and NATO.

Given the open nature of Role Theory, this study interprets Canadian decision makers' desire for consistency and the behaviours which flow out of this as a way which conforms to policymakers' conception about their respective nations' role in the international system. While Role Theory itself is more of a collection of interpretive elements to help unravel the questions of national roles, it provides a toolbox from which one can draw relevant concepts and add from other disciplines as necessary. As Aggestam observes referring to the work of D.D. Searing, "there does not exist a single general Role Theory to draw on as to why, when and how certain phenomena occur."[102] The flexibility of Role Theory presents the best way of coalescing the various elements of FPA into a structure which can shed light on the empirical puzzle that this study has proposed. Namely, how the Afghanistan and Libya campaigns link with differing interpretations of Canada's middle power foreign policy narrative under the various governments between 2001 and 2011 and the extent to which these interpretations affected Canada's foreign policy behaviour. Specifically, this examines the roles which are derived from distinct interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative. Ultimately as the diagram attached here highlights it is possible to chart the links between narratives, roles and behaviours broadly as follows;

---

[101] Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307.
[102] Lisbeth Aggestam, Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis," *The European Union's Roles in International Politics*, Ole Egström, Michael Smith, Eds., (London: Routledge, 2006), 11; Citing D.D. Searing, "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec. 1991), 224.



As noted earlier, this study will use a variety of input in addition to previous scholarship on Afghanistan and Libya, including *Hansard* records, journalism, press releases as well as interviews with policymakers in Canada and NATO. This study will look at the moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations for Canada's behaviour in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Given the 'routinising' effect that a consistent narrative has on a state's behaviour, the effect of the middle power narrative should appear as a significant force shaping Canada's policy options. Moreover, it should highlight the presence of roles, both preference and positional, in the articulation of foreign policy behaviour.[103] This requires cognisance of both the context and continuity which inform actors' foreign policy decisions thus prompting reflexive actions which aim to reconcile foreign policy behaviour with foreign policy narrative.[104] Through the qualitative research undertaken in this study and the subsequent analysis of the responses from interviewees, it should become clear that the middle power narrative feeds into a specific behaviours articulated by Canadian and NATO policymakers through speeches, declarations, policy documents and thus creates multidimensional expectations that Canada will conform to this role.

In order to reconcile Role Theory with the broader role of narrative in Canada's foreign policy this study looks to the 'poliheuristic' decision-making model developed by Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen as a way of understanding

---

[103] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.
[104] Brent Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 7.

how Canadian foreign policymakers created foreign policy.[105] This model suggests that there is a two-stage calculus,

> (1) rejecting policies that are unacceptable to the policymaker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (2) selecting and alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximising benefits and minimizing risks.[106]

With this model one can see the variables which inform the decision making process, however, given the instrumental function of foreign policy elites in this process this study departs from Mintz's model.[107] Mintz suggests that the 'essence of decision' lies in domestic politics, specifically; leaders will not take foreign policy decisions which pose a high political cost.[108] Sarah Kreps suggests that elites, as they related to Canada and the Afghanistan mission, were insulated from political costs related to participation in the mission due to consensus between major parties over the issue, also known as 'elite consensus.'[109] Offering a critical take on Kreps' point, Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson suggest that this insulation is not indefinite and sought to examine the link with public opinion and how government's utilised strategic narratives, noting that Canada's was weak and incoherent.[110] Ringsmose and Børgeson offer an interesting interpretation, however, as this study has noted, it is not only strategic narratives that matter, but also the much broader narrative of Canadian foreign policy. This helps to better characterise the incoherence to which Ringsmose and Børgeson refer while also clarifying the reasons *why* the elites that Kreps examines are insulated. Expanding on this, George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf built on Ringsmose and Børgeson's research and undertake a quantitative analysis as to

---

[105] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78.
[106] *Ibid*, 79
[107] Elites in this circumstance refers to the Canadian Prime Minister, politicians, diplomats as well as NATO policymakers.
[108] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.
[109] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[110] Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson, "Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives," *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2011), 505-528.

how elites respond to shifting public support for strategic narratives, most importantly noting that elites are simultaneously responsible for both shaping and responding to public opinion.[111] In part, this study addresses how these two elements interact by going beyond the relationship between strategic narratives and foreign policy but rather, exploring the broader foreign policy narrative and how this is interpreted by policymakers. Forsaking Canada's middle power narrative and its attendant behaviours created a discontinuity in Canada's narrative thus challenging policymakers' understanding of Canadian foreign policy narrative.[112] This in turn would have prompted both policymakers in Canada and NATO and potentially the Canadian electorate to seek to remedy this, thereby imposing the political costs Mintz suggests.

As an example, it is possible to suggest that Canadian decision makers, driven by a desire to reinforce Canada's foreign policy narrative viewed the 2003 invasion of Iraq against the defining middle power narrative and found it conflicted with the central tenets. The lack of elite consensus on this issue as outlined by Sarah Kreps would have incurred potential electoral costs to the ruling Liberal Party.[113] Indeed, the conservative Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative Parties supported the US invasion and urged strong Canadian involvement with the ruling centre-left Liberal Party, the left wing New Democrat Party and the Bloc Québécois ranging from ambivalent to outright opposition to Canadian support for the invasion.[114] Given that polls taken at the time showed Canadians supported the decision to stay out of the Iraq War in the absence of a UN Security Resolution authorising military

---

[111] George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, "Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Narratives, Elite Responsiveness and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006-2010" *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online Version published Jun. 2014; see also Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina de Simone, "The War That Wasn't There? Italy's 'Peace Mission' in Afghanistan, Strategic Narratives and Public Opinion," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online Version published Jun. 2014.

[112] This also helps to explain Canada's failure to participate in Iraq as elite consensus was lacking thus creating a potential domestic cost to the Liberal Party electorally. At the same time it would have triggered discontinuity with Canada's narrative as it related to multilateralism as will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

[113] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.

[114] EKOS, *EKOS/CBC/SRC/Toronto Star/La Presse Poll Presentation to Media Partners*, Ottawa 21 Feb 2003, http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/21feb2003.pdf.

intervention, it seems unlikely that the Prime Minister would have risked alienating the public on such a divisive issue.[115] Mintz and DeRouen's model of poliheuristic decision-making notes that the domestic factor comprises the 'essence of decision' and as such, policymakers will not make foreign policy decisions that make them electorally vulnerable.[116] Thus in exploring how the middle power narrative creates a perceived role for Canada it illuminates the decision framework informing the effects on Canadian foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis Canada's response to the invasion of Iraq. Additionally, this helps to clarify the link between narratives and behaviours and how disrupting longstanding foreign policy narratives can have a real impact on IR.

As such, this study will try to answer within the wider context of this research, whether the roles articulated in Canadian foreign policy and driven by the middle power narrative support Canada's foreign policy through their manifestation in the NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. To do so, this study will draw upon the previous scholarship in Role Theory and the broader FPA constructivist field and create an empirical, interpretivist analysis. Ultimately, this will help understand how foreign policy decision-making influences policymakers both inside and outside of Canada and how this translates into roles and behaviours. In order to establish this however, the next chapter will explore the field of Canadian foreign policy scholarship and how the middle power narrative has developed and shaped the discussion. Additionally, it will also highlight how FPA fits into the broader discussions currently ongoing in the Canadian foreign policy scholarship.

Case study selection and the middle power narrative link to FPA

As outlined in the introduction, the two NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya represent situations where Canada's physical existence was not directly under threat but nonetheless prompted military action. This is meant as a counter to the realist school of IR that contends states act to maintain their own survival

---

[115] EKOS, *EKOS/CBC/SRC/Toronto Star/La Presse Poll Presentation to Media Partners*, 21 Feb 2003.
[116] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78.

and that all behaviour is motivated by these acts.[117] Indeed, much of IR theory proceeds on the basis that states are inherently rational and will make decisions based on power and interest. The rational actor issue remains a central component in IR and a vital component in FPA. In a seminal work of FPA, Graham Allison famously outlined three models of foreign policy decision-making; the rational actor model, the organisational process model and the governmental politics model in, *Essence of Decision*, examining the Cuban Missile Crisis and positioned the issue of rationality in foreign policy as a vital component.[118] Nonetheless, as outlined already, there are other factors which also inform policymakers that while they may be rational, do not conform to traditional conceptions of strategic behaviour.

As such, NATO presents a structure within which Canadian policymakers can operate as rational actors to reinforce narrative and ensure the preservation of their interpreted foreign policy narrative. This does not discount the importance of the Alliance to Canada's security and defence policy and by extension, its strategic interests; rather, it seeks to understand Canada's foreign policy behaviour and how this is shaped or influenced by interpretations of its foreign policy narrative by policymakers. As Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett note, international organisations have the power to shape behaviour through a number of methods such as incentivising, setting agendas and framing issues thus ensuring that states act within certain guidelines and under certain conditions.[119] This study deviates from Finnemore and Barnett's examination in that is more concerned with the national level rather than the institutional, however, it does not discard the contention that these institutions do have an important effect in constraining and shaping behaviour.

This study is more concerned with Canadian policymakers and the friction that exists between the national foreign policy narrative and the role

---

[117] See Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
[118] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).
[119] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 17.

expectations that are generated through institutional behaviour. In this case, Canadian diplomats in Brussels have previously acted in a certain way within NATO, while Canadian policymakers in Ottawa have articulated their preferred roles according to their vision of the Canadian foreign policy narrative. In both cases they have had to contend with the reality of working within the Alliance structure which generates another set of conditions which constrain and enable these roles. Laura Roselle has explored, to a limited degree, the way in which strategic narratives shape behaviours in alliances, but nonetheless, does not sufficiently explore the internal foreign policy narratives nor the specific mechanisms by which behaviours are shaped.[120] This study remains cognisant of the pressures arising from institutions that influenced policymakers towards Canada's participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to explore how they were influenced by their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative, but understanding the context in which they operate also gives depth to the examinations of the policymaker's influence within NATO. In turn, this helps to illustrate the relationship between behaviour and influence in the organisation. In examining the narrative around the Afghanistan and Libya operations, this study can then examine them against the criteria of moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations and thus examine how this shaped Canadian policymakers preferences.

Canada's robust participation in the Afghan and Libyan NATO operations not only reinforced expectations of future involvement in future operations, but also served to reinforce ontological security at the international

---

[120] Laura Roselle, "Strategic Narratives of War: Fear of Entrapment and Abandonment during Protracted Conflict," presented at the Standing Group of International Relations, Stockholm, 2010, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Strategic%20Narratives%20of%20War.pdf

and domestic levels.[121] As will be explored in each of the case studies, this does not deny the existence of competing conceptions of the continuity of Canadian foreign policy amongst Canadian policymakers, however, given the existence of this narrative it is important to see how different interpretations dominate and affect behaviour. Indeed, Duane Bratt suggests that this is an area for deeper examination in his study of why Canada went to war in Afghanistan and also why Canada stayed involved in the conflict.[122] As a result, narrative analysis is an important tool that allows a researcher to justify and understand the ways that policymakers reconcile how narrative and action affect each other. Deviations from the Canadian foreign policy narrative thus alter the ways in which these different components interact.

Canada's deviation from this narrative due to domestic level factors thus had consequences within NATO linked to differing interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative. Additionally, as will be explored in the following chapters, there could have been domestic consequences within Canada by triggering a discontinuity within the narrative of Canadian foreign policy. Chapters 3 and 4 chart the change to Canadian foreign policy behaviour between 2001 and 2011 in greater detail, although as will be seen, a foreign policy

---

[121] 'Robust' refers not only to Canada's contribution of personnel, but also the country's participation in kinetic operations and overall lack of caveats on its role in Afghanistan. For more background on the role caveats played in this operation see: David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, "NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan," *American Political Science Association Meeting*, Toronto, (2009); to further substantiate this, a total of 40,000 Canadian servicemen served in Afghanistan between 2001-2014 along with tanks and artillery; Veterans Affairs Canada, "The Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan," *Remembrance*, http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/afghanistan, accessed 11 Jun. 2014. In Libya Canada contributed 635 personnel, 7 F-18s, 2 patrol aircraft, 2 tankers and 2 frigates; CBC News, "Canada's military contribution in Libya," 20 Oct., 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-s-military-contribution-in-libya-1.996755, accessed 11 Jun., 2014.

[122] Duane Bratt, "Afghanistan: Why Did We Go? Why Did We Stay? Will We Leave?," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and new ideas*, 2nd Ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

narrative can exert a powerful force on the articulation of roles.[123] As such, Canadian policymakers were compelled towards robust participation in NATO's operations in Afghanistan and Libya; this behaviour, in turn, reinforced Canadian policymakers' continuity with one of Canada's narratives and, in doing so, also gave Canadian policymakers a greater degree of salience within NATO. This created a mismatch between the middle power narrative and action leading to what could be regarded as the disruption of the traditional narrative which, as will be explored had consequences for Canadian standing in NATO. This shift will be explored in greater depth in the examination of Parliamentary debates and the news media. As a result, it is important to chart not only how the desire to maintain consistency with a national narrative shapes Canada's engagement in NATO operations but also, how policymakers' alternative interpretations of this narrative change this relationship.

[123] The study of foreign policy change is a relatively underexplored endeavour in Foreign Policy Analysis as suggested by Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2013). In charting foreign policy change in this case, there are important ramifications as it relates to the role of narrative and the interpretation of those narratives when it comes to shaping behaviour. See Spyros Blavoukos and Dmitris Bourantonis, "Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: An Eclectic Approach," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 20, No. 10 (Jan. 2014), 1-18, for an attempt to further refine this approach in foreign policy analysis.

Chapter 2 – Canadian Foreign Policy and the Middle Power Narrative

This chapter will examine the literature surrounding Canadian foreign policy in order to conduct a deeper examination of the middle power narrative and demonstrate how this study can contribute to the broader debates in the field. By exploring the relevant Canadian foreign policy literature it will identify the relatively underdeveloped theoretical avenues in this area of study as well as the need for alternative and critical approaches. The second part of this chapter will look more closely at the components of the middle power narrative and how they link to concepts of a role in Canadian foreign policy. The third part of this chapter will then reflect on the analysis undertaken here and highlight the need for closer attention to the role of narratives, identities and alternative approaches to understanding Canada's foreign policymaking behaviour while also highlighting some key characteristics of the middle power narrative and how this emerged as the dominant characterisation of Canadian foreign policy. These characteristics then serve as a reference point against which to later assess how they relate to foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan and Libya. This is an important part of this analysis as it provides insight into the ways in which the middle power is used while also exploring the concepts which underpin the empirical components of this study. The analysis undertaken in this chapter highlights the shortcomings present in the study of Canadian foreign policy whilst also highlighting how this study contributes to the current discussions occurring in the field.

Indeed, concerns over the *continuity* of Canadian foreign policy in much of the literature along with the importance of narrative, tradition and identity mean that there is an inherent resonance with many of the same themes outlined within this study's constructivist FPA approach. There is also a significant component of diplomatic history in this chapter as this field of research has a strong link with the study of Canadian foreign policy. As Jean-Christophe Boucher noted in his critique of the Canadian foreign policy research agenda, it

remains scattered and integrates a number of disciplines.[1] Many of the authors cited in this chapter such as Adam Chapnick, David Bercuson, Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein are historians, but nonetheless remain commentators on the subject and form an important part of the discussion which often overlaps between historical analyses alongside other relevant disciplines such as political science, International Relations and cultural studies.[2]

As will be explored in this chapter, there are clear themes that recur throughout Canadian foreign policy and more specifically, middle power literature, namely, the 'interests vs. values' debate, Canada's relationship with international organisations, the influence of the US and a focus on continuity with historical traditions. Ultimately, as will be seen in this chapter, an in-depth examination of the middle power narrative through this study's FPA approach presents a unique contribution to the field by adding a new, innovative approach for examining foreign policy behaviour and how this relates to Canada's diplomatic initiatives and military operations. Similarly, as will be explored in this chapter, there is a clear convergence with regards to the themes in FPA and Canadian foreign policy that lend themselves to greater examination.

Part I: Canadian Foreign Policy

The study of Canadian foreign policy is wide-ranging across a number of areas of policymaking. However, there are some discernible trends within the literature worth highlighting in order to situate this study in the broader field of Canadian foreign policy. Nonetheless, as will be seen in this section, Canadian foreign policy literature tends to re-tread the same ground repeatedly and falls back on a number of tired conventions, often to the exclusion of new, innovative approaches. It remains preoccupied with the issues of *context* and *continuity*; two elements which are both important to this study. The middle power narrative is a feature of this scholarship, but not always the focus and indeed, the role of

[1] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Yearning for a Progressive Research Program in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Mar. 2014), 214.
[2] This trend is noted by David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Still Notable: Reassessing Theoretical 'Exceptions' in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Mar. 2014), 133-151. This offers the field of study a breadth and depth that a purely International Relations or FPA approach might not offer in and of themselves.

narratives in shaping Canadian foreign policy, while previously neglected, is increasingly recognised. However, before exploring some of the newer approaches being taken in the field it is important to first gain an understanding of what the common themes and trends in the literature are. In a 2009 article, John Kirton proposed ten key works which form the foundation of the academic literature on Canadian foreign policy.[3] Claire Sjolander and Heather Smith noted in their excellent rebuttal of this list that while Kirton's subjective selection identified some important texts it failed to acknowledge alternative theoretical viewpoints.[4] They also note, however, that literature identified by Kirton conforms to two traditional strands emanating from two diplomats-cum-scholars who wrote extensively on Canadian foreign affairs, John W. Holmes and James Eayrs.[5] They identify Holmes' strand as concerning Canada's place in international affairs and Eayrs' as more preoccupied with processes and determinants.[6] Indeed, each of these authors has played an important role in the development of scholarship on Canadian international affairs with Holmes effectively defining Canada's 'place' in the international system during the Cold War.[7] Conversely, Eayrs laid the foundation for a more process-oriented examination of how domestic factors influenced Canadian policymaking.[8]

Both of these relatively recent literature reviews echo criticisms of the field of Canadian foreign policy noted by Michael Hawes nearly 30 years ago in his 1984 monograph, *Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite*.[9] Specifically, Canadian foreign policy tends to hew towards established tropes usually falling

---

[3] John Kirton, "The Ten Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[4] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather Smith, "The Practice, Purpose, and Perils of List-Making: A Response to John Kirton's '10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2010), 751-762.
[5] *Ibid*, 757.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] *Ibid*. For illustration refer to, John W. Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[8] *Ibid*, 757. Again, for illustration see, James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961). Eayrs is cited as a foundation for David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, (Toronto: John Wiley, 1983).
[9] Michael D. Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite?*, (Toronto: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984).

along well-established lines and rarely with much theoretical innovation. As will be explored in this chapter and throughout the analysis, there are recurring themes and descriptions of Canada's foreign policy tradition that inform the understandings or criticisms of this subject. More vitally, these tropes are of particular interest as they reflect the popular understanding of Canada's foreign policy narrative and both policymakers and academics repeatedly call on them, either to confirm or reject their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy.

This is a trend also highlighted by Maureen Appel Molot in 1990 in her review of Canadian foreign policy literature.[10] David Black and Heather Smith writing in 1993 and revisiting the subject in 2014 also remark on the various theoretical approaches worth deeper examination, including the middle power concept which will be explored further.[11] Nonetheless, Black and Smith note the overall trend in Canadian foreign policy to skew towards the descriptive, issue-specific and theoretically limited and, in their 2014 re-visitation of the topic press for renewed engagement with a diverse range of theories.[12] Indeed, more recently Jean-Christophe Boucher suggests that Canadian foreign policy scholarship remains overly descriptive and suffers from an underdeveloped field of research thus "debates become little more than a collection of well-worn and inconclusive anecdotes."[13] Given that Sjolander and Smith also remarked on the lack of sophistication in the field nearly 30 years after Hawes' original observation, there is clearly a need for some additional theoretical innovation to better link the field with broader IR and FPA literature as well as integrate newer approaches.

---

[10] Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[11] David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), 745-774; David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Still Notable: Reassessing Theoretical 'Exceptions' in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014) 133-151.

[12] David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), 773; David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Still Notable: Reassessing Theoretical 'Exceptions' in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014),150.

[13] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Yearning for a Progressive Research Program in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014), 227; See also Brian Bow, "Measuring Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014), 229-232.

Building on these reviews, it is possible to discern two key threads which define the traditional literature on Canadian foreign policy. This section will examine these, starting with the 'Canada as satellite perspective' and then 'Canada as internationalist.' Contained within these different interpretations are somewhat differing interpretations of Canada's middle power narrative, however, this will be examined in more depth in Part II of this chapter. The threads examined in Part I of this chapter each reflect different theoretical standpoints, but nonetheless, tend to focus on the systemic or domestic level pressures which shape Canadian foreign policy. This is not to suggest that there has been no alternative theorising in this field; however, these alternatives do not represent the mainstream literature on Canadian foreign policy. One of the more notable efforts comes from John Kirton and David Dewitt and their vision of 'Canada as principal power' which posits that rather than a middle power Canada was a 'principal power,' capable of exerting Great Power (principal) influence in certain spheres while relegated to lower tiers on other issues.[14] Dewitt and Kirton termed this a complex neorealist approach to examining Canada's international affairs and effectively defined Canada's capabilities as issue specific and through the lens of the Canada-US relationship.[15] Writing more recently, Kirton maintains that Canada now increasingly compensates for a declining US and is freer to choose its own foreign policy path.[16] While complex neorealism is one of the more interesting theoretical frameworks by which one can interpret Canada's foreign policy it suffers when trying to interpret domestic level influence over this policy. As Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Hampson note, "Kirton's theory of complex neorealism has difficulty in explaining the origins of these values and why some issues gain the attention and interest of policy practitioners while others do not."[17] Nonetheless, given the lack of alternative theoretical models in Canadian foreign policy it remains an interesting theoretical framework. However, Kirton has also admitted that it has not seized the attention

[14] David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as Principal Power: A Study of Foreign Policy and International Relations*, (Toronto: Wiley, 1983).
[15] *Ibid*, 40.
[16] John Kirton, "Vulnerable America, Capable Canada: Convergent Leadership for an Interconnected World," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol.18, No. 1 (Mar. 2012), 133-144.
[17] Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives and Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

of Canadian foreign policy scholars and remains an alternative analysis rather than a popular or mainstream framework.[18] Though there remain shortcomings in the systemic focus of Kirton and Dewitt's original 'principal power' model, it has prompted some of the more interesting theorising about the field. Patrick Lennox suggests Canada's foreign policy can be understood through the lens of a neorealist 'structural stability theory' perspective which posits that Canada's foreign policies rely on the United States as an anchoring force.[19] While useful, this nonetheless remains an alternative approach in the Canadian foreign policy literature and fails to capture the depth of Canada's broader international commitments.

As a result, it is useful to look once again at the key threads in Canadian foreign policy scholarship and examine each in greater detail. The 'satellite' view largely focuses on Canada's immediate security and foreign relations and is oriented towards a preoccupation with the United States. Prior to the Second World War, Canadian foreign policy was closely tied to the UK. This led to a pronounced strain of Atlanticism in Canadian foreign policy espoused by former diplomats such as Escott Reid as well as Prime Minister Lester Pearson.[20] Justin Massie suggests that there remains an undercurrent of Atlanticism in Canadian foreign policy as a form of institutional soft balancing to curb the ambition of the United States, though this has waned in parts of Canada in recent years.[21] Robert Bothwell notes that Canada largely dwelt in the orbit of the UK until after the Second World War when Canada's primary foreign policy focus shifted towards the United States.[22] George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* captured this sentiment in his 1965 work in which he suggested that following the installation of

[18] John Kirton, "Canada as Principal Power 2010," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[19] Patrick Lennox, *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada's Place in the World*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).
[20] Greg Donaghy and Stephane Roussel, *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar,* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004).
[21] Justin Massie, "United West, Divided Canada? Transtatlantic (Dis)unity and Canada's Atlanticist Strategic Culture, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jun. 2010), 118-138. For a dissection of the 'Atlanticist' concept and its evolution alongside the North Atlantic Triangle see David Haglund, "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo) Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 211-235.
[22] Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007), 54.

American nuclear-tipped Bomarc missiles in 1963 Canada's independence would be gradually eroded in the face of the overwhelming influence of the US.[23] This was a concern that still underpins much of Canada's domestic and foreign policy narrative and indeed, has led to a continuing, tentative relationship with the US, particularly on issues of foreign policy.[24]

Nonetheless, the United States was and remains a major preoccupation for policymakers and scholars. Jack Granatstein, for example, defines Canada's role vis-à-vis the United States and the broader international community as either satellite or middle power with similar characteristics defining each one.[25] Stephen Clarkson, writing in 1968 noted that those supporting 'continentalism' believed that disagreement with the US would diminish Canada's international standing, a view which he notes in 2007, persists in Canadian policymaking.[26] Certainly, Canadian policymakers were and remain concerned with US policy behaviour given the enormous level of interdependency between the two countries. As former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously remarked of the US, "living next to [the US] is like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly, or even tempered is the beast, if one can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."[27] Culturally, Canada and the US share many of the same basic traits, with some variations and indeed as Andrew Cohen suggests, US influence is embraced, albeit occasionally and with reservations.[28] Indeed, it is hard to deny the clear influence in real terms that the US has in Canada with each

---

[23] George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1965).
[24] Brian Bow, "Anti-Americanism in Canada: Before and After Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Oct. 2008), 341-359.
[25] Themes first articulated in Jack Granatstein Ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) can still be found in more recent scholarship such as Jack Granatstein, *Whose War is it? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007).
[26] Stephen Clarkson, "The Choice to be Made," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) see also Stephen Clarkson, "The Choices That Were Made and Those That Remain" in the same volume.
[27] Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Washington Press Club, 25 March 1969 archived online at http://www.cbc.ca/canadaus/pms_presidents1.html.
[28] Andrew Cohen, *The Unfinished Canadian: The People We Are*, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 2008).

country the others largest trading partner, doing $707 billion (US) in bilateral trade in 2012.[29]

Whilst literature in this area tended to focus on trade policy during the 1990s, this strain of Canadian foreign policy has enjoyed a resurgence of interest following a deepening of the Canada-US security relationship after 9/11.[30] David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Kent Roach captured this sentiment, suggesting after September 11, security and economics were now linked and that Canada could no longer pursue policies towards the US in isolation.[31] David Bercuson similarly characterised the Canada-US relationship as focused around trade (for Canada) and defence (US) and argued that Canada's comparative weakness on defence as costing it credibility with the US and, by extension, internationally.[32] Elinor Sloan advocated a closer relationship between the two countries as a way of ensuring North American security in her examination of Canada-US relationship in the context of the broader war on terror.[33] Others like Donald Barry and Duane Bratt suggest that Canada's defence relationship amounts to a "defence against help," in that Canada maintains just enough military capability so as not to be a liability to the US, thus preventing greater infringement on Canadian sovereignty.[34] These perspectives tend to place Canada as an international actor defined by its relationship with the US and its external relations are seen through this lens.

---

[29] Office of the United States Trade Representative, "U.S.-Canada Trade Facts," *Executive Office of the President*, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada, accessed 3 November 2014.
[30] For a good representation of this literature see, Michael Hart, *Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 1995).
[31] David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, "Introduction: Is Canada Now Irrelevant?," *Canada Among Nations: Coping With the American Colossus; September 11: Consequences for Canada*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[32] David Bercuson, "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September," *Canada Among Nations: Coping With the American Colossus; September 11: Consequences for Canada*, David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Kent Roach, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[33] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005).
[34] Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, "Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-US Security Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), 63-89. For the term's original use and definition see Nils Ørvik, "Canadian Security and 'Defence Against Help,'" *Survival*, Vol. 26 (Jan.-Feb. 1984), 26-31.

Similarly, writing from a critical theory perspective, Robert Cox provides a broad historical overview of Canada's relationship with the United States noting the strength of the north-south axis in Canadian foreign policy and suggests that because of this, Canadian interests become subordinated to US strategic interests.[35] This view, as touched upon earlier, is cited as the reason for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. Specifically, it is argued that Canada's rejection of the 2003 Iraq invasion spurred its involvement in ISAF and later, its taking the lead in Kandahar Province so as to placate the United States.[36] While the Canada-US relationship is vital to the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, this explanation places too much emphasis on the influence derived from Canada's relationship with the US, while also failing to adequately take into account other factors such as popular narratives, which inform Canadian foreign policy decision-making. As Karsten Jung noted in his overview of the satellite perspective, policymakers in Ottawa have placed some additional distance between Canada and the US on foreign policy issues, more so than in the past.[37] Indeed, as former Prime Minister Paul Martin noted in his memoirs, while the Canada-US relationship is important, however, "Canada's role in the world is not simply to support a great power."[38] Suggesting that US interests predominantly dictate Canadian foreign policy preferences downplays the importance of the policymakers in the creation of foreign policy and diminishes Canadian agency in international affairs. US influence on Canadian foreign policy could arguably be interpreted as a Canadian foreign policy narrative in and of itself, however, even if this is the case, there has not been adequate individual-level analysis of why this occurs or how, at this level, it shapes Canada's participation in military interventions. This is not to suggest that linkages do not exist between policy issues or that some policymakers may indeed internalise a Canada-US dynamic which sees the US as the dominant power. Nonetheless, much of the Canada-US

---

[35] Robert W. Cox, "A Canadian Dilemma: The United States or the World," *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 667-684.
[36] David S. McDonough, "The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada's International Security Policy" *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2007), 620-641. See also, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War,* (Toronto: Viking Canada), 2007.
[37] Karsten Jung, "Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests Through Peacekeeping," *European University Studies*, Vol. 575, No. 31, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009).
[38] Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 330.

literature focuses more on the immediate context of the decisions, rather than their continuity with Canadian foreign policy narratives outside of this relationship and thus does not adequately account for alternative factors.

With the end of the Bush administration and the reduction of public friction between the two countries, Canada-US focused scholarship has largely been subordinated to alternative examinations pertaining to a wider variety of foreign policy issues. Echoing the criticism of Smith and Black, the literature on the Canada-US relationship tends towards the issue-specific and policy upheavals between the two nations that consequently tend to prompt a spasm of writing on the topic at hand.[39] However, it is worth noting here the collection assembled by Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox, who together have collected some of the more interesting recent scholarship examining Canadian support for the post-9/11 international system buttressed by US hegemony.[40] The scholarship on this issue continues more recently with Fen Osler Hampson and Derek Burney in 2012 suggesting that during the Obama administration, Canada-US relations were at their lowest point in decades due to failure to approve a key oil pipeline and more broadly, the contention that Canada's relationship has been neglected in recent years.[41] Most recently Jack Granatstein, examining Arctic-related issues, in this same vein has asked whether NATO supports Canadian national interests and suggests that the US protects us in its own interest.[42] The view of Canadian dependency has limitations as it relates to broader Canadian foreign policy and only obliquely addresses the key questions that this study seeks to answer. While it is important to recognise the importance of the US in Canadian foreign policy, it is important to account for the complex domestic motivations which do not necessarily arise from US influence. Indeed, given the tendency to examine discrete, specific areas of study, the 'Canada as satellite'

[39] David Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), 768.
[40] Bruce Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, Eds., *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2010).
[41] Fen Osler Hampson and Derek Burney, "How Obama Lost Canada: Botching Relations With the United States' Biggest Trading Partner," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 3, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada, accessed 21 November 2014.
[42] J.L. Granatstein, "Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada?" Policy Paper, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (Mar. 2013).

view does not provide enough analytical breadth or depth with which to explore foreign policy narratives.

The second and most expansive area of research focuses on Canadian internationalism. This is the most theoretically diverse field but broadly focuses on the system level of International Relations. Emphasising a realist-informed approach is the Conservative Party of Canada-affiliated "Calgary School" with David Bercuson as a significant contributor to the literature on Canadian affairs, both domestic and foreign.[43] This end of the spectrum also hosts notable scholars of Canadian foreign affairs, namely Kim Nossal, Denis Stairs and Gordon Smith. Central to their view of Canada as an international actor is the idea of placing national economic and strategic interests at the core of foreign policy, ahead of what they see as values-based foreign policy decision-making.[44] This also incorporates the views of other former Canadian diplomats such as Alan Gotlieb, who has advocated a return to Canadian 'functionalism.'[45] As Tom Keating observed, this stems from the post Second World War idea that suggested Canada be accorded international significance according to its material contribution; a strategy pursued by Canadian diplomats operating in the nascent international organisations of the time.[46] These authors see Canada as having drifted away from this strategy towards one which privileges Canadian values over the pursuit of Canadian interests. Kim Nossal sought to term this *idealpolitik*, which found its greatest expression under the leadership of former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.[47] Daryl Copeland suggests that this was diplomacy 'on the cheap' combining niche diplomacy with soft power to

---

[43] David Bercuson, "Up From the Ashes: The Re-Professionalisation of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), 31-39. For views on Quebec's relations with Canada see David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, *Deconfederation: Canada without Quebec*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991).

[44] Denis Stairs, David J. Bercuson, Mark Entwistle, J.L. Granatstein, Kim Richard Nossal, Gordon S. Smith, *In The National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World*, (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2004).

[45] Alan Gotlieb, *Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy*, Memorial Lecture, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2004).

[46] Tom Keating, "Multilateralism and Canadian Foreign Policy: A Reassessment," Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Multilateralism%20and%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy%20-A%20Reassessment.pdf, accessed 10 November 2014.

[47] Kim Richard Nossal, "Don't Talk About the Neighbours: Canada and the Regional Politics of the Afghanistan Mission," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar. 2011), 9-22.

create a foreign policy founded more on rhetoric than action.[48] Similarly, Roy Rempel has suggested that Canada lacks an overall middle power strategy but instead has had a set of internationalist, dispersed, diplomatic ideals that fail to focus and support Canadian interests.[49] While this emphasis on interests underlies this broadly realist view of Canada's international engagement, many of these authors still view Canada as a middle power with a specific role to play internationally.

Conversely, others such as Jennifer Welsh, Andrew Cooper and Nelson Michaud also see Canada as a middle power, however, for better or worse, foreign policy is an expression of its values.[50] While these authors have differing views as to whether this is a positive or a negative, they see values as inherently linked to the practice of Canadian foreign policy. Much of the interests-based criticism of this perspective focuses on the *Canada in the World* foreign policy review put forward by the Chrétien government in 1995. In this policy review, in line with its explicit promotion of Canadian values and culture, there was a considerable amount of emphasis on human rights, sustainable development and foreign aid; it made peacekeeping a central focus of the Canadian forces.[51] In combination with this review, there were deep cuts to the defence budget as part of the Cold War peace dividend. Canada's cuts however, as Benjamin Zyla notes, were in line with most other western European nations and not excessively harsh suggesting that this may not have necessarily been linked directly to the interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative.[52] Nonetheless, Canada's Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy during the late 1990s spearheaded an ambitious 'Human Security Agenda' that he outlined at the 51st UN General

[48] Daryl Copeland, "The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity," *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
[49] Roy Rempel, *Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).
[50] See Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004); Andrew Cooper, "In Search of Niches: Saying 'Yes' and Saying 'No' in Canada's International Relations," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995), 1-13; Nelson Michaud, "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-making: Inspiration or Hindrance?," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[51] Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review.* Ottawa, 1995, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.
[52] Benjamin Zyla, "NATO and Post-Cold War Burden Sharing: Canada 'the Laggard'?" *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 337-359.

Assembly.[53] Human security is a broad concept that aims to provide different kinds of security in a number of areas including: food, economics, health, environment, community and politics.[54] This approach aims for a more holistic, soft power approach to conflict prevention and places less emphasis on hard power.[55] Axworthy outlined Canada's role as a peacekeeping middle power with soft power assets it could bring to bear as a way of promoting international development and trade in order to ensure human security.[56] John English suggests that the more interests-based critics of Axworthy and his foreign policy are incorrect and that this is in keeping with the Liberal Party's traditions on the conduct of foreign affairs.[57] This internationalist view of Canada places greater emphasis on Canada's multilateral engagements, particularly with the UN and related institutions. David Jefferess outlined the pervasive influence this perspective has taken in the Canadian imaginary and how this has become deeply engrained in the Canadian public consciousness thus giving a deep resonance to these examinations of the Canadian foreign policy tradition.[58]

Nik Hynek and David Bosold compiled some of the more recent scholarship on this issue in their recent volume which outlines the soft and hard power strategies of a middle power but critically, they outline that myths, clichés and stereotypes pervade the study of Canadian foreign and security policy.[59] Another recent volume from 2013 compiled by Claire Sjolander and Heather Smith focuses on Canadian Internationalism and builds on the 'outside-in' view

---

[53] Lloyd Axworthy, *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations*, New York, 24 Sept 1996.
[54] United Nations, *Human Development Report*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
[55] Hard power refers to the concept outlined by Joseph Nye, in opposition to soft power and refers to a state's ability to shape other country's preferences through coercion, most often militarily. Originally in: Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Further expanded in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) and *The Future of Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
[56] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Security*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Spring 1997), 183-196.
[57] John English, "In the Liberal Tradition: Lloyd Axworthy and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
[58] David Jefferess, "Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Mythology of Canada as Peacekeeper," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 709-725.
[59] Nik Hynek and David Bosold, *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

of Canadian foreign policy examined in the Hynek and Bosold volume to take an 'inside/outside' perspective on Canadian foreign policy scholarship. Their points about the interrogation of the central questions of 'what Canada is' in the world are developed further alongside many of the ideas previously noted. The diverse range of contributions offers an interesting foundation on which to develop future scholarship and offers directions for greater innovation in the study of Canadian foreign policy. Paul Gecelovsky's contribution examines the foundations of Stephen Harper's view of foreign policy offers some insight into how individuals can shape foreign policy.[60] Daryl Copeland also provides an insider perspective drawing on his extensive experience in the Canadian foreign service to map the changes to Canadian foreign policy and how to navigate a way forward without further disrupting or damaging Canada's international influence.[61] Similar to Hynek and Bosold's volume, Canada's *International Journal* has recently sought to publish issues focusing on a number of related topics examining new directions in Canadian foreign policy literature and more recently, interrogating whether Canada can still be considered a liberal internationalist actor. Indicative of the relevance of this study, in the September 2014 issue using Role Theory, Roland Paris examined how Canada's liberal internationalist tradition had shifted under the Harper government.[62] Rather than rejecting the body of Canadian foreign policy literature, this study seeks to build on this foundation and expand the boundaries of study.

The 'Canada-as-internationalist' thread of Canadian foreign policy scholarship has been a fruitful area of scholarship and while it still trends towards rehashing the same territory there has been more of an effort to try and develop some alternative approaches to the field. Other scholars have looked at this from a largely historical perspective either trying to situate Canada's narratives and identity in its historical context, or alternatively, undertake

---

[60] Paul Gecelovsky, "The Prime Minister and the Parable: Stephen Harper and Personal Responsibility Internationalism," *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[61] Daryl Copeland, "Once Were Diplomats: Can Canadian Internationalism Be Rekindled?" *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[62] Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307.

comparative analyses which attempt to offer explanatory reasons for Canada's international behaviour.[63] Fundamentally, most of the theoretical streams examined thus far focus on examining and explaining *context* and *continuity* in Canadian foreign policy. In the case of the Canada-US relationship the emphasis tends to be *contextual*, while in the case of Canadian internationalism it tends towards examining the *continuity*. This study provides an alternative way of understanding how Canada's foreign policy maintains its continuity through the actions of individuals and how this, in turn, shapes the way in which foreign policy is made. Indeed, the constructivist FPA approach helps to develop a new and contemporary addition to the Canadian foreign policy field. This ties Canadian foreign policy scholarship to broader discussions occurring in FPA and International Relations in order to hopefully expose the field to greater critical inquiry by scholars within and outside of Canada. The next sections will seek to broadly categorise the different views of what the middle power narrative entails and as such, provide a basis for utilising the framework outlined previously.

As has been explored in Part I, theorising about Canadian foreign policy tends to stay within relatively prescribed boundaries, but nonetheless, there has been an increasing effort to develop new approaches. Kirton and Dewitt's work offers a valuable contribution to the alternative theorising about Canadian foreign policy and it is also important to note some of the other work which has previously been done by Mark Neufeld, Robert W. Cox and Cranford Pratt utilising Gramscian and hegemonic perspectives to explain Canadian foreign policy.[64] As noted previously, Nik Hynek and David Bosold have applied Foucauldian perspectives to Canadian policymaking and the human security agenda.[65] Similarly, Claire Sjolander, Heather Smith and Deborah Stienstra have

---

[63] Jonathan Bays, *From Fire-proof House to Middle Power: Narrative, Identity and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1939-1956,* PhD Thesis: University of Oxford, 1999; Anton Bezglasnyy, *Middle Power Theory, Change and Continuity in the Asia-Pacific*, M.A. Thesis: University of British Columbia, 2010.

[64] See Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power," *Studies in Political Economy*, Vol. 48 (Autumn 1995) 7-29; Cranford Pratt, "Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Counter-Consensus," *International Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1983/1984), 99-135.

[65] Nik Hynek and David Bosold, "A History and Genealogy of the Freedom-from-fear Doctrine," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 143-158.

sought to explore Canadian foreign policy from a feminist viewpoint.[66] These alternative theoretical perspectives remain more the exception than the rule in the Canadian foreign policy literature. As will be explored in the next section, up until recently the image of Canada as a middle power has been implicitly or explicitly understood in much of their work (save for Kirton and the complex neorealists), though it has different meanings depending on the authors' different perspective and theoretical standpoint. Given the relative general theoretical stagnation in Canadian foreign policy, this study speaks to the critiques raised in more recent scholarship.[67]

Part II: Canada as middle power and related challenges

The following sections will aim to unpack the concepts surrounding the middle power narrative. Given the centrality of this narrative to much of the Canadian foreign policy literature there is some overlap between the sources here and those explored in Part I. As noted previously, the middle power narrative is an important component of Canadian foreign policy scholarship, particularly as it relates to Canada's international engagement and as such it is important to examine this separately. In examining how the middle power narrative has shaped foreign policy practice it is important to understand the constituent components of this narrative and how they are contested and interpreted in academia. While the middle power narrative is wide-ranging as it relates to Canadian policymaking and its relationship with Canada's foreign policy behaviour; in terms of this study, it is regarded as a vital foundation. Most critically in this case, the narrative occupies a space as both a narrative and as a role in itself. While this is a relatively simplistic characterisation, it nonetheless signals that rather than a simple narrative, it is complex as it also incorporates components of both narrative and role. It is important to explore the competing definitions of Canada's middle power narrative in order to fully understand the stability that this narrative provides. However, given that the middle power encompasses a number of important elements of Canadian foreign policy and

[66] Claire Turenne Sjolander, Heather Smith and Deborah Stienstra, Eds., *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[67] Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); See also *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014).

runs through much of the scholarship it requires further elaboration in order to better understand it.

The use of middle power to describe Canada's foreign policy narrative carries with it a number of subjective conditions that must be acknowledged. Given the interpretivist nature of this examination and as it does not aspire to an objective view of this subject, it is necessary to observe that the author of this study is also informed by experience working in the Operations Division at NATO headquarters and also by being Canadian. Working there involved regular interaction with Canadians working as part of the international staff as well as diplomats in the Operational Policy Committee (OPC), the North Atlantic Council (NAC) along with indirect reports on the outcomes of other important committees, namely the Political Partnerships Committee (PPC) and the Defence Planning Policy Committee (DPPC). However, in substantiating the middle power narrative it is not possible to provide a quantitative assessment of participation in said committees and further, it is not possible to attest to the value of the Canadian contributions as, due to security considerations, there is no access to the minutes or attendance records of these committees. Nonetheless, there are definite quantifiable elements such as military size, technology and budgetary contributions that cannot and should not be overlooked, however, these are not the sole determinants which define a country's commitment, neither to an alliance, nor as a measure of power or influence within that alliance. Nonetheless, there is a structural component which places Canada in the 'middle' of its systemic power relationships linked to capabilities which must be acknowledged before going deeper into greater detail concerning this narrative.

While recognising that there is an underlying complexity going beyond simple structural hierarchy in the concept of middle power as it relates to Canada, its relationship with and role in NATO it is nonetheless helpful to begin by looking at the structural elements behind this narrative. Indeed, in structural terms Canada can be classified first as a middle power within NATO, neither a small nation like Luxembourg, Iceland or Latvia, nor a major power like the United States, France or the UK. With a military of only 65,700 active duty personnel and 33,950 reservists alongside a limited inventory of deployable

assets, Canada falls firmly in the middle tier of NATO countries.[68] In addition to the military size, this takes into account the capability, mission caveats and participation in previous and ongoing Alliance operations. This places it alongside the other NATO nations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.[69] Despite these structural considerations, there is a belief that Canada remains capable of 'punching above its weight,' specifically, exercising greater influence or contributing disproportionately to international affairs for a country of its size.[70] Laura Neack sought to categorise Canada as a middle power along these lines suggesting that the capabilities of a middle power (or secondary power) determined state behaviour.[71] Nonetheless, the structural component, while relevant as it relates to capabilities and by extension the practice of Canada's military operations, does not account for the creation of a narrative that encompasses a number of elements which go beyond capabilities. As will be explored further in this section, the narrative of Canada as a middle power has become linked with a several concepts as they relate to Canadian foreign policy, incorporating structural, behavioural and normative components. Indeed, it remains persistent and pervasive due to its parsimonious, albeit vague qualities. In this way the narrative retains its currency and has been used, albeit only once, by Prime Minister Stephen Harper to describe Canada's foreign policy.[72] As Adam Chapnick suggests in his refutation of the use of this term, "so long as there is a general understanding of the term, many will not accept the need to be overly objective."[73] Since it is not possible to reach an objective definition of

---

[68] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2012*, Vol. 112, No. 1 (2012), 51.
[69] Germany is not included here due to a number of reasons worthy of deeper examination but go beyond the scope of this analysis. A combination of factors, namely military size coupled with national caveats, places it in a unique position amongst NATO allies. For more information see: Patrick Keller, "Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jun.-Jul. 2012), 95-110.
[70] Lawrence Cannon, Address by Minister Cannon at Carleton University, 23 Feb. 2009, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2009/55.aspx?view=d, accessed 20 November 2014.
[71] Laura Neack, "Delineating State Groups through Cluster Analysis," *The Social Science Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1993), 347-371; see also Laura Neack, "Linking State Type with Foreign Policy Behaviour," *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, (London: Prentice Hall, 1995).
[72] Stephen Harper, *A Conversation with Stephen Harper*, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 Sept 2007, http://www.cfr.org/canada/conversation-stephen-harper-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p14315, accessed 20 November 2014.
[73] Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1999), 73-82.

what a middle power is, the narrative's relationship and usage with academia and policymaking make it challenging to define in a clear manner. As noted already, it generates a self-reinforcing relationship between narrative and behaviour meaning that it carries the characteristics of both. As the rest of this chapter explores, there is an interplay between policymakers and academics in defining the contours of this narrative, however, this was also rooted in the very real considerations of what Canada could do as an international actor. This study is interested in the narrative element of the middle power tradition in Canadian foreign policy, however, it is impossible to disregard the behavioural elements which also seem to define it. It is this ephemeral characteristic that makes it an interesting narrative about Canadian foreign policy as it encompasses such a wide range of policymaking behaviour and thus provides an opportunity to assess its influence.

In exploring the middle power narrative one must account for the accumulated debate and context surrounding its usage in the academic and public spheres. As will be explored here, there is an interesting interplay between academia and policymaking which also shapes the narrative. Chapnick's dissection of the middle power categorised its definitions into three streams; functional, behavioural and hierarchical suggesting that the functional and behavioural definitions serve to enhance state power while, hierarchical serves to organise states.[74] While Chapnick offers some insights into the different ways one can categorise what middle power means, he does not explore it as a narrative in Canadian foreign policy but rather, remains a more descriptive label. One of the chief strengths and conversely, main difficulties with the term is its use to describe structural elements of the international system, the behaviours of the nations within the system and potentially the normative elements of that same system. In his dissection of the middle power ideational concept, Paul Gecelovsky refers to it as a 'prism' through which Canadian policymakers view the world, even though it continues shifting as the context in which it exists, changes.[75] The remaining part of this chapter will seek to elaborate on what this

[74] *Ibid*, 73-74.
[75] Paul Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), 77-93.

'prism' consists of by examining the history of the middle power narrative as well as look at the critical interpretations of this narrative and its normative elements. The final two sections of Part II will briefly touch on political developments in Canada and how this links to the middle power narrative and its influence on Canadian foreign policy behaviour.

The middle power as paradigm in Canadian foreign policy

The concept of middle power has existed for some time, though its historical links with national narratives are a far more recent development. As this section will explore, the narrative developed on dual tracks in relation to Canadian foreign policy, both as a way of describing Canada's position in the international system, as well as its behaviour within that system. As such, it straddles a relatively unique space as it offers a way of understanding both how Canadian policymakers viewed, and to some extent, still view the international system, while also giving insight into how this understanding also shaped national foreign policy behaviours. The term's early-recorded use by Italian Renaissance scholar and diplomat Giovanni Botero, in 1589, employed it as a very straightforward theoretical device for easily dividing up state power structures.[76] As a descriptive term and a simple concept it has existed in varying iterations throughout history, however, it did not become closely associated with national policymaking practices until the latter half of the 20th century. Subsequent historical iterations reflected this usage and are not all that relevant to this study until the early 20th century when elements of the idea re-entered the emerging discourse in the formal academic discipline of International Relations. During this time it increasingly became interwoven with nascent concepts of Canadian foreign policymaking. Writing in the 1930s, Oxford Professor David Mitrany saw the increasing role of smaller powers and suggested that these states could play 'functional' roles in international governance that great powers could not.[77] As will be shown below, this idea percolated through the academic sphere of the interwar period, finding its way from the nascent field of International Relations

[76] Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State,* trans. D. P. Waley, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), Book I, Section I, 8–9.
[77] David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1933).

into the policies of Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. Concurrently with this, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster (1931), which gave the British Commonwealth realms legislative independence, including the ability to shape their own foreign policies. Informed by the Canadian Department of External Affairs, King seized on Mitrany's idea during and after the Second World War as an effective way to manage and promote Canadian foreign affairs.

The Canadian Undersecretary of External Affairs, Hume Wrong, skilfully focused these concepts into practice as the 'functional principle;' a force multiplier for a country like Canada which had a number of limitations, namely a small population and massive territory.[78] Nonetheless, Canada was a power which in certain roles and functions, could operate at a great power level given the resources and capabilities it could bring to bear. Several contemporary articles by government ministers attested to this view, such as then-Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton, diplomat Lionel Gelber and special assistant to the Minister for External Affairs, R.G. Riddell.[79] The concept of functionalism fed into a burgeoning middle power narrative which was taking shape during the late 1940s, as Canada was playing an instrumental role in developing the architecture of the United Nations as well as the treaties that would form NATO. Sceptically chronicled by Robert Bothwell, the narrative was popular amongst Canadian diplomats as a way of describing Canadian post-Second World War diplomacy.[80] Escott Reid noted this categorisation in his recollections of Canada at the founding of the United Nations, noting that he had instructions to align himself with the other middle powers present at the conference in San Francisco.[81] Indeed, as Adam Chapnick observed, in the 1947 Gray Lecture on international affairs, then-Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent suggested that countries such as

---

[78] Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2000), 189.
[79] See Brooke Claxton, "The Place of Canada in the Post-war Organisation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 10 (Nov. 1944), 409-421; Lionel Gelber, "Canada's New Stature," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24 (Oct. 1945-Jul. 1946), 277-289; R.G. Riddell, "The Role of Middle Powers in the United Nations," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 48/140, 1948.
[80] Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada in the World, 1945-1984*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 89.
[81] Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983), 163.

Canada had a vital role to play in the conduct of international diplomacy provided the iconic first instance where the middle power narrative was articulated.[82] The narrative continued to carry great currency in the Canadian Department of External Affairs and it waged an unsuccessful campaign for middle powers to play a recognised role in the United Nations in 1948.[83]

Despite the failure of formal recognition in the UN, in his term as Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent again referred to this narrative to define and give shape to Canada's Cold War position. Ostensibly, what was meant by his definition was that while Canada was not neutral during the Cold War, it was not so small as to be completely insignificant on the world stage and as such, had a responsibility to maintain a stable international order.[84] Moving beyond the idea of functionalism and its relationship with the middle power terminology, this partly reflected the structural view of the international Cold War system, with Canada positioned between the global superpowers (USA, USSR, UK, France, China) and the smaller powers, thus a literal middle power in the international hierarchy. However, after Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent articulated this role, it was further championed by a pivotal figure in Canada's history, Lester B. Pearson, during his time in the Department of External Affairs and later carried forward as a defining principle during his time as Prime Minister. During Pearson's time in the Department of External Affairs he successfully helped to refine and promote the UN as a peacekeeping organisation, thus defining Canada's profile in diplomatic circles. Moreover, Pearson's promotion of Canada's middle power narrative whilst taking an active role in international affairs, in part through peacekeeping, raised the profile of Canada further and

---

[82] Adam Chapnick, "The Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007), 443-457 citing also Robert A. Spencer, *Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 7. Full text of the lecture is available at http://www.russilwvong.com/future/stlaurent.html, accessed 11 September 2014. The Duncan and John Gray memorial lecture was established to promote national unity between French and English Canada.

[83] Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), 62.

[84] Paul Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), 77-93.

added to a perception of "punching above its weight."[85] As former Canadian diplomat Arthur Andrews observed, it was during this time that some of the core behavioural tenets, such as peacekeeping, that would later define middle powers were enshrined and incorporated into this narrative.[86] With behavioural elements increasingly becoming an important component of this narrative Adam Chapnick observed that being a middle power was not actually about possessing a certain level of power, but rather, the way in which a country behaved.[87] Indeed, Prime Ministers after Pearson, both Conservative and Liberal, also largely subscribed to this understanding of Canada's international behaviour. The middle power concept as it related to Canada was not static and often shifted in order to reflect the international political system and the priorities of the government.[88] This reflects the dynamic through which the structural elements of the term, combined with the behavioural elements to develop a definition which encompassed a much broader view of international affairs both amongst practitioners and academics. While some like Pierre Trudeau, had sought to reorient or redefine the contours of this middle power narrative, the core tenets laid out previously, continued to endure.[89] Moreover, this narrative has continued to withstand numerous setbacks and challenges including, most notoriously, the Somalia Affair in which Canadian peacekeepers were found to have tortured and murdered a Somali civilian.[90] In their critical examination of this linkage, Heiki Härting and Smaro Kamboureli note that coupled with strong support for the United Nations and peacekeeping efforts, the ideas of middle power and peacekeeping are conflated in the national discourse and thus the narrative of

---

[85] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Punching Above Its Weight: 1939-1968" 9 Sept 2011, http://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/photos/punching-jouer.aspx?menu_id=39&view=d, accessed 20 November 2014.
[86] Arthur Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney*, (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1993).
[87] Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2000), 188-206.
[88] Paul Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), 89.
[89] Karsten Jung, "Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests Through Peacekeeping," *European University Studies*, Vol. 575, No. 31, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009), 44.
[90] Government of Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Ottawa, 1997. See also David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the murder in Somalia*, (Toronto: McClleland and Stewart, 1996).

Canada's international behaviour is tied to both concepts.[91] The behavioural elements of this narrative will be explored in greater detail further on, but nonetheless highlight its complex relationship with deep roots in both academia and policymaking.

As has been explored, the middle power narrative emerging from the Second World War was intertwined with the practice of Canadian diplomacy, in large part due to Canadian diplomats and policymakers' central role as agents who constructed and propagated this narrative. These elites who had been steeped in the foundational academic elements that had emerged prior to the Second World War were intimately tied to the practice of Canadian international affairs in the early Cold War and as such, the two became, to an extent, mutually reinforcing. It is in this way that the middle power narrative as defined by policymaking and academic elites came to predominantly define the practice as well as the study of Canadian foreign policy. As noted previously there was generally an acceptance by Canadian leaders from Prime Minister Lester Pearson up until the Harper government, of the middle power narrative and as a result, shared understanding about Canada's international behaviour.[92] Successive governments built on Pearson's legacy embedding the preference for multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding.

As will be explored further in this chapter and throughout this study, it is not until the Harper government that there has been a serious attempt to reinterpret Canada's foreign policy narrative. The middle power narrative, having been established through both policymaking practice as well as in the academic study of Canadian foreign policy emerged as the dominant understanding of this subject. The close association that developed between the

---

[91] Heiki Härting and Smaro Kamboureli, "Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives and the Cultural Imagination in Canada," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol.78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 656-686.

[92] Adam Chapnick, "Peace, Order and Good Government: The 'Conservative' Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 635-650. See also, John W. Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

practice of Canadian foreign policy and the study of Canadian foreign policy has played an important role in defining the middle power narrative, both domestically and internationally. Understanding the link between these elements establishes an important paradigm in this field of study. Consequently, examinations of Canadian foreign policy are generally defined either in their acceptance or rejection of an understanding of this narrative. In this way the middle power narrative continues to remain intimately tied to both the study and practice of Canadian foreign policy both as a narrative, a role and a set of behaviours. The study of Canadian foreign policy did not begin to unpack these different elements until the 1980s when increasingly critical examinations of Canada's foreign policy started emerging in academic circles.

Critical examination of the middle power concept

Just as Canada's narrative as a middle power grew out of an academic concept and found its way into the policy sphere, academics also continued to develop this topic further. Reflecting the expansion of critical theory in the International Relations discipline during the 1970s and 1980s, examinations of Canada's international engagement moved away from purely structural considerations and began integrating other elements such as behaviour, identity and culture. In continuing the examination of this narrative, its continuity within Canadian foreign policy became such a central focus of the discipline that it became the key concept against which other approaches were created. Through this process it created a narrative that, while internally contested, has generated a dominant interpretation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, despite the greater challenges to traditional definitions of the middle power narrative, the middle power concept retained validity in the popular consciousness, largely due to its ever-expanding definition.

Former Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes, writing in 1970, suggested the use of the term 'middlepowermanship' to describe the character of Canadian diplomacy imbuing a more abstract, proactive quality to its behaviour.[93] While Canada had been characterised as an 'honest broker' and 'helpful fixer' in

[93] John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 1.

international affairs this did not sufficiently explain Canada's foreign policy behaviour. It was clear that the concepts surrounding middle power required deeper examination as the international system continued shifting and successive Prime Ministers continued to consider Canadian foreign policy priorities. Writing in 1984, Carsten Holbraad defined many of the behavioural traits associated with middle powers while also highlighting the growing difficulties with the use of the term, namely the three facets which he identified as constituent components; balance of power, diplomacy and international law.[94] These three elements, structural, behavioural and normative have created difficulties, or flexibility, for those attempting to classify Canada's international position. However, this definitional challenge identified by Holbraad remains a persistent thread throughout the discussion of Canada's middle power narrative. Writing in 1989, Robert W. Cox sought to provide more clarity to this by drawing a distinction between behavioural 'middlepowermanship' and structural 'middlepowerhood.'[95] While this helped to distinguish behaviour from structural considerations and remains an important distinction in this literature, other scholars were driven to try and examine alternative theoretical models. As outlined in Part I, David Dewitt and John Kirton proposed in *Canada as a Principal Power*, that complex neorealism better represents the clear areas where Canada is a principal actor and others where it is not, rather than imposing the broader and more ill-defined term of middle power[96] The 'principal power' concept highlighted by Dewitt and Kirton continues to be an important critical facet to the discussion and dissection of Canadian foreign policy.[97] Moreover, this work helps to further contextualise the distinction between behaviour and structural considerations (place) as it relates to the middle power narrative.

Reflecting the political upheaval at the end of the Cold War there was a need to revise the idea of Canada as a middle power to better reflect Canada's

---

[94] Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), 205.
[95] Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order," *International Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), 823-862.
[96] David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*, (Toronto: John Wiley, 1983).
[97] John Kirton, "Canada as a Principal Power 2010," *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd Ed., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha Eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

place amongst a number of new actors. The dramatic structural changes to the field of International Relations required a re-evaluation of traditionally accepted labels. In 1993, another definition of middle power by Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal helped to redefine middle power status for the post-Cold War era and suggested that middle power behaviour is defined by an approach to diplomacy geared to mitigating conflict and building consensus and cooperation.[98] Since its publication, this behavioural definition has largely been the touchstone for those referring to Canada as a middle power. It takes a much less structural view of international power reflecting the post-Cold War period and the dramatic structural upheaval in the international system. Of course it is not without its problems, as the authors themselves highlighted "[t]o be included in the category of middle powers, countries have to act like middle powers."[99] This suggests that ultimately, the definition is somewhat tautological inasmuch as a middle power identifies itself as a middle power because it acts like a middle power.[100] This presents some definitional challenges, however, as not all nations have the same ability to act as middle powers, though they may fulfil some, if not all the associated criteria. Despite the broad architecture proposed by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal not all middle powers are created equal and some, such as Canada, embody a unique set of circumstances.

Concurrent to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal's book, there were other differing interpretations of Canada's middle power narrative. Mark Neufeld's dissection of the theoretical foundations, which informed by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal's work, tried to go beyond the "dominant theoretical traditions and analytical frameworks that have guided…thinking about world politics."[101] While this article was very of its time in its use of Gramscian theory and concern over stability in a post-hegemonic world, critical theory-based work like Neufeld's expanded the deeper theoretical foundations surrounding the middle

---

[98] Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 174.
[99] *Ibid*, 27.
[100] Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1999), 76.
[101] Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Canadian Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power," *Studies in Canadian Political Economy*, No. 48 (Autumn 1995), 7.

power narrative that had established a firm and popular hold in academia and in policy circles.[102] Similar to Neufeld, Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel suggested that the traditional concept of middle power was being denuded due to Great Powers taking a more active diplomatic role with multilateralism and cooperation no longer the preserve of the middle power.[103] David and Roussel's article incorporated and exemplified common trends in using the middle power label during the late 1990s, critically examining the term's relationship with the contemporary foreign policy whilst also blending the structural and behavioural elements of the term. Nonetheless, as noted previously, there remains a lack of theoretical sophistication, particularly as it relates to the exploration of these narratives and themes in Canadian foreign policy.[104]

The interpretations of an evolving middle power role gradually translated into policy through inclusion of middle power behavioural principles into the Canadian government's foreign policy review released in 1995. While the linkages between Canada's behaviour and the middle power narrative were not new, this represented their explicit inclusion and articulation as actual foreign policy preference. As mentioned previously, this review emphasised the 'softer' elements of Canadian foreign policy with a focus on sustainability, aid, development, human rights and peacekeeping.[105] This deepened the linkages between the middle power narrative and Canada's foreign policy behaviour by further ascribing certain policies to a middle power approach to post-Cold War diplomacy. In academia, this was carried forward into the early 2000s through the work of Jennifer Welsh who advocated a more normative transition away from the middle power to 'model power,' with a foreign policy which acted in

---

[102] See also Cranford Pratt Ed., *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); Arthur Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney*, (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1993); Laura Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (May 1995), 181-196.

[103] Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel, "'Middle Power Blues': Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 1998), 141.

[104] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather Smith, "The Practice, Purpose, and Perils of List-Making: A Response to John Kirton's '10 Most Important Books on Canadian foreign policy,'" *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2010), 751-762.

[105] Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review, 1995*, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.

the global common good and more critically asked whether Canada could remain a middle power in the "middle of what?" given the end of the Cold War.[106] Welsh's work typified a growing body of scholarship undertaking a more in depth and challenging examination of this narrative; a trend which had expanded throughout the 1990s into the present. At the same time, Welsh represented a strong advocate of the continued importance of values-based Canadian foreign policy literature as shown in her continued support for the human security agenda.[107] Indeed, Nikola Hynek noted that, "Canada derives its advantageous position from the fact that it has been repeatedly successful in (re)constructing and (re)producing its external identity as a middle power."[108] While the definitions of the middle power narrative may have been contested among academics and policymakers it nonetheless carried great currency and remained an important component of Canadian foreign policy.

Turning to more recent scholarship, it has increasingly focused on the constituent elements of the middle power idea and their relationship to broader international power structures. Patrick Lennox contends that this idea is best expressed through 'structural specialization theory' which emphasises variables that transcend individual political leaders or configurations to find the ultimate causes of a state's behaviour within a structural context.[109] Lennox's effort is ambitious, relying on a systemic level analysis and arguing that Canadian identity as a middle power arises out of its hierarchical relationship with the United States as its southern neighbour.[110] This approach however, does not adequately explain the internal narratives that also surround Canada's identity and neglects to adequately address the challenges posed by the manifold nature of the middle power definition, focusing almost exclusively on the structural elements of Canada's middle power status.

---

[106] Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004), 100.
[107] Jennifer Welsh, "Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy back into RtoP," *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2011), 255-262.
[108] Nik Hynek, "Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and Promises," *Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), 40.
[109] Patrick Lennox, *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada's Place in the World*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2009), 5.
[110] *Ibid*, 133.

Writing more recently David Bosold and Nik Hynek compiled a volume on the latest literature surrounding the middle power narrative in Canadian academia.[111] In this volume, Tom Keating presents an argument for the retention of this concept as a guiding signpost in Canadian foreign policy, not only as an internal narrative, but also as a way in which this narrative shapes how others see Canada.[112] The volume goes into greater detail about the soft power and hard power elements of the middle power concept, highlighting not only the versatility of the term but also the need for greater and more diverse examination of how it relates to Canadian foreign policy.

A germane contribution to this study, David Bosold, also using modified Role Theory, dissects the terminology surrounding the middle power narrative and breaks it down into three models for critical dissection: the hierarchical model, along the lines described by Lennox, the normative model and the behavioural model.[113] Bosold noted that a number of scholars on the issue have observed "a term such as middle power, 'model power,' or 'civilian power' is simply an empty container that can be filled with new content. One should add that the most crucial point is that there is *some* content."[114] As noted previously, Bosold suggests that Canadian's belief in the middle power narrative is derived from a shared, popular understanding of its diplomatic history.[115] As such, in looking at the role of the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy this study carries forward Bosold's assertion and in doing so, seeks to add detail and depth to how this influences Canadian policymakers. Indeed, the middle power narrative has come to incorporate more elements, specifically, its behavioural connotations and its conflation with specific behaviour, such as peacekeeping, has complicated its use. The inclusion of peacekeeping behaviour as a key tenet of this narrative has been an important factor in shaping not only the public's

---

[111] Nik Hynek and David Bosold Eds., *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[112] Tom Keating, "Whither the Middle Power Identity? Transformations in Canadian Foreign Policy Milieus," *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[113] David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[114] *Ibid*, 44.
[115] *Ibid*, 47.

view of Canadian foreign policy but also how the country's image has been projected internationally.

As this relates to the popular use of the middle power narrative and its catch-all characteristics in more recent scholarship, Robert Murray and John McCoy noted that Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson saw Canada's position in the international system as ideal for promoting peacekeeping as a form of engagement that was neither overtly aggressive, nor completely sidelined and thus the ideal form of 'middlepowermanship.'[116] Murray and McCoy's behavioural definition of Canada's international engagement is an example of the popular lens through which a significant amount of scholarship about Canada's status as a middle power is viewed. The concepts of middle power and "Pearsonianism" are frequently invoked in tandem when discussing Canada's international relations, speaking to both terms' enduring popularity.[117] The middle power narrative's link with peacekeeping behaviour has been given greater visibility and exposure due to Canada's involvement in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.[118] As numerous academics and the media have highlighted, for the first time since the Korean War, Canadian ground troops in Afghanistan were involved in an overseas combat role. The intertwining of peacekeeping with Canadians' conception about their international role has caused, to a certain extent, a polarising effect in Canadian politics and public opinion as it is often placed at odds with more kinetic operations.[119] In *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang examined how Canada came to be involved in Afghanistan.[120] While their study presented a thorough accounting of the policymaking process during the early part of the Afghanistan conflict, it also failed to capture how these decisions related to the broader

[116] Robert W. Murray and John McCoy, "From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2010), 171-188.
[117] Alex Morrison, "Pearsonian Peacekeeping: Does It Have a Future or Only a Past," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003).
[118] Prosper Bernard Jr., "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *American Review of Canadian Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2 (Aug. 2006), 233–261.
[119] Campbell Clark, "Part 2: Canadians pick peacekeeping over combat," *The Globe and Mail*, 25 Oct 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/part-2-canadians-pick-peacekeeping-over-combat/article1215629/, accessed 10 November 2014
[120] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007).

narratives surrounding Canadian foreign policy. This dynamic will be explored further in the examination of the Afghanistan operation as it points towards a reflexive interaction between behaviour and narrative.[121] Nonetheless, given the nature of Canada's international engagement in Afghanistan there has been considerable commentary about the use of the term middle power and its association with military intervention as well as the Canadian military's relationship with peacekeeping operations.

Exemplifying this trend Matthew Bouldin accepts the traditional narratives as they relate to the role of Canada as a middle power peacekeeping nation and suggests that the military is best adapted to these types of operations.[122] This is also reflected in more recent scholarship from former Canadian military officer, Walter A. Dorn, who argues, in a similar vein, that Canada should maintain its traditional role in peacekeeping and other international development operations.[123] Dorn's assessment of Canada's international role reflects the continued popular sentiment in the scholarship surrounding this discussion. Indeed, the linkages between popular perception (Canada as peacekeeper) and continuity in the way that this narrative shapes behaviour have practical implications for the formulation of policy.

The popular narrative which has surrounded Canadian peacekeeping, while simplistic, is a key element of the Canadian consciousness when it comes to international conflict. In their article on the political marketing of the Afghanistan mission, Joseph Fletcher, Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove found that the ideal of Canada as a peacekeeping nation is thoroughly entrenched in the Canadian popular consciousness.[124] Similarly investigating views on this topic, Heiki Harting and Smaro Kamboureli noted that the idea of 'Canada as peacekeeper' is often a popular lens, through which much of the academic

---

[121] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker Eds, (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149.
[122] Matthew Bouldin, "Keeper of the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations," *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep. 2003), 265-275.
[123] Walter A. Dorn, "Canada's Honourable Role as a Peacekeeping Nation," *Afghanistan and Canada: Is There an Alternative to War?*, Lucia Kowaluk and Steven Staples Eds., (London: Black Rose Books, 2009).
[124] Joseph F. Fletcher, Heather Bastedo, Jennifer Hove, "Losing Heart: Declining Support and the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec. 2009), 911-937.

literature on the nature of Canadian international identity is viewed.[125] Both of these articles highlight the rose-tinted lens through which many Canadians view their country's apparent important influence on international affairs.[126] However, as historian Robert Bothwell has observed along with a number of other academics, Canadian foreign policy, even in the halcyon days of "high Pearsonianism," the reality of peacekeeping was never as simple as Canada exercising outsized influence interposed between the two superpowers.[127] Nonetheless, the relationship between Canada as a middle power and peacekeeping is deeply entrenched in the academic literature as to often be construed as an implicit link between the two ideas.[128] This is important in that it reinforces the behavioural link between the narrative and behaviour and as such, is important in the way that Canadian foreign policy roles are constructed. This is also a consideration when examining Canadian policymakers who also seek continuity with the image of the middle power peacekeeper and thus reinforce these narratives through Canada's international behaviour. In examining peacekeeping as part of the middle power narrative, it is often tied up with broader behavioural considerations despite a strong normative element which will be explored in the following section.

Ultimately, the substance of the middle power narrative must be defined by its use in analysis and given the multitude of analyses that exist on Canada and its middle power identity it becomes challenging to ascribe universal qualities. As it relates to policymaking, it has become something of a catchall to characterise Canadian foreign policy behaviour as well. This does not mean that it has no utility, but instead this study seeks to explore how this narrative manifests itself in a role which informs Canadian policymakers thus ultimately

---

[125] Heiki Härting and Smaro Kamboureli, "Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives and the Cultural Imagination in Canada," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol.78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 656-686.

[126] For an example see, Owen Wood, "Canada: The World's Peacekeeper," *Canada's Military*, CBC News in depth, 30 Oct 2003, online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/worldspeacekeeper.html, accessed 3 April 2013.

[127] Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007).

[128] This is not to say that there are no efforts to change this perception. See, Ian MacKay and Jamie Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012).

driving the desire for continuity with this narrative. By exploring the relevant scholarship surrounding the middle power narrative it provides us with insight into its various components but also the ways in which it is labile. Rather than being a static concept, the middle power narrative is instead, characterised by a constant dynamic between policy and practice.

While the literature explored in this section feeds an interesting academic debate, this has created, in part, what has become a largely semantic discussion over whether Canada is a middle power, model power or something else entirely. The terminology has become so overused and bogged down with too many definitions, concepts, behaviours and hierarchical dissections that it means whatever authors' need it to in order to justify their own analyses. Similarly, as with the broader field of Canadian foreign policy, a limited amount of theorising about the role of identities, narratives and ontology as it relates to Canada's international behaviour whilst building on many of the concepts explored thus far. Writing in 2012, echoing distinctions made by John Holmes and Robert Cox over 20 years ago, Kim Nossal argues that the narrative remains valid as any definitions are fraught, though the author using the term must be clear to distinguish between 'middlepowermanship,' namely a set of behaviours and actions which define a middle power and 'middlepowerhood' referring to the more structural interpretation of Canada's position relative to Great Powers and smaller powers.[129] Despite this, the critical components of the Canadian middle power narrative and its relevance to policymaking are a hybrid of these different elements. Carrying forward Bosold's assertion, it is important to look beyond the definitional aspects of Canada's middle power narrative and look towards the continuity that this narrative provides and by extension, how it shapes the behaviour of Canada internationally.[130] In articulating this, these competing definitions and facets of the narrative will then need to be incorporated into a role for Canada. However, as mentioned previously, a challenging facet of this narrative remains its normative component which is often regarded as part of

[129] Kim Richard Nossal, "'Middlepowerhood' and 'Middlepowermanship' in Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 24.
[130] David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

middle power behaviour but is worthy of further examination to help distinguish some additional characteristics.

'Canada as peacekeeper' and normative confusion

When referring to the normative component of the middle power narrative the focus turns to how Canadian policymakers utilise international organisations for the construction of regimes and is often linked with Canada's relationship with the UN.[131] Indeed, one of the more complex elements of the middle power narrative, it is often closely tied to the behavioural and structural components as it encompasses aspects of both, however, it does have some unique aspects which require greater clarity. As Holbraad observed, the international law component of middle powers remains difficult to ascertain as some middle powers have a mixed legacy when it comes to influence in this area.[132] This is particularly important as it relates to how it shapes Canada's policies in international organisations and often by extension shapes these organisations themselves.[133] During the immediate post-Cold War era policymakers in the Liberal-led government often emphasised soft power capabilities when dealing with international security, underscored, at least until more recently, by a long-standing commitment to United Nations-led peacekeeping forces.[134] Canada's instrumental role as an architect of the UN and NATO was a foundation upon which the government sought to continue shaping international law, both outside of international institutions as with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, as well as with the creation of new organisations such as the International Criminal Court.[135] This was, for a time, supported by a historical commitment to foreign

[131] For an overview of the attempts to achieve this see Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2008), 615-639.
[132] Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), 205.
[133] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organisations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 23.
[134] Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review, 1995*, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.
[135] For a dissection of the Ottawa Treaty see, Ramesh Thakur and William P. Maley, "The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?" *Global Governance*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 1999), 273-302. For a brief overview of Canada's role in developing the International Criminal Court, see Anouk Dey, "A Brief History of Canada and the International Criminal Court," *Dispatch*, Canada International Council, 12 April 2012 http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/a-brief-history-of-canada-and-the-icc/.

aid and Canada positioning itself as a mid-sized Western power, largely free from colonial baggage capable of influencing both major and minor international power brokers.[136] Indeed others like Hans Maull, have sought to characterise these types of behaviours as those of 'civilian powers' such as Germany and Japan who, despite having the capabilities of larger powers rely on soft power instruments and multilateralism in order to achieve foreign policy outcomes.[137] While Maull's characterisation reflects many of the same components of the middle power narrative, it does not reflect the same conditions that define 'civilian powers' but rather a relatively unique set of behaviours and history in Canada's case.

The Liberal government during the 1990s undertook aggressive promotion of the peacekeeping narrative as David Jefferess observes, further enshrining it in a national imaginary; concretising the elements of structural, behavioural and normative behaviour which defined Canadian 'middle-ness.'[138] As has been noted already, conceptions of middle power as they related to Canada became intertwined with UN-led peacekeeping, multilateral diplomacy and good international citizenship. The normative element of this narrative found its expression through Canada's steadfast commitment to the UN and international law. Canada had been a major contributor to UN-led international peacekeeping operations from the 1950s through to the 1980s and remained a vocal, if less active supporter of these types of stability operations into the 1990s.[139]

During this decade, despite adopting a more selective policy on UN peacekeeping engagement, Canadian forces participated in a number of missions, in conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, the Caribbean and elsewhere. Jefferess examined the creation of the peacekeeping narrative during the 1990s and into

---

[136] Rob MacRae, "International Policy Reviews in Perspective," *Canada in the World 2004: Setting Priorities Straight*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004).
[137] Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 65, No. 90 (Winter 1990/91), 91-106; Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 56-80.
[138] David Jefferess, "Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Mythology of Canada as Peacekeeper," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 709-727.
[139] Jack L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.," *Benefactors Lecture*, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute), 21 Oct 2003.

the present through the examination of a book by former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and notes the "mythology of peacekeeping is complex, flexible, contingent, and, most importantly, resilient… Canada's peacekeeper identity is framed through nostalgia, in that it is articulated as both a tradition and a longing…"[140] While he does not explicitly explore peacekeeping's relationship with the middle power concept, his examination of this narrative both emphasises Canada's normative and implicit relationship to the terminology, as well as its blending with the behavioural, structural and normative elements of Canadian foreign policy. Jefferess also highlights and gives prominence to the role of the Canadian Foreign Minister during the late 1990s, Lloyd Axworthy. Together, Axworthy and former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Paul Heinbecker, aggressively promoted the idea of 'human security' which was written as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, a normative framework which sought to enshrine the idea of the state's responsibility to provide security to its citizens, superseding other considerations, up to and including sovereignty.[141] In creating this policy, it used Canadian conceptions of international good citizenship and sought to establish explicit behavioural rules for the international community to follow. Though it has entered the common policy lexicon in the United Nations and elsewhere, it failed to take on the central international role originally envisioned.[142] Regardless, the role of Canada as a confirmed multilateralist not only had behavioural connotations as it relates to the middle power narrative; it also took on deeper normative elements as policymakers sought to institutionalise these behaviours by enshrining them as vital components of Canadian foreign policy practice in the 1990s.[143]

As has been established thus far, the term middle power is often quite broad in its use to define Canada's narrative as it relates to its international

---

[140] David Jefferess, "Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Mythology of Canada as Peacekeeper," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 725.
[141] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Responsibility to Protect*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001.
[142] It remains an important element however, and will be explored in greater depth for the Libya example.
[143] David Black and Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Multilateralism Re-constituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Studies in Political Economy*, Vol. 49 (Spring 1996), 7-36.

behaviour and as such, its normative content is often left to either the author to define or to use the well-established tropes as they relate to Canada. These traditional ideas often expressed as peacekeeping, multilateral engagement and what could be termed 'good international citizenship' have all been hallmarks in the popular image of Canada as a middle power.[144] What is notable about this normative element is the general lack of exploration of how Canada has shaped NATO operations. This is despite an important role played by Canada in the creation of civilian casualty guidelines, the treatment of detainees among other human rights related issues in the Afghanistan mission.[145] Literature concerning Canada's participation in NATO tends to focus on the development of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.[146] There is a focus on Canada and the UN, more so of late, with open criticism coming from the Foreign Minister compounded by the failure of Canada to obtain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010.[147] The distancing of the UN relationship also goes hand in hand with a deeper involvement in NATO's kinetic peace support operations. This is combined with calls for a deeper, more comprehensive military approach, among them former Chief of Defence, General Walter Natynczyk, who seeks to give Canada a focused but robust international military capacity and by extension allowing Canada to fulfil its role as a good international citizen.[148] This echoes many of the same debates over functionalism and Canada's role in the UN during the early Cold War.[149] Indeed the normative element of the middle power narrative as it relates to NATO remains difficult to effectively define due to its close relationship with behaviour. Canada played an important role in defining

---

[144] Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International* Journal, Vol. 54*,* No. 1 (Winter 1998-99), 88-105.
[145] Interview 1, 16 October 2012.
[146] See Escott Reid, "The Art of the Almost Impossible: Unwavering Canadian Support for the Emerging Atlantic Alliance," *NATO's Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s*, Nicholas Sherwen Ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). For more a more recent view see, David Pratt, "Canadian Grand Strategy and Lessons Learned," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr. 2008), 61-78.
[147] "Baird Criticizes UN in Speech to General Assembly." *CBC News*, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/10/01/pol-baird-united-nations-monday.html, accessed 10 January 2013.
[148] General Walter Natanczyk, "The Canadian Forces in 2010 and 2011 - Looking Back and Looking Forward," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 2011), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo11/no2/03natynczyk-eng.asp, accessed 14 November 2014.
[149] Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1999), 75.

the relevant legal arrangements, civilian casualty guidelines and other frameworks which guided NATO forces in theatre.

As such, the normative component to the middle power narrative remains important as previously discussed, due to Canada's historically close association with the UN and initiatives like the Responsibility to Protect as well as its deeper involvement in NATO operations. These factors will be important in providing context to Canada's role as it relates to the Afghanistan and Libya operations. However, as alluded to already, there were more recent attempts by the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper to reinterpret Canada's narrative in order to better conform to their domestic and foreign policy priorities. A number of authors have started to examine the impact of Prime Minister Harper and the Conservative Party have had on Canadian politics and its foreign policy.[150] Nonetheless, there has been less work done specifically on the effects that the Harper government has had on Canadian foreign policy as these analyses are usually couched in relation to the government's effects on the domestic level. Some of the most relevant and comprehensive work done on foreign policy under the Harper government comes from John Ibbitson, however, he deals with foreign policy more holistically without a focus on NATO or any other institution and while informative, is arguably not as academically rigorous as could be hoped given the criticisms of Canadian foreign policy scholarship already outlined in this study.[151] Indeed, in his latest biography of Stephen Harper he suggests that Canadian foreign policy has changed to reflect a more conservative Canada but ultimately, this new interpretation of foreign policy gets results internationally.[152] As will be explored in this study, this re-orientation of Canada's foreign policy behaviour has also had an effect on how Canada is perceived by its allies and thus affects Canada's influence internationally. An effort to alter or redefine a national narrative can trigger a discontinuity which, as

---

[150] See John Ibbitson, *Open and Shut: Why America has Barack Obama and Canada has Stephen Harper*, (London: McLelland and Stewart, 2009); John Ibbitson and Darell Bricker, *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What it Means for our Future*, (London: HarperCollins, 2013); Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics of Control*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010); Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism*, (Toronto: Douglas Gibson Books, 2006).
[151] John Ibbitson, "The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada's Foreign Policy," *CIGI Papers*, No. 29 (April 2014).
[152] John Ibbitson, *Stephen Harper*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015), *Penguin Random House Ebook*, 24 September 2015.

discussed in the introduction, can have important subsequent effects on policymaking internationally.

Changing the definition?

Given that this study is examining how a foreign policy narrative shapes Canada's foreign policy behaviour, it is important to be cognisant of some of the domestic considerations which shape these national narratives. As mentioned in the introduction, this study is concerned with a dominant middle power narrative, however, that is not to say that there is one, singular interpretation of this narrative. As explored in the preceding analysis the middle power narrative is highly adaptable and expansive and as such, can be used to further political priorities depending on the agenda of the current government. Prior to the election of the Conservative Party of Canada and Prime Minister Harper, there had been few previous efforts to shift the perceptions of Canadian international military action and as a result, the popular narrative supporting Canada as peacekeeper and middle power became deeply entrenched and not easily shifted. As has been established, this carried through until the present where it has come under increasing scrutiny, particularly since 9/11. The military actions that have followed in Afghanistan and elsewhere have prompted some reflection about an international identity that best reflects the nature of Canadian international engagement.[153] Some of the common tropes surrounding Canada's international engagement were revisited in the early 2000s following years of serious government cutbacks thanks to an austerity budget that Canada adopted in the early 1990s to address major deficit issues. Funding to the Department of National Defence and the DFAIT was cut dramatically as part of wider budgetary austerity measures. Among other reductions, this prompted a withdrawal of Canadian forces from NATO structures in Europe and further called into question Canada's position as an effective actor in international security, a particularly salient issue in light of Canada's behaviour as a middle power.

[153] Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liegois, *Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping: The Future of a Tradition*, (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010).

The effects of these cuts were a popular recurring thread in scholarship during the 2000s and into the present. Some authors, such as Andrew Cohen writing in the early 2000s, suggested that Canada's international influence has never truly recovered from the cutbacks of the early 1990s.[154] Cohen observed an important sentiment that grew out of these cutbacks and fed into the significant 'declinist' theme in the early 2000s which saw a propagation of writing about Canada's declining international influence and how to get it back. Other authors like Jack Granatstein and Denis Stairs urged an adoption of a Canadian foreign policy, which placed greater emphasis on interests over values and discarded or diminished the traditional focus on peacekeeping. Jack Granatstein, suggests that Canada should support the United Nations, NATO and others when it is in our interest to do so, acting more out of *realpolitik* than idealism.[155] Writing in reference to the conflict in Afghanistan, Kim Nossal suggests that this policy is informed by *idealpolitik*, arguing that Canada tends to create its security policy based around more moralistic or idealistic grounds that inadequately represent our serious interests.[156] This is not an isolated theme on this issue, but rather there are a number of commentators who have raised criticism of Canada's supposedly 'values-based' foreign policy which was, they argue continuously reinforced during the tenure of the Liberal Party to the detriment of Canada's international interests.

There have been some limited attempts to reconcile the opposed factions in this argument, however, the view of a misguided Canadian foreign policy, particularly as it regards international military action has taken a firm hold in the discourse. Reflecting this, Denis Stairs advocates deeper introspection and critical thought on issues of foreign policy, particularly given the weight to middle power rhetoric in Canadian discourse.[157] Others, like former Canadian Ambassador Alan Gotlieb, urge a return to functionalism in Canadian foreign

---

[154] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost our Place in the World*, (Toronto: M&S, 2003).
[155] J. L. Granatstein, *Whose War is it? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007).
[156] Kim Richard Nossal, "Don't Talk About the Neighbours: Canada and the Regional Politics of the Afghanistan Mission," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar. 2011) 9-22.
[157] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2003), 240-256.

policy in order to best serve Canadian interests and promote the country's international relevance after its supposed decline in the 1990s.[158] Conversely, former Canadian Ambassador Paul Heinbecker argues that we should not overly romanticise the 'functionalist' era of the early Cold War and seek to create a broader, ambitious foreign policy that corresponds closer to Canada's traditional foreign policy narratives.[159] As mentioned in the earlier reviews of Canadian foreign policy literature, interests versus values are often central themes for the conduct of Canada's foreign affairs. The implication of these authors points to a perceived traditional preference in Canadian foreign policy which privileges values over interests which, in turn, damages the projection of Canadian power abroad. The difficulty with this dichotomy also lies in the perception of what constitutes a value versus an interest as these are fundamentally subjective. Nonetheless, the Conservative government has been very forthright in its assertion that its foreign and defence policies privilege Canadian interests while promoting a distinct set of values.

The declinist narrative, for its part, has also changed, thanks to Canada's robust participation in the Afghanistan mission and instead has moved towards scepticism as it regards Canada's participation in international institutions and other organisations. In this vein, whilst advocating participation in NATO, Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky note that some in Ottawa seem convinced that NATO does not serve Canadian interests quite as well as it should and as such are attempting to change Canadian policy priorities to reflect this.[160] Conversely, David Haglund writing from a strategic culture perspective, suggests that the Alliance remains important to Canada for strategic considerations which go beyond the partisan concerns of Liberal and Conservatives noting that Canada's serious engagement in the Alliance started under Liberal Prime Minister Jean

---

[158] Alan Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," C.D. Howe Lecture, Toronto, Nov. 3 2004.
[159] Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada*, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011). See also Paul Heinbecker, "It's Not Just the Drought Treaty. Canada is Vanishing from the United Nations," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 April 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/its-not-just-the-drought-treaty-canada-is-vanishing-from-the-united-nations/article10600939/, accessed 21 November 2014.
[160] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa In, Expenses Down, Criticism Out…and the Country Secure," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 315-336.

Chretien's government.[161] Following this avenue, Justin Massie suggests Canada's 'irrational' security policy stems from three concurrent and coexistent security cultures: continental soft-balancing, defensive internationalism and soft-balancing Atlanticism.[162] Perhaps most importantly, Massie contends that the uniting factor for all of these different cultures is they ultimately predicate Canada's participation in NATO on the maintenance of structures and regimes which make Canada's international identity most salient and thus an avenue to maintain international relevance.[163] As will be explored in this study, Canada's relationship with NATO has nonetheless changed over the past decade and consequently, this could be seen to reflect wider trends in Canadian foreign policy.

Indeed, the Conservative government sought to encourage a more hard power approach to foreign policy emphasising a more robust military and foreign policy as a way to distinguish itself from previous Liberal governments. As journalist Lawrence Martin noted in his critical exploration of Stephen Harper's leadership, "foreign affairs, more than any other department, was steeped in Liberal tradition, with its arrogant officials assuming they should have the run of things, and that policy should be based on long-standing soft-power biases."[164] The Conservative Party has been seen to have embraced the military side of NATO, at least until the end of Canada's engagement in the Libya and Afghan combat missions in 2011 and continues to float participation in potential future military activities.[165] At the time interviews with officials at NATO headquarters were conducted, Canada came across notably quieter after the end of its combat operations in Afghanistan.[166] Furthermore, there are deep cuts to Canadian defence which began in 2013 aiming to shrink the military budget by five percent

---

[161] David G. Haglund," In Considerable Doubt? Canada and the Future of NATO," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2011), 14.
[162] Justin Massie, "Making Sense of Canada's 'Irrational' Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jun. 2009), 625-646.
[163] *Ibid,* 644.
[164] Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics of Control*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010), 80.
[165] John Ivison, "Canada's New Foreign Policy Strategy Comes with Risks." *National Post*, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/11/24/john-ivison-canadas-new-role-in-the-struggle-between-good-and-bad-has-its-risks/, accessed 10 January, 2013.
"Analysis | Is Harper Trying to Increase Canada's Military Might?" *CBC News*, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/11/24/f-military-canada.html, accessed 10 January 2013.
[166] Interview 5, October 17, 2012.

by 2015, though with promises to increase spending again in the future.[167] This raises questions about whether there was a serious re-definition of Canada's international identity or the Harper government merely used the rhetoric as a way of distinguishing themselves from the previous Liberal government.

Speaking in 2007 to the Council on Foreign Relations, Stephen Harper was clear that he regarded Canada as a middle power with international obligations and leading by example using much of the same language of the previous Liberal governments to advocate its foreign policy agenda.[168] However, since that speech, the Conservative government took a number of policy positions that have been a dramatic shift from the previous governments. This includes notable criticism and an almost disdainful attitude towards the United Nations, far more so than previous Canadian governments. Upon taking office in 2006, the Harper government sought to place some distance between Canada's former perceived cosiness with the UN and altered the government's rhetoric towards the organisation. This was coupled with more assertive policy stances on a number of issues that have been seen to diverge with Canada's traditional UN policies. It has been noted that the Harper government's unequivocal support for Israel, redirection of foreign aid, public criticism of China's human rights record and a waning commitment to peacekeeping missions have tarnished Canada's UN credentials.[169] The Harper government's policies are thought to have contributed to Canada's failure to obtain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, the first time in Canada's

---

[167] Campbell Clark, "Deep Cuts to Military Mark Reversal for Harper," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 Mar 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-for-harper/article4097823/; James Cudmore, "Budget 2014: Military Wings Clipped Again," *CBC News*, 11 February 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/budget-2014-military-wings-clipped-again-1.2532827, accessed 4 November 2014. For an alternative set of recommendations commissioned and disregarded by the Harper Government see, Department of National Defence, *Report on Transformation 2011*, Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie, Ottawa, July 2011.

[168] Stephen Harper, "A Conversation with Stephen Harper," Council on Foreign Relations, September 25, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/canada/conversation-stephen-harper-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p14315, accessed 20 November 2014.

[169] Paul Koring, "Blue Helmets Cast Aside, Canada Keeps the Peace No More." *The Globe and Mail*, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/blue-helmets-cast-aside-canada-keeps-the-peace-no-more/article4240950/, accessed 8 June 2012.

history it had failed to do so.[170] Indeed, Adam Chapnick suggested that the Harper government tried to redefine Canada as an 'anti-middle power.'[171]

Returning to John Ibbitson's recent and in-depth exploration of Harper's foreign policy from 2006 through to 2014 suggests that the Conservative Party has been successful in shifting the core components of Canadian foreign policy away from the Liberal Party tradition centred on Ontario and Quebec, or as he terms it, the 'Laurentian consensus.'[172] Ibbitson notes that the Conservative Party's has promoted "[a] new emphasis on trade, a new belligerence in the North, a more robust military, a new patriotism, a new skepticism toward at least some global institutions, a new and unqualified commitment to Israel" as core components of a foreign policy that is more representative of its electoral base in Western Canada.[173] Indeed, this is a point recently emphasised by Kim Nossal noting that, "[p]art of the Conservative strategy is to ensure that any policy approach that was deeply connected to the Liberals (or even the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney) is discarded, replaced by policies that will assist in achieving the broader electoral end of future Conservative hegemony."[174] This subordination of Canada's place in the world to domestic political concerns arguably conflicts with the traditional narrative of Canadian foreign policy that has been established and outlined in this chapter. Indeed, this highlights the importance of examining not only how policymakers shape foreign policy behaviour but also how their competing interpretations of Canadian foreign policy inform this narrative. As such it is important to examine what informs these interpretations and the resultant effect on behaviour.

Despite these shifts, in seeking to differentiate itself from the previous Liberal government's foreign policy, the Conservative Party failed to latch on to

---

[170] Colum Lynch, "Foreign Policy: Why Canada Is At Odds With The UN : NPR." *NPR.org*, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130665959, accessed 29 November 2012. "Policy Cost Canada UN Seat: Ex-ambassador." *CBC News*, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/13/policy-cost-canada-103.html, accessed 29 November 2012.
[171] Adam Chapnick, "Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013), 102-111.
[172] John Ibbitson, "The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada's Foreign Policy," *CIGI Papers*, No. 29 (Apr. 2014).
[173] *Ibid*, 16.
[174] Kim Richard Nossal, "Old Habits and New Directions Indeed," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No.2 (Jun. 2014), 256.

a concrete policy issue which is amenable to a course of action reflecting a new identity. Gerald Schmitz suggested that these changes were "to do with the Harper government's incremental reconsideration and reorientation of established foreign policy in directions that most strategically serve its interests while appealing to its electoral base."[175] Nonetheless as Schmitz also noted, government background documents on Canada's Afghanistan mission, while steering away from language used by the Liberal government, still framed Canada's commitment along humanitarian lines.[176] Greater involvement in NATO and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan have somewhat shifted perceptions among Canadians about the military's role and Canadian assertiveness abroad.[177] This conflicts with the still popular conception that the country was an honest broker and helpful fixer that seeks to find pragmatic solutions and maintain stability in a chaotic and charged international system.[178] In seeking to change the popular narrative around Canadian identity, the government undermined a thread which runs deeply in Canadian international affairs.

Broadly speaking, the overall effect of an attempted shift in foreign policy behaviour should be limited given the entrenched middle power narrative. Similarly, even increased hard power international military engagement, when used in the right context, reinforces traditional ideas about Canada's identity as a good international citizen. Thus, in engaging with the international system as a middle power, Canadian policymakers have certain expectations generated by the need to maintain this narrative and thus adapting foreign policy behaviour to that end. Related to this, the behavioural and structural elements tied up in the middle power discussion, as it relates to Canada, are often blended making it hard to parse any distinct thread and fundamentally, serves as a catch all

---

[175] Gerald R. Schmitz, "Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government's Foreign Policy?," *Occasional Paper Series*, No. 67 (Aug. 2013), Centre for International and Defence Policy, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University).
[176] Gerald R. Schmitz, *Canadian Policy Toward Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: Issues, Prospects, Options*, Publication No. 2010-26-E, Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2010.
[177] "War Shifts Canada's Military Expectations." *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203750404577173330113550946.html, accessed 27 February 2012.
[178] Andrew F. Cooper, "How Hollywood Sees Us: *Argo* as a Lens into Perceptions of the Canadian Role in the World," *Worlds of Global Governance*, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2 Nov 2012, http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/worlds-of-global-governance/how-hollywood-sees-us-argo-lens-perceptions-of-canadian-role-world.

depending on the writers' or policymakers' agenda. Therefore, while there have been some alterations to Canadian foreign policy behaviour, broadly speaking, its conduct has not varied so dramatically as to define a new role for Canada in the international system. However, it is important to acknowledge the domestic pressures that are continually reshaping challenging the dominant interpretation of this narrative whilst also remaining focused on the continuity in Canadian foreign policy.

Part III: Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Canadian foreign policy lacks extensive theoretical diversity and rarely possesses either granular or multidimensional focus to sufficiently explore the complex interplay between the different levels of analysis. Rather, Canadian foreign policy scholarship remains overly concerned with issues of place and process, including as they relate to the middle power narrative.[179] This is present throughout the literature on 'Canada as a satellite' or internationalist. While there is some alternative theorising on the middle power narrative occurring in Canadian foreign policy scholarship, there has not yet been an in-depth empirical attempt at exploring how this narrative relates to Canada's foreign policy behaviour. This study is not meant to invalidate any of these prevailing interpretations, be they focused on the Canada-US relationship or other facets of Canada's international engagements. Rather, it aims to give depth and provide an innovative, alternative lens by which to interpret state behaviour while also exploring a number of key themes in Canadian foreign policy literature. Nonetheless, in exploring the middle power narrative one should be clear to discern a number of characteristics related to the practice and traditions of Canadian foreign policy; namely, a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. This is not meant to be an exclusive definition, but rather a broad way of describing many of the traditional behavioural hallmarks of the middle power narrative and by no means

[179] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather Smith, "The Practice, Purpose, and Perils of List-Making: A Response to John Kirton's '10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2010), 757.

exclusionary. It does however, offer a foundation against which can then be used to explore how these characteristics in relation to Canada's foreign policy behaviour during the Afghanistan and Libya operations. That said, it does not wholly account for an emotional component to the policymaking process and as such these motivations need to be explored as a separate component.

As has been demonstrated there are clear themes that recur throughout the middle power literature, namely, the 'interests vs. values' debate, Canada's relationship with international organisations and the influence of the US and a focus on continuity with historical traditions. Representative of these themes is the importance given to peacekeeping and its popular association with the middle power narrative. The close association between this narrative and peacekeeping behaviour presents an interesting avenue of exploration as to whether Afghanistan and Libya represent continuity in Canada's actions as they relate to its foreign policy narrative. This also gives us an opportunity to explore interpretations of this continuity given that Conservative Party and Liberal Party policymakers seem to have differing visions and preferences as they relate to Canadian foreign policy, particularly as it relates to NATO. The Canada-NATO relationship is vital to the exercise of Canadian diplomacy as it has traditionally supported Canada's commitment to multilateral forums as well as provided an opportunity for diplomatic leadership. Nonetheless, beyond the context of why NATO remains critical to Canada's ability to exert its influence in the security and defence arena; it is important to recognise the need for a more comprehensive view of how this, in practice, is shaped by narratives and other factors. Similarly, the Canada-NATO relationship remains an underdeveloped area of study, particularly as it relates to Canada's participation in more recent operations and offers an opportunity to develop the Canadian foreign policy literature. Indeed, Canada's participation in NATO is more often couched in terms of Canada's internationalism and support for multilateralism while not focusing specifically on this relationship. When examining the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy it is necessary to explore in greater detail the ways in which this actually shapes the behaviour of policymakers in these institutions.

Furthermore, the Conservative government's attempts to reinterpret the dominant narrative offers an opportunity to examine the reflexive interaction between narrative and policymaking as new actions can be measured against the previous government's interpretation of Canada's narrative. To do so, it is necessary to go beyond simply explaining Canada's place in the international system and the processes which inform this position. This study aims to understand how the middle power narrative relates both to the continuity of Canadian foreign policy as well as the way in which it interacts with and shapes the context of policymaking. Given the complexity of this narrative as it concerns structural, behavioural and normative components of Canada's foreign policy, it is important to see how these elements manifest themselves in the expectations of Canadian and NATO policymakers at the individual level thus shaping the practice of Canadian policymaking in NATO.[180] Additionally, it is necessary to explore the narrative components of the middle power tradition and gain greater clarity on the ways in which the behavioural components manifest themselves and how they do so. This leads us to the next chapter which will focus on how this middle power narrative articulates a behavioural role. In exploring this role one can then assess how it can be measured against moral, humanitarian, and honour-driven roles.

[180] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist−Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), 473-495.

Chapter 3 - Canadian Policymakers and the Middle Power Narrative

As has been explored thus far, there are a number of forces which influence state action, one of which has been identified as the policymaker's interpretation of a state's foreign policy narrative. This study's FPA approach helps to understand the way in which such an interpretation translates into roles and how these roles relate to foreign policy behaviour. Rather than being a one-way interaction, however, this is a dynamic process; policymakers also respond to foreign policy behaviour by understanding it in relation to their national foreign policy narratives.[1] In interpreting empirical data, it is possible to see how narratives surrounding states' roles, function to both levy an expectation on policymakers at the national level, and to also ensure that they in turn try to conform to previous behaviours. This chapter looks at relevant foreign policy debates in the Canadian Parliament and interviews with Canadian policymakers in NATO in order to construct their understanding of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and Libya as a way to see how the middle power narrative shapes the decisions to undertake interventions. In doing so, it is important to remain focused on the broader narratives of Canadian foreign policy, rather than specific policy initiatives or controversies.

In order to elucidate the central middle power narrative, this chapter will examine the major debates between 2001 and 2011 on Afghanistan and Libya and seek to draw out each party's narrative about Canadian involvement in these NATO operations. Canada pledged support to the Afghanistan mission as of October 8, 2001.[2] It should be noted that from 2001-2002, Canadians were deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) outside of NATO command. However, in 2003 Canadian forces were deployed to Kabul as part of NATO ISAF before taking up command of Task Force Kandahar in December 2005 where they reverted to OEF until July 2006 when ISAF took command of

[1] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002).
[2] CBC, "Canadian Troops May be Heading for Afghanistan," http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-troops-may-be-heading-for-afghanistan-1.258638/, accessed 23 October 2013.

Southern Afghanistan.[3] Canadian Forces remained under this structure through to the end of combat operations in 2011. The broad view of these debates should effectively provide a foundation on which each case study can be further examined and thus provides a baseline narrative against which this study can assess Canada's policymaking and actions in each operation. In the interest of clarity and focus, it will go into depth on the debates focusing on mission renewal as well as challenges or limits posed to the operation by various political parties. Informational discussions, Senate debates and their relevant narratives are also examined. As will be explored in further detail in the following chapter, the debates also inform outside understandings of Canada's foreign policy narrative and as a result, are incorporated into popular understandings of Canadian foreign policy narrative and behaviour. While these debates do not all have a direct effect on policy formulation, they still offer a clear articulation of competing narratives across the political spectrum. This is due to the fact that while narratives and roles are expressed, explicit state actions are not usually authorised in these circumstances; rather, policymakers are given the opportunity to question the Prime Minister's policy.

Additionally, it is necessary to note that the Parliamentary system also contributes to the way in which policy is formulated. Given Canada's Westminster Parliamentary system, there is a significant amount of authority given over to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and cabinet, thus more influence accorded to the individuals there.[4] This further enhances the importance of narrative in the policymaking process as individual policymakers play a greater role in shaping policy according to their own interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative. In a parliamentary situation, conversely, particularly during a minority government, there is a need to create policy which arguably meets with agreement from other parties in government in order to get

[3] This is broadly referred to as the Kandahar II deployment, Canada's previous deployment to Kandahar in 2002 being Kandahar I.

[4] This lends credence to Margaret Hermann's hypothesis on the importance of "decision-units" as previously outlined, however, as noted already, for the purposes of this analysis these dynamics are subordinated to the examination of narratives. See Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), 47-81.

it passed.[5] Discussions in the Canadian Senate will also be included, however, as noted earlier in this study, given the unelected nature of the Senate and the wide-ranging brief of their responsibilities its ability to shape the foreign policy narrative is considerably more limited than the Parliament. Indeed, it should be noted that while relevant Senate contributions are added in this chapter, Canadian Senators rarely override the House of Commons given that they are unelected. Moreover, given that the Senate meets more regularly, debates tend to be more piecemeal rather than substantive sessions and are rarely covered by the media or heard by the public. Additionally, Part I of this chapter will also incorporate the debate over Canada's involvement in the Iraq War as a way to examine how the middle power narrative is interrelated with Canada's military foreign policy.

In examining these parliamentary debates, each party's contribution on Afghanistan and Libya will be scrutinised in order to examine how language is used to express MPs views on Canada's conduct vis-à-vis its previous international behaviour. Given the intepretivist nature of this study, through each debate the researcher is aiming to uncover the presence, either explicit or otherwise, of the middle power foreign policy narrative. Additionally, this language will also elucidate the roles that policymakers articulate and as such, inform Canada's international behaviour. While undertaking these analyses, it is important to recall as outlined in Chapter 2, that the middle power narrative is complex in that it occupies a fluid space in that it can act as both a role and a narrative simultaneously.

This chapter will also examine the language of key policymakers, namely, the Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence respectively. In order to do so, this analysis encompasses three governments, namely, that of Liberal Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul

---

[5] Glenn Palmer, Tamar London and Patrick Regan, "What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behaviour in Parliamentary Democracies," *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan-Mar. 2004), 1-24. This article offers an empirical examination of the constraints on conflict and suggests that minority governments have a lower likelihood of involvement in a militarised dispute. See also, Kaare Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Martin (minority government 2004-2006) and Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (minority 2006-2008, minority 2008-2011). It must also be noted that some domestic political shifts took place during this time, namely the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative party in 2003. Additionally, with elections in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 there is some electoral volatility and clear shifts between the different parties. Finally, it is important to remember that every individual's recounting of Canadian foreign policy narrative is also formed by his or her own, unique experiences. However, given a wide enough sample it is possible to extrapolate that in their position as elites, MPs have greater influence over the articulation of these narratives.[6]

There are a number of challenges contained in this exercise. This is inherently subjective as the value of MPs' contributions to these debates are not always proportional to the amount of time spent debating. In this circumstance it is a balance between quality and quantity, however, given the interpretivist and hermeneutic approach this study is seeking to draw out a foreign policy narrative from language.[7] As noted previously, this study uses a hermeneutic approach to examine the context and the continuity of actions without assuming that the observations are reducible to scientific principles or laws.[8] In this regard, it must be acknowledged that this type of examination does not provide a quantitative analysis of what constitutes national narratives. Specifically, the use of language in the debates is often contextual depending on the party, or in some cases the individual's stance on the operation in question. This chapter will break down the contributions by party and aim to draw together commonalities between these interpretations as well as highlight how each government aims to direct the foreign policy narrative related to these operations to reflect its own

---

[6] In line with what is outlined in the introduction, this paper regards MPs as 'elites' given their position as national policymakers. As noted; Susan A. Ostrander, "Surely You're Not in This Just to Be Helpful: Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three Studies of Elites," *Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods*, Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber, Eds., Sage Focus Edition, (London: Sage, 1995).

[7] As noted previously, this means that there is a degree of ambiguity in the interpretation of the language examined. See Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, "Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities Within the Art of Interpretation," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 (May 2006) http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/145/319, accessed 20 November 2014.

[8] Freidrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22.

interpretation. This is done to help establish both the context of each debate as well as highlight a progression from each debate to the next. This offers an opportunity to distinguish between the different governments and examine a broad progression and a finer grained analysis as to how the foreign policy debates become distanced from traditional middle power characteristics. Rather than attempting to analyse ten years of debates in one large section, one can instead see more detail related to each debate. Each party's contribution to the debate is ordered in terms of subjective importance to the broader narrative discussion as well as the relevance of the contribution to the debate. Particular attention is given to how MPs refer to tradition and the context in which it is invoked. Similarly, it will look at how MPs draw on values and interests in relation to Canada's participation in Afghanistan and Libya. When taken together, these elements will highlight the importance of narrative in constructing and shaping foreign policy. Fundamentally, this overview of the key debates will help to highlight some of the important narrative elements which shape Canada's actions when it comes to participation in NATO actions.

Narratives in the Canadian Parliament and Links to Role Theory

There has been some work done examining the various narratives surrounding Canada's participation in the Afghanistan mission, of note Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen's comparative examination of strategic narratives surrounding the deployment of NATO in Afghanistan and Heiki Hartig and Smaro Kamboureli's work on the peacekeeping narrative in the cultural imagination.[9] Perhaps, most pertinent for this chapter, Jean-Christophe Boucher conducted a discourse analysis of the successive federal governments' attempts to sell the Afghanistan mission to the Canadian public through the analysis of 101 speeches by prime ministers, ministers of national defence, and ministers of foreign affairs and international trade.[10] Boucher concludes that ultimately,

[9] Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen, "Shaping Public Attitudes Towards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives," *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2011), 505-528; Heiki Harting and Smaro Kamboureli, "Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives and the Cultural Imagination in Canada," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 659-686.

[10] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-2008," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 717-733.

narratives about participation in Afghanistan were confused between the different governments between 2001 and 2008 and as such, offered no coherent justification to the public.[11] His analysis, while examining competing narratives, does not effectively bridge the gap between narrative and action. Nonetheless, building on his work it is possible to develop this further by examining the roles that flow from the different interpretations of Canada's middle power narrative. Boucher offers an interesting method of categorising the ways in which different narratives are emphasised by different Canadian governments between 2001 and 2008. He breaks these down along three lines, 'us, them and we:' narratives which are self-referential focusing on Canadian values and interests, narratives focusing on altruistic motives and finally narratives focusing on the international community.[12] While Boucher separates these three components in his analysis, given what this study has explored already it is possible to view these as all as constitutive elements of the Self. As noted already however, this study is not dealing with a national Self but rather the policymaker's interpretation of what that national narrative is. In referencing these different components, ultimately Boucher recognises that policymakers are nonetheless distinguishing Canadian narratives about action in Afghanistan and Libya in relation to how they relate to their own understandings of the Canadian foreign policy narrative.

As noted previously it is necessary to acknowledge that the concept of a national Self remains somewhat problematic, namely the distinctions between a Self and a collective identity. However, as noted earlier, this study will instead look at the dominant narrative which informs a broader identity without ascribing a singular one to Canada. Indeed, the same anxieties, which arise from the tensions between Self and Other, are present within Canada, thus making satisfactory Canadian, or indeed state-level, identity generation a deeply challenging issue.[13] Indeed, this study is fundamentally concerned with the policymaker and as such, the Self remains a vital element of this model. This study does not discard the Self's centrality, but rather examines internal, contested and dominant narratives which constitute broader Self identities at the

[11] *Ibid*, 730.
[12] *Ibid*, 721.
[13] See Chapter 1, pg. 58.

personal level which are manifest in the middle power concept. As noted already, deeper examination of a specific narrative requires that the focus must be on the individual's conception of that state, rather than the state itself. This study focuses on the individual level as a way of examining these narratives, however, rather than ascribe a unitary state Self, it views the expression of a role as a reflection of the interpreted narrative articulated by policymakers. Role Theory thus helps to establish a stronger link between narrative and action by simplifying these narratives and helps make sense of the multiple Selves articulated by policymakers and state action.

As explored in the previous chapter Brent Steele's examination of ontological security provides a way in which it is possible to assess the different individual motivations which drive specific foreign policy behaviours; honour, humanitarian and moral.[14] As noted in Chapter 1, Steele applies these to the state-level in order to understand how ontological security and narratives of self-identity shape IR. However, as a research area this remains problematic.[15] This chapter examines how Steele's motivations link with the middle power narrative through Role Theory as a way of examining how these inform foreign policy behaviours. As noted in Chapter 1, some components of the ontological security research agenda have a clear resonance with the constructivist FPA approach undertaken in this study, as it is fundamentally concerned with the individual. Building on Steele's elements it can use these motivations to categorise the ways in which different governments understood Canada's foreign policy narrative. In distilling the language and the various interpretations of Canadian foreign policy history, the analysis of Canadian Parliamentary Debates on Afghanistan and Libya provides a window into the contested interpretations of the foreign policy narrative which ultimately informed Canada's decision to participate in these two operations. Similarly, these also highlight that while Canada's immediate physical security may not have been at stake, other motivations proved just as compelling. Steele builds on the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Max Weber on

[14] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 49.
[15] Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos, "Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the State Personhood Debate by Means of a Pragmatist Ontological Model for International Relations Theory," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct. 2010), 1057-1077.

the individual self to reconcile the moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations as critically important elements related to a state's narrative that can shape or possibly threaten self-identity.[16] It is in this way that emotions such as fear and shame also come into play when discussing the relationship between narratives and behaviour.[17] Thus in analysing the debates over the Afghanistan and Libya operations, it is important to recognise how much these emotional factors shape policymakers' narratives about state action.

In particular, in examining these different motivations it is necessary to understand how they inform differing roles. In discussing honour, Steele suggests that "the honourable is enacted when performing an action which fulfils a commitment about what 'we' have been, who we are now and, who or what we wish to be in the future."[18] In doing this it establishes how an honourable motivation, thus articulates a role which supports this honourable end. With regards to humanitarian action, Steele's explanation is more complex but remains founded on shame, in particular, retrospective shame in which individuals look back on actions (or inaction) which do not align with our perception of ourselves.[19] This helps to understand roles rooted in humanitarian motivations as it suggests that policymakers are driven to align their state's behaviour with actions that reflect their perception of the state and avoid shame.[20] Moral motivations are also intertwined with the humanitarian and are also derived in part from shame, however, when examining issues of International Relations there is a strong tension between moral action (what is right) and self-preservation (selfish action).[21] Moreover, there is an anxiety over whether the actions undertaken in foreign policy can be reconciled with the broader conceptions of morality held by the individual policymaker.[22] This study distinguishes these morally defined roles as ones that are articulated in clear

---

[16] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 49.
[17] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 131.
[18] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 97.
[19] *Ibid*, 55.
[20] Steele uses the example of Rwanda to explain intervention in Kosovo, *ibid*, 133.
[21] *Ibid*, 41.
[22] *Ibid*, 48.

terms of right and wrong with less of a concern over how these actions are perceived by others. Instead policymakers articulating these roles are more concerned with how these actions fulfill and reflect their own internally held ideas about who they are and the principles for which they stand.

Building on these elements, one can see that MPs, in part, articulate the state's internal conception of itself and its associated roles forming a component in the creation of foreign policy preferences. Some work has been done analysing Parliamentary speeches in order to try and identify National Role Conceptions (NRC); of note, is Marijke Breuning's examination of foreign assistance rhetoric and behaviour though it sought to quantify how these contested roles emerge.[23] Kai Opperman has also examined the way in which a changing NRC can affect the interactions with other nations and thus change expectations of international behaviour.[24] Along similar lines is Amy Catinlac's article examining the Japanese government's responses to the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003 and how these resulted in different foreign policy outcomes.[25] From these previous analyses it is possible to establish an important link between narratives and roles and how these shape interactions. Indeed, as Jennifer Mitzen established when writing about ontological security, role identity is a vital part of foreign policy as "[r]ole identities are formed and sustained relationally; they depend on others to be realized."[26] Building on this, Roland Paris has also attempted to use Role Theory to explore Canadian foreign policy examining the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy under the Harper government.[27] Paris focuses his attention on how narratives about national roles are viewed by the Canadian public rather than by policymakers. This points to the importance of the articulation of these roles by policymakers, both in the House of Commons as

[23] Marijke Breuning, "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behaviour in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun. 1995), 235-254.
[24] Kai Opperman, "National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints, and the New 'Normalcy' in German Foreign Policy: The Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond," *German Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2012), 502-519.
[25] Amy Catilinac, "Identity Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq," *Politics and Policy*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar. 2007) 58-100.
[26] Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), 357.
[27] Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307.

well as in the Senate and their relationship with foreign policy narratives. Through careful readings of the key debates over Canada's foreign policy related to the Afghanistan and Libya operations by MPs it is possible to identify the crucial language relevant to this study. While Lisbeth Aggestam focuses more broadly on national identity, she notes that,

> [f]oreign policy speeches often reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural group that are related to specific customs, institutions, territory, myths, and rituals. These expressions of identity indicate how foreign policy-makers view past history, the present, and the future political choices they face.[28]

Aggestam's point is applicable in the case of narratives as these direct the ways in which foreign policy is publicly articulated and thus conform to roles. By looking at the language used by MPs in debating Canada's foreign policy in Afghanistan and Libya it is possible to see how narratives surrounding Canada's past behaviour inform the creation of new policies and the pressures that these exert on future operations.[29]

This also helps us to situate the Role Theory component of this analysis and helps to establish that in essence, NRCs are not entities in their own right but rather the product of individuals. In contesting these different NRCs, policymakers are more broadly negotiating and renegotiating their own visions of a country's narrative in order to make sense of their actions.[30] Using this as a foundation, this chapter will seek to establish competing interpretations of the middle power narrative expressed in Canadian Parliamentary Debates on Afghanistan and Libya as a way to establish how the roles articulated ultimately shape and define foreign policy behaviour. This study seeks to build on this further using a number of interviews from NATO headquarters to help

---

[28] Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Foreign Policy," *ARENA Working Paper*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1999), http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm.

[29] This will focus on debates over the Afghanistan mission's renewal and parameters along with "take note" informational debates. Similarly, on Libya, it will focus on debates over the mission's approval and, given its short duration, parameters for Canadian forces involved. See also Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini, Eds., (London: Sage, 2011).

[30] For more on contested NRCs see Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, No.1 (Jan. 2012), 5-24.

understand how the middle power narrative articulated in the parliamentary debate manifests in policymaking behaviour.

Ultimately, it is the expression of how the understanding of the middle power narrative and attendant roles, relate to state actions that most concerns this study. As such, it is not vital to find explicit mention in the Parliamentary Debates of the words middle power in relation to Canada, but rather, the objective of this chapter is to identify and draw out the narratives which inform and shape the roles and by extension, the course of action policymakers envision for Canada; what Lisbeth Aggestam suggests is a 'role set.'[31] It is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds of roles that are articulated, namely what kinds of behaviours do they express; do they reflect the preferences of the policymaker? Or, are they rooted in capability-focused considerations? In examining which is privileged here, one can gain insight into the relationship between narratives and behaviour. Moreover, as Trine Flockhart suggests, these 'role sets' constitute, "a collection of specific functional tasks that are perceived to be in keeping with, and supportive of, the self-identity."[32] Thus each interpretation of a narrative carries with it a set of attendant behaviours, i.e. a policymaker who sees a country's foreign policy narrative as primarily humanitarian expresses a desire to see more development work along with the associated development programmes. Additionally, it is important to distinguish how different roles interact and thus affect policy. Michael Barnett offers an interesting distinction here suggesting that "when examining how roles affect state behaviour, and particularly so for preference roles, the state's understanding of and the meaning it attaches to its role must be incorporated."[33] While Barnett remains concerned with the state level of action, this conceit can be adapted in order to examine the roles articulated by policymakers. In doing so, this provides

---

[31] Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy," *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*, Ole Egström and Michael Smith, Eds., (London: Routledge, 2006), 21.

[32] Trine Flockhart, "NATO and the (Re)constitution of Roles: 'Self' 'We,' and 'Other'?" *Role Theory in International Relations*, Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hans W. Maull, Eds., (London: Routledge, 2011). As noted previously, self-identity in this case poses a problematic concept and Flockhart uses this in relation to NATO, however, in the instance of role-sets the definition remains applicable.

[33] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.

some insight into how policymakers regard the Canadian foreign policy narrative, through the language they use, both in terms of actions and also how they regard Canada's position in the international system. Barnett also differentiates roles in terms of preference roles and position roles, each of which has a different effect on policymaking options; *preference* roles are more flexible if unstable while *position* roles are more restrictive and less interpretive.[34] Given the prevalence of the middle power narrative in Canadian scholarship and in the formation of foreign policy, this potentially has ramifications for policymaking. Indeed, in articulating what appears to be an overt position role, this arguably limits the formulation of foreign policy options. Going beyond this, the following analysis will aim to identify how these roles and narratives are linked and how this is connected to Mintz and Kreps' hypotheses explored in the introductory chapter. Specifically, Mintz suggests that the 'essence of decision' lies in domestic politics, specifically; leaders will not take foreign policy decisions which pose a high political cost.[35] This study builds on this with Sarah Kreps' suggestion that elites, as they related to Canada and the Afghanistan mission, were insulated from political costs related to participation in the mission due to consensus between major parties over the issue.[36]

There is an important interaction between the leadership, in this case the various Prime Ministers, their Cabinets and the Parliament, the dynamics between which, while important do not necessarily give insight into foreign policy narratives.[37] Instead, this chapter examines the ways in which the different political parties describe competing interpretations of the middle power narrative in relation to Canada's previous foreign policy behaviours. While it is already clear what the foreign policy behaviours *were*, this study is more concerned with understanding the narratives driving Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and

---

[34] *Ibid*.
[35] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.
[36] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[37] See Juliet Kaarbo, "Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policymaking Process," *The Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), 243-263. As noted in the introduction, this examination will steer away from the psychological examination of the various individuals.

Libya. Fundamentally, this helps to interpret the reflexive process between the policymakers and how they assign meaning to the foreign policy narrative.[38] Similarly, this also gives some additional clarity to the process of foreign policy change.[39]

Taken altogether, it is possible to assess how the middle power narrative ultimately provides an understanding as to how certain preferences are formed through the exploration of narratives and roles. As outlined previously in this study, these narratives when drawn together feed into the perception of Canada as a middle power and during parliamentary debate this lens is created through the invocation of this narrative. It is important to note that in the case of each operation, both debates on these operations begin prior to their integration into the NATO command structure. As will be demonstrated, this is important to the concept of multilateralism and its relationship to narratives around Canada's international behaviour. Nonetheless, the bulk of each operation takes place within this structure and the process of policymaking at the systemic level also provides an opportunity to assess the impact of the middle power narrative.

This chapter will start with the parliamentary debate following the attacks on September 11, 2001 and follow through to debates nearing the conclusion of the Libya air campaign in October 2011. It will then incorporate interview material taken from discussions with Canadian policymakers in NATO between 2012 and 2014. These policymakers represent the link between foreign policy narratives and behaviour and moreover, are the ones who are affected by differing interpretations of the foreign policy narrative. This also helps in triangulating the effects of changing foreign policy narratives and how this shapes related behaviours. As Canadian foreign policy changed between the Liberal and Conservative governments, there were clear consequences for

---

[38] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002); See also, Anthony Lang, *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention*, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 18.

[39] While not a key focus of this study, this is an interesting area of study worthy of further examination in future studies. See Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2013); Frederik Doeser, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish 'Footnote Policy,'" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun. 2011), 222-241.

Canada's role in NATO as well as how Canada's allies reacted. In speaking with Canadians in NATO it is clearer how this behaviour manifests itself out of Canada's changing foreign policy narrative.

Part I: Parliamentary Debates

September 17, 2001 - House of Commons Debate, 9/11 and Afghanistan

This initial debate saw all the parties united in their desire for a response to the 9/11 attacks. Canada played an important role in NATO's invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and as such, was binding on members of the Alliance to respond to any act of aggression against a fellow member. The long, wide-ranging debate covered many of Canada's security concerns as well as information about the immediate responses the government was undertaking against terrorism. Most of the remarks made in the House of Commons expressed the shock, sadness and outrage at the attacks as well as a significant amount of reflection on both security practices but also on the open, democratic societies that had been violated. Fundamentally, there was not as much of a conflict in the House of Commons over narrative due to the immediacy of the attack. Nonetheless, 9/11 represented a serious disruption of the international routines which had governed foreign policy behaviour for the decade prior and set in motion a dynamic process which would alter Canada's foreign policy behaviour and reshape its relationship with NATO.

Liberal Party

As discussed previously, the Liberal Party of Canada has a strong association with many of the policies associated with the middle power narrative. Indeed, the leadership of Prime Minister Lester Pearson helped to define many of the central tenets of the middle power narrative. Following governments took up the hallmarks of this foreign policy, though whether this authentically reflects a universal attribute of Canadian foreign policy remains disputed.[40] Nonetheless, this narrative ostensibly continued through to the government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien under the custodianship of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. As

[40] Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Government Statement*, Ottawa, 1995.

noted previously, Axworthy sought to further underline many of the core components of a distinct, Liberal, Canadian foreign policy.[41] As it relates to Canada's initial involvement in Afghanistan the parliamentary debate in September 2001 reflected the Liberal Party's inherent ownership of the peacekeeping narrative with then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noting, "Canadians do not dwell often on thoughts of war. We are thankful for having enjoyed a long season of peace. When we consider our role in the world, we are more likely to think of Canadians keeping peace than waging war."[42] Nonetheless, during the course of the debate, Foreign Minister John Manley was very clear that whilst rooted in values and principle[43] Canada's foreign policy and international actions would need to respond through multilateral avenues to the action of 9/11.[44] Similarly, then-Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton also highlighted Canada's commitment to NATO Allies.[45]

Canadian Alliance (CA)

As the official opposition, the CA while supportive of the Liberal government's response also had some criticism of government policy. Indeed, MP Brian Pallister suggested Canada was on the sidelines due to years of defence cuts and that the lack of capability had eroded its global reputation.[46] Party leader Stockwell Day noted that this was "a genuine war…which can only be won, as Sir Winston Churchill said of another long struggle, with blood, toil and tears."[47] He also noted that Canadians were more likely to view Canada's role in the world as keeping peace than waging war.[48] Nonetheless, CA MPs were keen to press the government on a lack of defence spending and security infrastructure.[49]

Progressive Conservatives (PC)

---

[41] Lloyd Axworthy, *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations*, New York, 24 Sept 1996.
[42] House of Commons Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 137, No. 79, (17 September 2001), 1135, pg 5118, Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[43] John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1240, pg 5126.
[44] John Manley, 1250, pg. 5127.
[45] Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence, 1435, pg 5143.
[46] Brian Pallister, Member of Parliament, 1315, pg. 5131.
[47] Stockwell Day, Leader of the Opposition, 1130, pg. 5117.
[48] Stockwell Day, 1135, pg. 5118.
[49] Myron Thompson, Member of Parliament, 1610, pg. 5156, Leon Benôit, Member of Parliament, 1620 pg. 5157, Paul Forseth, Member of Parliament, 1640, pg. 5159.

Leader of the PC Party, Joe Clark, stated that, "Canada's role in the world has been to ensure that freedom and order prevail and prevail together…We have earned a reputation as a nation that stands on the frontline of defending and advancing free societies."[50] Other PC MPs also urged extra funding for the military, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Secret Intelligence Services.[51]

New Democratic Party (NDP)

Leader of the NDP Alexa McDonough counseled a search for a peaceful solution and invoked the memory of Lester Pearson.[52] Additionally, she also advocated an independent Canadian foreign policy based on multilateralism and not overshadowed or directed by the United States.[53] MP Bill Blaikie also emphasised the importance of international law and wanted to ensure that Canada was respecting its international commitments.[54] Similar to this MP Svend Robinson noted that a multilateral response, not just in the framework of NATO, but more generally must be committed to international law.[55]

Bloc Québécois (BQ)

Leader of the BQ, Gilles Duceppe, stated that "we are the defenders of freedom and democracy. This fact must remain at the heart of all our concerns."[56] Duceppe went on to warn that NATO's Article V was not carte blanche and that this shouldn't turn into a civilisational or religious war.[57] There was a push for a responsible decision about future action not motivated by vengeance.[58] Moreover, MP Paul Crête also invoked the memory of Lester Pearson and urged the government to take inspiration from its past actions.[59]

Analysis

---

[50] Joe Clark, Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, 1225, pg. 5124.
[51] Elsie Wayne, Member of Parliament, 1715, pg. 5164; Peter MacKay, Member of Parliament, 1335, pg. 5133.
[52] Alexa McDonough, Leader of the New Democratic Party, 1210, pg. 5122.
[53] *Ibid*, 1220, pg. 5123.
[54] Bill Blaikie, Member of Parliament, 1455, pg. 5146.
[55] Svend Robinson, Member of Parliament, 1725, pg. 5165.
[56] Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the Bloc Québécois, 1200, pg. 5121
[57] *Ibid*, 1200, pg. 5121.
[58] Michel Gauthier, Member of Parliament, 1520, pg. 5150.
[59] Paul Crête, Member of Parliament, 2345, pg. 5214.

As noted, in this first debate there is a frequent repetition of themes both condemning the attacks of 9/11 and supporting an internationally coordinated response. In examining Afghanistan's effect on Canadian foreign policy it is important to see the conflict both as triggering and enabling a disruption with Canada's previous foreign policy narrative. It is no understatement to characterise the attacks as triggering anxiety at a fundamental level amongst policymakers.[60] When confronted with such a radical and catastrophic disjuncture, policymakers thus fall back on routines and pre-existing narratives as a way in which to understand and react to events. As such, in this first debate Lester Pearson's legacy and Canada's international reputation were invoked by policymakers across a number of parties indicating certain commonalities in the interpretation of Canada's international role. This consistency was ensured through the articulation of Canada's role as a guarantor of peace and stability, largely through the support of multilateral institutions.

This connects with Steele's articulation of honour, which refers to both internal and external drives to perform actions which reinforce an agent's sense of who they are and what they stand for.[61] It is possible to fundamentally distinguish this from the other motivations outlined by Steele – humanitarian and morality driven responses. Both of these remain rooted in shame, or as Steele suggests, "when agents of states express discursive remorse for something in their nation's past."[62] While the case can also be made that there is a moral component to Canada's immediate response to 9/11, it is important to recognise that honour has an intrinsic moral component which cannot entirely be disaggregated. Honour inherently contains a conception of right and wrong, thus the policymaker enacts an internal vision not only seeking to maintain standing and reputation, but also places a judgment upon the social actions of others in

[60] When discussing this in the context of ontological security it builds on Søren Kierkegaard's conception that individuals build routines as a way in which they can reduce existential anxiety. See Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. W. Lowrie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), originally published 1844.
[61] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 97.
[62] *Ibid*, 54.

relation to their interpretations of those actions.[63] One can distinguish between the two in that morality emphasises the right and wrong of the actions themselves, though in large part, as Reinhold Niebuhr contends, it is up to the individual actor to assess whether the action undertaken is in the actor's self-interest and then judge those actions.[64] Honour, however, is more relational (i.e. is concerned with standing, credibility and reputation) and thus concerned with one's response to actions both internally and externally.

This also builds on Barry O'Neill's contention that honour is a crucial component in the maintenance of a sense of self which can require a violent response particularly when challenged.[65] In relation to Role Theory as explored in the previous chapter, it is possible to see the articulation of a role preference by policymakers, one that is constructed out of a self-generated narrative.[66] In this sense, self-generated refers to the sense that each policymaker largely draws on a number of preconceived or familiar narratives that are not inherently static, but as Catarina Kinnvall posited, constantly negotiated between actors.[67] In this case, policymakers were driven to respond to 9/11 through a recognition that Canada *should* play a role in responding to the attacks, both out of kinship with the United States but also to send a message to other actors. In this way it both satisfied *internal* and *external* conceptions of honour allowing policymakers to feel that they were both responding to a crisis while also taking actions vis-à-vis Canada's allies.

Broadly speaking, there was little deviation in the various positions, though the CA were perhaps most vocal in seeking to push a harder line in the response to 9/11. Nonetheless, this first debate, despite the parties moderating their criticism and tone, evokes a particular narrative about Canadian foreign

---

[63] For more clarity on honour and motivations in the international system see Richard Ned Lebow, "Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations," *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 3 (2006), 431-448.
[64] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, (London: Scribner, 1934), 92.
[65] Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols and War*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 92. Steele builds on this extensively through his own work on honour.
[66] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.
[67] Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalisation and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), 8.

policy that would continue to crop up throughout the next decade and sets the stage for a significant reinterpretation of the narrative of Canadian foreign policy. The narrative and the attendant roles that were articulated in the ensuing parliamentary debates provides a way in which to assess how the middle power narrative influenced the Canadian decision to take part in the Afghanistan campaign. Ultimately, the leadership of the Liberal Party agreed to deploy forces in support of the United States as a way of demonstrating solidarity and in particular demonstrated an honour-driven response to the attacks of September 11th. This initial involvement of Canadian Special Forces in Afghanistan initiated a ten-year commitment to the conflict.

Indeed, the war in Afghanistan forced the Liberal government to reinterpret its views of Canadian foreign policy and ultimately gave way to a new narrative emphasised by the Conservative government elected in 2006.

January 28, 2002 - House of Commons Take Note Debate on Afghanistan

This was one of the earliest opportunities for the House to discuss at length, Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan operation. Canadian Forces had been committed as of October 2001 and had been operating in theatre. A number of MPs were not comfortable with the deployment of combat troops without debate or the consent of Parliament. All parties referenced Canada's peacekeeping tradition though with slightly different interpretations as to the narratives relevance to operations in Afghanistan. The release of images in a major national newspaper showing Canadian Special Forces transferring hooded and shackled detainees to US forces in theatre brought significant criticism from the BQ and the NDP against the Chrétien government concerning its and by extensions Canada's commitment to human rights.[68] Nonetheless, there were attempts by all the opposition parties to interrogate the Liberal Party approach to the conflict. Each party sought to convey the role it saw Canada playing in Afghanistan while also criticising the Liberal government who had overseen a decade of serious defence cuts to the Canadian military.

[68] Allison Dunfield, "Canadians Helped Take Prisoners in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 January 2002, www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canadians-helped-take-prisoners-in-afghanistan/article1171819/, accessed 10 November 2014.

Liberal Party

Defence Minister Art Eggleton was clear in his remarks that while it was a multinational operation, this was not a peacekeeping mission.[69] He also noted that "Canada has earned the excellent reputation it enjoys throughout the world in large part because of our unwaivering[sic] respect for human rights and international law."[70] The debate became heated at points as the Minister was forced to defend the assessment of the Canadian Chief of Defence and the mission parameters in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to the operations of Canadian Special Forces unit, JTF-2.[71]

Canadian Alliance

A significant amount of the criticism by the CA centered on what they characterised as the Liberal government's chronic underinvestment in the military.[72] MP Brian Pallister noted that Canada was, "moving away from being a mid-Atlantic, multilateralist middle power into the realm of United States influence."[73] He went on to note the importance of peacekeeping in the Canadian popular consciousness and the changing nature of undertaking this type of task and urged the government to provide more resources to the relevant military components necessary to support this mission.[74]

Progressive Conservatives (PCs)

The PCs supported the criticisms of the CA in relation to the lack of spending.[75]

BQ

The BQ focused its criticisms on the treatment of prisoners, as it emerged that Canadian forces were handing over prisoners to the US with no guarantees about

---

[69] Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence, House of Commons Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 137, No. 133, (28 January 2002), 1850, pg. 8359. Typo in *Hansard*. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[70] *Ibid*, 1855, pg. 8360 [typo in *Hansard*].
[71] *Ibid,* 1920, pg. 8364.
[72] Leon Benôit, Member of Parliament, 1910, pg. 8363.
[73] Brian Pallister, Member of Parliament, 2110, pg. 8377.
[74] *Ibid*, 2110, pg. 8378.
[75] Elsie Wayne, Member of Parliament, 2015, pg. 8370.

respect for the Geneva Conventions.[76] Additional concerns were raised about the lack of a vote on the mission given the US leadership and not under the UN.[77] Indeed, MP Antoine Dubé noted that "this supposed peacekeeping mission does not fall entirely within the tradition to which we have become accustomed under various Canadian governments, starting with Lester B. Pearson."[78]

NDP

The NDP had previously been critical of a military intervention and leader Alexa McDonough stated that the party would support the mission only if it was under humanitarian and peacekeeping auspices with the UN in charge and after a House of Commons vote.[79]

Analysis

As a first real debate on Canada's mission in Afghanistan a number of themes are articulated about Canadian behaviour. While the Liberal Party's narrative about the conflict was largely subsumed by the defence of JTF-2 and prisoner transfer agreements, the wider narrative of the conflict concerned the duty to allies and Canada's reputation. This interpretation links with the broader conceptions of honour as articulated in the aftermath of 9/11, namely, describing Canada's contribution in terms of the esteem of others and by extension, satisfying a need for external honour.[80] This, in and of itself, is not a huge departure from narrative about Canadian involvement overseas and indeed, there were serious concerns raised about the legitimacy of the mission and the role of the UN.[81] There was also some hesitation about the extent to which the Canadian Forces' could maintain respect for international law and the leadership of the United States. The detainee issue and the concern over human rights was a recurrent issue over the course of the Afghanistan operation and represented a

[76] Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the BQ, 1420, pg. 8325.
[77] Francine Lalonde, Member of Parliament, 1930, pg. 8365.
[78] Antoine Dubé, Member of Parliament, 2130, pg. 8380.
[79] Alexa McDonough, Leader of the NDP, 1950, pg. 8367.
[80] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 98.
[81] Alexa McDonough, 1950, pg. 8367.

serious challenge for policymakers in defending the legitimacy of the mission.[82] This would come to colour both the Liberal and later other parties' defence of the mission. Prime Minister Chrétien suggested that Canada's deployment to Kabul nonetheless reflected its peacekeeping tradition and that the Martin government's decision to deploy to Kandahar was ultimately misjudged.[83] Indeed, peacekeeping and the legacy of Lester Pearson once more cast a long shadow over the conduct of Canadian foreign policy with differing views of how to interpret Canadian Forces' actions in Afghanistan. At this stage, however, it was not entirely clear the scale to which Afghanistan would become such a major foreign policy priority for Canada.

Nonetheless, in relation to the middle power narrative, it is possible to parse out slight variations in interpretation with the BQ and NDP articulating an idealised vision of Canada's role; namely one with Canada as an upholder of international law and supporter of international regimes – fundamentally a more normative-related vision of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the characteristics of this narrative remain as core priorities in the foreign policy roles both parties articulated. As explored in Chapter 2, this vision of Canada was well entrenched though there were a number of critical views of this narrative.[84] Interestingly, the NDP were the only ones to question, off the back of their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative, whether Canada *should* be militarily involved in Afghanistan – a theme which characterised the NDP position throughout the operation. Nonetheless, the Liberal government's response to 9/11 is firmly couched in a historical interpretation of its foreign policy by policymakers. As such, the honour-driven motivation for Canada's participation in the mission was related to an interpretation of not only the right action, but also concerns over Canada's standing, reputation and credibility towards its allies, particularly the United States.

---

[82] Canadian Press, "Alleged Afghan Prison Torture Controversy Slips Quietly into History Books," 10 March 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/alleged-afghan-prison-torture-controversy-slips-quietly-into-history-books-1.2567308, accessed 10 November 2014.
[83] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 305.
[84] As an exemplar see: Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, (Toronto: M&S, 2003).

At this time Canada's Afghanistan mission did not yet fall under NATO purview and is not the most instructive in relation to Canada-NATO international narrative as it was instead, initially under the auspices of a US-led coalition of the willing. Nonetheless, NATO had invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and the UN had authorised international action in Afghanistan under resolutions 1368, 1378, 1383 and 1386. Despite a significant contribution and international authorisation most Canadian forces withdrew from Afghanistan in August of 2002 after a 6-month rotation. Indeed, then Chief of Defence Staff, General Ray Henault noted that Canada needed an operational pause to regenerate the forces from the operations in Afghanistan leading to the withdrawal of ground forces in 2002.[85] From the peak of 845 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry soldiers deployed to Kandahar airfield, Canadian forces did not return in any significant way until NATO took over command and coordination of the ISAF mission the following year.[86] This initial entry into Afghanistan nonetheless set the stage for Canada's later redeployment to Kabul and then on to Kandahar. This signaled the beginning of the next decade of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and would see the most extensive deployment of Canadian forces overseas since the Second World War.

17 March 2003 – House of Commons Debate on Canadian Participation in the Invasion of Iraq

Prior to the Canadian forces redeployment to Afghanistan under the ISAF aegis, the United States had made clear its intention to disarm Saddam Hussein and invade Iraq. Under the Chrétien government, the Canadian Parliament held an emergency debate on participation in the Iraq conflict. Participation in the war was widely opposed by the Canadian public, however, the government's position

[85] BGen.(ret.) G.E. Sharpe, "Observations on the Association Between Operational Readiness and Personal Readiness in the Canadian Forces," *Defence R&D Canada*, 31 March 2006, Toronto: www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473037, accessed 20 November 2014.
[86] Department of National Defence, "Deputy-Chief of Defence Staff Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison Provides a Briefing on Operations of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan," *National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces*, 13 March 2002, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=deputy-chief-of-defence-staff-vice-admiral-greg-maddison-provides-a-briefing-on-operations-of-canadian-forces-in-afghanistan/hnmx1bi4, accessed 20 November 2014.

on the issue was not made clear until shortly before the invasion.[87] As it related to the debate, a number of views from each party were expressed across a number of related topics. While this study does not go into great depth with regards to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the debate surrounding the invasion forms important context to the future discussions of Canada's Afghanistan deployment. Similarly, it provides further clarity to Canada's middle power hallmarks, namely Canada's commitment to multilateral, legally founded international action. As such, it is possible to extract different interpretations of the foreign policy narrative from the statements made reflecting a narrative about Canada and its role in the world along with the importance of multilateral institutions. In the lead up to debate, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noted that he saw Canada playing the role of 'honest broker' between members of the UN in securing a resolution on Iraq.[88] Indeed, there are distinct, discernable views about Canada's middle power narrative which illustrate its importance in parliamentary debate. By applying the lenses outlined earlier in this study this offers a check into how policymakers articulate roles in keeping with a narrative. As with the other segments of this chapter, this will break down along party lines.

BQ

Having initially called for the debate, members of the Bloc Québécois were very clear in their condemnation as to actions they regarded as "illegitimate or immoral, based on the criteria reflecting public opinion around the world."[89] Indeed, the BQ was particular in its opposition to the conflict viewing the circumvention of the UN as illegal and called on the government to ensure there was no Canadian support for action. [90]

NDP

---

[87] For polling results see, http://25461.vws.magma.ca/admin/articles/torstar-24-03-2003c.html also Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 55.
[88] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 312.
[89] Francine Lalonde, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 38th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 138, No. 71, (17 March 2003), 1815, pg. 4283. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[90] Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the BQ, 1420, pg.4244.

Similar to the BQ, the NDP was vocal in its opposition to the war in Iraq, both as an illegal action, but also in calling for a peace process.[91] It was highly critical of the Liberal government's attempts to broker a last minute settlement at the UN which might have legitimised US action.[92] Along a similar line, the NDP robustly advocated for the protection of civilians and avoiding the use of depleted uranium weapons as well as cluster munitions and land mines.[93]

CA

The CA was much more forthright casting the conflict in terms of good and evil.[94] The language used also suggested that joining the coalition in Iraq was in Canada's interests, and failing both its allies and to share the burden of international action would diminish Canada's role in the world.[95] Indeed, remarks tended to focus on maintaining Canada's credibility rather than expressly advocating Canadian military action in the Gulf.[96]

PC

Similar to the CA the PC focused on Canada's role as a transatlantic bridge and by refusing to take part the Liberal government was damaging its reputation and ultimately rendering Canada irrelevant.[97] Similarly, there is the view that the government had failed the UN and had squandered Canada's ability to affect diplomatic change and by extension, these actions were against its national interest.[98]

Liberal

The Liberal party was very clear about its support for the United Nations and noted that traditionally, multilateralism had served Canadian values and

---

[91] Alexa McDonough, Leader of the NDP, 1440, pg.4247.
[92] Bill Blakie, Member of Parliament, 1915, pg.4291.
[93] Judy Wasylycia-Lies, Member of Parliament, 2310, pg. 4319.
[94] Stockwell Day, Member of Parliament, 1850, pg. 4287, Leon Benôit, 2130, pg. 4307
[95] *Ibid*, 1900, pg. 4288.
[96] Rahim Jaffer, Member of Parliament, 2025, pg. 4300.
[97] Joe Clark, Leader of the PC Party, 1930, pg. 4292, Scott Brison, Member of Parliament, 2230, pg. 4314.
[98] Bill Casey, Member of Parliament, 1940, pg. 4293, Scott Brison, Member of Parliament, 2230, pg. 4315.

interests.[99] Representatives were also clear in invoking Prime Minister Lester Pearson, the peacekeeping tradition and unique capabilities that Canada could offer in this regard.[100] The party was keen to promote the narrative of Canada's support for peace and security and the tradition of 'soft diplomacy' and the promotion of dialogue as a central value.[101]

Analysis

The Iraq debate remains unique in this study as it falls outside the general NATO-related purview. However, it remains valuable in its contextual relationship to other Canadian action taking place simultaneously in Afghanistan. Worthy of note, the debate was undercut by a charged strain of anti-American sentiment in the Canadian public and as such, rhetoric on this issue was often framed vis-à-vis the US.[102] Given that it is concurrent with Canada's action in Afghanistan and the Iraq debate's proximity to the Afghanistan operations it provides a window into the Chrétien government's attitude towards conflict post-9/11. Thus in parsing the comments made during this debate it is possible to gain some additional clarity into the Afghanistan debates as well as the Libya debates which followed in 2011. Indeed, there are a few distinct views reflected between the different political parties throughout this debate. Members of both of the conservative parties (CA and PC) were keen to stress Canada's traditional position as a loyal ally and oriented their discussion in terms of Canada's national interest. Indeed, Stephen Harper and Stockwell Day had an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* on 23 March noting that despite the government's desire to stay out of the war, the CA supported the US stance against 'evil.'[103] As will become increasingly apparent, the conservative parties in Parliament sought to

[99] Gar Knutson, Member of Parliament, 1835, pg. 4286.
[100] Hedy Fry, Member of Parliament, 2315, pg. 4320 Brent St. Denis, Member of Parliament, 2040, pg. 4302 see also, Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2220, pg. 4313.
[101] Karen Redman, Member of Parliament, 1955, pg. 4296.
[102] Brian Bow, "Anti-Americanism in Canada: Before and After Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Oct. 2008), 350. This article provides a good overview of the undercurrent of anti-Americanism in Canadian politics but has difficulty on determining how issue specific this undercurrent is.
[103] Stephen Harper and Stockwell Day, "Canadians Stand With You," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 March, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB104881540524220000, accessed 27 February 2014.

describe much of Canada's international action in moral terms, rather than the honour and humanitarian motivated language of the other parties.

On the opposing side, the Liberal and BQ members sought to place Canada's participation in differing terms, in this case, respect for the UN and international law and maintaining continuity with Canadian support for multilateralism and peacekeeping. This links back with some of the observations from the 17 September, 2001 debate and the themes resonate with the same parties. Both the BQ and Liberal Parties were clear during this debate about their views on the importance of the UN as a legal foundation for international action, overriding Canada's closeness with the US. Similarly, the NDP members were far more unforgiving of the US disregard for the UN and invoked Canada's traditional commitment to the organisation, urging a harsher response to US actions. Ultimately, these slightly divergent views reflect competing interpretations of Canada's tradition in foreign policy but at the same time are not mutually exclusive of each other. There is a clear recognition by both sides with regards to Canada's respect for international law and its role acting amongst nations, be that standing with allies or supporting international institutions. The Liberal government, defending its decision not to go to war stressed the narrative which arguably resonated best with the Canadian public. That being said, Canada was not completely uninvolved either; while expressing his disappointment in the government's decision, then Ambassador Paul Cellucci noted that Canada was already providing more indirect support through its support of counterterrorist operations in the Persian Gulf (Combined Task Force 150), than most other coalition partners.[104] In his examination of Canada-US relations, Paul Lennox observed that Canada's contribution to these operations in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea made Canada the fourth largest contributor behind the US, UK and Australia.[105] This is not to say that there were also not pragmatic considerations informing Canada's decision not to participate. Indeed, as former PC Leader Joe Clark highlighted during the debate, "by sending our scant troops

[104] Paul Cellucci, "We Are Family," *Policy Options*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (May 2003), 13.
[105] Paul Lennox, *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada's Place in the World*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).

to Afghanistan, we made it impossible to participate in any conflict in Iraq."[106] Clark sought to use this as a criticism against a lack of government spending on defence but it pointed to practical considerations related to Canada's role. Moreover, Clark's criticism reflects the distinction between role preference and role position in that even if the Liberal government had articulated a role for Canada in Iraq, the capabilities to hand would have made deployment difficult.[107] That being said, in his memoirs, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that to support the invasion of Iraq on those grounds would have been "politically and intellectually dishonest."[108] Moreover, he noted that "[a]s a matter of principle, we didn't approve of his actions because he hadn't convinced the United Nations of the urgent need to invade Iraq."[109]

In expressing each party's view, the MPs in this debate articulated their vision of Canada's role(s) in the world and situated these within the context of Canada's foreign policy tradition. Indeed, there is a strong pressure exerted by the weight of Canada's historical choices, particularly when it comes to the UN and military coalition operations. This reflects Mintz' assertion with regards to poliheuristics; namely that policymakers will discard unacceptable options and choose from those which maximise benefits and minimise risks.[110] In practice, MPs seek to preserve their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative and as such, limit their policy options accordingly. Ostensibly, informed by practical capabilities as well as foreign policy narrative they articulate a role position (as opposed to a preference) which they envision best categorises and facilitates Canadian action internationally and, in turn, remains consistent with their understanding of its narrative.[111] As noted earlier, the desire for consistency overrides or at least inhibits alternative options for action. Indeed, provoking a discontinuity with Canada's foreign policy narrative would have potentially levied considerable electoral costs on the Liberal Party, not to mention the

---

[106] Joe Clark, Leader of the PC Party, 1930, pg. 4292.
[107] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.
[108] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 314.
[109] *Ibid*.
[110] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78.
[111] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275

additional costs in blood and treasure. On the opposing side of this, the conservative parties, particularly the CA articulated a stance in moral terms with its leader Stephen Harper decrying the "moral nihilism" of the Canadian Left following this debate on Iraq.[112] In describing this conflict in Manichaean, good vs. evil, terms the CA thus renders foreign policy decisions moral and immoral, right and wrong. As a result they transcend simple national interest or Canadian aims and thus reduce their complexity. Placing foreign policy in moral terms also reduces nuance and thus presents a much narrower range of options.[113] This approach is developed more fully once Stephen Harper is elected but already at this stage, it suggests that at its fundamental level, the interpretation of foreign policy by a policymaker, when described in terms such as morality, can take on significantly different characteristics and by extension, alter state behaviour.

The Iraq debate also represents one of the last major foreign policy crises of the Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. He resigned in November 2003 with leadership of the party then going to MP Paul Martin. Elections were called in early 2004, however, the Liberals only managed to capture minority control of the House of Commons. It was during Prime Minister Martin's tenure that the decision to deploy Canadian troops to Kandahar was taken alongside a foreign policy review, the first in a decade. While the mechanics behind the decision to send soldiers to Kandahar had been set in motion years before, it was Paul Martin who ultimately authorised the deployment, though he saw it as an obligation he had to follow through on.[114] The decision to do so was taken at cabinet level and not debated in the House of Commons making it difficult to examine the individual motivations for doing so. Nonetheless, this process has been chronicled and this study is not as interested

---

[112] Stephen Harper, "Rediscovering the Right Agenda," *Christian Coalition International,* June 2003, found on http://www.cannabisculture.com/articles/4629.html as cited previously by Paul Wells, 'Harper on Process vs. Policy,' *Maclean's*, 30 March 2011.

[113] This hearkens back to Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) in which the rational actor model notes that individuals prefer simplicity when considering foreign policy options. This adds credence with regards to Steele *et al*'s contention that 'morality' framed in terms of the national interest is rational; Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 38.

[114] Bill Schiller, "The Road to Kandahar," *Toronto Star*, 8 September, 2006, http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2006/09/road-kandahar, accessed 20 February, 2014; Matthew Willis, "Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives," *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 49-67; Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007).

in the detailed mechanics of the Kandahar II deployment.[115] Rather the focus is on the broader motivations behind the Afghanistan and Libya operations within the NATO framework and how these actions relate to the broader narrative of Canadian foreign policy. That said, one can still chart the dynamics of change within narrative of Canadian foreign policy between the Liberal governments as in the 2005 take note debate on Afghanistan.

November 15, 2005 – House of Commons take note Debate on Afghanistan

This was meant as a take note debate and an opportunity for other parties to raise their concerns or queries about the mission. This debate offers some glimpse into Canadian foreign policy during the brief tenure of Prime Minister Paul Martin who governed a minority Liberal government between 2004 and 2006 but also presided over a major expansion of Canada's mission in Afghanistan into Kandahar. Notable by omission is the lack of any major discussion of Afghanistan in 2004, reflecting the Martin government's prioritisation of other missions. Additionally, it also marks the appearance of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) created at the end of 2003 through the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives. This party presented a serious challenge to the historic Liberal Party dominance of Parliament.

Liberal Party

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew, placed the mission in terms of the party's international policy statement issued in 2004 as well as the country's strategic interests.[116] He also outlined the central elements of the '3D approach' (Development, Diplomacy and Defence) and how these fit with Canada's approach to the mission.[117] Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, was also keen to stress the multilateral nature of the mission, NATO's role and UN

[115] Again as an example see, Matthew Willis, "Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives," *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 49-67.
[116] Pierre Pettigrew, Minister of Foreign Affairs, House of Commons Debate, 38th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 140, No. 150, (15 November 2005), 1900, pg. 9693. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[117] Pierre Pettigrew, 1915, pg. 9695; "3D" approach is variously known as the "3-Block War" or "whole of government" involving a comprehensive view of conflict incorporating developmental, diplomatic initiatives alongside traditional combat activities. This forms a vital part of counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) strategies.

authorisation.[118] Graham went on to elaborate that this mission was not peacekeeping in the traditional mode, but rather, a stabilisation effort.[119] Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Keith Martin, sought to cast traditional peacekeeping as a "war by another name."[120] Expanding on this, MP Larry Bagnell noted that peacekeeping was part of the three-block war method but that nonetheless, combat operations were necessary to allow aid organisations to operate.[121] He was also very clear in casting the mission as in keeping with Canada's previous contributions to peacekeeping around the world.[122] Expanding on the softer side of the operation, MP Maria Minna noted that the mission would also ensure that "constitutional and human rights norms were implemented throughout the country."[123] It was also noted that the Liberal government had ensured that Responsibility to Protect was brought into the UN highlighted its importance as part of the government's international policy statement.[124]

Conservative Party of Canada (CPC)

The CPC was very clear that this was not a peacekeeping mission but rather a combat mission. MP Gordon O'Connor sought to cast the mission as both a defence of Canada's national interest and its values.[125] Furthermore, O'Connor was clear that Canada had been provoked into the conflict and should embrace its combat role.[126] While supportive of the mission, criticism focused on a lack of criteria for success as well as concerns over the adequate supplies to Canadian forces.[127] Indeed the CPC was clear that this mission was separate from Canada's previous peacekeeping missions and tried to establish that peacemaking was a different type of mission.[128] Additionally, MP Stockwell Day reminded the

[118] Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, 1950, pg. 9700.
[119] *Ibid,* 2010, pg. 9703.
[120] Keith Martin, Member of Parliament, 2220, pg. 9719.
[121] Larry Bagnell, Member of Parliament, 2140, pg. 9714.
[122] Larry Bagnell, Member of Parliament, 2300, pg. 9725.
[123] Maria Minna, Member of Parliament, 2155, pg. 9716.
[124] Keith Martin, Member of Parliament, 2325, pg. 9728.
[125] Gordon O'Connor, Member of Parliament, 1920, pg. 9696.
[126] Gordon O'Connor, Member of Parliament, 1920, pg. 9696.
[127] *Ibid,* 1930, pg. 9697.
[128] Stockwell Day, Member of Parliament, 2210, pg.9718.

House that a Conservative government would provide consistent leadership on Responsibility to Protect regardless of the UN or intervening variables.[129]

NDP

The NDP was skeptical of the mission in Afghanistan and criticism focused on how this operation was not in keeping with Canada's peacekeeping tradition and historic international roles despite the government's efforts to portray it as such.[130] MP Bill Blaikie also noted the importance of international norms that Canada had helped to establish and questioned whether Canadian actions in Afghanistan reflected national values.[131] Indeed, Canada's reputation was a central focus of the NDP's concern and how Canadian forces were distinguishing themselves as opposed to their allies in theatre.[132]

BQ

The BQ voiced its support for the mission while acknowledging that it was not peacekeeping.[133] MP Claude Bachand noted that while it was a stabilisation mission rather than a peacekeeping mission, the conflict remained legitimate in the eyes of the UN and NATO.[134]

Analysis

While this debate did not represent actual policy formulation it helps to illustrate some of the interpretations of the foreign policy narrative as conveyed by the different parties. The Liberal Party, governing as a minority, largely reflects the policies of the previous Liberal government. Nonetheless, the efforts made by the Liberal Party to link the mission in Afghanistan with the peacekeeping narrative that runs through Canadian foreign policy points towards a specific conception of a role founded in a particular interpretation of Canada's wider foreign policy narrative. That being said, Adam Chapnick suggests that there is a distinctly more muscular approach to Canada's role in Afghanistan, moving away from the

[129] *Ibid*, 2350, pg. 9730.
[130] Bill Blaikie, Member of Parliament, 2000, pg. 9701.
[131] *Ibid*, 2005, pg. 9702.
[132] *Ibid*, 2045, pg. 9707.
[133] Gilles-A. Perron, Member of Parliament, 2130, pg. 9713.
[134] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1940, pg. 9699.

human security side of the spectrum.[135] This was reflected in the Foreign Policy Review undertaken by the Martin government which was meant to raise Canada to a place of "pride and influence."[136] Indeed, Boucher's observations regarding the Martin government noted that there was greater emphasis on Canadian "values," though these remain ill-defined by the various governments.[137] Similarly, the deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Kandahar reflected the mixed priorities of the Martin government seeking to combine the humanitarian and military components of its foreign policy.[138] Paul Martin stated in his memoirs, that he felt Africa needed to be a priority in Canadian foreign policy, in particular Canada needed to exercise leadership in addressing Darfur.[139] As a result, the Martin government in its short tenure sought to refocus Canadian foreign policy in such a way to address a number of issues.

As explored in the previous chapter, during the early 2000s there was a strain of declinism or backlash against the Axworthy years in Canadian foreign policy literature. Indeed, as an example of this Denis Stairs had noted that Canada was increasingly complacent about its foreign policy emphasising words over action and that at a foundational level required a more critical interrogation.[140] As Paul Martin suggested in his memoirs, "[e]ven if at one time there had been some truth in the idea of a middle power…it was looking increasingly dubious in an era where the Bush administration had adopted a 'with us or against us' unilateralism."[141] As such, the Martin government's foreign policy review gives greater clarity to the disjuncture with the previous Canadian foreign policy narrative. In the review, when discussing a Canadian

---

[135] Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012), 141.
[136] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, (Ottawa, 2005).
[137] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-2008," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 726.
[138] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 107.
[139] Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 331.
[140] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal,* Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2003), 240-256.
[141] Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 328.

approach it aims to discard the middle power concept, noting that "[o]ur old middle power identity imposes an unnecessary ceiling on what we can do and be in the world."[142] The challenge then presented was identifying an alternative way of describing or identifying an alternative narrative or set of behaviours that resonated. This accounts for the tepid reception that the foreign policy review received in the press upon its release.[143] Moreover, the 2005 foreign policy review only found limited purchase given the election of Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada in 2006 who had their own interpretation of Canada's foreign policy priorities and as a result, discarded many of the review's recommendations.

Offering an alternative to the Liberal foreign policy narrative is the NDP's interpretation of Canada's historical role internationally which focuses much more on 'soft' aspects of diplomacy. Nonetheless members stress Canada's peacekeeping heritage though with less criticism of the legitimacy due to the benediction offered by the UN and NATO. Outside of this exchange the CPC remained vocal on the importance of the military. The BQ also voiced reserved support for the mission as long as it was in keeping with traditional Canadian and Québécois values, focusing on multilateralism, UN legitimacy and shared effort. Ultimately, the decision to deploy to Kandahar had been undertaken by this point, though as the then (Canadian International Development Agency) CIDA head of aid and reconstruction in the region noted, the decision to deploy was taken with a minimum of consultation.[144] Nonetheless, even if Kandahar was not a top priority, the Martin government oversaw a massive increase in defence spending, pledging $13 billion (CAD) over the next five years; a trend that was

---

[142] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, Ottawa, 2005, 15.
[143] Don Martin, "Martin's Reign of Error," *National Post*, 21 May 2005, A1; Michael Campbell, "Canadians are Sold on Empty Moralizing," *Vancouver Sun*, 21 April 2005, D3; "Fixing Canadian Foreign Policy: Yesterday's Report Contains Surprisingly Upbeat Tone towards the United States," *National Post*, 20 April 2005, A20.
[144] Nipa Banerjee, Interview with the Canadian Press, "Questions Swirl as Canada Winds Down Military Effort in Afghanistan," *The Toronto Star*, 10 March 2014. http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/03/10/questions_swirl_as_canada_winds_down_military_effort_in_afghanistan.html, accessed 28 November 2014.

ultimately taken up by the succeeding Conservative governments under Stephen Harper.[145]

As noted previously, there are specific understandings about Canada's role in the world revolving around multilateralism, UN legitimacy and an important peacekeeping tradition. Together, these components frequently factor heavily into MPs articulation of Canada's foreign policy behaviour. As the Canadian Forces headed into the most challenging phase of the Afghanistan deployment how then does this align with Canada's middle power narrative? Perhaps most evidently, after the Iraq debate, members of the CPC had attempted to position their party as the inheritors of Canada's moral tradition in foreign policy. Interestingly, the Martin government showed that while it clearly sought to maintain a level of continuity with Canadian foreign policy, the shift towards a more robust military solution was evident. In this way it undercut CPC criticism that it was soft on defence while also reinforcing Canada's military commitment to the Afghanistan mission. This arguably helped to offset the refusal to take part in Iraq, while further maintaining Canada's commitments to its NATO Allies and maintaining continuity with its previous actions in Afghanistan for as others such as Andrew Richter, Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel suggested were sentimental or intuitive reasons.[146] Rather these emotional responses are linked back to policymakers' interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative.

In this circumstance, one can see that in continually debating and renegotiating the narrative of Canada's international involvement in Parliament this induces change in the narrative itself as different individuals put forward their own interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative. Although many of the same themes that were explored in Chapter 2 remain present, there is a clear attempt to try and break from the past government's foreign policy, while still seeking to create a sense of continuity. Fundamentally, it is in the brief Martin

---

[145] Daniel Schwarz, *CBC News*, "What Kind of Military Can Canada Afford?," 12 November 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/1.1230004, accessed February 17, 2014.
[146] Andrew Richter, "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbour: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment," *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 471-502; Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's Odd Man out Steps Forward," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr. 2008), 100-115.

government that there is a serious reconsideration of foreign policy. Even though the foreign policy review may not have had the same impact as the 1995 *Canada in the World* review, it nonetheless opened the door for alternative interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative to come to the fore.

April 10, 2006 - House of Commons Debate take note debate on Afghanistan

While only a take note debate, this represented the new Conservative government's first opportunity to discuss their vision of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The debate provided a window into the narrative each party was seeking to articulate. Given that the Liberal Party had originally committed forces to Afghanistan and moved them south to Kandahar the debate focused less on whether Canada should take part in the mission, but rather, on the role CPC members thought Canada should play in it.

Conservative Party of Canada (CPC)

Following the amalgamated Conservative Party of Canada's victory in the 2006 election, the party quickly sought to establish its credentials on Afghanistan. In his remarks to the House of Commons, the new Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, echoed by the new Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, sought to establish the key tenets of the Party's foreign policy on this operation. This is broadly termed the 'Canada First' approach and sought to elevate and guarantee Canadian interests abroad, in this case, by preventing terrorism overseas though it would not be fully articulated as policy until 2008.[147] Despite this language of interests, his remarks centered mainly on maintaining Canada's alliances abroad, humanitarianism and its responsibility to the international community.[148] Indeed, Minister for International Cooperation, Josée Verner, characterised the government's policy as one which would, "promote and defend the Canadian values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights."[149] Similarly,

[147] Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 6, (10 April 2006), 1815, pg. 275; All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2025, pg. 292; see Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 2008, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page, accessed 13 October 2014.
[148] Gordon O'Connor, 1820, pg. 275.
[149] Josée Verner, Member of Parliament, 1945, pg. 287.

Peter Van Loan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, explicitly stated this as "broadly defined national interest" and noted Canada's position on the front lines was leadership and an obligation.[150]

Party members also stressed Canada's commitment to coalition operations and the country's tradition of support for certain military actions.[151] Indeed, during this period Canada had reverted to Operation Enduring Freedom, outside of the NATO structure, though NATO was slated to take command of Southern Afghanistan operations in mid-2006. Critically however, there was a distinct effort to avoid casting this as a peacekeeping role with one member noting that, "[p]eacekeeping is a wonderful Canadian tradition that I suggest has gone the way of traditions; perhaps some day it will come back."[152] Nonetheless, the peacekeeping tradition was again invoked as a way to establish the Afghanistan operation as continuity within Canada's foreign policy.[153]

Liberal Party

With the Liberal Party as the official opposition for the first time since 1993, party members were placed in the position of debating an operation that they themselves had implemented and supported. As such, debate between the CPC and Liberal Party tended to focus on minor interpretations of the Afghanistan mission between the two sides and often linked in with wider issues of interests versus values and mission priorities rather than whether the Afghanistan mission had merit.[154] Indeed, interim leader of the opposition, Bill Graham, stressed a continued 'Canadian' approach to the mission.[155] Elaborating on this, MP Ujjal Dosanjh noted that this comprised a 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) approach with a commitment to reconstruction whilst also recognising that it was not a traditional peacekeeping mission in the post-Cold War mode.[156] This was echoed by MP Michael Ignatieff who expressed that Canada's role had changed

[150] Peter Van Loan, Member of Parliament, 2115, pg. 299.
[151] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 1845, pg. 279; Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, 1920, pg. 284.
[152] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 2030, pg. 291.
[153] Russ Hiebert, Member of Parliament, 2105, pg. 298; Stockwell Day, Member of Parliament, 2150, pg. 304.
[154] John McKay, Member of Parliament, 2235, pg. 310.
[155] Bill Graham, Leader of the Opposition, 1825, pg. 276.
[156] Ujjal Dosanjh, Member of Parliament, 1830, pg. 278.

and moved away from peacekeeping, though with some reservations about unlimited, indefinite, counterinsurgency actions in Afghanistan.[157] Nonetheless, the traditional peacekeeping narrative remains present with MP Irwin Cotler expressing the need for human security to underpin the core of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and in the wider international community.[158] Similarly, MP Robert Thibault noted that the reputation as peacekeepers needed to be preserved, despite the nature of the mission.[159]

NDP

The NDP expressed concern over the Afghanistan mission's continued existence as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). NATO did not take command of the six southern provinces of Afghanistan until July 2006.[160] As a result, the NDP were concerned about the extent of US influence over the Canadian contribution to the mission and the rules of engagement and maintenance of Canada's peacekeeping traditions.[161] Indeed, there was considerable concern that Canada would be operating under US rules of engagement as well as concern about the role in the broader counterinsurgency mission.[162] The blending of military action with what the government touted as part of a 3D approach raised some concerns among members and who noted that this would potentially endanger those doing aid work.[163] Similarly, there was serious concern over the transfer of detainees and prisoners to the US or Afghan government due to fear of abuse.[164]

Bloc Québécois

The BQ, while broadly supportive of the mission, also raised concerns over the use of land mines and the treatment of prisoners.[165] Nonetheless, members of the BQ voiced their support for a comprehensive mission as part of a broader

[157] Michael Ignatieff, Member of Parliament, 2015, pg. 291.
[158] Irwin Cotler, Member of Parliament, 2130, pg. 301.
[159] Robert Thibault, Member of Parliament, 2135, pg. 302.
[160] Prior to this Canada had been operating as part of both OEF as well as ISAF.
[161] Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, 1920, pg. 284.
[162] Dawn Black, Member of Parliament, 1930, pg. 285-286.
[163] Peggy Nash, Member of Parliament, 2220, pg. 308.
[164] Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament, 2135, pg. 302; Bill Siksay, Member of Parliament, 2200, pg. 305.
[165] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1830, pg. 277.

international coalition, though with some frustration about the OEF command structure.[166]

Analysis

This debate is important in that it represents the CPC's desire to both maintain continuity with Canadian foreign policy traditions while also attempting to articulate a distinct vision for Canadian foreign policy. It is in this debate that there is a clear attempt to break from what would be considered traditional Liberal foreign policy tropes like peacekeeping, while nonetheless attempting to promote an alternative interpretation of foreign policy tradition. Adam Chapnick suggests that this was due to a number of linked factors, specifically, "inexperience managing foreign relations invited greater emphasis on ideological thinking. And [the Conservatives'] suspicions of a bureaucracy that had been serving Liberal governments for 13 consecutive years made them hesitant to listen to public sector advice." [167] Fundamentally, there was minimal variation between the positions of the Liberal Party and the CPC, which can be attributed to the articulation of a much clearer *role position* which had become present in Canadian foreign policy. This had emerged out of Canada's continued presence in Afghanistan and a desire on the part of the previous Liberal minority government under Paul Martin to move away from the Chrétien legacy. Indeed, the personal animosity which existed between Paul Martin and his predecessor was well documented.[168] David Bercuson, Jack Granatstein and Nancy Mackie suggest that on his election Martin sought to distance himself from Chrétien by de-prioritising the Afghanistan mission.[169] While the Martin government implemented some structural changes to the conduct of Canadian foreign policy with the release of its foreign policy review, in practice it did not considerably

---

[166] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1900, pg. 281; Francine Lalonde, Member of Parliament, 2050, pg. 296.
[167] Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012), 141. This reflects an earlier hypothesis articulated by George C. Perlin in 1979, namely "minority party syndrome." See *The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1979).
[168] "Jean Chrétien v Paul Martin: Now It's Really War," *The Economist*, June 6, 2002, http://www.economist.com/node/1169236.
[169] David J. Bercuson, J.L. Granatstein and Nancy Mackie, *Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan*, Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (October 2011), 12.

change the calculus in regards to Afghanistan. As Matthew Willis notes, at this point the wheels had been set in motion with regards to the Kandahar II deployment and though not inevitable, could not easily be derailed.[170] The decision to deploy to Kandahar was undertaken by the Martin government, and was, in many ways in line with the position Canada was expected to play within NATO, though as one Senior NATO Operations official suggested, was arguably misjudged.[171] This links into what Barnett observed about roles, "position roles better define and limit state behaviour, they are better able to standardize expectations, avoid misunderstandings, and increase stability."[172] Namely, Canadian policymakers acted in a way which was both predictable and in keeping with their conceived narrative about Canadian foreign policy while also fulfilling expectations amongst allies. The comparative rigidity of this role position helps to reconcile competing or alternative narratives and thus maintains a stable or routinised set of behaviours that helps to facilitate interactions with its NATO Allies.[173] As noted earlier in this chapter, the middle power concept incorporates what can be seen as positional and preferential behaviours due to, as Paul Gecelovsky observed, the terminology's ingrained and varied use in Canadian foreign policy discourse and literature.[174] Thus the CPC in adopting a more militaristic tone could continue to claim continuity with Canada's foreign policy traditions without triggering any serious discontinuity. Furthermore, as regards the Afghanistan mission, Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada later made it a foreign policy priority. As Duane Bratt observed, Stephen Harper's first international trip as Prime Minister was to visit the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and thus link himself in the eyes of the media and the public with the mission in Kandahar.[175] Thus the groundwork was in place whereby the Conservative Party of Canada could emphasise its interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative whilst avoiding the need to make any

[170] Matthew Willis, "Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives," *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 20.
[171] Interview 15, 6 November 2013.
[172] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 277.
[173] *Ibid*, 292.
[174] Paul Gecelovsky, "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), 89.
[175] Duane Bratt, "Mr. Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Return of 'High Politics' in Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Political Science Association, 2007.

additional commitments to the Afghanistan mission. Not only does this balance the domestic considerations, it blunts the potential repercussions related to a disruption in the foreign policy narrative. Moreover, it also ensures that allies can expect a relative level of continuity in Canadian foreign policy interactions.

17 May 2006 - House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan mission extension

In early 2006, the newly elected Conservative government called a debate to extend the mission in Afghanistan through until 2009. This proved to be somewhat controversial largely due to the short notice with which it occurred. MPs were given roughly 36 hours to prepare and the debate focused as much on the Parliamentary procedure as the actual policy. At this stage the mission was occurring as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under the command of the US, though NATO ISAF was slated to take over responsibility for the Regional Command South RC(S). This also provoked some issues during the following debate due to inherent concerns over US leadership.[176] Nonetheless, in discussing an extension to the mission MPs invoked foreign policy traditions which have been explored and noted already. Ultimately, the vote barely passed with 149 supporting to 145 against.

CPC

Prime Minister Stephen Harper led off this debate reminding MPs of their commitment to NATO and their allies and the broader multilateral effort.[177] While he invoked Canada's tradition as a responsible member of the international community, he did not explicitly refer to peacekeeping.[178] These sentiments were echoed by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay, who referenced the strong commitment to Canada's allies as well as the defence and support of Canadian values in Afghanistan.[179] Additionally, MacKay was very clear that this was not a traditional peacekeeping mission and military support

[176] Libby Davies, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 25, (17 May 2006), 1940, pg. 1532. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[177] Stephen Harper, Prime Minister, 1550, pg. 1501.
[178] *Ibid*, 1600, pg. 1503.
[179] Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1745, pg. 1517; *Ibid*, 1755, pg. 1519.

remained vital.[180] In his remarks, Defence Minister, Gordon O'Connor, reminded MPs of the Conservatives policy of 'Canada First' in terms of national interest as well as Canada's traditional role as a good ally.[181] O'Connor also sought to cast this as a potential leadership role for Canada in theatre, with the possibility of creating a greater leadership role for Canada globally.[182] Similarly, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai, noted that Canada's participation in the mission ensured that there was an equal voice in NATO.[183] Of interest as well, was the CPC aversion to using peacekeeping or drawing on the peacekeeping tradition. Indeed both the Minister for International Cooperation, Josée Verner and her Parliamentary Secretary, Ted Menzies, were very careful when discussing Canada's development projects in Afghanistan and sought to link them clearly with the military-focused narrative promoted by the government.[184] Indeed, even when mentioning Canada's military presence in Cyprus as part of a peacekeeping mission, the term is not mentioned, but rather subordinated to the narrative of Canada as a staunch military ally.[185]

Liberal Party

As the official opposition the Liberal Party found itself in the position of again debating the government on the operation it had initiated. Interim leader Bill Graham noted that while the Liberals supported the mission, there were concerns over the open-ended nature of the commitment.[186] MP Michael Ignatieff explicitly supported the extension, "because it is the moment where we have to test the shift from one paradigm, the peacekeeping paradigm, to a peace enforcement paradigm that combines military, reconstruction and humanitarian effort."[187] Nonetheless, there were still some questions related to this shift, as MP Bonnie Brown noted, that while participating in Afghanistan, Canada had only

[180] *Ibid*, 1750, pg. 1518.
[181] Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, 1845, pg. 1525; *Ibid*, 1845, pg. 1527;
[182] *Ibid*, 1855, pg. 1527.
[183] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 2055, pg. 1542.
[184] Josee Verner, Member of Parliament, 1945, pg. 1532, Ted Menzies, Member of Parliament, 1955, pg. 1534.
[185] Russ Heibert, Member of Parliament, 2040, pg. 1540.
[186] Bill Graham, Leader of the Liberal Party, 1620, pg. 1506.
[187] Michael Ignatieff, Member of Parliament, 1800, pg. 1519.

59 personnel taking part in UN operations.[188] Similarly, in discussing support for the mission, MP Stephen Owen noted that Canada's contribution to the norms of humanitarian intervention were important elements informing the mission's extension.[189] MP Ruby Dhalla also invoked Canada's tradition and reputation as a champion of human rights, in particular under Liberal leadership.[190]

NDP

The NDP raised concerns over the nature of the mission, specifically whether it would operate under OEF as a combat mission.[191] Leader of the NDP, MP Jack Layton explicitly articulated Canada's role as a middle power, specifically, "a country renowned for our pursuit of peace. We are a nation of facilitators, not occupiers. We are a people committed to the ideals of building bridges, not burning them down."[192] Layton further accused the government of diminishing Canada's role as peacekeepers and undermining its ability to offer contributions to other missions around the world.[193] Indeed, party members were clear on the ideas about Canada's traditional role, specifically, MP Bill Siksay noted that, "[t]his is not how Canadians do peacekeeping" and that this is not the Canadian way to do development work.[194]

BQ

The BQ were clear that while they broadly supported the mission in Afghanistan, they were intent on extracting some concrete information about the mission extension.[195] Duceppe was straightforward about a defined military role for Canada, particularly in relation to the mission's peacekeeping angle.[196] There were additional concerns that the blending of a humanitarian mission with a

[188] Bonnie Brown, Member of Parliament, 1840, pg. 1524.
[189] Stephen Owen, Member of Parliament, 2010, pg. 1535.
[190] Ruby Dhalla, Member of Parliament, 2055, pg. 1542.
[191] Alexa McDonough, Member of Parliament, 1615, pg. 1505, Dawn Black, Member of Parliament, 1725, pg. 1515.
[192] Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, 1705, pg. 1512.
[193] *Ibid*, 1710, pg. 1512.
[194] Bill Siksay, Member of Parliament, 2015, pg. 1537.
[195] Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the BQ, 1640, pg. 1509.
[196] *Ibid*, 1645, pg. 1510.

military one would present serious challenges for both NGOs and for Canadian forces in theatre.[197]

Analysis

Taken altogether, this debate reflected two distinct sides to the Canadian narrative. The CPC was very clear about distancing itself from the previous Liberal governments' emphasis on traditional roles such as peacekeeping, while nonetheless stressing the operation's multilateral nature and consequent legitimacy. The emphasis on Canada's military role and as a good ally represents a shift away from previous interpretations of the middle power narrative. Boucher noted that the rationale of Canada fulfilling its international obligations was particularly salient under the Harper government.[198] While not a dramatic change from the previous Liberal government, it demonstrated a subtly differing view of the utility of military force to do what is right, rather than merely necessary to satisfy internal and external recognition. In this way it transitions from an honour-driven motivation towards a moral one.

On the other side, the Liberals, the NDP and the BQ were all keen to emphasise the UN and Canada's previous role as a peacekeeper and peace builder in conflict zones. The roles articulated here are not necessarily mutually exclusive but they do reflect competing conceptions of Canada's traditions in foreign policy. Importantly, this debate casts the CPC in the role of defenders of Canada's mission in Afghanistan whereas before the Liberals, the architects of Canada's involvement in the mission, had borne the brunt of the criticism. As noted previously, the increasing tempo of operations in Afghanistan and the prioritisation of the conflict by the Harper government made this, to quote Michael Byers, "Stephen Harper's war."[199] The CPC were clear not to denigrate Canada's past participation in peacekeeping missions, nor were they keen to

[197] Francine Lalonde, Member of Parliament, 1935, pg. 1531.
[198] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-2008," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 729.
[199] Michael Valpy, "This is Stephen Harper's War," *Globe and Mail*, 18 August, 2007, http://ctv.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070818.wwshuffle18/tech/Technology/Technology/&id=RTGAM_20070818_wwshuffle18, accessed 14 November 2014. Byers writes as a notable critic of the Harper government and previously ran in the 2008 election as an NDP candidate.

characterise the Afghanistan mission as such, but rather this operation represented continuity in Canada's military tradition stretching back to the First World War. Indeed, at the time of the debate Canadian Forces in Kandahar were involved with Operation Mountain Thrust, a major combat operation and the largest coalition operation since the beginning of the conflict in 2001, aimed at disrupting the Taliban throughout Southern Afghanistan.[200] This also helps to explain the urgency of the debate as it is likely significant Canadian casualties during the operation might have condemned the mission extension altogether. Similarly, it also links to the CPC's aversion to the peacekeeping narrative as its invocation ahead of major combat operations would have triggered a notable disjunction between the foreign policy action and the historical foreign policy narrative. This then suggests the pressure that narratives exert in the policymaking process. Moreover, other dynamics at play are visible, namely Mintz's assertion that the 'essence of decision' lies in domestic politics.[201] The CPC as a minority party needed Parliamentary support for the mission as a way to potentially mitigate fall out over Canadian casualties while also legitimising their narrative for the future mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in doing so, this helped to cement an elite consensus over the mission – namely it established that a (near) majority supported the mission and thus insulated the CPC somewhat from potential electoral costs.[202]

Nonetheless, this highlights the importance of narratives for policymakers in that by undertaking behaviours which conflict with the dominant foreign policy narratives, there are potentially important electoral consequences. This is not to say that this debate was held in isolation and indeed, the full scale of the mission or the future casualties were still unclear. It should also be noted that from the beginning of 2006, Canada had only suffered 16 casualties in Afghanistan, eight of which had occurred since taking over the command of

---

[200] Bill Roggio, "Three Days of Operation Mountain Thrust in Kandahar," *Long War Journal*, 14 June 2006, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/06/three_days_of_operat.php, accessed 12 March 2014; See also *The Long Road, http://afghanistan.nationalpost.com/canada-in-afghanistan-2006/*

[201] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[202] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.

Kandahar.[203] In total, this represented only about 10% of the total casualties suffered to the end of 2011 and did not account for the increased tempo of operations associated with Operation Mountain Thrust and subsequent operations in the Afghanistan theatre.

Taken together, it is possible to see the different interpretations of the foreign policy narrative offered by each side in this debate. The BQ and Liberal Parties were keen to stress the mission's links with Canada's peacekeeping and development traditions. The NDP was the most vocal about its opposition to a US-led combat operation instead seeing Canada's traditional role as one focused on development and reconstruction. Nonetheless, the Harper government's efforts to link the operation with previous conceptions of honour; standing with allies and honouring treaty commitments, highlighting the external (allies) and internal (values) forms of honour, were also promoted alongside the importance of doing the right thing. While ensuring continuity with previous justifications for the Afghanistan mission the CPC also laid the groundwork for a moral approach to foreign policy.[204] This would take on greater importance as the mission wore on; additionally, there was some reference to humanitarian motives related to the development projects and PRT in Kandahar, though these were deemphasised in the 3D approach. Broadly speaking, the narrative espoused by the Harper government while still couched in moral language nonetheless sought to link the mission with Canada's international standing within NATO and the broader international stage.

19 April 2007 – House of Commons Debate to conclude Afghanistan combat mission in 2009

Following the mission extension in 2006, the Liberal Party introduced a motion to conclude Canada's combat mission in southern Afghanistan by the end of 2009. This was done to provide a concrete end date to Canada's combat mission amidst growing discontent in the House of Commons over the continuing

[203] iCasualties.org, "OEF: Afghanistan, Canada" http://icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx.
[204] A number of academics have observed the "moral" characteristic of Harper's foreign policy; see; Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307; Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012), 137-154.

operation and mounting casualties. While many MPs sympathised with the motion, the NDP ultimately sided with the CPC in defeating it. The CPC refused to support it on the grounds that placing an end date on the mission could signal weakness to allies and the Taliban while the NDP felt the motion did not go far enough and were keen on an immediate withdrawal. The motion failed and while the NDP introduced a motion a week later demanding the immediate withdrawal of Canada's combat forces in southern Afghanistan the divisions between the parties meant that ultimately, Canada would stay in Regional Command South until the end of 2011. The analysis for both of these debates will be done together as a way to highlight how these different interpretations of the middle power narrative were utilised to justify each party's approach to Canada's foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan.

Liberal Party

Members of the Liberal Party, whilst still supporting the mission sought to give a clear end date alongside greater clarity to Canada's role, particularly with respect to development and ensuring Canada's values were upheld.[205] Newly chosen Liberal Party leader, Stéphane Dion, made it clear that the motion was about accountability and determining what exactly the government sought to achieve in Afghanistan.[206] Indeed, the Liberal Party sought additional support from NATO Allies as well as a greater focus on the other '2Ds,' diplomacy and development.[207] Similarly, other members noted that Canada's continued participation in military operations in southern Afghanistan precluded its participation elsewhere around the world.[208]

[205] Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 136, (19 April 2007) 1020, pg. 8413. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[206] Stéphane Dion, Leader of the Liberal Party, 1035, pg. 8145.
[207] Byron Wilfert, Member of Parliament, 1330, pg. 8439.
[208] John Cannis, Member of Parliament, 1545, pg. 8460.

NDP

The NDP remained skeptical of the mission's continuation and expressed its disappointment with the similarity between the Liberal and CPC viewpoints.[209] Additionally, members of the NDP began advocating for a change towards a peace mission with a negotiated solution.[210] Further to this, MP Jack Layton noted that Canada's continued participation in a combat mission undermined its ability to act according to "[its] own inherent and globally recognised skills at peacemaking, at developing negotiation and mediation and at bringing sides together."[211]

BQ

The BQ voiced their support for a multilateral NATO mission with a UN mandate but nonetheless remained concerned over the combat focus of the mission.[212] Furthermore, the BQ invoked Canada's tradition as a peacekeeping nation as a counterpoint to the 'American-style' operation underway in Afghanistan and what the party perceived as undue US influence over Canada's objectives in the country.[213] Concerns were focused on mission creep and BQ representatives urged Canadian forces to focus on a humanitarian and peacekeeping role.[214]

CPC

The CPC was aggressive in its defence of the mission, going so far as to suggest that members opposite were "siding with the terrorists and the Taliban."[215] In invoking Canadian tradition Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for International Cooperation, Ted Menzies, was careful only to mention Canada's participation in conflicts and the fight for democratic freedoms.[216] Indeed, there was a careful effort to equate the mission in Afghanistan to Canada's efforts in

[209] Alexa McDonough, Member of Parliament, 1120, pg. 8421.
[210] Olivia Chow, Member of Parliament, 1145, pg. 8425, Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, 1155, pg. 8426, Dawn Black, Member of Parliament, 1205, pg. 8428.
[211] Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, 1200, pg. 8426.
[212] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1125, pg. 8422.
[213] *Ibid*, 1135, pg. 8423.
[214] Robert Bouchard, Member of Parliament, 1530, pg. 8458.
[215] Steven Blaney, Member of Parliament, 1040, pg. 8416.
[216] Ted Menzies, Member of Parliament, 1055, pg. 8418.

the First and Second World Wars.[217] Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Russ Heibert, went further and noted that not only was this action in Canada's national interest, it was also necessary not to shirk its duty to its NATO Allies.[218] The government suggested that Canadian participation in the Afghanistan operation and the successful completion of the mission was critical to maintaining the credibility of NATO.[219]

April 26, 2007 - House of Commons Debate to conclude Afghanistan combat mission immediately

Following the previous week's debate on the Afghanistan mission, one can see that a number of issues arose in Parliament concerning Canada's continued participation in the mission. In this discussion, the NDP, led by MP Jack Layton introduced a motion to immediately withdraw Canadian forces from the counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan. The motion stated that counter-insurgency was not the right mission for Canada but rather, the mission should be focused on reconstruction and development. The motion followed a Liberal motion put forward on 19 April that would have continued the combat mission through to 2009 with Canadian forces transitioning to a different, non-combat role. This motion, while similar, dictated an immediate end to Canada's participation in combat operations but was defeated in the ensuing vote.

NDP

Layton warned that the combat mission did not fit with Canada's traditions and sought to move towards reconstruction, development and peace negotiations.[220] Indeed, Layton was opposed to an open-ended mission and saw a role for Canada as a mediator and leader in creating a ceasefire and initiating peace negotiations with the Taliban.[221] MP Bill Siksay stated that Canadians were heavily invested in the idea of Canada playing a peacekeeping role and had specialised expertise

[217] Jay Hill, Member of Parliament, 1310, pg. 8436.
[218] Russ Heibert, Member of Parliament, 1110, pg. 8420.
[219] Kevin Sorenson, Member of Parliament, 1250, pg. 8434.
[220] Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 141, (26 April 2007), 1030, pg. 8711. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[221] *Ibid,* 1035, pg. 8712.

and experience in that type of operation.[222] Echoing this, MP Dawn Black stated that Canada's role in Afghanistan was a break with the history of Canada's foreign policy noting that, "Canada invented peacekeeping and peacemaking."[223] Other MPs such as Peggy Nash suggested that Canada's sacrifice was disproportionate and that Canada had moved away from its peacekeeping tradition.[224] The NDP sought to articulate a specific role for Canada, namely as "a leader for strategic diplomacy, international law, reversing the arms race, conflict prevention and eradicating world poverty."[225]

CPC

The CPC noted that the NDP's policies would break Canada's UN and NATO obligations and ultimately undermine Canadian values.[226] Indeed, they stated that defecting from a NATO and UN mandated mission would deeply affect Canada's credibility.[227] MP Pierre Lemieux aimed to link the mission in Afghanistan to Canada's national interest and its tradition of helping others.[228] Similarly, to rebut the accusation of an overly militaristic operation, there were efforts to recast Canada's role not as counterinsurgency but instead as stabilisation.[229]

Liberal Party

Members of the Liberal Party echoed some of the CPC criticisms stating that an immediate end to the operation would "break its word to Afghanistan, and to [its] NATO partners."[230] Liberal Party members emphasised the importance of burden sharing with NATO Allies and noted that full engagement in southern

[222] Bill Siksay, Member of Parliament, 1535, pg. 8755.
[223] Dawn Black, Member of Parliament, 1045, pg. 8714.
[224] Peggy Nash, Member of Parliament, 1245, pg. 8729, Dennis Bevington, Member of Parliament, 1350, pg. 8738.
[225] Denise Savoie, Member of Parliament, 1555, pg. 8758.
[226] Steven Fletcher, Member of Parliament, 1050, pg. 8714.
[227] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 1225, pg. 8726.
[228] Pierre Lemieux, Member of Parliament, 1115, pg. 8717.
[229] Rick Casson, Member of Parliament, 1325, pg. 8735.
[230] Ujjal Dosanjh, Member of Parliament, 1125, pg. 8719.

Afghanistan meant engaging in combat operations and doing reconstruction work simultaneously.[231]

BQ

The BQ noted its support for the mission and the importance of NATO solidarity with some reservations, particularly with regards to burden sharing.[232] MP Francine Lalonde explained this further stating that Canada should make clear its intention to withdraw from combat operations in southern Afghanistan with other NATO nations taking over responsibility.[233] Furthermore, MP Vivan Barbot was clear that while not keen on a military operation the BQ would support an operation grounded in international law and conducted in conjunction with allies.[234]

Analysis of both debates

In these debates, many of the same issues were raised in both sessions. The NDP again demonstrated its view that Canada's traditions support the adoption of a peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. These debates took place against the backdrop of Operation Achilles which saw ISAF and Afghan National Army forces undertake major operations in the Kandahar-Helmand area to dislodge the Taliban.[235] Casualties had been in the Canadian news with the worst single-day loss of life for the Canadian forces in Afghanistan with six soldiers killed by an improvised explosive device and a further three soon thereafter.[236] The steady stream of Canadian casualties since the renewal vote in 2006 attracted international media attention and reflected the increasingly conflicted narrative

[231] Byron Wilfert, Member of Parliament, 1140, pg. 8721.
[232] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1155, pg. 8723.
[233] Francine Lalonde, Member of Parliament, 1215, pg. 8725.
[234] Vivian Barbot, Member of Parliament, 1705, pg. 8768.
[235] NATO, "Operation Achilles Making Progress," *ISAF-NATO Press Releases*, 8 March, 2007, PR# 2007-160, www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/03-march/pr070308-160.html.
[236] CBC News, "6 Canadian Soldiers Killed in Roadside Bombing in Afghanistan," 8 April, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/6-canadian-soldiers-killed-in-roadside-bombing-in-afghanistan-1.641512, accessed 17 March, 2014; CBC News, "2 Canadian Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan," 11 April, 2007 http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/2-canadian-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan-1.634068, accessed 17 March, 2014.

about Canadian participation in the operation.[237] In the first debate introduced by the Liberal Party, the aim was to curtail Canada's mission and bring it back in line with a more humanitarian motivation, though this interpretation did not go far enough for the NDP members.

Party members from both the Liberals and NDP invoked many of the key behavioural middle power peacekeeper attributes which, while they had popular resonance, arguably did not reflect the reality of the Afghanistan mission. Indeed, the move by the NDP to advocate for talks with the Taliban earned the late leader of the party, Jack Layton, the nickname 'Taliban Jack' from the political right.[238] Fundamentally, the NDP were so driven by their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative that they could not accept a Liberal compromise motion regarding the Afghanistan mission. Members had a distinct focus on humanitarian behaviours which do not immediately mesh so neatly with motivations for state actions. In keeping with the broader framework, the NDP can be characterised as driven by shame over what members believed to be a disruption from its Canada's foreign policy narrative. Namely, members of the NDP saw Canada's foreign policy behaviour under the stewardship of both Liberal and CPC leadership as conflicting with their own internal narrative of how Canada *should* act internationally. Thus, they outline roles whose behaviours better conform to these conceived narrative which focused on diplomacy and explicit non-military ends.[239] Steele uses *shame* as a way to explain the motivations underlying NATO's intervention in Kosovo and thus by extension, participation in collective action.[240] While the context in this instance is slightly different, the NDP are nonetheless seeking to rectify Canada's future

---

[237] Christopher Mason, "After Deadly Week, Canada Debates Role in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 23 April, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/world/americas/23canada.html?fta=y&_r=0, accessed 17 March 2014.

[238] "Taliban Jack: How the NDP Lost its Way on the Afghan War," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 February 2008, http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/story.html?id=7f644573-dd8c-4e31-99fe-2ea0489031fc, accessed 10 March 2014; Adam Radwanski, "Second Reading: Reconsidering Taliban Jack," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 September, 2007, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/second-reading/reconsidering-taliban-jack/article784295/#dashboard/follows/, accessed 10 March, 2014.

[239] Denise Savoie, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 141, (26 April 2007), 1555, pg. 8758.

[240] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 115.

policy actions to bring them back in line with the individuals' perceived narrative.[241] In this case, the classic middle power behavioural roles as a multilateralist honest broker are prioritised as a way of getting back to traditional Canadian diplomacy. The Liberals, CPC and BQ countered this by insisting that this was not a traditional peacekeeping mission, but rather, an evolution of Canada's longstanding commitment to the international community. These parties sought to establish a continuity in Canada's foreign policy between its actions in Afghanistan and its previous international actions, be they Pearsonian peacekeeping or participation in major international conflicts like the First World War, Second World War or Korea. The roles here were more reactive, dictated by Canada's actions in the field and less by the preferences of the policymakers. As such, a distinction can be drawn between the visions of Canada's foreign policy narrative as it relates to foreign policy roles and by extension, behaviours.

The CPC were the most vehement not only in their defence of the mission, but also in equating criticism to a lack of support for the Canadian forces.[242] This fits with the clear dichotomy and larger moral narrative that the Conservatives had sought to cultivate as a way to distinguish their foreign policy from their Liberal Party predecessors. The difficulty with this then becomes how one recognises this as a moral narrative. As mentioned previously in the Iraq War debate, Stephen Harper had argued that participation in that conflict as a moral one. In October of 2007 he reminded Canadians that Canada had a moral responsibility to remain in Afghanistan.[243] Again, the challenge in ascribing moral characteristics to a foreign policy narrative then becomes: in what way does this action serve the agent's self-interest? In this case, the CPC claimed that its foreign policy would best serve Canada's national interest, however, vague that interest may be as a way to maintain Canadian participation in the mission.[244] Nonetheless, the articulation of Canada's mission in Afghanistan as

---

[241] *Ibid*, 55.
[242] Stephen Harper, Prime Minister, 1425, pg. 8744; Helena Guergis, 1100, pg. 8716; Pierre Lemieux, 1250, pg. 8729.
[243] Canadian Press, "Canada Has a Moral Duty to Stay in Afghanistan: PM," 3 October 2007, http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=ffa4b8eb-57e3-4b85-8d94-c95111bda5c0, accessed 10 October 2014.
[244] Russ Heibert, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 136, (19 April 2007), 1110, pg. 8420.

part of the national interest in this way thus also reinforces the narrative of Canadian values as a supporter of freedom, democracy and thus right; consistent, at least to members of the CPC.

25 February 2008 – 13 March 2008 - House of Commons debate on Afghanistan mission extension

Following the votes to conclude the Afghanistan mission in 2007 the Harper government commissioned an independent, non-partisan panel led by former Liberal Foreign Minister, John Manley to examine Canada's mission in Afghanistan and offer recommendations about its future role. Following the presentation of the Manley Report the Conservative government introduced a confidence motion in order to extend the Canada presence in Kandahar through to the end of 2011, instead of the previous mission extension date of 2009.[245] The Harper government offered an ultimatum to NATO Allies in January requesting an additional 1,000 troops to reinforce Canadian Forces in Kandahar.[246] Based on the recommendations of the panel, the CPC and the Liberal Party supported the motion over the objections of the BQ and NDP and the vote passed 198-77.[247] The vision articulated in the report saw a continuing presence for Canada to guarantee that the gains made during the Canadian forces deployment were upheld and to ensure an orderly transition to Afghan-led security in southern Afghanistan.[248] The ensuing debate centered on the role Canada was playing in Afghanistan, not only in terms of its effectiveness, but also its ability to successfully complete the mission and, more critically, what success would look like. This debate demonstrated a clear expression of the narrative surrounding Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan mission.

CPC

The Conservative government made the case for a mission extension from 2009 to the end of 2011. Defence Minister Peter MacKay noted that Canada was promoting its values and interests and more importantly, "the UN wants us there,

[245] Government of Canada, *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, John Manley, January 2008.
[246] BBC News, "Canada PM Issues Afghan Ultimatum," 31 January 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7219415.stm, accessed 9 April, 2014.
[247] House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 142, No. 66, (13 March 2008), pg. 4160.
[248] *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, John Manley, January 2008, 39.

NATO needs us there."[249] While avoiding using the term 'peacekeeping,' he further maintained that Canada's reputation, built on Responsibility to Protect and the sacrifice of Canadians "in the service of peace" would be at stake if Canada didn't extend its mission.[250] Minister of International Cooperation, Bev Oda, cautioned that this was not the regular kind of aid mission and required a robust military engagement.[251] During the course of the debate, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence, Laurie Hawn, invoked the tradition of Lester Pearson noting that he recognised the "combination of strength and national resolve in cooperation with like-minded allies."[252] Hawn went further to emphasise the morality of the mission stating that, "Canada is the kind of country that continues to do the right thing because it is simply the right thing to do and that is who we are."[253] Indeed, there was a clear effort on the part of the CPC to try and link Canada's historical military narrative to the mission in Afghanistan, as opposed to its peacekeeping heritage.[254] The CPC invoked tradition a number of times to demonstrate how Canada had to remain committed in Afghanistan. MP Brian Storseth argued that while Canada had created a peacekeeping paradigm, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine required Canada to remain active in the Afghanistan operation.[255] Indeed, to close the debate MP Bruce Stanton invoked Lester Pearson's commitment to collective security and suggested that it was, "a mission that is every bit as just, noble and meaningful as those of the nearly 100,000 Canadians, men and women, who gave their lives over the last century to protect and defend our security, indeed, the collective security of our world, shoulder to shoulder with their allies."[256]

---

[249] Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 142, No. 53, (25 February 2008), 1220, pg. 3194.
[250] *Ibid*, 1245, pg. 3198.
[251] Bev Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, 1615, pg. 3229.
[252] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 1735, pg. 3240.
[253] *Ibid*, 1110, pg. 4105.
[254] Greg Thompson, Member of Parliament, 1920, pg. 3254, Ed Komarnicki, Member of Parliament, 2045, pg. 3265, Bradley Trost, Member of Parliament, 2105, pg. 3268.
[255] Brian Storseth, Member of Parliament, 1845, pg. 3249.
[256] Bruce Stanton, Member of Parliament, 1750, pg. 4159.

Liberal Party

The Liberal Party remained supportive of the mission though it sought greater clarity on the limits of the mission.[257] Leader of the Liberal Party, Stéphane Dion, stated that Canada could not be expected to carry the burden in southern Afghanistan indefinitely and urged the government to bring in other NATO Allies to replace Canadian forces.[258] MP Michael Ignatieff went further stating that Canada's engagement in Afghanistan was not a 'blank check' and the mission must end in 2011 to allow Afghan forces to support themselves.[259] Party members noted that while Canada went to Afghanistan in its own self-interest, the sustained success of the mission required commitment by the government to development and reconstruction.[260] Others like MP Maria Minna, insisted that Canada must be out of Kandahar by 2009 and that the government should inform NATO as such in order to mobilise other allies.[261]

BQ

The BQ sought to distance itself from the mission and noted that Quebeckers were keen to see the mission end in 2009.[262] Similarly, the BQ aimed to move away from the combat mission towards development assistance.[263] In particular, the BQ wanted to promote Canada's traditional, "achievements in human rights and for our values of reconciliation and diplomacy. We should now be able to play this role fully and let others fight in the most dangerous areas."[264] Similarly, MP Claude Bachand stated that Canada's expertise lay in peace missions and Afghanistan represented the opposite of this tradition.[265] Indeed, the BQ also invoked Lester Pearson, peacekeeping forces and peace missions as well as Canada's role as a mediator.[266]

---

[257] Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament, 1250, pg. 3198.
[258] Stéphane Dion, Leader of the Liberal Party, 1305, pg. 3200.
[259] Michael Ignatieff, Member of Parliament, 1645, pg. 3232.
[260] Keith Martin,Member of Parliament, 2015, pg. 3261.
[261] Maria Minna, Member of Parliament, 1905, pg. 3252.
[262] Vivian Barbot, Member of Parliament, 1345, pg. 3205.
[263] *Ibid*, 1350, pg. 3206.
[264] Vivan Barbot, 1540, pg. 3224.
[265] Claude Bachand,Member of Parliament, 1730, pg. 3238.
[266] *Ibid*, 1800, pg. 3243.

NDP

The NDP took issue with the mission extension and sought a serious redefinition of the operation. Most significantly, the NDP wanted the UN to take the lead in the mission rather than NATO with a political approach as the key to a lasting solution.[267] Leader of the NDP, MP Jack Layton, stated that NATO lacked the capabilities for a complex operation that included peacebuilding and reconstruction; areas where Canada could provide expertise and leadership.[268] MP Dawn Black also noted the UN peace building Commission was headed by a Canadian and could create a forum for negotiations.[269]

Analysis

This debate represented another clear expression of the CPC and Liberal Party's vision of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan while also demonstrating the difficulties in parsing a singular, unified narrative about Canadian international action. The reflexive interaction between the narrative and behaviour as interpreted by policymakers has shaped the understanding of Canada's international action as the various components of the middle power narrative are constantly renegotiated. While the debates were focused on Canada's action in Afghanistan, these were rooted in policymakers' understandings of the broader Canadian foreign policy narrative. As such, Canada's international action is always being compared to their understanding of what Canada *should* do internationally. This creates routines founded in this narrative which can be subject to disruption, depending on the policies adopted by the government in power. Steele characterises this as an action which 'disembeds' agents from routines and thus creates the conditions which force the state to confront its current actions in relation to previous actions.[270] That said, the elite consensus between the CPC and the Liberal opposition in that support for the mission was

[267] Jack Layton, Member of Parliament, 1550, pg. 3225.
[268] *Ibid*, 1555, pg. 3226.
[269] Dawn Black, Member of Parliament, 1610, pg. 3228.
[270] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 152.

no longer split clearly along explicitly partisan lines.[271] Indeed, this stands in marked contrast to the debates held in 2006 and 2007 which had sought to curtail the mission. Fundamentally, the various justifications for continued action in theatre were once again dependent on each party's view of how Canada *should* act internationally, rather than reflecting the reality of action on the ground. Nonetheless, this debate placed a clear end date on Canada's involvement in Afghanistan slated for 2011 – a move that eventually proved controversial among NATO Allies as will be explored further in this chapter and the next.

As discussed already, the differing conceptions of Canada's foreign policy narrative helped generate differing conceptions of roles. The CPC, in emphasising what has been termed a moral approach to foreign policy sought to place Canadian Forces as upholders and defenders of the good through military force.[272] Furthermore, given that the government had put this issue to a confidence vote it was vital that it retained support from other parties or else it would trigger an election. However, as mentioned already with the presence of a bipartisan elite consensus between the Liberal Party and the CPC there was less concern that there would be a domestic cost to the Harper government.[273] Both of these parties worked together in crafting the mission extension and as a result, the language used in the debate is tempered for both parties, both of which were more careful about overt disagreement. It was in the interest of the CPC government as well as the opposition Liberal Party to express the successes of the Afghanistan mission as much as it was in the NDP and the BQ's to highlight the weaknesses.

Nonetheless, each party sought to push the implementation of policies it thought best represented the narrative of Canada's international action abroad. Each party shaped its narrative about the mission to conform to its conceived narrative about the Afghanistan mission and by extension, Canada's relationship

---

[271] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[272] Joy Smith, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 142, No. 66, (13 March 2008), 1015, pg. 4097.
[273] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.

to the international community. Each of these interpretations of the foreign policy narrative found expression as a role envisioned for Canada. In this case, policymakers in the NDP and BQ were again, more explicitly expressing a role preference and by extension sought to create continuity with their interpretation of Canada's past international behaviour. Perhaps most clearly articulated was the NDP vision for Canada as a UN leader and champion of international norms surrounding peace building, mediation and human rights. The party's concern with the military mission and more critically, the inability to define the mission's success linked the country's actions with a failure to remain linked to Canadian tradition.

Vitally, this debate marks a clear distinction from the Liberal Party of the 1990s to the Liberals of the late 2000s in that the reflexive support of the UN, while still present, is not prioritised. Rather, the Liberal Party rhetoric recognised that Afghanistan was borne out of primarily national self-interest, namely creating an Afghanistan that would no longer be a safe haven for terrorists who could threaten Canada, rather than as a part of the wider international community effort.[274] While this is not mutually exclusive of other interpretations, it offers a view of the ways in which the traditional middle power roles had been moved aside in favour of a more capabilities focused discussion – a recognition of Canada's role position, rather than preference. In doing so, there is a clear move away or 'disembedding' from the defining narratives of the Canadian middle power and peacekeeping mythologies from the two largest parties in Parliament.

The CPC for its part continued to try and distance itself from the peacekeeping narrative of the past while nonetheless invoking the tradition, emphasising the military component of the mission. The government was keen to ensure the passage of a mission extension and steered away from the overt partisan language relating to Canada's moral mission in Afghanistan in part to avoid alienating Liberal MPs who supported the mission extension. With the clear articulation of the mission end date the CPC had room to explore ways in which to reinforce their interpretation of the mission, whilst also allowing the party to avoid an open-ended commitment to the conflict.

[274] Robert Thibault, Member of Parliament, 1245, pg. 4118.

March 26, 2009 - House of Commons take note debate on Afghanistan

This take note debate took place against the backdrop of the International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague. This debate was contextually important for Canada as it took place around the time that Canadian combat troops had been scheduled to draw down before the extension that had taken place in 2008. It was in this debate that the opposition parties began showing fatigue with the tempo of the mission, particularly Canada's continued presence in Kandahar. By this time Canada had taken 116 casualties in Afghanistan and with elections slated for later in the year there was hope that this would distract attention from Canadian losses and highlight the progress being made.[275]

CPC

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, noted that in the preceding year, Canada had expanded its diplomatic presence in Kandahar, in line with the Manley report recommendations.[276] Moreover, he welcomed the beginning of the US troop 'surge' into Afghanistan, a move which would help take pressure off Canadian Forces in Kandahar.[277] Given the mandate that had authorised the continued mission in 2008, the CPC was less pressed to defend Canada's action in theatre and instead sought to reinforce that the mission was proceeding well. Responding to criticism that the mission needed more examination, MP Deepak Obhrai emphasised the UN mandate and noted that the Parliament had supported an extension to that very mission a year prior.[278] MP Laurie Hawn, in his capacity as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence also emphasised the role of the Canadian military in earning the esteem of the international community.[279]

Liberal Party

---

[275] iCasualties.org, "OEF: Afghanistan, Canada" http://icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx
[276] Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 144, No. 34, (26 March 2009), 1805, pg. 2032. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[277] *Ibid*, 1810, pg. 2033.
[278] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 1910, pg. 2040.
[279] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 1950, pg. 2046.

The Liberal Party, having supported the mission extension a year prior was not overly critical but sought clarification on a number of issues. Notably, MP Denis Coderre expressed concern over the effort expended between NATO Allies, particularly the differences in the Canadian mission as compared to the German or Turkish missions and sought a more equal distribution of tasks among allies.[280] Nonetheless, the new party leader, Michael Ignatieff had supported the mission extension in 2008 along with much of the Liberal caucus and as such, while the interpretation of the foreign policy narrative that they prioritised may have differed somewhat, both the Liberals and the Conservatives were in agreement over the importance of the mission. Coderre also emphasised Canada's duty to intervene in Afghanistan "as a country, as a citizen of the world"[281] MP David McGuinty expressed some concern that the US was dictating too much of what would guide Canadian policy.[282]

BQ

The BQ were much harsher in their criticism of the government with accusations that the CPC were more responsive to American preferences.[283] Similar to the Liberals however, the BQ urged a rotation of the Canadian forces out of Southern Afghanistan or at least some form of redistributive burden sharing.[284] MP Johanne Deschamps also noted that the CPC and Liberals initiative to enhance the mission's development and diplomatic components had been suggested by the BQ in 2007.[285]

NDP

The members of the NDP were still keen to wind up Canada's combat role in Afghanistan but also sought a realistic plan for post-2011 engagement. MP Paul Dewar suggested that Canada could help spearhead a UN initiative for regional peace building and stressed the need for a multilateral diplomatic solution.[286] MP

[280] Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament, 1815, pg. 2033.
[281] *Ibid,* 1825, pg. 2034.
[282] David McGuinty, Member of Parliament, 1935, pg. 2045.
[283] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1820, pg. 2034.
[284] *Ibid,* 1845, pg. 2037.
[285] Johanne Deschamps, Member of Parliament, 2015, pg. 2050.
[286] Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament, 1905, pg. 2040.

Niki Ashton also noted that while the government had made a number of pledges regarding its commitment to development and diplomacy, "We are seeing a change from the way things have been done in the past."[287]

Analysis

In this debate, regarding Canada's role in Afghanistan the Liberals and CPC emphasised a UN mandate and Canada's traditional global citizen narrative. Interestingly, the CPC directly mentioned the esteem of Canada, though it diverges slightly from the morality-infused language that had characterised previous CPC statements. In this case, the need to reinforce Canada's international esteem also over-rode domestic opposition concerns about the continued mission. Ned Lebow suggests that, "when actors seek self-esteem through honour, standing or autonomy, they are often willing to risk, even sacrifice, themselves or their political units in pursuit of these goals."[288] Indeed, Lebow categorises Canada's foreign policy behaviour as one which relies on honour founded in its domestic institutions in order to exert influence in its international relations.[289] In this case, the government was willing to tie its political future to the mission in Afghanistan with the possibility, albeit remote at that time, that the public could revoke its support for both. The CPC were the clearest in not only promoting a link between Canada's foreign policy and international esteem as well as previously established, wider conceptions of morality. This was important for the government in that with rising casualties and public attention, Stephen Harper's government had become closely associated with the conflict.[290] As a result, the CPC were resolute in expressing Canada's support for the Afghanistan mission despite climbing casualties, costs and criticism. That being said, members of the Liberal Party were also supportive of the contribution to the mission.

---

[287] Niki Ashton, Member of Parliament, 1935, pg. 2044.
[288] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19.
[289] *Ibid*, 545.
[290] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 232.

Since the Harper government had effectively prioritised the mission in 2006 casualties had continued to mount and while Canada was still slated to leave Kandahar in 2011, as the CBC reported, there was increasing opposition among voters towards Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.[291] Furthermore, the Afghan elections, which took place later in the year, highlighted the lack of progress in many ways with allegations of widespread fraud and low voter turnout.[292] However, with the CPC previously describing Canadian participation in the Afghanistan mission in moral terms, they had not only linked the mission with national self-interest, but also made it a reflection of Canada's foreign policy narrative.[293] Thus, in order to maintain the mission in the face of growing domestic unpopularity, the CPC were forced to again, re-orient their description of Canada's participation and how the mission links with Canada's participation in NATO. Indeed, by once again linking honour to Canada's mission it becomes as Steele characterises it in the case of Belgium in the Second World War, "a painful, costly, and tragic, but also emancipatory, action."[294] In this way it gave further freedom of action for the government to define what the 'successful' conditions for Canadian withdrawal would be in 2011, regardless of the facts on the ground. Thus, honour not yet satisfied, morality still to be defended, the CPC could make the case that Canada needed to remain in Afghanistan both for the sake of its allies and its national interest.

In contrast, the NDP and BQ offered a number of criticisms, namely that Canada's autonomy and standing were no longer benefiting from the continuation of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The NDP was even more explicit in underlining how the mission did not in fact reflect its interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative. Altogether, the CPC foreign policy narrative in this circumstance has moved in order to maintain consistency with its previous

---

[291] CBC News, "54% of Canadians Oppose Afghan Mission: EKOS Poll," *CBC News: Canada*, 16 July, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/54-of-canadians-oppose-afghan-mission-ekos-poll-1.859617, accessed 7 April, 2014.
[292] Ian Pannell, "Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed," *BBC News*, 18 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8207315.stm, accessed 6 March, 2014; Jon Boone, "Afghanistan Poll Legitimacy Fears as Taliban Violence Keeps Voters Away," *Guardian UK*, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/20/afghanistan-elections-taliban-attack-voters, accessed 6 March 2014.
[293] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 44.
[294] *Ibid*, 113.

conceptions of Canada's foreign policy whilst also justifying its current role position in the conflict.

November 25, 2010 - House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan mission

This debate outlined Canada's transition away from a combat role into a training support mission that would last from 2011 through to 2014. The Conservative government unilaterally decided this mission prompting the debate in the House of Commons.[295] There was context to this discussion as the Harper government had previously prorogued Parliament in February, a move which was seen to have killed an inquiry into the treatment of Afghan detainees.[296] Indeed, the ongoing investigation had threatened to find the CPC government in contempt of Parliament, with opposition parties demanding information on the treatment of detainees the Harper government refused to release.[297] Perhaps linked to this, the government did not put forward any more votes on the future of the Afghanistan mission. The BQ called on a statement from 6 January 2010 that noted that the Afghanistan mission would be strictly civilian from 2011 onwards. As such they introduced a motion condemning the government's decision to extend the mission. Whilst this debate did not directly affect Canada's participation in the operation it nonetheless highlights the narrative employed by the Conservative government towards the end of the mission.

---

[295] Government of Canada, Ministers Cannon, MacKay and Oda Announce Canada's New Role in Afghanistan, Archived at: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2010/2010_11_16.aspx?lang=eng.

[296] Prorogation is a Parliamentary maneuver in which the Parliament is effectively suspended where all outstanding business is taken off the agenda and needs to be re-tabled when Parliament reconvenes. See Colin Horgan, "Canada's Afghan Detainee Scandal Gets Constitutional," *Guardian*, 28 April 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/28/canada-afghanistan, accessed 10 October 2014; Les Whittington, "People Don't Care About Afghan Detainee Issue: Harper," *Toronto Star*, 5 January 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/28/canada-afghanistan, accessed 10 October 2014.

[297] Paul Szabo, House of Commons Debate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, December 10, 2009, 1650, pg. 7926.; CBC News, "Afghan Detainee Contempt Motion Won't Spark Vote: MP" *Politics*, 2 March 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghan-detainee-contempt-motion-won-t-spark-vote-mp-1.974740, accessed 10 October 2014.

BQ

MP Claude Bachand argued that the Conservative government had broken its word with regards to the deployment of troops and stated that the power to do so must be shared with the House of Commons.[298] Additionally, he noted that Canadian forces had paid a heavy toll in comparison to NATO Allies and urged a return to peacekeeping.[299]

CPC

In response to the BQ's criticism, MP Deepak Obhrai underscored Canada's commitment to NATO.[300] Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, tried to draw a deeper link noting, "Canada is in Afghanistan for one very clear reason: Canada's national security."[301] This defined the issue as one of domestic security and linked the stability of Afghanistan directly to the security of Canada. This once again underlined that the nebulous conditions for the successful completion of the mission rested with the government. He further clarified that Canada's forces would be in a non-combat role in keeping with the needs expressed by NATO.[302] Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay also reflected on Canada's combat mission and admitted that there would always be requests for Canadian soldiers to deploy.[303] MacKay went further to emphasise that considerable support for the mission still existed in the House and that since it was not a combat mission, no vote was needed to extend the mission.[304] MP Jim Abbott then later characterised the continued mission as peacekeeping and reflected Canadian empathy and morality.[305]

Liberal Party

---

[298] Claude Bachand, House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 145, No. 104, (25 November 2010), 1020, pg. 6422. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[299] Claude Bachand, Member of Parliament, 1025, pg. 6423.
[300] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 1030, pg. 6424.
[301] Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1040, pg. 6425.
[302] *Ibid*, 1055, pg. 6427.
[303] Peter MacKay, Minister of Defence, 1105, pg. 6429.
[304] *Ibid*, 1110, pg. 6430.
[305] Jim Abbott, Member of Parliament, 6445, pg. 1305.

The Liberal Party did not offer much criticism of the plan for Canadian trainers to remain in Afghanistan, rather, MP Bob Rae cautioned that Canada had made an obligation to the UN and NATO to stay until the job is done.[306] Rae also questioned whether peacekeeping could occur in a conflict zone without conflict, noting that this mission went beyond partisanship and reflected the national interest.[307] Nonetheless, Rae still invoked the legacy of Lester Pearson in response to the BQ calls for a peacekeeping role, though in this circumstance described as the need to respond to aggression with some degree of force.[308]

NDP

The NDP was much more critical of the government and the other opposition parties. MP Chris Charlton insisted that the NDP opposed the extension of the Canadian mission altogether and that the troops should be brought home immediately.[309] Accusations of collusion between the Liberals and the CPC were put forward.[310] MP Paul Dewar also sought clarification on where funding for this mission was going, particularly with regards to diplomatic spending.[311] Leader of the NDP, Jack Layton, accused the Harper government of putting emphasis on the military solution to Afghanistan and thus jeopardising civilian-led development programmes.[312]

Analysis

As the last House of Commons debate of the Afghanistan mission to be examined in this study, the presence of a number of interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative remain evident. The BQ were clear about their conception of Canada as a peacekeeping nation, much along the same lines as the NDP who had long voiced its opposition to combat operations more generally. That said, the confluence of the Liberal and CPC positions provides an interesting view of how the importance of the mission in the minds of

[306] Bob Rae, Member of Parliament, 6431, pg. 1120.
[307] *Ibid*, 6431, pg. 1125.
[308] *Ibid*, 6433, pg. 1140.
[309] Chris Charlton, Member of Parliament, 6424, pg. 1035.
[310] John Rafferty, Member of Parliament, 1700, pg. 6479.
[311] Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament, 6427, pg. 1110.
[312] Jack Layton, Leader of the NDP, 1425, pg. 6456.

policymakers overrode the desire to remain consistent with the traditional conceptions of Canadian foreign policy. The Liberal Party, under the leadership of Michael Ignatieff had, to a certain degree, also moved the party away from its previous views on peacekeeping though the pull of the Liberal Party tradition still exerted influence.[313] Indeed, Ignatieff as a public intellectual, had previously supported the invasion of Iraq and on entering public life, felt compelled to issue an apologia recanting his previous stance on the war.[314] Nonetheless, both parties called on this previous narrative with the CPC referring to the future mission as peacekeeping and the Liberals invoking Lester Pearson as ways to reflect the continuity with broader Canadian foreign policy. It reflects the desire of policymakers to maintain their interpretations of this foreign policy narrative and in doing so preserves and promotes it as a persistent narrative of Canada's foreign policy.

Turning attention to specific policies, rather than the broad sweep of the foreign policy narrative, the Afghan detainee scandal had been progressing on slow course throughout the duration of Canada's deployment to Afghanistan. This had first appeared as a controversial issue under the Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and had continued through until the end of Canada's operation in Afghanistan. As noted previously, there had been criticism of the practice of turning Afghan prisoners over to US and Afghan custody without sufficient oversight on human rights practices. While Canadian diplomats in NATO had been forward leaning on issues relating to detainee treatment and oversight, the issue remained an important part of the discussion in Parliament in that it was a reflection of the ways in which Canada had 'lost its way.'[315] Fundamentally, this specific policy issue, among others, reflected the ways in which the

---

[313] Martin Patriquin, "Bogus Peacekeeping," *Maclean's,* 17 August 2009, http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/07/17/%E2%80%98bogus%E2%80%99-peacekeeping/, accessed 20 February 2014.
[314] Michael Ignatieff, "Getting Iraq Wrong," *New York Times Magazine*, 5 August, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 20 February, 2014.
[315] Interview 1, 16 October 2012; Antonia Zerbesias, "My Canada Includes War, Environmental Degradation and Lost Causes," *Toronto Star*, 31 March 2010, http://www.thestar.com/life/2010/03/31/zerbisias_my_canada_includes_war_environmental_degradation_and_lost_causes.html, accessed 10 October 2014.

reinterpretation of narrative of Canadian foreign policy and the process of change had disrupted the routines of Canadian diplomats in NATO.

Indeed, given that there was a desire on the part of the Liberals and the CPC to pull away from the previous associations between Canada and 'peacekeeping' it is interesting that members of all the major parties still felt the need to continue to hearken back to it. The CPC may have sought to cast this in relation to a morality-driven narrative but as will be explored further, previous interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative both in the media and among policymakers, continue to exert pressure on the *preferred* roles that Canada is envisioned as playing. As with the Afghanistan debate in 2009, the different characterisation of Canada's national self-interest, argued either in moral terms or relation to honour required a re-orientation of what Canada's international role should be in relation to NATO. Ultimately, the reinterpretation of Canada's role coming out of the Afghanistan experience will be explored further through discussions with policymakers in NATO headquarters.

With regards to Canada's future participation in NATO, the debates surrounding the Libya mission are worth examining. The CPC interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative had, to this point, placed emphasis on morality and the Canadian national interest, a theme which carries over into the Libya campaign. However, the mission held a number of commonalities with the previous Canadian foreign policy narrative given its UN mandate, NATO support, and emphasis on the Responsibility to Protect. The desire to maintain the perceived continuity of a foreign policy narrative thus represents an important force informing Canada's decision to participate in the Libya mission, despite the increasingly bitter aftertaste of Afghanistan.

<u>21 March, 2011 - House of Commons Debate on the UN Resolution 1973 on Libya</u>

This take note debate surrounded the House of Commons approval and support of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorising the protection of civilians in Libya adopted on 17 March. Canada had already deployed the frigate, HMCS Charlottetown to the region to assist with the evacuation of Canadian civilians in the country and remained in place to support the

implementation of UNSCR 1970 placing sanctions on Gaddafi's government.[316] Similarly, the Prime Minister preempted this debate by deploying 6 CF-18 fighter aircraft and necessary personnel to support Operation Odyssey Dawn, the American-led coalition enforcing the no fly zone and arms embargo.[317] This was the last debate with the CPC leading a minority government. The Conservative government was found in contempt of Parliament due to withholding information related to military procurement and subsequently lost a vote of non-confidence leading to an election that spring.

CPC

Defence Minister Peter MacKay explained that Canada was compelled to act, "both in a moral duty and by duty of NATO and the United Nations, which as members would know, are two institutions we helped found."[318] Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai, was adamant in invoking the importance of supporting core Canadian values in the region.[319] He also cautioned that Canada was not a superpower and as such, could only act in the region with a UN resolution and the support of allies; moreover, the operation did not involve an invasion of Libya.[320] Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, noted the government's support for the involvement of the International Criminal Court in investigating crimes against humanity and emphasised Canada's support for Charter VII of the UN Charter for the restoration of international peace and security.[321] Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Laurie Hawn among other CPC members, maintained that the government's support for the military had enabled Canada to act quickly to provide aircraft and naval support to the operation in this circumstance. [322] At the end of the debate, Parliamentary Secretary to the

[316] CBC News, "PM Pledges $5M for Libya Aid," *CBC*, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pm-pledges-5m-for-libya-aid-1.1026741?ref=rss, accessed 10 November 2014.
[317] Peter MacKay, House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 145, No. 145, (21 March 2011) 1535, pg. 9042. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[318] Peter MacKay, Minister of Defence, 1540, pg. 9042.
[319] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 1835, pg. 9065.
[320] *Ibid*, 1645, pg. 9050.
[321] Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1700, pg. 9052.
[322] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 1805, pg. 9060; Jean-Pierre Blackburn, Member of Parliament, 1735, pg. 9056.

Minister of International Cooperation, Lois Brown, stated the importance of Responsibility to Protect and how Canada and its allies had stepped up to the plate in order to implement and reinforce this norm.[323]

Liberal Party

The Liberal Party supported this mission as well, noting Canada's duty to participate in the mission.[324] Members of the party sought clarity as to the mission objectives, such as whether this was meant as regime change or as a humanitarian protection as well as urging a clear duration for the mission.[325] MP Paul Szabo asked the government directly, "whether we are peacekeepers or peacemakers, and whether or not there is a proper balance when it comes to humanitarian needs."[326] Other Liberal Party MPs, such as Bob Rae were very clear about the mission's links to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, while acknowledging that it had not been universally implemented.[327] MP Paul Karygiannis also noted the importance of the UN and Responsibility to Protect as the legitimising factor for Canada's participation in the mission.[328] A number of members also raised the importance of capitalising on Responsibility to Protect's implementation and emphasised the importance of ensuring its implementation in the future.[329]

NDP

The NDP while supportive of the mission went further in seeking clarity of Canada's role in the operation and the nature of its activities in Libya. NDP Foreign Affairs Critic, Paul Dewar, insisted that Canada must be part of a humanitarian and diplomatic solution coordinated through the UN.[330]

[323] Lois Brown, Member of Parliament, 1925, pg. 9071.
[324] Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament, 1540, pg. 9042.
[325] Michael Ignatieff, Leader of the Liberal Party, 1550, pg. 9043; Paul Szabo, Member of Parliament, 1650, pg. 9050.
[326] Paul Szabo, Member of Parliament, 1725, pg. 9055.
[327] Bob Rae, 1555, pg. 9044.
[328] Jim Karygiannis, Member of Parliament, 1725, pg. 9055.
[329] Larry Bagnell, Member of Parliament, 1850, pg. 9066.
[330] Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament, 1640, pg. 9050.

Additionally, Dewar was clear that the NDP wanted an explicit time frame and military limits for Canadian action.[331]

BQ

The BQ also supported the mission, as it was a multilateral effort to protect civilians with a UN mandate.[332]

Analysis

In keeping with the CPC's interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative members once again couched motivation and involvement in the Libya mission in terms of 'moral duty.'[333] As Andrew Cooper and Bessma Momani suggest, the Harper government emphasised a values-based approach in order to 'sell' the Libya mission and what they argue resembled a normative approach similar to their Liberal predecessors.[334] While the CPC interpretation of the mission reflected its view of Canadian foreign policy narrative, there was again little question of whether Canada *should* be involved in this mission from any of the other parties. Given the support for the mission expressed by a number of MPs it suggests that the Libya operation, in broad terms, fits well enough so as not to trigger a discontinuity in the view of policymakers. Moreover, this debate had no real effect on the policymaking process as the Prime Minister had set Canada's military participation in motion already. In comparison to the debates over Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, Libya appears comparatively uncontroversial. After examining the different interpretations of Canada's narrative surrounding Afghanistan, it is likely that the fact that the mission fit more closely with more traditional conceptions of the Canadian foreign policy narrative (multilateral operation, UN mandates, NATO support, clear grounding in humanitarian norms, i.e. Responsibility to Protect) helped to facilitate the Canadian participation. Moreover, the contribution to the mission did not require

[331] *Ibid*, 1650, pg. 9051.
[332] Jean Dorion, Member of Parliament, 1615, pg. 9047.
[333] Peter MacKay, Minister of Defence,1540, pg. 9042.
[334] Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, "The Harper Government's Messaging in the Build-up to the Libyan Intervention: Was Canada Different than its NATO Allies?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014), 185.

Canadian Forces on the ground, instead the contribution of naval and aerial assets presented a much lower risk of casualties and costs.

June 14, 2011 - House of Commons, Mission renewal debate on Libya

This was the first debate after the 2011 election with the NDP, led by Jack Layton as the official opposition to the Conservative government, again led by Stephen Harper. Following the election the Liberal Party had been reduced to a shadow of its former self, winning only 34 seats and the Bloc Québécois falling below the twelve seats needed for official party status in the Canadian House of Commons. The leaders of both parties, Michael Ignatieff and Gilles Duceppe also resigned in the wake of their respective party's poor electoral performances. As a result, both parties were under interim leadership during this debate which also saw the participation of the leader of the Green Party of Canada, Elizabeth May. The debate ultimately proved relatively straightforward but nonetheless, highlighted the various parties' interpretations of how Canada should participate in the Libya operation.

CPC

Foreign Minister, John Baird, started the debate outlining the successes in the mission to that point and emphasising Canada's strong support for the UN, human rights and the need for a continued commitment to the operation.[335] Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai was also clear that Canada would continue to act in support of a multilateral organisation.[336] While not explicitly referencing peacekeeping, he used oblique language to refer to Canada's historical preference in this regard, explaining, "this government understands the genuine concerns of Canadians who oppose the use of lethal force and of turning to military action to resolve the problems of the international community. I believe this is an instinct that all Canadians share and is a credit to us all."[337] Baird went on to note that Canada was 'punching above its weight' as the NATO mission was commanded by Lieutenant General

[335] John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, House of Commons Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 146, No. 270, (14 June 2011), 1015, pg. 313. All subsequent citations for this date are from this session unless otherwise noted.
[336] Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament, 1250, pg. 332.
[337] John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1025, pg. 314.

Charles Bouchard.[338] MP Laurie Hawn also sought to draw a continuum with regards to Canada's international actions in support of Responsibility to Protect suggesting that Libya was akin to Canada's role in the First World War, Second World War, Korea, Afghanistan and its other peacekeeping missions.[339] Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay, was equally clear that the mission was in keeping with Canadian values of freedom, democracy and human rights as well as demonstrating leadership and commitment to NATO Allies.[340] Of particular note were the substantial remarks by Minister for the Status of Women, Rona Ambrose, who lauded Canada's leadership in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 focusing on mitigating the impact of conflict on women.[341]

NDP

The NDP, in its role as official opposition, raised concerns about the military nature of the operation.[342] Foreign Affairs critic, MP Paul Dewar warned that the UN needed to lead the mission and it should be solved by diplomatic and humanitarian means.[343] The NDP were also less enthusiastic about NATO's role in the operation, particularly without UN support.[344] The party also reinforced the importance of Responsibility to Protect, particularly with regards to the protection of civilians noting that "humanitarian aid is a little more than a third of what we have spent on the military effort."[345] MP Jack Harris stated that while this intervention was founded in Responsibility to Protect, Canada would not play a more military role internationally stating that it is not in Canada's tradition to use "our military as an aim in foreign policy and building ourselves up in the world through that means."[346] Indeed, the NDP was clear in its support for a diplomatic solution which would provide an architecture to avoid haphazard interventions.[347]

---

[338] *Ibid*, 1035, pg. 316.
[339] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, 1615, pg. 363.
[340] Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, 1140, pg. 324.
[341] Rona Ambrose, Minister for the Status of Women, 1525, pg. 356.
[342] Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament, 1025, pg. 315.
[343] *Ibid*, 1045, pg. 317.
[344] *Ibid*, 1105, pg. 319.
[345] Hélène Laverdière, Member of Parliament, 1210, pg. 327.
[346] Jack Harris, Member of Parliament, 1250, pg. 333.
[347] Joe Comartin, Member of Parliament, 1750, pg. 375.

Liberal Party

The Liberal Party was broadly supportive of the mission extension. Nonetheless, the party sought clarity in terms of Canada's aid to Libya and any planning that had occurred for a post-Gaddafi state.[348] Interim Party Leader, Bob Rae, demanded that Canada's role should not be restricted to a military mission but should also include a more substantial plan for development and diplomacy.[349] MP Dominic LeBlanc urged a broader role for Canada in developing state institutions and expanding the role of CIDA.[350] Liberal Party MPs referred to the vital work of Lloyd Axworthy in developing the Responsibility to Protect and its importance in relation to this mission.[351] Similarly, the Liberals were keen to invoke the legacy of Lester B. Pearson.[352] Moreover, Canada's reputation as a 'peace-loving' and 'non-imperialist' country needed to be protected through careful application of these norms.[353] MP Denis Coderre categorised it as a peacekeeping mission in support of the Libyan people based around defence, diplomacy and development.[354]

Green Party

As the only representative of her party, Green Party Leader Elizabeth May voiced her discontent with the mission. She was most adamant about Canada's role as a peacekeeper, urging an end to the military mission and to work with the UN for a negotiated solution.[355]

Analysis

As it relates to the traditional Canadian foreign policy narrative, the Libya mission reflected many of the roles that had been emphasised under the previous Liberal governments along with the attendant foreign policy behaviours. The Libya intervention was a multilateral, UN-mandated operation with clear

[348] Mark Eyking, Member of Parliament, 1110, pg. 320.
[349] Bob Rae, Leader of the Liberal Party, 1120, pg. 320.
[350] Dominic LeBlanc, Member of Parliament, 1535, pg. 357.
[351] Francis Scarpaleggia, Member of Parliament, 1635, pg. 366.
[352] Scott Simms, Member of Parliament, 1655, pg. 368.
[353] Francis Scarpaleggia, Member of Parliament, 1640, pg. 366.
[354] Denis Coderre, Member of Parliament, 1800, pg. 376.
[355] Elizabeth May, Leader of the Green Party, 1720, pg. 372.

prohibitions on the use of ground forces and on a humanitarian basis; all elements that linked well with the previously articulated middle power narrative. Despite the invocation of Responsibility to Protect and peacekeeping, there was less of an explicit effort on the part of the government to link this mission with Canada's foreign policy during the 1990s. That said, members of the NDP, Liberals and to a lesser extent the Green Party invoked the peacekeeping tradition and expressed some concern over a major military role for Canada in the mission. Despite this, Canada provided a notable military contribution as one of twelve NATO nations providing maritime assets and one of eleven NATO nations providing aircraft to enforce UNSCR 1973. As will be explored further, despite Canadian involvement, some policymakers in NATO were ultimately unaware of the Canadian contribution to the mission aside from Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, deployed as staff from JFC Naples for the mission.[356] Given the departure from the traditionally recognised narrative, policymakers no longer expected a routine interaction from the Canadian delegation and as such, informally diminished the importance of Canada within the NATO Alliance.

This mission bore the hallmarks of many of the key tenets of Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s and prior; however, it does not resonate or conflict with the broader foreign policy narrative in the ways that the Afghanistan mission did. Despite its broadly humanitarian nature, multilateral participation and robust legal legitimacy through the UN and NATO, Libya more resembled a coalition of the willing. Indeed, the fact that this operation, despite its success, has had limited follow through also suggests that this was not only a problem on the Canadian side, but also a broader issue within the Alliance.[357] This then presents the challenge of identifying whether this signifies a re-interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative and the implications of such, particularly as it proves difficult to identify the presence of any kind of reflexivity aiming to correct it. There was comparatively little debate over this mission suggesting, in part, that given its reflection of Canada's traditional narrative of international action it was more palatable. NATO's Libya operation suggests that while Canadian policymakers certainly felt a duty to participate, drawing on their past

[356] Interview 7, 4 November 2013.
[357] Interview 4, 16 October 2012.

actions as referent points, it is less clear how this has been incorporated into a broader interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative that have since been promoted under the Harper government.

Senate Debates

In examining the ways in which Canada's foreign policy narrative is contested within the policymaking process it is also useful to look briefly at the Canadian Senate. As the upper house of the Canadian legislature, the Senate as an unelected body is meant to represent a less partisan place of 'sober second thought' to carefully examine decisions made by their elected counterparts in Parliament. Senators are nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Governor General, generally on the merit of their contributions to Canadian life over their respective careers and are allowed to serve until the age of 75. This presents a challenge for this analysis as the Senate has a number of different rules making the examination of narrative contestation a more challenging issue. Namely, Senators in practice are generally unwilling to significantly shape government policy given that they are unelected. Additionally, there are rarely back and forth exchanges as Senators are unable to speak more than once on the same question during a debate. In practice, if the Senate does send something back to the House of Commons it generally offers small amendments to the bills presented rather than rejecting them outright. In the period that this study examines (2001-2011), the Senate refused Royal Assent to over 60 pieces of legislation, none of which directly related to Canada's operations in Afghanistan or Libya.[358] Debates in the Senate generally tend to be less issue specific given that its schedule is more flexible than Parliament and debates are only held if enough Senators are present to fulfill a quorum.

With that in mind, this section will examine the way in which Senators discuss Canada's participation in Afghanistan and Libya and in doing so will try to draw out the previously identified middle power narrative characteristics. As with the Parliamentary debates this examination is concerned with the ways in

[358] Government of Canada, Parliament, "House of Commons Bills that Did not Receive Royal Assent," http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/compilations/houseofcommons/legislation/billsbyresults.aspx?Parliament=&BillResult=03d93c58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb, accessed 1 October 2015.

which Canadian foreign policy is described and how this links with the roles and by extension, foreign policy behaviours.

As with the Parliamentary debates this will proceed chronologically, however, analysis will follow at the end of this section.

2001

Reflecting the debate in Parliament, the Senate expressed both condolences and solidarity with the United States. Much like his Parliamentary conservative counterparts, the Leader of the Senate Opposition, Progressive Conservative John Lynch-Staunton, noted that years of defence cuts had limited Canada's capabilities but it was nonetheless building on its tradition of peacekeeping, it had a duty to stand with its allies.[359]

2002

There were a number of discussions on Afghanistan over the course of 2002 and the contours of Canada's mission there. In particular, Senator Douglas Roche, a Progressive Conservative Senator and founding Chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative urged serious caution in Canada's course of action stating clearly that Canadian values were "support and trust of the United Nations as the guarantor of international peace and security, multilateralism and working through international consensus; compassion and humanitarianism; the rule of law; and sustainable development to achieve common security."[360] In opposition to this, a fellow Progressive Conservative Senator, Michael Meighen, opined that Canada had a responsibility to contribute to international peace and security and that its allies and neighbours expected Canada to do its part.[361] In May, Liberal Senator Pierre De Bané gave a lengthy speech on the challenges to Canadian foreign policy noting that it reflected the Pearsonian values of idealism, humanism and

[359] John Lynch-Staunton, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 140, No. 18, (September 18, 2001), 1450, pg. 1202.
[360] Douglas Roche, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 139, No. 107, (April 23, 2002), 1450, pg. 2658.
[361] Michael A. Meighen, Senator, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 139, No. 107, (April 23, 2002), 1510, pg. 2662.

solidarity.[362] Most importantly, he noted that Canada had an important role in relation to the US and its allies, acting not only as an honest broker, but restoring American confidence in multilateral solutions in the wake of 9/11.[363]

While not strictly a debate, the Senate often hosted notable figures from Canada and elsewhere and invited them to speak about their experiences in order to better inform decision making in the Upper Chamber. In this case, the invitees were the Lieutenant Colonel Pat Stogran who had commanded Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and Major General Michel Gauthier who had commanded the Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. In his remarks, Lt. Col Stogran acknowledged the open-endedness of this mission but nonetheless was prepared to serve the country with honour and the Canadian Forces commitment to international stability and collective security.[364] Most of the Senate inquiries focused on the Tarnak Farm friendly fire incident and the overall level of readiness of the Canadian Forces to undertake this mission.[365]

2003

There was limited discussion of Afghanistan in the Senate though there was continued concern over the invasion of Iraq. As Senators Douglas Roche and Sharon Carstairs noted, Canada's deployment to Afghanistan was characterised as a peacekeeping mission which was positive and in keeping with Canadian traditions.[366] This was by no means an accepted way of characterising Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, in an exchange later in the year, when the leader of the Liberal Senate Caucus, Sharon Carstairs, discussed Afghanistan as a peacekeeping mission, there was considerable pushback from one of her Progressive Conservative colleagues, Senator Michael Forrestall who stated that

---

[362] Pierre De Bané, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 139, No. 116, (May 28, 2002), 1600, pg. 2870.
[363] *Ibid*, 1640, pg. 2876.
[364] Lt.Col Pat Stogran, Commander Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 140, No. 18, (November 19, 2002), 1420, pg. 352.
[365] The Tarnak Farm incident saw four Canadian servicemen accidentally bombed by a US warplane while undertaking night time exercises near their base.
[366] Douglas Roche, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 140, No. 36, (February 13, 2003), 1410, pg. 849; Sharon Carstairs, Senator, 2nd Session, Vol. 140, No. 36, (February 13, 2003), 1410, pg. 849.

since the conflict had not formally ended, this was not a peacekeeping mission.[367]

2004

In 2004, attention turned towards the ongoing conflict in Sudan, with the Senate devoting a considerable amount of time to discussing the deteriorating humanitarian situation there. There were some discussions related to Afghanistan, but they focused more on the logistic elements of the mission rather than the broader narratives informing it.[368] In particular, Conservative Senator Raynell Andreychuk invoked the memory of inaction in Rwanda and was forthright in urging the government to take action.[369]

2005

In light of the July 7 attacks in London, the Senate convened in order to discuss the threats to Canada emanating from its participation in the Afghanistan operation. Echoing remarks in the House of Commons, there was some concern over the blunt language used by the new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, in which he stated that Canada should prepare for casualties.[370] Senator Jack Austin, speaking as the leader of the Liberal caucus in the Senate stated that a political decision by the Government of Canada had been made to put Canadian troops in harm's way.[371]

---

[367] Michael Forrestall, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 140, No. 72, (June 19, 2003), 1430, pg. 1744.
[368] Michael A. Meighen, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 141, No. 31 (April 21, 2004), 1350 pg. 855.
[369] Raynell Andreychuk, Senator, Senate Debate, 37th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 141, No. 35, (April 29, 2004) 1410, pg. 978.
[370] L. Ian Macdonald, "A General Warning: General Hillier's Comments Were Intended as a Wake-up Call for a Smug Canadian Public that Doesn't Think Terror Could Strike Close to Home," *The Montreal Gazette*, 26 July 2005, A19; Michael Nickerson, "The Not-so-civil Servant and the 'Scumbags' Who Hate Us," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 July 2005, A15; Rondi Adamson, "Is Gen. Hillier Setting the Right Tone for our Military?," *Toronto Star*, 7 August 2005, A16; Lewis Mackenzie, "Rick Hillier's Right, so Back Off," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 August 2005, A11.
[370] Mike Blanchfield, "Canadians Oppose Tough, New Role for the Military, Poll Shows: Respondents Prefer 'Old-fashioned' Peacekeeping to Hunting Terrorists," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 August 2005, A4.
[371] Jack Austin, Senator, Senate Debate, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 142, No. 83, (July 18, 2005), 1850, pg. 1760.

2006

Reflecting the House of Commons debate on the extension of the Canadian mission in Kandahar on 17 May, the question was raised as to whether the Senate should also debate this issue.[372] Liberal Senator Roméo Dallaire, criticised the Conservative government for both the short notice period ahead of the debate as well as the insinuation that if one should disagree with the mission extension it might appear they are in opposition to the mission overall.[373] In a separate session, Conservative Party Senator Consiglio di Nino spoke at length about Canada's commitment to the mission noting that it was there not only for the gratitude of its allies but because it was also about helping others.[374]

Later in the year, President Hamid Karzai addressed both the House of Commons and the Senate thanking Canada for its sacrifice and invoking Canada's pluralistic, bilingual traditions as models to be emulated by Afghanistan.[375] This sparked further discussion later in the year with Senator Roméo Dallaire questioning the government's commitment to delivering development aid as a part of an integrated military approach.[376] The leader of the Conservative Party in the Senate, Marjory LeBreton, countered this arguing that Canada was in Kandahar due to the dithering of Prime Minister Paul Martin.[377]

In this same debate session, Senator Dallaire invoked Canada's status as a middle power in order to support humanitarian laws and continue fighting for others to enjoy those rights.[378] Indeed, the next day, Senator Dallaire again recalled this tradition noting that while the Pearsonian peacekeeping era ended

---

[372] Art Eggleton, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 14, (May 16, 2006), 1450, pg. 319.
[373] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 15, (May 17, 2006), 1400, pg. 333.
[374] Consiglio di Nino, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 17, (30 May, 2006), 1630, pg. 383.
[375] Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, House of Commons, 22 September 2006. Appendix to 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 32, (September 28, 2006).
[376] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 40, (October 25, 2006), 1410, pg. 945.
[377] Marjory LeBreton, Senator, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 40, (October 25, 2006), 1420, pg. 946.
[378] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 40, (October 25, 2006), 1530, pg. 956.

with the Cold War, the Government of Canada still sought to play the role of a leading middle power.[379]

2007

This year saw a review of Canada's Afghanistan mission where Liberal Senator Jane Cordy raised the possibility of a 2009 end date for Canada's deployment the issue of relief for Canadian troops in Kandahar given the caveats placed on deployment by other NATO Allies.[380] Indeed, the issue of Canada's end date came up repeatedly reflecting the debates in the House of Commons. As Liberal Senator Frank Mahovlich observed, the government seemed to be avoiding setting a definite end date on the Afghanistan mission.[381]

Interestingly, later that year, there was a debate over Canada's middle power status between Liberal and Conservative Senators. This was in specific reference to Canada's failure to act in Darfur, Sudan. Conservative Senator Consiglio di Nino opined that Canada, "Canada has shown principled leadership in the world and punched above its weight."[382] Similarly, one of his Liberal colleagues invoked Canada's lack of colonial history as a potential factor strengthening its ability to persuade African countries to act in the UN.[383] Carrying this point further, Liberal Senator Jim Munson invoked Canada's middle power tradition alongside its deployment to Afghanistan when discussing its role in supporting UN resolutions.[384]

Giving some insight into the way Canada's traditions were invoked during a debate on creating a national peacekeeper's day, Senator Dallaire stated that "[t]he term 'peacekeeping' can either be considered history, that it does not exist anymore, or recognized as an all-encompassing capability in which we

[379] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 41, (October 26, 2006), 1500, pg. 971.
[380] Jane Cordy, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 75, (February 27, 2007), 1435, pg. 1837.
[381] Frank Mahovlich, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 93, (May 3, 2007), 1400, 2261.
[382] Consiglio di Nino, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 94, (May 8, 2007), 1530, pg. 2293.
[383] Joan Fraser, Senator, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 94, (May 8, 2007), 1530, 2293.
[384] Jim Munson, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 108, (June 14, 2007), 1750, 2708.

provide conflict resolution that ultimately ends up with a peace agreement and monitoring as we do nation building."[385] His comments were reflective, in part, of how the discussion of Canada's traditional behaviours had shifted since the deployment to Afghanistan. Indeed, Senator Dallaire, while quick to describe Canada as a middle power was also clear that this was not a static label or set of behaviours.

2008

Compared to the previous year, there was less mention of Afghanistan and consequently less debate over the mission. Conservative Senator Gerry St. Germain gave a statement comparing Canada's Kandahar mission to Canadian battles in the First and Second World Wars as well as Korea.[386] Nonetheless, Senator Dallaire stated that Canada as a middle power in the world needed to do more to support human rights internationally while reminding his colleagues on the anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda.[387] Moreover, there was also a push to support a National Peacekeepers' Day recognising Canada's historical contribution to international peacebuilding.[388]

2009

Debates during the course of the year saw the middle power narrative continue to be invoked in Senate discussions, though not always linked directly with Canada's Afghanistan mission or NATO more generally. As Conservative Senator Hugh Segal suggested, Canada's middle power tradition allowed it a degree of independence from the US and advanced the country's ability to pursue its own trade and geopolitical interests.[389] Later in the year, Independent Senator Marcel Prud'homme gave a farewell speech in the Senate on Canada's foreign policy stating, "[w]e have a reputation, a way of doing things, that

[385] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 144, No. 18, (November 29, 2007), 1520, pg. 365.
[386] Gerry St. Germain, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 144, No. 35, (February 26, 2008),1400, pg. 806.
[387] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 144, No. 47, (April 8, 2008), 1415, pg. 1058.
[388] Nancy Ruth, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 144, No. 35, (February 26, 2008), 1630, pg. 829.
[389] Hugh Segal, Senator, Senate Debate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 146, No. 5, (February 3, 2009), 1750, pg. 88.

focuses firmly on respect for human rights, and we are known as a middle power that is respected and well regarded in all regions of the world."[390] He went on to note that during his tenure in the Senate he had seen Canada's influence in the world decline as it moved away from its traditions.[391]

2010

As Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan drew towards a close, discussion shifted as to what the next step would be in theatre. Conservative Senator Pamela Wallin presented a report on Canada's post-2011 engagement noting that Canadians "have heart in our mission both as war-fighters and humanitarians."[392] The report urged the continued presence of Canadian military trainers in Afghanistan and sought to emphasise the positive outcomes of the mission. In discussing Canada's continuing training mission later in the year, Senator Wallin went on to praise Prime Minister Harper's decision to keep trainers in Afghanistan as the "right thing."[393]

2011

Much like in the House of Commons, there was little opposition to Canada's involvement in the Libya campaign. Liberal Senator Romeo Dallaire questioned whether Canada was there under the auspices of Responsibility to Protect, since the government had given indications that this was not why Canada was taking part in the Libya operation.[394] Conservative Senator Raynell Andreychuk stated that since nations in the UN had not effectively codified what Responsibility to Protect means, it was not applicable in this case.[395] This was coupled with an increase in overtly partisan language, between the Liberal and Conservative Senate members who loudly praised the actions of Prime Minister Stephen

[390] Marcel Prud'homme, Senator, Senate Debate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 146, No. 73, (November 25, 2009), 1420, pg. 1799.
[391] *Ibid*, 1420, pg. 1799.
[392] Pamela Wallin, Senator, Senate Debate, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 147, No. 51, (September 28, 2010), 1500, pg. 1102.
[393] Pamela Wallin, Senator, Senate Debate, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 147, No. 68, (November 23, 2010), 1620, pg. 1391.
[394] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 147, No. 96, (March 22, 2011), 1420, pg. 2063.
[395] Raynell Andreychuk, Senator, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 147, No. 96, (March 22, 2011), 1430, pg. 2064.

Harper. Indeed, Conservative Senators such as Doug Finley sought to actively downplay the Liberal foreign policy legacy opining that "in the 1990s, Canada surrendered its role as an active leader in the world. We seemed content to go with the flow at the UN and settled for currying favour and approbation from abusive dictators and despots, rather than taking a principled, forceful, Canadian stand for human rights."[396] This type of language was coupled with actions such as announcing the closure of the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre in the name of budget cuts.[397]

In a separate 2011 debate, during an exchange focused on Canada's 'innate modesty' Conservative Senator Stephen Greene rejected Canada's middle power traditions at length, stating "I refer to the 'honest broker.' This is an ideal policy for the innately modest because with that policy what Canadians want does not matter. All you engage in is moral relativism."[398] As he went on to say, "[u]nder the Liberals we were indeed a middle power and very content to hide our light under a bushel. Under successive Liberal governments we sacrificed our military."[399] This represented a wholesale rejection of the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy and the Conservative government's attempts to redefine their legacy.

Analysis of Senate Debates

Overall, the Senators in these debates reflect many of the sentiments expressed by their House of Commons colleagues. As noted previously, Canadian Senators' actual ability to shape foreign policy behaviour is heavily circumscribed given their position as unelected officials. Given that this is the case, they are not subject to Mintz and DeRouen's poliheuristic decision-making model and ostensibly, could articulate completely alternative views of Canada's

[396] Doug Finley, Senator, Senate Debate, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 148, No. 19, (October 18, 2011), 1510, pg. 371.
[397] Marjory LeBreton, Senator, Senate Debate, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 148, No. 8, (June 16, 2011), 1400, 92.
[398] Stephen Greene, Senator, Senate Debate, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 148, No. 31, (November 22, 2011), 1650, pg. 662.
[399] *Ibid*, 1650, pg. 662.

foreign policy narrative given that they cannot be electorally vulnerable.[400] That said, it is evident that the middle power narrative informs many of their understandings of Canada's foreign policy tradition. In addition to this, it is also possible to observe the rise of overtly partisan language in the Senate after the election of Stephen Harper.

Much like their counterparts in the House of Commons the roles that Senators articulated were founded in the Canadian middle power narrative. In particular, Senator Roméo Dallaire, a former Canadian general who had commanded UN peacekeepers in Rwanda frequently invoked the middle power label when discussing the role that Canada should play in the world.[401] This reflects the duality of the label in that Dallaire invokes the middle power narrative both as tradition and as role, however, with a closer reading, it becomes clearer that this is not one single role but rather a collection of roles that Canada is seen to have historically played. In this case, reflecting this study's definition: a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding.

Similarly Senators were quick to categorise Canada's participation in Afghanistan either as peacekeeping or at the very least in relation to peacekeeping though as the mission dragged on, this became less evident. Nonetheless, the roles articulated through the majority of debates remain rooted in the middle power narrative and as charted in this chapter, Senators were much quicker than their House of Commons counterparts to refer to this when discussing Canadian foreign policy. Similarly, it is interesting to note that Senators reflected much of the elite consensus that shaped much of the discussion of Canadian foreign policy.[402] Senators from both Liberal and Conservative Parties spoke out in support of Afghanistan and Libya and

---

[400] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 78

[401] Roméo Dallaire, Senator, Senate Debate, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 143, No. 41, (October 26, 2006), 1500, 971.

[402] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.

demonstrated a shared understanding of Canada's foreign policy rooted in its middle power narrative, regardless of whether they supported or rejected it.

Perhaps most illuminating was Conservative Senator Stephen Greene's argument against Canada's middle power tradition and the founding of his criticism in the Conservative Party's moral motivations. In particular, the categorisation of Canada's middle power tradition as moral relativism as well as its role as honest broker clearly reflects the differing interpretations of the foreign policy narrative.[403] Senator Greene's criticisms remain rooted in the popular understanding of the foreign policy narrative underlining the explicit attempts to re-orient Canadian foreign policy away from its Liberal Party tradition. Indeed, this categorisation of moral action that disregards external preferences or how these actions are received by other actors focuses exclusively on fulfilling a self-conception.[404] This fits within with the ontological security analysis that this study uses and indeed, also further emphasises that link between narratives and behaviour.

Despite their comparatively limited ability to significantly shape policy, the debates in the Senate mirrored the House of Commons. Debates under the Liberal governments of Chrétien and Martin were generally discussed either in terms of Canada's behaviour vis-à-vis its allies and the ways in which its actions were interpreted (honour-seeking behaviours) or Canada's inaction on certain issues, such as Sudan (humanitarian). This is unsurprising given that the Senate generally reflects the debates in Parliament but the motivations as identified in the House of Commons debates were somewhat less pronounced. The exception to this is the moral motivations that come to the fore under the Harper government which are highly evident. In this case, the roles that are articulated are preferences more than positional.[405] Specifically, Canada's role in Afghanistan and Libya was that of a principled actor and founded in moral conviction. This again reflects that Senators were in a position to speak more

---

[403] Stephen Greene, Senator, Senate Debate, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 148, No. 31, (November 22, 2011), 1650, pg. 662.
[404] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 41.
[405] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.

abstractly about Canadian foreign policy in relation to its foreign policy narrative without worrying specifically about more capabilities-driven considerations. However, given that this is the case, it becomes clear that the middle power narrative continues to exert a powerful influence on the practice and debates over Canadian foreign policy in the Senate and Senators sought to maintain continuity with this understanding. As will be explored further in the next chapter, this narrative also permeates the popular understanding of Canadian foreign policy as expressed in the media.

Part II: NATO Headquarters and Canadian policymakers

Through interviews in NATO headquarters with a number of Canadian staff, both members of the International Staff as well as in the Canadian Joint Delegation, it is possible to begin to construct their understanding of the middle power narrative and whether this shapes Canadian behaviour in NATO and then compare this to the foreign policy narrative articulated by parliamentarians and the attendant roles that accompany it. As noted in the introduction, the majority of these interviewees opted for anonymity so as to encourage a frank exchange of views as well as protect their professional reputations.

In discussing Canada's participation in NATO, particularly with regards to Afghanistan and Libya, there were frequent references to a number of terms related to Canada's foreign policy narrative. Indeed, the term honest broker was frequently invoked in relation to Canada's role in NATO, though in discussions with Canadians working in the headquarters, this was largely used in the past tense.[406] The policymakers that were interviewed also noted interesting changes in Canadian foreign policy during the various governments. As one Canadian NATO Staff Officer explained that while the Chrétien and Martin eras had been marked by notable engagement and leadership in NATO, the Harper government had seen an "increasing view, both in, I don't know, in sense and in deed, that Canada's also pulling away from its multilateral approach and its willingness to participate."[407] This Staff Officer had noted that the changes in Canadian foreign

[406] Interview 24, 14 November 2013; Interview 27, 15 November 2013; Interview 22, 11 November, 2013.
[407] Interview 12, 11 November 2013.

policy did not sit well with his identity as a Canadian.[408] Similarly in relation to Afghanistan it was not entirely clear as to what Canada's purpose in remaining in Afghanistan was inside or outside the delegation.[409] The lack of overarching strategy was articulated as such by one Canadian Senior NATO Official who stated,

> [w]e've damaged our image as a middle power, maybe I'm too much from the Trudeau era. I think that we've done a lot of damage to the role that we could play internationally and when I say that I look at a collectivity of things. I look at, I guess I think of too much in terms of the Conservative government or Mr. Harper has really wanted to create a new mold for Canada and I fear that he may have chosen the wrong moment[410]

Another Canadian member of the international staff explained that there was an expectation of a Canadian role in NATO and that the government had both muzzled the communications from the Canadian delegation and de-emphasised the narrative relating to NATO, thus making the organisation less important in the eyes of the Canadian public.[411] This also manifested in the delegation with the loss of clarity as to Canada's place in NATO's operations and what it was meant to do.

Moreover, there was a distinct view that the Conservative government had an alternative approach to the organisation. Another Canadian Senior NATO Official noted that the Harper government had taken a much more transactional view of the Alliance and did not have previous governments' reflexive belief in multilateralism.[412] By the same token however, the greater desire for freedom from the constraints created by multilateral structures helped to create flexibility of action for Canada.[413] Furthermore he added that, while previous Canadian governments saw the rules-based functioning and the execution of foreign policy through multilateral structures as fundamentally in Canadian interest the Conservative government did not.[414] When this point was raised with a senior

---

[408] *Ibid*, 11 November 2013.
[409] Interview 5, 17 October 2012.
[410] Interview 26, 15 November 2013.
[411] Interview 8, 4 November 2013.
[412] Interview 9, 4 November 2013.
[413] *Ibid,* 4 November 2013.
[414] *Ibid*, 4 November 2013.

member of Canada's defence delegation in headquarters, it was suggested that while perhaps transactional was too harsh, the Harper government saw the relationship as instrumental; a tool to achieve certain ends.[415] Indeed, it was suggested that the foreign policy portfolio had shrunk in importance with a focus being placed on 'retail politics' and an emphasis on 'principle.'[416] This reflects some of the criticism noted in the Parliamentary *Hansard* concerning the Conservative's approach to Afghanistan and foreign policy more generally – namely that Canadian foreign policy was being redefined along partisan CPC principles in order to win domestic electoral support.

Taken together, the Harper government had made it clear that it was seeking to distance itself from the previous Canadian foreign policy narrative defined, in large part, under Liberal governments. This included the use of the middle power narrative, which was referred to as "a hackneyed Cold War expression" by one interviewee.[417] Speaking to a similar point about Canadian foreign policy, another Canadian serving in a senior position in NATO noted that "we used to have an image of a good international player, someone you could depend on, I see that shrinking; I see us losing some of that good will which, there will come a time, things being cyclical, we will wish we didn't, hadn't lost it or we will be wanting to rebuild it."[418] Indeed, in conversation with another Canadian diplomat serving in Geneva, it was noted that the pressures placed on Canadian diplomats to adhere to the government's foreign policy were damaging the department, likely necessitating a decade of internal rebuilding.[419]

These comments from Canadian diplomats all point towards an overarching narrative surrounding not only Canada's role in NATO, but Canada's foreign policy behaviour more broadly. The responses reflect not only a deep concern over the conduct of foreign policy under the Harper government, but also a concern over the clear disjuncture with previous foreign policy continuity. In keeping with this study's interpretative approach, it is possible to discern a narrative within the institutions that conduct Canadian foreign policy,

[415] Interview 23, 14 November 2013.
[416] *Ibid*, 14 November 2013.
[417] *Ibid*, 14 November 2013.
[418] Interview 26, 15 November 2013.
[419] Interview 27, 2 March 2014.

one which is multilateral, constructive, progressive and capable; in many ways reflecting the key characteristics of a middle power. In departing from the established narrative related to Canada's foreign policy, the Harper government thus challenged the perception of the foreign policy narrative held by Canadian policymakers. As one senior Canadian official explained, that some naïveté about foreign policy had been lost through Canada's experience in Afghanistan. However, concurrent to this, the Conservative government had developed an allergy to multilateral institutions.[420] This statement reflects the process of disruption in action; with the Conservative government changing the narrative around Canadian foreign policy coming out of Afghanistan, there were clear behavioural changes that came with it. Canadian officials also confirmed this in saying that there was a new set of 'principles' governing Canadian foreign policy which, while making Canada more assertive had in turn harmed its image within NATO.[421] However, as noted already, it was not clear what exactly the alternative narrative entailed.

In speaking to the Canadian delegation members, there was no clear overarching theme to Canadian foreign policy akin to Canada's ownership of the human security agenda.[422] While there were mentions of maternal health initiatives, the Arctic, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights and Israel, there was no unifying theme to the various areas of emphasis.[423] Moreover, that is not to say that in these instances there was disagreement with the policies. The interviewees, while noting their discomfort with the new direction of Canadian foreign policy, were not entirely clear as to what the

[420] Interview 22, 13 November 2013.
[421] Interview 24, 14 November 2013; Interview 27, 14 November 2013.
[422] Interview 22, 13 November 2013.
[423] Terry Pedwell, "Harper, Baird Fan out in NYC to Push Canada's Efforts on Maternal, Child Health," *Maclean's*, 25 September 2013 online at http://www.macleans.ca/news/harper-baird-fan-out-in-nyc-to-push-canadas-efforts-on-maternal-child-health/, accessed 7 July 2014; John Stackhouse, "Sovereignty is Canada's Top Priority in the North, Baird Tells Davos Forum," *Globe and Mail*, 23 January 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/sovereignty-is-canadas-top-priority-in-the-north-baird-tells-davis-forum/article16470142/, accessed 7 July 2014; Canadian Press, "John Baird Blasts 'Hateful' Russian Anti-gay Law," *CBC News*, 1 August 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-blasts-hateful-russian-anti-gay-law-1.1355767, accessed on 7 July 2014; Campbell Clark, "Baird Underlines Israel Support with Controversial East Jerusalem Visit," *Globe and Mail*, 1 April 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/baird-underlines-israel-support-with-controversial-east-jerusalem-visit/article11048090/, accessed 7 July 2014.

Harper government's new policy was. The actions taken by the Conservative government with regards to NATO do not necessarily reflect a clear, cohesive narrative. Indeed, as shown in the Parliamentary record, the government was staunchly committed to supporting the mission through until 2009, when it was clear that the combat mission would end in 2011. However, as a member of the delegation noted, members of the government complained publicly about our allies' caveats in Afghanistan up until it was clear that Canadian forces would be withdrawing.[424] Moreover, Canada also announced its withdrawal from the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Airborne Warning And Command System (AWACS), the latter of which it had staunchly supported for years past. As a Canadian senior official noted, Canada also unilaterally cut its share of NATO's common funding, the pooled assets which fund NATO's various programmes.[425] The withdrawal from these programmes was seen as indicative of the government's new attitude towards NATO and as one Canadian staff officer put it, "had a fairly loud thud as it hit the ground."[426]

These actions, all taken together, may not necessarily reflect a new foreign policy narrative, however, they are certainly sufficient to disrupt the routines of the Canadian policymakers working in NATO. As a senior Canadian official noted, politicians are the ones who prioritise what happens when and the current government has a certain view of foreign policy that impacts the way that Canada acts.[427] Indeed, it was recognised that by moving away from the traditional foreign policy narrative, there was a real impact for Canada's foreign policy behaviour, particularly with regards to Canadian policymaker's ability to shape policy in NATO committees. As will be explored in the next chapter, it is also important to see how this narrative is transmitted, in this case through the media, and how it is interpreted. Disrupting the routines of Canadian policymakers as well as other national policymakers' interpretations of Canada's

[424] Interview 23, 14 November 2013; See also "NATO Needs to 'Step up' in Afghanistan, Says MacKay after U.S. Talks," *CBC News*, 20 September 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nato-needs-to-step-up-in-afghanistan-says-mackay-after-u-s-talks-1.641391, accessed 8 July 2014; "Allies Urged to Find New Roles in Afghanistan," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 December 2007, http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=db873558-2d99-443c-b893-324093905103, accessed 8 July 2014.
[425] Interview 26, 14 November 2013.
[426] Interview 12, 4 November 2013.
[427] Interview 23, 14 November 2013.

foreign policy narrative, changed expectations about the role that Canada could play in the Alliance. Moreover, there is a dynamic process by which the narrative of Canadian foreign policy travels back and forth between policymakers in Ottawa and those who execute its associated behaviour in Brussels. This also gives some clarity to the process by which narratives shape behaviours – in that behaviours dictated from Ottawa which conflict with the established Canadian foreign policy narrative, then trigger a disjuncture in policymakers' routines and thus Canada's foreign policy behaviour.

Part III: Conclusions

In seeking to draw out interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative through the parliamentary debates there is a gradual but nonetheless clear shift away from traditional conceptions of Canada's middle power peacekeeping role. Indeed, the explicit middle power label carries little weight with Canadian policymakers in Parliament or in NATO. That being said, the constituent components of this narrative still exert a magnetic pull in terms of structuring the discussions about Canada's foreign policy actions. While the preferences of policymakers shifted, these are still compared against the peacekeeping tradition and justified in relation to Canada's past foreign policy behaviour. It is possible to discern the ways in which the middle power characteristics mentioned previously; a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding, all have a definite presence during the discussions of Canada's participation in the operations. Moreover, there was little question related to whether or not Canada *should* take part in these interventions. Indeed, regardless of public opinion, both main parties were largely agreed on taking part in the mission reflecting the elite consensus between the two.[428] Rather, it was largely accepted that Canada had a role to play in both Afghanistan and Libya, even if the parties could not agree on the nature of that involvement. As Prime Minister Jean Chrétien articulated, "[w]hen NATO sent forces in Bosnia,

[428] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.

Kosovo, and Afghanistan, we were expected to be there…Most times, however, Canadians wanted to participate in multilateral peacekeeping missions. They were practically a Canadian invention"[429] These traditional elements of Canadian diplomacy continue to exert pressure, however, the specific behaviours and emotional elements linked with a foreign policy narrative affect policymakers remains variable. This suggests that the narrative of Canadian foreign policy exerts a clear pressure in driving foreign policy behaviour, even if the characteristics or details of that behaviour are contested. Given Canada's foreign policy history it would have effectively been unconscionable for Canadian policymakers to oppose any kind of involvement in Afghanistan in response to 9/11 or by the same token, in Libya. Indeed, the drive for policymakers to maintain a narrative of Canadian foreign policy then informed and helped justify the decision to become involved in both operations.

Integrating the findings from the preceding chapter, this concluding section will first interpret the motivations behind the various governments' foreign policy decisions, then examine the links between narrative and role through Role Theory, before establishing how this shapes foreign policy behaviour.

Motivations

Building on Steele's ontological security related motivations for actions, policymakers evinced many of the same drives depending on their interpretation of the national foreign policy narrative.[430] Liberal Party MPs, on initially involving Canada in Afghanistan, saw this as somewhere where Canada *should* be and drew on different kinds of language to justify this case. Nonetheless, involvement in Afghanistan was initially focused on duty, not moral duty, but rather a broader duty to allies and itself, or as noted before, honour. Liberal policymakers were driven to get involved in Afghanistan as a way to maintain their standing with the US and in NATO, fulfill commitments towards their allies

[429] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 333.
[430] As noted in Chapter 1 ontological security offers some insight into why policymakers seek to maintain consistency with their self-narrative, however, it does not sufficiently explain *why* policymakers feel the need to do so and does not offer a research programme that could explore this in sufficient detail.

as well as support the broader cause of international security but most importantly, to have Canada's contribution recognised as important by its allies. This reinforced both internal and external honour which as Lebow notes, are separate components, but still related.[431] Different reflections of this honour were present both in deterring actions that did not mesh with policymakers' vision of Canadian foreign policy and also shaped how they interpreted the actions of other states. These different visions of honour justified Canadian policymakers' decision to sit out of Iraq while also creating an expectation that other NATO Allies would have a similar level of commitment (i.e. burden-sharing) in Afghanistan.[432] When examining the commitments to Afghanistan through the concept of honour, it helps us to understand Canadian considerations vis-à-vis the United States and NATO Allies, but also how it reflects not only external recognition but also how this relates to internal considerations of international behaviour.[433] There was a recognition amongst all parties, narrative aside, of the heavy burden that Canada bore in these respective operations, which, as will be explored further on, had important implications for Canada-NATO relations. However, throughout these debates though Canada's past foreign policy behaviour influences the interpretation through reflexive examination of current and future actions, there is a clear move away from peacekeeping as the dominant behavioural expression of Canadian foreign policy.

The Liberal focus later shifted more towards a humanitarian aim in Afghanistan which reflected the narrative confusion which Boucher observed.[434] With the Martin government's focus on activities beyond Afghanistan, the interpretation of the middle power narrative became more attuned to shame over failures in previous foreign policy initiatives, particularly in Africa. With regards to the Afghanistan campaign, Martin, through his ministers, sought an arrangement with the International Committee for the Red Cross for oversight on

---

[431] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 272.
[432] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 97.
[433] *Ibid*, 40.
[434] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-2008," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 725.

detainee treatment, however, this was eventually seen as insufficient.[435] Contemporary to the Martin government there was increasing focus on the ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Sudan and the government offered support for the African Union mission there (AMISOM) providing funding, training and equipment.[436] As mentioned previously, Steele characterises humanitarian motives as arising from shame over disjunctions in a country's foreign policy narrative, in this case Canada's neglect of Africa and more specifically, the alleged genocide in Darfur, Sudan as noted in the Martin government's international policy statement.[437] Martin himself also stated clearly in his memoirs that he sought to create a leadership role for Canada in Africa through UN and regional initiatives.[438] As such, this prompted Martin's reorientation of the Canadian foreign policy narrative to emphasise the importance of foreign aid and cooperation with relevant non-governmental organisations.[439]

As many observers have since noted, in contrast to the Liberal governments there is a clear moral narrative to the Harper government's approach to foreign policy.[440] On taking power in its respective minority

---

[435] CanWest News Service, "Martin Government Cleared Detainees Deal: Memos," *Edmonton Journal*, 3 May 2007, http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=84b483cf-765f-4700-ba6c-19655539885f&sponsor=, accessed 10 October 2014.

[436] Government of Canada, "Canada Supporting Peacekeeping in Darfur: Past, Present, Future," *Department of Foreign Affairs,* December 4, 2012, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan_south_sudan-soudan_soudan_du_sud/support-appui.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 30 March, 2014.

[437] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, Ottawa, 2005, 14.

[438] Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 332.

[439] This also hearkens back to the diplomatic work done under Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in the late 1990s. See Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Antipersonnel Landmines: The Case for Human Security as a Foreign Policy Priority," *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[440] Gerd Schönwälder, "Principles and Prejudice: Foreign Policy under the Harper Government," *Centre for International Policy Studies*, No. 24 (June 2014), http://cips.uottawa.ca/publications/principles-and-prejudice-foreign-policy-under-the-harper-government/, accessed 15 July 2014; Martin Goldfarb, "Stephen Harper Has Injected Moral Principle into Canadian Diplomacy," *National Post*, 17 January 2014, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/17/martin-goldfarb-stephen-harper-has-injected-moral-principle-into-canadian-diplomacy/, accessed 15 July 2014. See among others; Paul Gecelovsky, "The Prime Minister and the Parable: Stephen Harper and Personal Responsibility Internationalism," *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011," *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012), 137-154.

governments and then as a majority, the CPC retained a distinct narrative rooted in moral language; Canada's duty to Afghanistan went beyond honour, but was rather a moral duty to support the good and do what is right, argued vaguely in this case, as defending Canadian values. In terms of its relationship with NATO, at least from 2005 to 2008, one NATO staff officer noted, there were no major changes in Canada's approach to the Alliance.[441] Moreover, when it came to actual foreign policy behaviour, the CPC conceived of Canada's foreign policy narrative slightly differently with an emphasis on principle and moral action, supporting causes which promoted values and defended interests. Foreign Minister John Baird, while neglecting any mention of peacekeeping, stated in his 2011 address to the United Nations General Assembly, "Canada does not just 'go along' in order to 'get along.' We will 'go along,' only if we 'go' in a direction that advances Canada's values: freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law."[442] As seen in this chapter, the CPC's efforts to try and reorient Canadian foreign policy were met with resistance and in some cases bewilderment, as it was such a clear departure from traditional or what could be termed Liberal Party foreign policy priorities. Fundamentally, the CPC foreign policy reflected more of the internal moral considerations of the policymaker. As noted in Chapter 1, ontological security posits that this is done in order to maintain consistency with one's self-narrative. However, it does not suitably explain why this is the case on the individual level.[443] Paul Gecelovsky suggests that Prime Minister Harper's foreign policy is rooted in religious conviction from his upbringing.[444] Ultimately, this goes beyond the scope of what this analysis seeks to accomplish but nonetheless points to the importance of exploring the motivations driving foreign policy roles.

---

[441] Interview 8, 4 November 2013.
[442] John Baird, "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly," *Government of Canada*, 26 September 2011, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011-030.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 7 August 2014.
[443] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 55
[444] Paul Gecelovsky, "The Prime Minister and the Parable: Stephen Harper and Personal Responsibility Internationalism," *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

The Libya campaign, finally, highlighted how far the discussion of the Canadian foreign policy narrative had shifted from the Axworthy years with regards to the 'human security agenda.' Not because it represented a radical departure from a traditional narrative, but rather, as it highlights the ambiguity present in the Canadian foreign policy narrative after years of effectively attempting to 'unfix' it from the middle power peacekeeping image. Rather than linking the mission to these traditional narratives or the humanitarian narrative of Canadian foreign policy, the Harper government initially described this action along moral lines and emphasised its support for Canadian values; notable given the party's previous criticism of the Liberals for their emphasis on the same thing.[445] However, in this circumstance it becomes clear that the motivations, particularly those founded in honour and moral understandings defined Canadian policymakers' contributions to Afghanistan and Libya and thus required a robust contribution to these operations to fulfill their linkage with the Canadian foreign policy narrative. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the importance of shame in shaping the ways in which interviewees responded to questions. Indeed, the deviation away from what was seen as Canada's traditional diplomacy had real implications for Canada's influence within NATO. As Steele suggests, shame is vitally important when observing a disconnect between action and narrative as it shapes how actors interact and understand each other.[446] In particular, in conversation with Canadian policymakers in NATO there was a sense that they were adrift as the Conservative government sought to break from the traditional components of the middle power narrative. Policymakers within NATO are then left to construct a new understanding of Canadian participation in the Alliance and what this means for Canadian diplomacy.

Narrative and Role Theoretical Analysis

The invocation of Canada's foreign policy narrative and its attendant roles provide a window into both preferred action (role preference) and action borne

[445] Peter MacKay, House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 145, No. 145, (21 March 2011), 1540, pg. 9042.
[446] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 54.

out of circumstance (role position).[447] Nonetheless, while distinguishing between the two, it is through their expression that narrative then becomes linked with foreign policy behaviour. This chapter also highlights the role contestation that occurs on the domestic level with different actors articulating different roles. Their desire for consistency and the behaviours which flow out of this conform to how they understand their respective nations' role in the international system. This process has been explored by a number of authors aiming to explore the relationship between National Role Conceptions (NRCs) and the domestic level.[448] While the NRC literature offers some insight into this process, as explored in this chapter, agent-specific, but nonetheless multidimensional components of narratives become more apparent.

Initially, the Liberal Party conceived of Canada as a dutiful ally who, in a legitimate, authorised (UN and NATO), multilateral setting would play its part to support a specific cause. Ideally these foreign policy actions would reinforce Canada's position as a supporter of international justice and development whilst simultaneously buttressing the existing international order. In many ways, however, this Liberal-defined role set and its attendant narrative was taken up by policymakers within NATO as it reflected their interpretation and understanding of Canada's foreign policy narrative. Indeed, the narrative present within DFATD and the DND was, in large part, defined by many of the Liberal Party tenets of foreign policy. This can be attributed to the notable Liberal dominance of federal government, holding power for 75 of the 114 years between 1900 and 2014.

As a result the influence the party then exerted in shaping the outlook and character of Canadian foreign policy has resulted in a close association with the Department of Foreign Affairs' institutional narrative. Indeed, the memory of Lester Pearson is as much a part of the fabric of the Liberal Party as it is in the Foreign Service, certainly evident given that the Canadian Department of

---

[447] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.

[448] See Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan. 2012), 5-24; Klaus Bremmer and Cameron G. Thies, "The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Jul. 2015), 273-293.

Foreign Affairs and Trade is headquartered in the Lester B. Pearson Building. As such, this can be interpreted as the reflexivity that occurs as part of the construction of a narrative by relevant policymakers.[449] Moreover, this narrative then becomes institutionally ingrained as consecutive policymakers continually reinforce it, thus shaping a tradition.[450] In this case, it forms a relatively unique narrative within the Canadian foreign policy community, informing the roles and policymakers' understandings of Canada's place in the world and how it acts within it. The Liberals under Martin and the subsequent CPC governments sought to create some distance from the traditional middle power role set through a greater emphasis on the military. Instead of articulating the traditional Canadian roles as peacekeeper, these governments echoed the functional roles of the past, still rooted in the same values, but altogether more concerned with Canada playing a role where it *could*, not because it should.[451] In doing so, this suggests a greater concern with the role position, as opposed to the role preference which could be characterised as the dominant tradition in the 1990s.

Carrying forward this tradition however, CPC policymakers articulated a role that cast Canada as vocal and at times enthusiastic supporter of causes that aligned with a moral interpretation of Canada's foreign policy. While still rooted in practical, capability related considerations, this meant that Canada's international role fundamentally seeks to defend causes which reflect what CPC policymakers saw as right. This reinforced their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy tradition and to do so Canada's participation in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent Libya, couched in language that linked them with other morally right foreign policy actions like the First and Second World Wars.[452] In doing so however, this also had a clear effect on the how Canadian foreign policy was conducted in NATO.

---

[449] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 72.
[450] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 205.
[451] Alan Gotlieb, *Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy*, Memorial Lecture, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2004).
[452] Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 146, No. 270, (14 June 2011), 1615, pg. 363; Jay Hill, Member of Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 136, (19 April 2007), 1310, pg. 8436.

Behavioural links

What this chapter highlights at its most fundamental level is that a foreign policy narrative nonetheless defines and shapes the basis for potential behaviours. Canadian policymakers were driven to take action in response to 9/11, something which they were not inherently forced or coerced to do. While Article V, NATO's collective defence component was invoked this did not automatically necessitate a military response.[453] Furthermore, the US did not build its initial coalition to invade Afghanistan around Article V, thus there was no binding legal basis informing Canada's decision to take part in the initial phases of the operation. Similarly, with the humanitarian motivations coming to the fore under the Martin government, the deployment of the PRT to Kandahar reflected the role that the government had sought to promote. However, as seen in this chapter, the influence of reinterpreting Canada's foreign policy narrative was more profound at the policymaker level and in the practice of policymaking inside NATO.

The dynamic process of negotiating Canada's foreign policy narrative between the Liberal and Conservative governments thus points to the wider disruption of the middle power peacekeeping narrative, beyond only what occurred under the successive Harper governments. With the CPC victory in 2006 the opportunity was presented in which to try and redefine the institutional culture within the civil and foreign service. The prioritisation of these components eschewed the traditional behaviours associated with the middle power role set – peacekeeping, commitments to multilateral solutions and diplomacy-led initiatives. Instead, Baird placed his emphasis on the elevation of principle in the Canadian foreign policy, criticising the UN for its increasing irrelevance and lack of effectiveness particularly in its pursuit of consensus.[454] This was also reflected in Canada's strained relationship with the organisation.[455]

---

[453] Edgar Buckley, "Invoking Article 5," *NATO Review* (Summer 2005), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html, accessed 10 October, 2014.
[454] John Baird, "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly," 26 September 2011.
[455] Paul Koring, "Blue Helmets Cast Aside, Canada Keeps the Peace No More." *The Globe and Mail*, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/blue-helmets-cast-aside-canada-keeps-the-peace-no-more/article4240950/, accessed June 8, 2012.

Taken together the change in foreign policy behaviour altered the routines to which allies had become accustomed. Routinisation forms a foundation of social interaction and as a result, within NATO, when Canada's allies can no longer predict how it will react to certain events, it changes the dynamics of the relationship, both between Canadian policymakers inside and outside of Canada, as well as between Canada and NATO.[456] Moreover, in preferring a morality-focused role for Canada internationally that emphasised a commitment to what is right and less concern over multilateralism or diplomacy, the Conservative government disrupted routines within NATO.

In discussing the Canada-NATO relationship a number of interviewees, Canadian and otherwise, noted that the relationship changed on the back of Afghanistan, in part due to the deployment of NATO AWACS.[457] The approval for NATO AWACS deployment was given in 2009, however, they did not arrive in theatre until 2011.[458] In this case, Canada, who had been a major contributor to the NATO AWACS programme, requested their deployment to support Canadian Forces in Southern Afghanistan, however, this was held up in committee due to concerns related to funding their deployment outside of Europe.[459] When combined with the rising Canadian casualties, continued concerns over allies' caveats on their forces and a more instrumental view of diplomacy from the Conservative government, there was a clear shift in the attitude towards NATO. As a result, the narrative surrounding Canada's deployment was influenced through events on the ground, the influence of policymakers in NATO as well as in Parliament. It is here that one can see a way in which policymakers attempt to reconcile the current mission realities to the broader historical narrative about Canadian foreign policy. Nonetheless, as seen

---

[456] Antony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of Theory of Structuration*. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 86.
[457] Interview 22, 13 November 2013; As noted earlier, this refers to NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). This is notable for being one of the few deployable assets actually *owned* by NATO and not by one specific host nation and thus represents one of NATO's few shared capabilities.
[458] NATO, "NATO E-3A Component celebrates 10,000 Flight Hours in support of Afghanistan Operation," http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/stories/story_074.htm, accessed 11 October 2014.
[459] Interview 22, 13 November 2013.

in the Afghanistan debates, this became increasingly harder to do as the requirements and focus of the mission continually changed.[460]

What is striking about so much of this action however, is the *actual* role of Canadian MPs outside of the PMO as policymakers in the process, both in the Liberal and Conservative governments. While MPs sought to express their views on Canada's foreign policy, the number of votes in which they could actively shape the participation in the mission proved quite limited in the end. Thus while interpretations of the foreign policy narrative in a Parliamentary setting are contested, negotiated and renegotiated through debate, the actual agency of policymakers in this setting is limited. Moreover, it fulfils the conditions laid out earlier through the combination of Mintz and Kreps' hypotheses; Canada's political leadership was largely insulated from electoral punishment due to the lack of voting that occurred and a degree of consensus among Parliamentarians about the importance of the Afghanistan and Libya missions and as a result, there were limited political costs to supporting the operations.[461] This suggests that when greater agency resides in fewer policymakers their individual internal conceptions of the Canadian foreign policy narrative carries greater weight.

In relation to NATO, policymakers' ability to shape Canadian foreign policy behaviour was also somewhat circumscribed. Members of the Canadian delegation noted the tight control exerted over messaging under the Harper government and suggested that this also made the shifting narrative that much more dramatic.[462] Additionally, as a Canadian defence official noted, in the discussions about Afghanistan, NATO was not really a major factor but instead it was much more about Canada in Afghanistan than the Alliance.[463] In their examination of Canadian strategic narratives, Ringsmose and Børgesen found that the Canadian strategic narrative towards Afghanistan was weak and inconsistent, however, their research was more concerned with how public

---

[460] *Ibid,* 13 November 2013.
[461] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79; Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[462] Interview 23, 14 November 2013; Interview 24, 14 November 2013.
[463] Interview 23, 14 November 2013.

opinion shapes foreign policy behaviour.[464] While not focused on the policymaker specifically, Ringsmose and Børgesen's observations about the importance of narratives could prompt reflection and a deeper questioning among policymakers of Canada's place in NATO and by extension Canadian foreign policy more generally. This reinforces the interpretation that the de-prioritisation of NATO was a function of policymakers in Ottawa and thus flowed directly from their interpretation of Canada's middle power narrative and NATO's place in it. Additionally, the operations in Afghanistan and Libya were thus defined against the narratives about Canadian foreign policy first, rather than against narratives about Canada in NATO. By clearly expressing the Canadian foreign policy in the context of domestic political priorities and linking them with past decisions it is possible to avoid a dramatic disruption to foreign policymakers' views of Canada. However, given that Canadian diplomats had clear instructions about communications from Ottawa, the differing emphasis of the Conservative government actually damaged Canada's 'brand' within NATO headquarters.[465]

Building on the analysis undertaken in this chapter, the next chapter will examine how the Canadian foreign policy narrative was transmitted and interpreted by examining Canadian media concerning the Afghanistan and Libya campaigns and then supplement that analysis with interviews with non-Canadian members of NATO's International and International Military Staffs as well as members of other NATO delegations. Taken together it provides some clarity not only to the relationship between narratives and behaviour, but highlights yet again, the individual's importance in interpreting a narrative of Canadian foreign policy. This speaks to Jeffrey Checkel's suggestion to expand on the individual-level impact of ontology, however, does not yet account for the multidimensional effects that a foreign policy narrative can have.[466] Moreover, in looking at this Canadian narrative as seen by non-Canadians it becomes clearer as to how

[464] Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen, "Shaping Public Attitudes Towards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives," *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2011), 523.
[465] Interview 26, 15 November 2013.
[466] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist−Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), 473-495.

narratives and identities are also interpreted, negotiated and reinterpreted in a dynamic process.

Chapter 4 – Transmitting and Interpreting Foreign Policy Narratives: An 'Outside-in' Perspective

This chapter examines the middle power narrative in the media and among non-Canadian policymakers through the examination of news sources discussing Canada's participation in Afghanistan and Libya between 2001 and 2011 as well as interviews with non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. This is done in order to explore how the interpretation of the middle power narrative resonates and informs the reflexive interaction between different agents. This should also give further clarity to the ways in which behaviours impact the practice of policymaking and also prompt re-examinations of a foreign policy narrative. It is in this way that one can better understand how the middle power narrative shapes the discussion of Canada's participation in NATO operations across multiple dimensions; domestic, international as well as those inside and outside. Narratives do not exist only in the mind of policymakers but are also negotiated and contested among members of the public and as this chapter explores, the media and agents outside of Canada. As noted in the previous chapter, the media reporting on detainee transfers by JTF-2 in Afghanistan forced the Minister of Defence to confront accusations that these practices were betraying core principles of Canadian foreign policy.[1] That being said, the extent to which public opinion actually shapes foreign policy is outside the scope of this analysis and moreover, remains a point of contention in FPA.[2]

Following the same qualitative analysis as the *Hansard* records, in reviewing news media this study will be cross cutting in its examination of sources from the mainstream political spectrum, whilst also remaining within a

---

[1] Allison Dunfield, "Canadians Helped Take Prisoners in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 January 2002, www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canadians-helped-take-prisoners-in-afghanistan/article1171819/, accessed 20 November 2014; Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence, House of Commons Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 137, No. 133, (28 January 2002), 1900, pg. 8360.

[2] There is a diverse body of work on the interplay between media, public opinion and foreign policy. For a representative sampling, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,* (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr. 1999), 301-309; John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, "Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945-1991," *Political Communication*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), 385-405; Robert Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

manageable scope for one researcher.[3] This will require an examination of major Canadian newspaper and magazine outlets and their coverage will be broken down year to year from 2001 through to 2011.[4] This is not national cross section of news media as it is less concerned with establishing regional attitudes towards these operations, but rather is more interested in the wider trends across Canadian news outlets and by extension, how narratives reach more Canadians. Each year examined focuses on Canada's participation in the Afghanistan and Libya operations and specifically explores articles which use the term middle power. From there, it will also look for linkages with certain interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative.

As noted already, this will not examine social media sources as they were not available for the first part of the conflicts being examined and it is more useful to chart the ways in which narratives change by following specific news sources.[5] Remaining cognisant that the media often reflect specific biases, what Robert Entman terms 'content bias,' the following analysis recognises that with competing narratives about Canadian foreign policy present between policymakers, so too does the media promote or de-emphasise various elements of the Canadian foreign policy narrative depending on the priorities of the journalist or news outlet.[6] This also provides a way to examine how the contestation of these various narratives reinforces or dissents from the positions of policymakers. The narratives that the media create do not necessarily have the same duty as Canadian policymakers do to respond either to public opinion or reflect popular conceptions of foreign policy. As a result, while examining media sources in this chapter, it will be important to remain aware as Entman suggests,

---

[3] Mainstream political spectrum refers to sources from Canada's mainstream news media reflecting the viewpoints which dominate Canadian political discourse with a significant readership, in this case with a circulation ~800,000 upwards. See Newspapers Canada, http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/daily-newspaper-circulation-data, accessed 23 October 2015. .

[4] This will examine through a subjective cross section focusing on *The Globe and Mail* (national), *The National Post* (national), *Montreal Gazette, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, Calgary Herald, The Vancouver Sun* (British Columbia) and *Maclean's*.

[5] For example, YouTube was not founded until 2005, Facebook in 2004, Twitter in 2006.

[6] Robert Entman, "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2007), 163; Entman's categorization of biases (distortion, content and decision-making) offers a way to recognize the ways in which media affects the distribution of power, however, in this instance this study is more concerned with how the bias interplays with the promotion of competing narratives, rather than explicitly how it changes the power relationship between government and the public.

of patterns of slant that support the interests of particular holders or seekers of power.[7] Additionally, this will also include the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) which as a government agency, possesses and disseminates a narrative about Canada, though it remains at arm's length from government oversight.[8] In looking at the descriptive terms used it is possible to ascertain what kinds of narratives are defined in the popular news media.

This chapter will then turn to interviews conducted with non-Canadian NATO personnel and foreign diplomats as a way to help triangulate how Canada's foreign policy narrative is interpreted. In speaking with NATO policymakers it is possible to see how they interpret this narrative as a way of making sense of Canada's international behaviour. By comparing their responses to the Canadian media it should be clearer as to how the dynamic processes of narrative formation are not restricted to Canada or even between Canadian policymakers. As with the Canadian policymakers in NATO, the interviewees remain largely anonymous to encourage candid responses and elicit frank exchanges during interviews about Canadian foreign policy in NATO and speak to the question whether there had been a noticeable change in the relationship. Familiarity with Canadian foreign policy varied widely between interviewees with some expressing deep knowledge of Canadian narratives. When examined alongside the media, the responses from NATO policymakers help to understand the ways in which the middle power narrative inform how others see Canadian foreign policy and what they expect of it. Indeed, the interviews here, alongside the interviews in the previous chapter help to establish that among a notable cross section of NATO personnel, both Canadian and non-Canadian, there was an understanding of Canada's foreign policy narrative. This outside view offers a critical take on how others view the way that foreign policy narratives and behaviour interact and how this feeds back into the process of policymaking.

---

[7] *Ibid*, 166.
[8] Government of Canada, *Broadcasting Act*, S.C. 1991 c. 11, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.01/FullText.html, accessed 13 November 2014.

Links with Previous Analysis and Role Theory

The previous chapter explored the competing understandings and motivations behind the Canadian foreign policy narrative in Parliamentary debate and the attendant roles that emerge from this contested middle power narrative; it is necessary to then establish how these are articulated. Indeed, as Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo cautioned, "[o]ne actor's assertion of a national role is not synonymous with national-level agreement."[9] The roles expressed by policymakers in the previous chapter are articulated and communicated to the public by the media and in doing so are then open to further contestation. As this chapter will highlight, this process often attempts to reinforce the continuity of Canadian foreign policy as a way of maintaining a coherent narrative. As Nik Hynek suggested, "Canada derives its advantageous position from the fact that it has been repeatedly successful in (re)constructing and (re)producing its external identity as a middle power."[10] This chapter is meant to explore the ways in which this occurs and offer a deeper understanding of how this process unfolds. Similarly, this chapter will examine whether perlocutionary discourse plays a role thus allowing the media to try and urge certain courses of action by highlighting potential disconnects between the articulated narrative and foreign policy behaviour.[11]

The media provides a conduit through which foreign policy is both communicated and interpreted.[12] By doing so, the media offers a way in which to view the contestation of different competing narratives in public discourse, beyond the policymaker level and thus help establish the dynamic process

[9] Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan. 2012), 2.
[10] Nik Hynek, "Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and Promises," *Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), 40.
[11] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 74; Steele draws this from Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy, (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1981). This refers to language which is meant to evoke a course of action, in this case by drawing attention to the ways in which these actions maintain consistency with the national foreign policy narrative.
[12] See Dietram A. Scheufele, "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1999), 104-122. This article offers insight into the dynamic processes (framing) by which the media and audiences interact with one another in the construction of reality.

through which narratives are constructed at a wider, national level, although interpretation remains individual. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle explore this aspect in some detail, in their work on strategic narratives, highlighting the importance of informational infrastructure which ultimately mediate the ways in which narratives are transmitted and received.[13] While their work focuses primarily on the way in which the state uses this in order to achieve their foreign policy outcomes, the way in which narratives are received and understood remains an important part of the way in which policy is made.

In this case, this study is looking for the hallmarks of the middle power narrative such as a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. In reflecting and reinforcing these elements of the middle power narrative the media help to construct a popular understanding of Canadian foreign policy that, in turn, shapes policymakers' and the electorate's views of Canada's foreign policy narrative in a dynamic process. This also offers a degree of public input in that public opinion can still shape and affect foreign policy by levying potential electoral costs.[14] It also gives voice to those interpreting the elite articulations of Canada's foreign policy narrative, speaking further to the need for 'outside-in' perspectives.[15] This reminds us to be cognisant of the fact that states do not have unitary 'Selves' and are contested internally with some groups actively shaping foreign policy, in this case elites, while there are also internal 'Others' who then interpret and contest these narratives and such dichotomies are not necessarily evident.[16]

---

[13] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 150.
[14] This study has elaborated on this previously see, Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 72. See also, Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307.
[15] Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Introduction," *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2013), xix.
[16] For examination and deconstruction of self/other see Richard Ned Lebow, "Identity and International Relations," *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec. 2008), 473-492.

The need to maintain an understanding of a foreign policy narrative not only affects Canadian policymakers but also foreign policymakers with whom interaction is routine. In undertaking a deeper examination, it is possible to examine a dynamic with the Other; the Self in this case being the constructed narrative of Canadian foreign policy and the Other being the non-Canadian policymakers in NATO who interpret this narrative. Given that this study is concerned with the policymaker, rather than state-level identity formation, it is necessary to expose both the ways in which a foreign policy narrative is communicated, in this case through the media, as well as how Other policymakers see this narrative and whether perlocutionary discourse plays a role.[17] By examining this element of Canada's middle power narrative, it provides insight into the complex ways in which narrative shapes interactions and how narratives are perceived and understood by others.[18] This is not to inject another overt Self/Other dynamic but rather provides deeper interrogation into how the interaction between the two informs the basis of the roles that Canada's Allies in NATO expect it to play.

In the cases of Afghanistan and Libya, there was, generally speaking, an elite consensus over these missions between policymakers over Canada's participation given that on the few opportunities to vote on these operations, they were supported.[19] As noted earlier in this examination, the 'essence of decision' lies in domestic politics and as a result, policymakers are unlikely to make foreign policy decisions that impose domestic costs.[20] However, only examining political speech does not necessarily reflect change in Canadian foreign policy and, as seen in the previous chapter, even with differing understandings and motivations, policymakers aim to draw continuity between foreign policy actions. While domestic considerations are important factors, the Canadian

---

[17] Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), referenced in Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 74.
[18] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 148.
[19] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[20] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 72.

governments between 2001 and 2011 were largely insulated from the electorate on Afghanistan and Libya. As a result, this provides an opportunity in which to not only examine Canada's foreign policy narrative outside of Parliament, but also how Canada's narrative changed. Rather, it is necessary to look beyond to help establish that it is not only public pressure that shapes foreign policy, but policymakers' internal conceptions of a foreign policy narrative. As noted previously, there is an important element about the ways in which these narratives are contested outside of just the policymaking sphere.[21] As such, media coverage remains an important component of this analysis due to its ability to communicate how these narrative interpretations resonate beyond Parliament.

This chapter will focus on exploring the narrative and roles identified as helping Canadian policymakers maintain foreign policy routines between the different governments. Specifically, building on the analysis from the last chapter one can attempt to parse the motivations driving Prime Minister Chrétien's involvement in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Martin's foreign policy realignment and then Prime Minister Harper's re-interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative. This also helps to contextualise Canada's foreign policy behaviour by exploring how its actions are interpreted in relation to outside understandings of its foreign policy narrative.

Part I: Narratives in the Media

2001

As noted previously, prior to 9/11 there had been comparatively little critical examination in the press regarding Canada's middle power narrative and its associated behaviours. Canada's involvement in the Balkans during 1999-2000 under what would later characterise the Responsibility to Protect, had conformed to previous interpretations of international behaviour. Its role as peacekeeper and constructive member of the international order was broadly accepted and unchallenged. In March of 2001, *The Ottawa Citizen* reported on Minister of

[21] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 110.

Defence Art Eggleton's new plan for Canadian peacekeeping which emphasised 'early in, early out' and noted Canada's withdrawal from the mission in Kosovo and continued support to Bosnia.[22] Following on from this the *Ottawa Citizen* reported on polling data indicating that Canadians were largely satisfied with the foreign policy status quo.[23] The author, Joan Bryden, went on to explain how Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was expected to leverage Canada's position as a neutral middle power to play a more influential role in the G8.[24] Reporting that featured the middle power narrative and peacekeeping treated the link between the two elements as implicit and was largely regarded uncritically.

September 11 turned the focus on Canada's foreign policy. In a speech reported by *Ottawa Citizen,* former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney referred to the country's middle power status, declaring that "[p]eacekeeping is a Canadian trademark."[25] Others like former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy published an op-ed urging a balanced approached between capacity building and traditional peacekeeping.[26] Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 a number of publications remarked on the peacekeeping tradition, though many noted that cuts to the Canadian Forces and its peacekeeping orientation had left Canada unable to offer an effective military response.[27] Moreover, the seeds of the critical view of the prevailing Canadian foreign policy narrative were also visible in Andrew Cohen's op-ed, derived from his remarks to the Standing Committee

---

[22] Mike Blanchfield, "'Early In, Early Uut' Is New Plan to Keep Peace," *Ottawa Citizen,* 22 March 2001, A9; Rae Corelli, Luke Fisher and Stefan Lovgren, "'Early In, Early Out': Canadian Peacekeeping Is Changing as Ottawa Backs away from Open-ended Missions," *Maclean's,* 25 June 2001; 26. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.
[23] Joan Bryden, "65% Happy With the Level of Foreign Activity: Canadians Support Status Quo on Aid, Peacekeeping: Poll" *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 July, 2001, A3.
[24] *Ibid*.
[25] Brian Mulroney, "Fight the Good Fight: Canada Has a Historic and Moral Duty to Support the Founding Principles of the United Nations and Stand Alongside the United States, says Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 October, 2001, A19.
[26] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada to the Rescue: Forget the Military, Lloyd Axworthy says. We Can Lead in Other Ways; A Balanced Approach Will Show That the Fight Against Terrorism is not Just a Cover for Continued Western Hegemony Over the Rest of the World." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 September 2001, A18.
[27] Jeffrey Simpson, "Canada's Help: Who Are We Kidding?" *The Globe and Mail*, September 19, 2001, A15; Jeff Lee, "Canada's Short-handed Military Unsuitable for Terrorist Fight: Analyst: A Strategic Studies Expert says We Need Better Internal Security to Battle Terrorism" *Vancouver Sun*, September 18, 2001, A4.

on Foreign Affairs and International Trade delivered in November 2001.[28] Likewise, the *Globe and Mail* reported in November that while Canadian Forces could be deployed to Afghanistan for six months, they would likely be pulled out at the first sign of combat.[29] It was not entirely clear as to what the nature of the international force would look like and, by extension, the Canadian deployment. However, with the Bonn agreement allowing a peacekeeping force in Kabul, Canadian Forces were expected as of the beginning of 2002, albeit with limited duties.[30] Reflecting the discussions in Parliament, there was a general acceptance that the 'Canada-as-peacekeeper' narrative was, for better or worse, an accurate representation of Canada's international behaviour and foreign policy narrative. The first signs of disruption of this narrative came with September 11 and the concerns raised over military spending and capabilities. Nonetheless, the peacekeeping deployment outlined in the Bonn agreement did not represent a major departure from what Canada had done in the past. As such, generally speaking, one can trace the continuity of this narrative in relation to the Canadian foreign policy tradition, despite the different interpretations that may exist in Parliament.

2002

As of 7 January Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton stated that Canada would be supporting the US military efforts underway as part of a coalition (Operation Enduring Freedom).[31] News outlets, such as the *Vancouver Sun* noted that Canadian Forces were being deployed in support of a combat mission instead of the peacekeeping mission in Kabul and it marked a departure from Canada's

---

[28] Andrew Cohen, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, 22 November 2001, 1025. See also, Andrew Cohen, "The Ghost of Canada Past: Our global reputation is in decline as we stand on old accomplishments and ignore our present crisis," *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 December 2001, A15. These themes were developed further in Cohen's 2003 book referenced previously, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*.
[29] Brian Laghi, "Eggleton Plays Down Combat Role for Troops," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 November, 2001, A1.
[30] Nahlah Ayed, "Our Troops Expected in Kabul This Week," *The Montreal Gazette*, 30 December 2001, A1; Kathleen Kenna, "Afghanistan Sees Limited Duties for Peacekeepers," *Toronto Star*, 20 December 2001, A10.
[31] David Kilgour, "Canada and the Fight Against Terrorism," *Remarks to the l'Institut Diplomatique et des Relations Internationals, Algiers, Algeria*, 13 January 2002, http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/algerenglish.htm, accessed 20 November 2014.

traditional deployments.[32] Paul Knox, writing in *The Globe and Mail*, argued that the fact that this was not classic peacekeeping was not in itself troubling, but rather the danger lay in the vague nature of the mission, as well as the threat to the "perception of Canada as a multilateralist middle power."[33] This was followed shortly by revelations that the Canadian Special Forces unit, JTF-2, had already been operating in theatre and handing over detainees to the US for interrogation.[34] As discussed in the previous chapter, there was significant debate about this in Parliament and whether this reflected Canadian traditions. In his comment for the *Toronto Star*, Graham Fraser reminded readers that this case had parallels with Canada's participation in the Korean War, though the keenness to be included and follow the US reflected a diminishing of the middle power status.[35] Despite these questions about Canada's foreign policy direction, Foreign Minister Bill Graham emphasised the human security agenda and that Canada remained a middle power built on a strong multilateral system, despite closer ties to the US.[36] Indeed, on the back of the detainee issue, there was increasing criticism over the Canada-US relationship and what was seen as undue influence over the conduct of Canadian diplomacy.[37] There was notable criticism of Canadian foreign policy from Robert Fulford in the *National Post*, who suggested that Canada's middle power identity and peacekeeping were a way in which Canada asserted its difference from the United States despite wanting to remain onside with the Americans.[38] As referenced previously in this examination, the current of anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Canadian politics, however, it resurfaced aggressively during the Bush

[32] Tim Naumetz, "750 More Canadian Troops Heading to War: Alberta-based Soldiers to be Under U.S. Command in Afghanistan," *Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 2002, A1
[33] Paul Knox, "What Does the Canadian Military Have to Prove?" *The Globe and Mail*, 9 January 2002, A9.
[34] Allison Dunfield, "Canadians Helped Take Prisoners in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 January 2002, www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canadians-helped-take-prisoners-in-afghanistan/article1171819/, accessed 10 November 2014.
[35] Graham Fraser, "What A Difference 50 years Make on War Front," *Toronto Star*, 27 January 2002, A11.
[36] Alison Hanes, "Remember the Past: Graham," *The Montreal Gazette*, 26 March 2002, A8.
[37] John Ibbitson, "One Date Isn't a Relationship," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March 2002, A21; Jeffrey Simpson, "So, Really, How Do We Engage the Bushites?" *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 2002, A17; Richard Gwyn, "Steering Our Own Course," *Toronto Star*, 22 September 2002, A15.
[38] Robert Fulford, "Fantasy Informs Our Foreign Policy," *National Post*, 7 September 2002, A18.

Presidency.[39] Nonetheless, there were clear, continuing concerns over Canada's international behaviour and what this meant for Canadian foreign policy.

Perhaps the most traumatic incident of the year was the death of four Canadian soldiers and the wounding of eight others during a training exercise outside of Kandahar in the Tarnak Farm incident. In this circumstance a US Air Force pilot mistook Canadian Forces for Taliban and bombed their position. These were the first Canadian combat casualties since the Korean War and prompted significant response from news outlets across the country. Kevin Myers in the *National Post* lamented that this Canadian sacrifice would be forgotten as "Canada repeatedly does honourable things for honourable motives" but is rarely recognised for these acts.[40] The deaths caused reflection on Canada's mission but galvanised the mission going forward and saw major recognition with a memorial service conducted in Edmonton drawing 16,000 people wishing to pay respects.[41] This incident nonetheless cast a shadow over the rest of Canada's deployment in Kandahar until the forces returned to Canada in August 2002.

2003

The beginning of 2003 was dominated by the buildup to the Iraq War and indeed this prompted a serious reflection on the Canada-US relationship as well as the way in which this reflected Canada's foreign policy narrative. Writing in the *National Post*, Sheldon Alberts noted that President Bush naming Britain as the United States' closest ally should be cause for concern and reflected Canada's diminished ability to project its influence abroad, militarily or otherwise.[42] On the other side, writing in the *Toronto Star*, James Travers maintained that Canada had recommitted forces to Afghanistan and was seeking to broker a compromise that would help the US avoid circumventing the UN, fulfilling many of the middle power hallmarks of Canadian diplomacy.[43] Others sought to reinforce the

---

[39] Brian Bow, "Anti-Americanism in Canada: Before and After Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Oct. 2008), 341-359.
[40] Kevin Myers, "Salute to a Brave and Modest Nation," *National Post*, 26 April 2002, A1.
[41] Jill Mahoney, "'We Have Brought Them Home,' 16,000 Attend Memorials for Fallen Soldiers," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 April 2002, A1.
[42] Sheldon Alberts, "Riding On America's Shoulders," *National Post*, 28 January 2003, A12.
[43] James Travers, "To Be on World Stage, Canada Must Act," *Toronto Star*, 1 March 2003, E02.

peacekeeping narrative, with the CBC covering the Governor General's award of the peacekeeping service awards.[44] Nonetheless a number of outlets published articles noting that the status quo in Canadian foreign policy had been upset and as a result, it needed to change.[45] Also writing in the *National Post*, Andrew Coyne suggested that the Prime Minister's decision to avoid Iraq was "the patriotism of fools: multilateralism, über alles."[46] Statements from the military leadership warning that Canada could not contribute to more peacekeeping missions as the Canadian Forces were spread too thinly, also underscored this.[47] Similarly, there was recognition of Canada's fading influence in the world with a national television station airing a documentary on the subject, as well as a number of articles and books reflecting this declinist theme.[48] There was widespread concern that Canada's foreign policy narrative had diverged too far from its capabilities and as such, undermined its ability to project its influence abroad. This reflection did not necessarily call into question the underlying narrative of Canadian foreign policy but rather focused on whether Canadian policymakers were doing enough to actually reinforce or support it.

In terms of Canada's new Afghanistan deployment, the government had committed 1,800 troops in support of ISAF's Kabul mission. Speaking to the Canadian Press, Defence Minister John McCallum explained that this was not a combat mission and extensions to Canada's future commitment would not be

---

[44] Owen Wood, "Canada: The World's Peacekeeper," *CBC News: In Depth – Canada's Military*, 30 October 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/cdnmilitary/worldspeacekeeper.html, accessed 10 July 2014.
[45] Carol Goar, "The Old Equilibrium is Gone," *Toronto Star*, 11 April 2003, A30; Drew Fagan, "Canada in the World: Heading Back Up?" *The Globe and Mail*, A17; Hugh Segal, "Leaving Never-land: Canada Has a Place in the World, but We Must Decide Where That Is and How Much to Pay to Get There," *Ottawa Citizen*, A15; Thomas Walkom, "As The Old World Order Passes Away, Canada Can Only Sit and Watch," *Toronto Star*, 15 February 2003, E05.
[46] Andrew Coyne, "PM's Decision Means Moral Free Ride is Over," *National Post*, 19 March 2003, A1.
[47] Robert Fife and Tim Naumetz, "Troops to Help in Mideast, PM Vows: But Forces Spread too Thin to Fill Peacekeeping Role, Top Officers Warn," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 31 May 2003, A1.
[48] Global Television, *Foreign Fields,* 10 September 2003; see also, Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2003), 240-256; David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, "Introduction: Is Canada Now Irrelevant?," *Canada Among Nations: Coping With the American Colossus; September 11: Consequences for Canada*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Alex Morrison, "Pearsonian Peacekeeping: Does It Have a Future or Only a Past," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003), http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/349/544, accessed 16 September 2012.

ruled out.[49] Other outlets paid homage to tradition with *The Montreal Gazette* noting that, "Canadian soldiers will return to Afghanistan, this time in their traditional role as peacekeepers, not as terrorist-hunting warriors."[50] Moreover, a Canadian was slated to take command of the ISAF mission during the transition to NATO control.[51] Writing later in 2003, David Bercuson cautioned that the mission in Afghanistan would soon evolve into a more proactive operation and that Canadian Forces were unprepared for a more aggressive role in theatre.[52] What is perhaps most notable during the coverage of Afghanistan is that Canada's participation in the mission was described more in terms of its relation to recognition by other allies than in terms of the wider Afghanistan mission.

2004

During 2004 and the aftermath of Iraq, coverage of the challenge to Canada's foreign policy narrative lessened somewhat with reporting focusing in on the forces in Afghanistan and the various challenges to maintaining a mission there. Discussion of the middle power narrative was also subordinated to coverage of the upcoming elections and the Liberal Party led by Paul Martin. Indeed, there was more commentary surrounding this narrative related to inaction in Darfur rather than Afghanistan.[53] Marcus Gee detected Lester Pearson's long shadow in foreign affairs and argued that the current Prime Minister was taking an active role in trying to leverage Canadian influence abroad visiting conflict zones in Africa, Haiti, North Africa and Asia.[54] Nonetheless, there was significant criticism of the middle power narrative, with a number of publications focusing

[49] Stephen Thorne, "Troops Told of Afghan Dangers," *Toronto Star*, 18 July 2003, A1.
[50] Mike Blanchfield, "It's Back to Afghanistan: 2,000 peacekeepers. Decision Makes it All But Certain Canada Won't Send Troops to a War in Iraq," *The Montreal Gazette*, 13 February 2003, A1; also published in *Vancouver Sun, Ottawa Citizen.*
[51] Matthew Fisher, "Canadian to Lead NATO in Afghanistan: Prestigious Appointment: Lord Robertson Praises Canada's Strong Contribution," *CanWest News Service*, 27 September 2003, A6.
[52] David Bercuson, "Canada Faces Afghan Mission Creep," *National Post*, 26 December 2003, A23.
[53] Graham Fraser, "Massacre Looming in Darfur: Dallaire," *Toronto Star*, 21 September 2004, A10; Susan Riley, "Foreign Affairs Minister Martin," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 November 2004, A12.
[54] Marcus Gee, "The Price of a Pearson," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 November 2004, A27.

on an article by former diplomat, Thomas Axworthy.[55] Similarly, there was significant coverage of Jennifer Welsh's book on Canadian foreign policy which argued that Canada needed to reexamine its place in the world and this spurred a number of related articles.[56] With Martin's election, focus again turned to the Afghanistan mission and Canadian perceptions of this mission highlighted by polling which suggested that Canadians were more willing to use a military solution than in the past.[57] In relation to Iraq, Martin was also clear that Canada would not deploy troops but would seek to contribute in areas that it could make a substantial difference though this ultimately came to very little.[58] With Paul Martin indicating an expanded Canadian peacekeeping role there was a planned expansion of the military with an additional 5,000 personnel to be recruited.[59] That said, the *National Post* reported Minister of Defence Bill Graham indicating these forces would contribute to a more muscular expeditionary role which could include additional Canadian casualties.[60]

Specific to the Afghanistan mission, while still characterised as peacekeeping, the concerns over the expansion of the mission continued to inform coverage. Of note, on 10 January *The Globe and Mail* published a comment from Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, a member of the board of directors of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre announcing her resignation along with half of the board of directors over the continued focus on military operations in

---

[55] Thomas S. Axworthy, "An Independent Canada in a Shared North America: Must We Be in Love or Will An Arranged Marriage Do?" *International Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), 761-782; Mark Kennedy, "Liberals Deny Canada Has Lost U.S. Respect: Americans Appreciate Our Overseas Efforts: Pettigrew," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 30 November 2004, A4.
[56] Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004); Graham Fraser, "Author Lays Out Global Vision of Foreign Policy," *Toronto Star*, 3 October 2004, A09; Petti Fong, "Determining Canada's Role in a Post 9/11 World: Jennifer Welsh Thinks Now is the Time to Enter the Discussion," *Vancouver Sun*, 9 October 2004, D20.
[57] Chris Wattie, "Canadians Want More Active Role for Military, Poll Finds: Willing to Commit Troops to Dangerous Assignments," *National Post*, 4 November 2004, A8.
[58] "No Canadian Troops to Iraq: Martin," *CBC News*, 14 October 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/no-canadian-troops-to-iraq-martin-1.484113, accessed 10 July 2014.
[59] Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review, 1995*, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.
[60] Mike Blanchfield, "New Peacekeepers Meaner, Tougher: Contrasts With PM's Promise," *National Post*, 22 December 2004, A7.

Afghanistan.[61] John Ibbitson reported that as of the end of Canada's second rotation through Kabul in August, there would only be 500 personnel available for overseas deployment, despite increases to the Defence budget.[62] Soon after this, however, Prime Minister Paul Martin committed these 500 soldiers to the ISAF peacekeeping mission in Kabul.[63] Additionally, the Canadian commitment in the Balkans was drawn down, though overshadowed by the ongoing Afghanistan engagement.[64] Moreover, with problems flaring in Haiti, the Balkans and Darfur there were frequent talks of overstretch of Canadian Forces.

2005

This year saw the release of a foreign policy review, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, meant to establish Canada's foreign policy priorities and expressly sought to distance itself from the middle power narrative.[65] Olivia Ward writing for the *Toronto Star* suggested that restoring Canada's international position and reinforcing its reputation should be a priority of the document.[66] However, with the conflicted processes leading to its release and the infighting between departments that had characterised its development there was a significant amount of coverage on the delays.[67] The multiple re-writes of the review drew comparisons to Narcissus' self-absorption from Mike Blanchfield writing in the *Ottawa Citizen*, who also highlighted increasing criticism of the process from former diplomats.[68] The report's actual release was met with tepid response from some outlets such as the *National Post* and the *Vancouver Sun*

---

[61] Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Peace Comes At A Price," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 January 2004, A21
[62] John Ibbitson, "Army Will Soon Have Just 500 Available Troops," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 January 2004, A1.
[63] "500 Soldiers To Stay in Kabul After NATO Stint," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 5 February 2004, A5
[64] Chris Wattie, "'Beginning Of The End' For Mission in Bosnia: Canadians Gone By Fall," *National Post*, 24 March 2004, A8.
[65] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, Ottawa, 2005.
[66] Olivia Ward, "How Canada Lost Credibility," *Toronto Star*, 29 January 2005, A22.
[67] Peter Hadekel, "PM Has Shot At Ending Fickle Foreign Policy," *The Montreal Gazette*, 31 January 2005, A12; Mike Blanchfield, "Foreign Policy Review Delayed to 'Get It Right': Pettigrew Aide Blames Changing World; Critic Says Report Sent For Dose of 'Pizzazz,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 2005, A5; "Tories Blame PM's Dithering For Foreign Policy Delay," *National Post*, 22 February 2005, A6; "Still Waiting," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 March 2005, A12.
[68] Mike Blanchfield, "Canada's Tortuous Path To A New Foreign Policy," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 2005, A1.

noting that the review's release had been overshadowed by the selection of a new Pope.[69]

As a result, the use of the middle power narrative in the media was notably diminished in the relevant reporting. Writing also in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Andrew Cohen maintained that while the foreign policy review had discarded the middle power slogan, the Prime Minister struggled to articulate a larger vision of Canada in the world.[70] Nonetheless, the narrative appeared in the media during discussions of UN reform and the Prime Minister's speech before the General Assembly.[71] Moreover, the Prime Minister placed significant emphasis on supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Africa.[72]

In relation to Afghanistan and peacekeeping, however, the middle power narrative was no longer as clearly linked. The press reported on the high possibility of Canadian casualties in Kandahar while occasionally questioning the deployment given the lack of debate in the Canadian Parliament.[73] Reportage on Afghanistan often related to the need to reinvigorate the Canadian Forces and the appointment of General Rick Hillier to Chief of Defence attracted some attention, particularly given his outspoken views.[74] However, General Hillier's remarks later in the year about the role of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan drew significant press attention. After noting that the Forces were ready to take on a larger overseas burden after a rest, he noted that 2,000 troops would deploy southwards to Kandahar in early 2006 to go after "detestable murderers and

---

[69] Don Martin, "Martin's Reign Of Error," *National Post*, 21 May 2005, A1; Michael Campbell, "Canadians Are Sold On Empty Moralizing," *Vancouver Sun*, 21 April 2005, D3; "Fixing Canadian Foreign Policy," *National Post*, 20 April 2005, A20.
[70] Andrew Cohen, "Liberal Luck Is All Bad Now," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 April 2005, A12
[71] Steven Edwards, "World Comes To N.Y. To Ponder UN's Future: Security Nightmare," *National Post*, 12 September 2005, A8; "Canada Has Critical Role to Play In Reforms," *Toronto Star*, 11 September 2005, A11.
[72] Paul Koring, "Martin Vows to Ease Darfur's Suffering," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 February 2005, A1; Graham Fraser, "Ottawa Boosts Aid Effort For Darfur," *Toronto Star*, 8 May 2005, A22; Anthony Mitchell, "Canada Leads Way in Darfur Pledges: $134 million U.S. for Peacekeeping. African Union Plans to Increase its Troops in Western Sudan to more than 12,300," *The Montreal Gazette*, 27 May 2005, A16; Dean Beeby, "Troops Poorly Prepared For Africa, Report Says," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 October 2005, A4.
[73] Mary Janigan, "Why are we in Afghanistan?," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 September 2005, F3; Terry Pedwell, "Canadians Take Over Kandahar Patrols," *Canadian Press*, 11 August 2005, A10;
[74] Paul Koring, "PM Will Name Hillier to Top Defence Post, Sources Say; Ex-commander of International Forces Outspoken On Need to Modernize Military," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 January 2005, A4.

scumbags."[75] This prompted significant coverage as it was seen as a departure from traditional comments about the Canadian Forces' peacekeeping heritage and signaled a much more aggressive tone to Canada's Afghanistan mission.[76] Nonetheless, reporting on a Department of National Defence poll of the Canadian public, it found that 57% of Canadians surveyed preferred Canada in a "traditional peacekeeping" role.[77] The Canadian military, in response to this, took great pains to emphasise that this would not be a peacekeeping role, but rather an aggressive, offensive combat role.[78]

At the end of 2005 a vote of no-confidence brought down the Liberal government and prompted a new electoral campaign. Both the Liberal Party and the Conservatives promised significant increases in the Defence budget as part of their platforms alongside support for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.[79]

2006

The election of the minority CPC government did not see an immediate shift in foreign policy in the media. Writing in the *Toronto Star*, James Travers noted that Canadians abroad still benefitted from the image of Canada as a "middle power peacekeeper," despite the fact that this image was dated and peacekeeping had given way to peacemaking.[80] Chris Cobb writing in the *Ottawa Citizen* noted the efforts to debunk the peacekeeping myth on the part of the military but nonetheless echoed the fact that Canada's image abroad remained largely

---

[75] John Ward, "Rejuvenated Army Poised for Overseas Missions, Hillier Says," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 May 2005, A1; Daniel Leblanc, "JTF-2 to Hunt Al-Qaeda; Canada's Top Soldier Announces Mission to Root Out 'Murderers' in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 July 2005, A1; "Helping Afghanistan Will Protect Canada, Says Top Soldier," *CBC News*, 15 July 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/helping-afghanistan-will-protect-canada-says-top-soldier-1.558828, accessed 10 July 2014.

[76] L. Ian Macdonald, "A General Warning: General Hillier's Comments were Intended as a Wakeup Call for a Smug Canadian Public That Doesn't Think Terror Could Strike Close to Home," *The Montreal Gazette*, 26 July 2005, A19; Michael Nickerson, "The Not-so-civil Servant and the 'Scumbags' Who Hate Us," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 July 2005, A15; Rondi Adamson, "Is Gen. Hillier Setting the Right Tone For Our Military?," *Toronto Star*, 7 August 2005, A16; Lewis Mackenzie, "Rick Hillier's Right, So Back Off," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 August 2005, A11.

[77] Mike Blanchfield, "Canadians Prepare for Offensive in Afghanistan: General Will Oversee Kandahar Troops. Public 'Doesn't Have Full Understanding of What We're Getting Into: Commander," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 August 2005, A4.

[78] *Ibid*.; "The Dangers in Afghanistan," *Ottawa Citizen*, A14.

[79] David Pugliese, "About-face: Defence Spending is Usually Not a Hot Topic During Canadian Elections," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 December 2005, B1.

[80] James Travers, "Old Image Benefits Canadians Abroad," *Toronto Star*, 25 March 2006, F02.

unchanged.[81] Graham Fraser wrote in the *Toronto Star, "*less than six months after forming a government, Harper is showing that he is shifting Canadian foreign policy in a number of dramatic ways."[82] Fraser further explained that Harper was creating an ideological delineation between countries that were approved of and those that were not.[83] He concluded that Harper was tilting towards a more interests focused approach rather than the values approach of Martin, emphasising Afghanistan over the Sudan.[84] Barbara Yaffe writing in the *Vancouver Sun* noted that leaders could easily distinguish themselves in foreign affairs, as they look "decisive and proactive without getting bogged down in day-to-day politics."[85] This speaks to the idea that foreign policy ultimately, is not often *the* deciding factor in elections, as the electorate tend to focus on domestic considerations rather than foreign policy. With Prime Minister Harper's address to the United Nations General Assembly in September it was suggested that the foreign policy prioritised the promotion of democracy, freedom and rule of law, which opened the government up to accusations of being too pro-US.[86] In relation to the Afghanistan mission however, middle power had little currency. However, there was significant reflection as to how the mission echoed Canada's peacekeeping tradition.

The Canadian Forces deployment to Kandahar, as noted in the previous chapter also triggered some criticism. Indeed *The Globe and Mail* reported on a poll in January that suggested that Canadians were largely against the deployment of forces to Kandahar and were skeptical of operations that were not UN peacekeeping.[87] Indicative of the reporting that followed was an editorial in

---

[81] Chris Cobb, "Afghanistan: Canada Prides Itself as a Nation of Peacekeepers," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 March 2006, B1.
[82] Graham Fraser, "A Change In Emphasis," *Toronto Star*, 22 July 2006, F01.
[83] *Ibid*.
[84] Graham Fraser, "Foreign Policy Blending Values and Interests," *Toronto Star*, 22 April 2006, F02.
[85] Barbara Yaffe, "Harper Given Good Marks, Free Advice on Foreign Policy," *Vancouver Sun*, 13 May 2006, C7.
[86] Steven Edwards, "Harper to Address UN Assembly Today: Prime Minister's Speech will Emphasize Canada's Commitment to Fighting Terrorism," *Vancouver Sun*, 21 September 2006, A15.
[87] Brian Laghi, "Majority Opposed to Afghan Mission," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 February 2006, A1; Dan Gardner, "You Can't Fight This Myth," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 July 2006, A15; "Fewer Canadians 'Strongly Approve' of Afghan Mission: Survey," *CBC News*, 9 November 2006 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/fewer-canadians-strongly-approve-of-afghan-mission-survey-1.605606, accessed 10 July 2014.

the *Toronto Star* where academic Sean Maloney argued that Afghanistan was not peacekeeping and tried to draw the continuity between Kandahar and Vimy Ridge as the frontlines for Canadian Forces.[88] Harper visited the Canadian Forces in March of 2006 and warned that it would be a long mission, with the sentiment relayed in the press.[89] This was his first international visit as Prime Minister and reflective of his foreign policy priorities. Writing about the visit, John Ibbitson saw this as part of a wider scheme to remake Canadian narratives, arguing that Harper had embraced the Kandahar mission and made it a reflection of "core Canadian values."[90] Linda McQuaig also suggested that a continued combat mission in Afghanistan would threaten Canada's image internationally and its reputation for promoting peace and justice.[91] Nonetheless, a new poll released in March showed that public support had swung behind the mission.[92] Public opinion, however, proved a fickle metric swinging back and forth during the course of the year and ultimately, there was a Parliamentary debate on the Afghanistan mission despite the Harper government's previous objections.[93]

Several outlets reported on NDP leader, Jack Layton's remarks suggesting that Canadians do not support a combat mission but rather a peacekeeping one.[94] *The Globe and Mail* published an article in which each party's member with the defence portfolio contributed their party's views; this along with a series of articles triggered intense debate.[95] As a consequence, coverage of April's debate on the Afghanistan mission was mixed. Mike

---

[88] Sean Maloney, "Canada's Reality in Kandahar," *Toronto Star*, 22 January 2006, A12.
[89] Jeffrey Simpson, "Our Afghan Mission Must Be Rooted in Realism," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 March 2006, A17; James Travers, "PM Must Sell War at Home," *Toronto Star*, 14 March 2006, A17
[90] John Ibbitson, "How Kandahar Fits into PM's View of Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March 2006, A4; Ibbitson and Darrell Bricker developed these ideas further in his book, *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What it means for our Future*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2013).
[91] Linda McQuaig, "Our Reputation for Promoting Peace, is at Risk, Says Linda McQuaig," *Toronto Star*, 19 March 2006, A16.
[92] Michael Den Tandt, "Canadians Get Behind Deployment," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March 2006, A1.
[93] "To Achieve the Purpose of the Afghan Debate," *The Globe and Mail*, 7 April 2006, A14.
[94] Bill Curry, "A Struggle for Canadian Hearts and Minds; Saying People don't Support 'Warlike' Mission," *The Globe and Mail*, 18 January 2006, A13; James Gordon, "NDP Questions Afghan Mission," *National Post*, 18 January 2006, A6.
[95] Gordon O'Connor, Ujjal Dosanjh, Claude Bachand, Dawn Black, "WHEREAS the Government of Afghanistan Has Requested International Assistance," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 Februray 2006, A15.

Blanchfield writing for the Canwest news service suggested the debate was tepid, with all parties supporting the troops.[96] Nonetheless, the government took some criticism for equating debate over the mission to defeatism or a lack of support for the troops.[97] With another debate on the mission's renewal following soon after there was some confusion in the media. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, the government called this debate with very little warning and received significant criticism from the other parties. Nonetheless, there were some voices who suggested that this debate was an opportunity for MPs to demonstrate where Canada truly stood on the Afghanistan issue, despite the mission's growing unpopularity.[98]

There were also a number of articles which questioned the peacekeeping narrative in Canadian foreign policy. Writing in *The Ottawa Citizen*, diplomat Chris Berzins noted that politicians frequently invoked Canada's peacekeeping tradition when criticising the Prime Minister. Exploring the narrative he suggests that the mythology fixes Canada to one point in time.[99] Echoing this sentiment Antony Anderson writing in the *Toronto Star*, also noted that Canada's narrative of being a neutral peacekeeper was wrong, rather Prime Minister Lester Pearson had been a ruthless pragmatist.[100] *The Globe and Mail* also followed this vein with Michael Valpy arguing that while the mythology of the Canadian peacekeeper remained persistent, it was no longer as easy to distinguish peacekeeping from fighting wars.[101]

2007

---

[96] Mike Blanchfield, "Afghanistan 'Debate' Stirs No Dissent: Canadians Divided, but Politicians Stay United Behind Mission," *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 April 2006, A1.
[97] Haroon Siddiqi, "Profound Policy Shift Carried Out by Stealth," *Toronto Star*, 16 April 2006, A15; Michael Den Tandt, "NDP demands answers on Afghanistan; O'Connor Responds by Calling Critics Anti-Military," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 April 2006, A4.
[98] L. Ian MacDonald, "Afghanistan Debate? Bring It On!: Let's See Where the Liberals, Bloc and NDP Stand on our Commitment to Continuing the Mission," *The Montreal Gazette*, 17 May 2006, A27; Marcus Gee, "Are We Mice or Men?" *The Globe and Mail*, 17 May 2006, A17; Josee Legault, "Debate Was a Sham: The Quick Vote on Extending Mission in Afghanistan Was Cynical and a Distortion of the Democratic Process," *The Montreal Gazette*, 19 May 2006, A25.
[99] Chris Berzins, "Did We Really Invent Peacekeeping," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 30 October 2006, A11.
[100] Antony Anderson, "Pearson and the Myth of Neutrality Canada's Ruthless Pragmatist," *Toronto Star*, 5 November 2006, D04.
[101] Michael Valpy, "The Ballad of the Blue Beret," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November 2006, F4.

The Afghanistan mission had clearly triggered a significant amount of debate over Canada's participation and also the broader foreign policy narrative. *The Globe and Mail* noted that the mission in Afghanistan was the news story of 2006 and the Canadian soldier the top newsmaker.[102] As an ardent defender of Canada's peacekeeping traditions and middle power status, former General Romeo Dallaire urged Canada not to abandon its traditional position in the international system.[103] Writing in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Allan Gregg opined that Harper's challenge to Canada's honest broker middle power peacekeeping narrative was a major undertaking, but nonetheless anachronistic and the Prime Minister would have to go against the tide of public opinion.[104] Nonetheless, as the *Ottawa Citizen* reported, Prime Minister Harper insisted that middle powers like Canada had an important role to play through leading by example.[105] Others like Carol Goar at the *Toronto Star* suggested that the Pearsonian middle power ideal no longer informed policymakers in Ottawa.[106]

Indeed, there was recognition among many mainstream outlets that traditional images of Canadian foreign policy endured. There were a number of articles throughout the year noting the attachment to the myth of the Canadian peacekeeper and the challenges this presented to the military.[107] As Michael Valpy pointed out in his article, despite Canada's active role in Afghanistan 70% of Canadians saw peacekeeping as a defining characteristic of Canada, while the country only contributed less than 0.1% of the UN's peacekeeping troops.[108] The peacekeeping narrative underscored how different the Afghanistan operation was from Canada's previous troop deployments overseas. A steady stream of

---

[102] Les Perreaux, "Afghan Mission Named Top Story of 2006," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 January 2007, A4
[103] Romeo Dallaire, "A Call to Arms for Peace," *Toronto Star*, 20 April 2007, A19.
[104] Allan Gregg, "Making Peace," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 August 2007, A11.
[105] Steven Edwards, "'Canada's Back,' Harper Tells U.S.; Middle Powers Lead by Example, Prime Minister Says,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 September 2007, A1.
[106] Carol Goar, "Pearson's Goal Consistently Ignored," *Toronto Star*, 13 June 2007, AA06.
[107] Richard Foot, "Canada's Top General Wins Over the Public as Champion of the Military," *Vancouver Sun*, 27 January 2007, I9; James Travers, "A Military at War with Peacekeeping; Canadian Forces Want More Than Just to Keep the Peace," *Toronto Star*, 24 February 2007, F01; Michael Valpy, "The Myth of Canada as Global Peacekeeper," *The Globe and Mail*, 28 February 2007, A8; John Ward, "Goodbye to Peacekeeping: Canadians Cling to Nice-Guy Image, but it's a Tougher World Where War has New Meanings," *The Montreal Gazette*, 25 March 2007, A17; Chris Cobb, "Coasting on Pearson's Prize," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December 2007, A6.
[108] Michael Valpy, "The Myth of Canada as Global Peacekeeper," *The Globe and Mail*, 28 February 2007, A8.

casualties from 2006 into 2007 further compounded the diminished peacekeeping narrative. Allegations of abuse against Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan served to create more uncertainty about Canada's international role.[109] Later in the year, Jack Aubry, writing in the *Ottawa Citizen,* warned that Canadians across the political spectrum were increasingly skeptical of the mission's chances of success though polling indicated that many thought it enhanced Canada's standing on the world stage.[110] Also in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Chris Cobb questioned at what point Canadian voters would become fed up with the mission as casualties seemed to have a negligible impact on the mission's support, though 2009 was likely as far as Canadians were willing to continue their support.[111] Writing in *Maclean's*, Paul Geddes suggested that Afghanistan was no longer the foreign policy priority for the Harper government and that the benefits imparted by the mission for Canadian foreign policy would be lost.[112] Nonetheless, the government did not suggest that Canada would withdraw, with Stephen Harper counting on the fact that Canadians still supported the moral purpose of the mission.[113] Coverage in 2007 thus focused on the changing attitudes towards the mission and reflected the general uncertainty in the Canadian public over how much would be sacrificed and how the mission would end.

2008

While 2006 had seen a surge of coverage of the Afghanistan campaign, 2007's more muted, uncertain view of the war suggested an uneasiness with the relative open-endedness of the campaign. In relation to Canada's middle power peacekeeper narrative, while it lingered, there was a clearer recognition that Canada's mission was not peacekeeping and its soldiers were not peacekeepers. Barbara Yaffe insisted that there needed to be more serious contemplation of

---

[109] Paul Koring, "Canadians Split on Mission, but Strongly Support Troops," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 February 2007, A18; Jack Aubry, "Most Say Truth Likely Won't Emerge from Afghan Abuse Probe: Poll," *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 2003, A3; Graham Thompson, "Canadian Troops Face PR Nightmare in Afghanistan: Military's Killings of Innocent Afghans Damages Effort to Win Over People," *The Vancouver Sun*, 20 February 2007, A9.
[110] Jack Aubry, "Canadians Doubt Success of Afghanistan Mission: Poll; Half say Canada's World Reputation Enhanced," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 June 2007, A5.
[111] Chris Cobb, "Taking a Measuring of War," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 June 2007, A7.
[112] Paul Geddes, "Harper's Next Big Five: the Tories' Priorities for this Fall Won't be as Simple as the Last Ones," *Maclean's*, 10 September 2007, 24+, *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.
[113] Richard Foot, "'Moral' Support for Afghan Mission: PM," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 July 2007, A5.

Canada's place in the world despite its middle power position and what Canadians should identify as foreign policy priorities.[114] Similarly, Don Martin, writing in the *National Post* observed that Prime Minister Harper was relishing his position as a middle-power leader no longer relegated to peacekeeping.[115] Beyond this however, the middle power narrative in relation to the Afghan mission was notably scarce in the press.

The release of the Manley Report also forced a re-examination of Canada's foreign policy narrative and how the Prime Minister would seek to define Canada's future role in Afghanistan. As reported in *The Montreal Gazette*, John Manley was skeptical of the peacekeeping mission outlined by Liberal leader Stéphane Dion while also pressing the need for Canada to remain engaged in Afghanistan.[116] Furthermore, Jeffrey Simpson writing in *The Globe and Mail* noted that the Manley report also placed pressure on NATO to take some of the burden off Canada in Southern Afghanistan though he was skeptical that more troops could stabilise the situation there.[117] In a similar vein, Richard Gwyn suggested that the report represented a choice between international isolationism and engagement, the starkness of which was built on years of resting on a complacent peacekeeping image.[118] Manley also invoked the memory of Pearson in justifying the mission's continuation, a comparison seen as wholly inappropriate by Linda McQuaig at the *Toronto Star* as, despite the UN mandate, this was a combat mission led by the US.[119] In *Maclean's* Paul Wells suggested that the Harper government's response to the Manley report highlighted the collapse of Canadian diplomacy which had been geared towards supporting the US War on Terror.[120] Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapter, Parliament accepted the findings of the Manley report and authorised the mission's

---

[114] Barbara Yaffe, "Canada Needs to Find its Place in the World," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 February 2008, A10.
[115] Don Martin, "Afghan Plan Carved in Paper," *National Post*, 22 February 2008, A1
[116] Andrew Mayeda, Richard Foot, "Pressure lands on Harper, Dion; Positions Must Dovetail or We Vote. PM Urged to Step Up, While Liberals Draw Ridicule for Peacekeeping Proposal," *The Montreal Gazette*, 23 January 2008, A4.
[117] Jeffrey Simpson, "Manley Wants Us to Play a Game of Chicken with NATO," 23 January 2008, *The Globe and Mail*, A17.
[118] Richard Gwyn, "Our Choice: Engagement or Isolation," *Toronto Star*, 12 February 2008, A2
[119] Linda McQuaig, "Keep Pearson Out of It," *Toronto Star*, 5 February 2008, A06.
[120] Paul Wells, "Foreign Policy? What's That all About?" *Maclean's*, 18 February 2008: 14, *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.

extension through 2011. With the collapse of the government triggered by Prime Minister Harper in September 2008, electioneering actually turned away from Afghanistan. As Terry Glavin in the *National Post* explained, all the key political parties had something to lose in the election by discussing Afghanistan.[121]

Other journalists such as Andrew Coyne suggested that the Conservatives were trying to reinvigorate older Canadian traditions while pushing aside peacekeeping and other Liberal components.[122] Paul Wells, echoed this sentiment though he was much more critical of the Harper government's frequent U-turns on policy for political expediency, particularly regarding Afghanistan.[123] Despite this, the peacekeeping image of Canadian Forces remained deeply entrenched with a survey conducted by the Department of National Defence concluding that the public still overwhelmingly saw Canadians as peacekeepers.[124] Writing in *Maclean's* Noah Richler lamented that Canada's peacekeeping heritage was being maligned and dismantled both inside and outside of Parliament, and effectively the peacekeeping heritage had been discarded in favour of a warrior narrative.[125] This was reflected in polling of Canadians who continued to support humanitarian interventions, although the relationship between this and peacekeeping remained unclear.[126] During Remembrance Day ceremonies, while the press was often reflective over Canadian casualties, there was greater questioning of whether Canada had changed. As Michael Valpy observed, the military had become a much more

---

[121] Terry Glavin, "Ignoring Afghanistan; The War has Become the One Issue That None of the Parties Want to Talk About. Why?," *National Post*, 13 September 2008, A26

[122] Andrew Coyne, "Harper's Patriot Games: Arctic Sovereignty is Just One Way the Tories Can Reclaim the Flag," *Maclean's,* 8 September 2008: 22+, *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.

[123] Paul Wells, "Harper's Canadian Revolution: the Prime Minister isn't Just Fighting an Election. He's Bent on Reorienting the Nation," *Maclean's*, 29 Sept. 2008: 18+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. Accessed 19 August 2014.

[124] Murray Brewster, "We See Soldiers as Peacekeepers, Poll Finds," *Toronto Star*, 6 September 2008, A17.

[125] Noah Richler, "And Now We are Warriors: Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping in the Country that Invented It?," *Maclean's*, 26 May 2008: 43+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014. See also, Noah Richler, "Fighting for Peace" *Ideas with Paul Kennedy*, CBC Radio, 21 May 2008.

[126] Oliver Moore, "Canadians Have 'Obligation' To Step In," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 December 2008, A12.

visible presence in the daily lives of many Canadians with uniformed soldiers present around the country.[127]

2009

In this year, there was a growing recognition that the narrative informing Canada's foreign policy was no longer as relevant as it once was. Writing in *The Globe and Mail*, Doug Saunders argued that Stephen Harper had sought to shake off the middle power image with much more aggressive language and a confrontational attitude towards allies not seen to be pulling their weight, alienating Canada from the international community.[128] Retired Canadian diplomat, Jeremy Kinsman, reflecting on the decade from 1999-2009 opined that Canada's "middle power status" could allow it to thrive in a multipolar, networked and democratising world.[129] Brian Stewart, also writing for the CBC noted that the traditional Pearsonian peacekeeping that Canadians knew could no longer exist in the current international environment and that the UN's ability to oversee complex operations had grown increasingly limited.[130] Retired General Lewis Mackenzie also cautioned that the pace of operations in Afghanistan had exhausted the Canadian Forces with regular infantry deployments meaning that the 5,000 strong force was burning out.[131] Nonetheless, Canada remained committed to Afghanistan through until 2011 as established after the Manley report of 2008. That said, as in years past, the fixation with peacekeeping continued to inform the coverage and examination of the war in Afghanistan.

Writing in a *Toronto Star* op-ed, Linda McQuaig suggested that Liberal-party leader Michael Ignatieff reprioritise peacekeeping as a Liberal priority.[132]

---

[127] Michael Valpy, "Warriors Once More, We Struggle With What It Means," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November 2008, A4.
[128] Doug Saunders, "How Harper's European Spring Turned Sour," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 May 2009, F1
[129] Jeremy Kinsman, "Let's Just Call it a Decade and Move On," *CBC News*, 30 December 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/let-s-just-call-it-a-decade-and-move-on-1.857397, accessed 10 July 2014
[130] Brian Stewart, "The Sad, Unlamented End of UN Peacekeeping," *CBC News*, 23 April 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-sad-unlamented-end-of-un-peacekeeping-1.791833, accessed 10 July 2014.
[131] Lewis Mackenzie, "We Can't Answer the Battle Cry; Our Infantry Ranks Are So Diminished That Canada's Combat Role in Afghanistan Has to End," *The Globe and Mail*, 28 May 2009, A19.
[132] Linda McQuaig, "A Peace Plank for Ignatieff," *Toronto Star*, 5 May 2009, A15.

The CBC reported the observance of the first National Peacekeeping Day in Canada, highlighting that over 100 Canadians had died in the course of UN peacekeeping operations since the 1950s.[133] As noted in the *Ottawa Citizen*, despite the increased number of UN peacekeeping operations, Canada was now the 63rd largest contributor with only 55 personnel while Canada had been 33rd as recently as 2006.[134] Similarly, there was increasing anxiety over how Canada's international image was changing with several articles noting the friction Harper's foreign policy was creating in various circles.[135] Similarly, there was some recognition that the government's emphasis on hard power may not be the most productive avenue for the exercise of Canadian influence.[136] Indeed, there was a recognition that the Harper government was trying to re-brand Canada. A number of outlets outlined the departure from traditional narrative of Canadian foreign policy. Commentators Rick Salutin and Lawrence Martin, both writing in *The Globe and Mail*, argued that the previous years of Conservative rule had seen the party try and shift the traditional Canadian narrative.[137]

2010

As the penultimate year in Canada's combat mission there was an increased focus on the legacy of Canada's mission in Kandahar. Given that Canada had sustained 138 dead in Afghanistan by this point, the media turned towards looking at what the sacrifices had been made for.[138] In terms of the broader

---

[133] Robert Smol, "Lest We Forget the Cost of Peacekeeping," *CBC News*, 14 July 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/lest-we-forget-the-cost-of-peacekeeping-1.801072, accessed 10 July 2014.
[134] David Pugliese, "We're Number 63: Canada Slides in UN Mission Contributions; Peacekeeping 'Abandoned,' Policy Group Says," *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 December 2009, A5.
[135] Doug Saunders, "How Harper's European Spring Turned Sour," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 May 2009, F1; Eric Reguly, "The Canadian Myth's Roman Holiday is Nearly Done," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 July 2009, A8; Michael Valpy, "Invisible No More; Canadians are Reimagining Their Country as a Military Nation, Embraced the Culture of the Warrior," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 November 2009, F1.
[136] Gordon Gibson, "Whatever Happened to Speaking Softly?," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 November 2009, A19; Nicholas Keung, "New Immigrants to See Canada's Darker Side," *The Toronto Star*, 12 November 2009, A30.
[137] Lawrence Martin, "It's Only Been a Decade, but the Conservative Way is Redefining Us," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 November 2009, A19; Rick Salutin, "Think 11/11, Then Think Rebranding," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November 2009, A25.
[138] Patrick White, "Canada's Kandahar Legacy Rests on a Shift in Strategy, But is There Enough Time?," *The Globe and Mail*, 2 January 2010, A1; Matthew Fisher, "We Played Vital Role, General Says; Holding Kandahar Will be Legacy Left by Canadian Forces," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June 2010, A6.

exercise of diplomacy, the discussions of Canadian influence in the world had also shifted. By this time, the middle power narrative was only really used in passing and generally did not signify the same positional or behavioural situatedness of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the only significant usage of the term was found in reporting on the Wikileaks diplomatic cables where former US Ambassador Paul Cellucci had reported in 2005 that Canadian political and academic elites wanted to return Canada to its middle power status reversing the country's falling international clout.[139] Writing in the *National Post*, Don Martin suggested that coming out of Afghanistan Canada was a "military middle power" well-suited to a non-permanent position on the UN Security Council.[140] As discussed earlier in this study, Canada did not win this seat, notable for the fact that it was the first time it had failed to do so.[141] This led to several introspective articles considering the nature of Canada's relationship with the UN, particularly under the Harper government.[142] In a debate hosted by *Maclean's* legal scholar and NDP candidate, Michael Byers, he sparred with the editor of *Maclean's,* insisting that the Harper government was being unnecessarily rigid with its foreign policy and in doing so, alienating Canada's allies and by extension diminishing its presence in the world.[143] The CBC reported that polling among Canada's allies and trading partners indicated that Canada's reputation in the world was declining.[144]

---

[139] "Limited Fallout Over Canadian Cables," *Toronto Star*, 2 December 2010, A23; See Wikileaks, "Scenesetter: Secretary Chertoff's Visit to Ottawa, March 17, 2005," 05OTTAWA774_a.

[140] Don Martin, "Tories Ready the Blame for Possible UN Loss," *National Post*, 9 October 2010, A13.

[141] "Policy Cost Canada UN Seat: Ex-ambassador." *CBC News*. 13 October 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/13/policy-cost-canada-103.html, accessed 29 November 2012.

[142] Barbara Yaffe, "Blame Game Begins as Canada Loses Out on UN Security Council Seat," *Vancouver Sun*, 13 October 2010, A1; Paul Heinbecker, "Security Council Failure was of Canada's Own Making," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 October 2010, A17; Norman Spector, "To Understand the UN Vote, Listen to Jean Chrétien," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 October 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/second-reading/to-understand-the-un-vote-listen-to-jean-chretien/article4328895/ accessed 10 March 2014.

[143] "Our Place in the World: is the Harper Government's Recent Foreign Policy Record a Sign That it has Lost its Way?" *Maclean's*, 1 Nov. 2010: 26+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 20 Aug. 2014.

[144] "Canada's Reputation Worsens: Global Poll," *CBC News*, 11 Feburary 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-s-reputation-worsens-global-poll-1.892750, accessed 10 July 2014.

Indeed, the narrative surrounding Canada's relationship with the UN had changed somewhat, with Eugene Lang and Eric Morse suggesting in a *Toronto Star* op-ed, that with the Canadian Forces' increased capabilities coming out of Afghanistan, the UN would not be the likely forum for Canadian foreign policy.[145] With increased focus on future missions post-Afghanistan, the military and politicians sought to distance themselves from traditional peacekeeping.[146] Nonetheless, as a poll for the *Globe and Mail* suggested, the Canadian public still believed that peacekeeping should play a central role for the Canadian Forces in the future, despite a recognition that peacekeeping was not really a foreign policy priority any more.[147]

2011

During the last year of combat operations in Afghanistan focus increasingly turned to the next steps for Canadian foreign policy. John Geddes and Paul Wells writing in *Maclean's* looked back at the Harper government's foreign policy and suggested that the Foreign Minister's role had been relatively incoherent with Harper playing effectively a central role when it came to decisions about Afghanistan.[148] Moreover, the article quoted a Conservative Party strategist who outlined that the party had to create a new Canadian narrative as all the previous hallmarks, including peacekeeping, were closely associated with the Liberal Party.[149] As reported in *The Montreal Gazette*, Foreign Minister John Baird had been outlining new priorities for Canadian foreign policy, largely focusing on trade and eschewing the traditional middle power priorities.[150] Nonetheless, the use of the middle power label saw a relative resurgence related to its

---

[145] Eugene Lang and Eric Morse, "What next for Canada's tough new army?," *Toronto Star*, 28 March 2010, A17.
[146] "Senior Soldier Moving to New Posting Future of the Military: 'Canada Has an Enormously Competent Army'," *Toronto Star*, 16 June 2010, A6.
[147] Campbell Clark, "For Canadians, Peacekeeping a Priority over Combat Roles; Poll Shows Public Mood Against Another Mission Like That in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 25 October 2010, A1; Geoffrey York, "Peacekeeping Passes Canada By; Country Turns its Back on Effort Once Seen as a 'Defining Characteristic' of Nation," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October 2010, A14.
[148] John Geddes and Paul Wells, "What You Don't Know about Stephen Harper: His Backroom Battles, Diplomatic Scraps, Betrayals and Secret Insecurities: Behind the Scenes of Five Years in Power," *Maclean's* 7 Feb. 2011: 14+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.
[149] *Ibid*.
[150] Tobi Cohen, "Conservatives Quietly Hammer out Foreign Policy Plan," *The Montreal Gazette*, 17 August 2011, A4.

participation in the Libya mission, Operation Unified Protector. One of the few examples was Campbell Clark in *The Globe and Mail* discussing Canada's contribution to the Libya mission and explaining that in these types of circumstances the public expects Canada should act alongside other middle powers like Japan, Germany and Australia.[151] John Ibbitson and Daniel LeBlanc also echoed this sentiment, suggesting that Canada used its status as a middle power to leverage power within NATO and give teeth to the Responsibility to Protect agenda.[152] Attention turned more towards the Libya mission as well as the sacrifices made by Canadians over the duration of the combat mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, there was a broader recognition that the traditional peacekeeping narrative had gone by the wayside, at least among policymakers.[153] Writing in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Brian Crowley argued that the drive to preserve peacekeeping reflected a moral weakness and Afghanistan had demonstrated that Canada could sacrifice to achieve these ends.[154] John Ivison, writing in the *National Post* echoed these remarks when he reminded readers that Harper had announced that international actions would be governed by "moral clarity" and a keen sense of "moral duty."[155] Indeed, this was reflected in an interview with Stephen Harper in July of 2011, where he specifically outlined that he saw Canada as a triumvirate, "the courageous warrior, compassionate neighbour, confident partner."[156] Taken together, these differ somewhat from the traditional middle power characteristics and if viewed in context when examining Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government, the change in language signals a different conception of Canada's international role.

---

[151] Campbell Clark, "Naval Mission Signals Ottawa's Hardening Stance on Libyan Crisis," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 March 2011, A11.
[152] John Ibbitson and Daniel LeBlanc, "Canada Turns Commitment into Clout," *The Globe and Mail*, A3.
[153] Sean Henry, "Exploding the Myth of Peacekeeping," *National Post*, 7 July 2011, A14, Rosie DiManno, "Was The Mission Worth It? Absolutely," *Toronto Star*, 9 July 2011, A1; Brian Hutchinson, "Canadians Fought Two Different Wars," *National Post*, 25 June 2011, B2.
[154] Brian Lee Crowley, "Some Things Are Worth Dying For," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 July 2011, B7.
[155] John Ivison, "PM's More Muscular Foreign Policy; 'Those Who Talk the Talk ... Must Walk the Walk'," *National Post*, 25 November 2011, A4.
[156] Kenneth Whyte, "How He Sees Canada's Role In The World and Where He Wants To Take The Country, Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Conversation with Kenneth Whyte" *Maclean's* 4 July 2011: 16+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.

With regards to the Libya mission, the contours of the operation drew quick comparison to Canada's participation in Kosovo in 1999. Defence Minister Peter MacKay had stated that the mission was a moral duty, as well as a duty to the UN and NATO.[157] Reference to Responsibility to Protect from the government was relatively limited although other commentators such as former Prime Minister Paul Martin, Liberal MP Irwin Cotler, Liberal Senator Romeo Dallaire, Conservative Senator Hugh Segal did invoke the norm.[158] As former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Allan Rock insisted, the international community should use the opportunity to structure the response to Gaddafi in terms of Responsibility to Protect.[159] The press was also obliging of the Canadian influence in helping to create this norm, noting that Responsibility to Protect was a guiding principle for humanitarian intervention in Libya. That said, despite unanimous authorisation, getting the Canadian Parliament onside with a Canadian deployment as John Ibbitson observed, Harper had worked behind the scenes to ensure that the mission had wide support.[160] Nonetheless, the Libya mission was tempered by concerns over a long engagement, as several outlets observed; NATO remained deployed in Kosovo twelve years after the initial intervention.[161] Similarly, some suggested

---

[157] John Ibbitson, "Commons Fully Backs Deployment; Support Conditional On Oversight of Operation, Further Consultation if Mission Exceeds Three Months," *The Globe and Mail*, 22 March 2011, A19.
[158] Campbell Clark, "Evacuations Move Quickly, Decision On Sanctions Doesn't," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 February 2011, A4; Irwin Cotler, "The Urgent Need for R2P; The World Needs to Follow Its Own Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in Libya," *National Post*, 26 February 2011, A25; Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal, "How Canada Can Help Libya; We Must Take the Lead to Ensure The UN Lives Up To The Responsibility to Protect Helpless People, writes Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 February 2011, A13.
[159] Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock, "World Leaders Must Call R2P What It Is," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 2011, A9.
[160] John Ibbitson, "Commons Fully Backs Deployment; Support Conditional On Oversight of Operation, Further Consultation if Mission Exceeds Three Months," *The Globe and Mail*, 22 March 2011, A19.
[161] Ian MacLeod, "Top Tory Questions Role in Libya; 'Does Anyone Know Where It Will Lead?' Burney Asks," *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 March 2011, A11; "Bombing Mission Looks Easy. But Remember Kosovo?" *Toronto Star*, 23 March 2011, A16; Peter Goodspeed, "Sowing Seeds of Defeat: Good Intentions of a 'Humanitarian War' Are Often Lost, Strategist Says," *National Post*, 9 April 2011, A21; Kate Heartfield, "The Libyan Quagmire," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 June 2011, A12.

that the Libya mission demonstrated a new era in Canadian foreign policy.[162] Nonetheless, the moral component of the Libya mission was not unnoticed. As Peter Goodspeed observed, in humanitarian missions, the moral purpose was often lost in the course of the intervention as it is ultimately still warfare.[163]

Part II: Non-Canadian NATO policymakers

While the media provides some insight into the contestation of the foreign policy narrative and the ways in which it is transmitted, this narrative does not exist in a vacuum. The way in which it is interpreted by non-Canadian policymakers also influences the policymaking process within NATO. The narratives that are communicated, in part, shape the way in which interactions between Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers occur as they indicate what kind of behaviour is prioritised. In this way, NATO Allies can expect Canada to play a certain role within the Alliance and thus certain routine behaviours as dictated by this narrative. The interactions between policymakers in this environment offers some insight into the ways that Canada's behaviours are interpreted by other policymakers and how that affects the ways in which Canada is perceived. As noted earlier in this study, perception is important in that it not only shapes how others see Canada, but also how they react to it and expect it react.[164]

The interviewees were drawn from a number of NATO nations and all had varying degrees of familiarity with Canadian foreign policy. The bulk of the interviews were focused on NATO operations and the related International Military Staff personnel. However, there were a few delegations that were also willing to be interviewed and offer some insight into their impressions of Canadian foreign policy. Taken together they offer an interesting cross-section of

---

[162] Bill Curry, "The End of Gadhafi's Rule; The Beginning of a New Tougher Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 August 2011, A3; "Canada, 10 Years Later; How The Tragedy of 9/11 Made Us a Bolder, Braver, Prouder Nation," *National Post*, 10 September 2011, A20; Paul Robinson, "The Afghan War Has Altered Canada's Values; The elevation of the military into a moral elite of super-citizens has damaged the structure of civil-military relations, writes Paul Robinson," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 July 2011, A11; John Ibbitson, "The Harper Doctrine, In Black And White; Canada now has the political will and military might to back up a more muscular foreign policy," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 June 2011, A4.

[163] Peter Goodspeed, "Sowing Seeds of Defeat: Good Intentions of a 'Humanitarian War' Are Often Lost, Strategist Says," *National Post*, 9 April 2011, A21.

[164] See Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr. 1968), 454-479.

views about Canadian foreign policy from members of staff who interact relatively frequently with Canadian policymakers. That said, through these interviews it is much more difficult to parse exactly how these different understanding of Canadian foreign policy came to the fore. Indeed, the NATO personnel interviewed are much more interested in discussing and understanding the Canadian foreign policy behaviours rather than the narrative behind them, unlike the Canadian interviewees who saw the two elements as inherently linked.

Perhaps most astute and familiar with the Canadian foreign policy narrative was one senior member of the US delegation to NATO. He suggested that after Afghanistan there had been a clear change in attitude and that the absence of General Rick Hillier driving the Canadian approach certainly had an effect on Canadian policymaking.[165] Indeed, he remarked that Canada's behavioural change was definitely linked to the new government and indeed, the new attitude, particularly with regards to Afghanistan was frustrating to the US as it challenged the 'in-together, out-together' mentality that had characterised the mission.[166] He went on to warn that while Canada remained an active ally, it was being self-handicapped due to a lack of participation (particularly with regards to AWACS and AGS) and as a result, it is no longer certain what Canada's responses will be, having become more of a question mark.[167] Indeed, the AWACS and AGS withdrawals were symbolic of the changed attitude towards the Alliance. The senior US official suggested that Canada had withdrawn from these programmes due to frustration over burden sharing in Afghanistan and the slow pace of AWACS deployment after a Canadian request in 2009.[168] Frustration was a common theme amongst a number of the interviewees when discussing how Canadian foreign policy with regards to NATO and NATO operations had changed.

As one NATO staff officer explained, while Canada remained a positive force in NATO overall, issues like burden sharing were often difficult to square. As he remarked with regards to the Afghanistan operation,

---

[165] Interview 10, 5 November 2013.
[166] *Ibid*.
[167] *Ibid*.
[168] *Ibid*. As noted earlier, NATO AWACS were not deployed until 2011.

> it was because it was not burden sharing that Canada meant, Canada meant you have to have as many troops killed as we do. You have to have as difficult a domestic challenge as we do. That is what was meant by burden sharing, not we need to share the burden of council approved operations, because Canada didn't.[169]

He noted that Canada no longer contributed to other NATO operations such as Kosovo, Operation Ocean Shield or Operation Active Endeavour and that burden sharing, as a concept, was more than simply troops in Afghanistan. Indeed, coming out of the Afghanistan operation prompted a noticeable shift in attitudes in the relationship between Canada and NATO. Another Senior NATO official working on operations explained that "for Canada's role in NATO's operations it's disappointing and it's much less forward leaning than it was 10 years ago, that's for sure."[170] In relation to Canada's previous, proactive role in operations many non-Canadian policymakers observed that the foreign policy behaviour did not necessarily match with the expectations in terms of the roles that Canada was expected to play.

When speaking with non-Canadian interviewees, however, it is more challenging to identify the shifts in Canadian foreign policy between governments. Given that Canadian policymakers in Ottawa, both Liberal and Conservative, had embraced the Afghanistan mission, it is less clear that the behavioural changes in foreign policy were not always directly linked to the governments. As one senior NATO official suggested with regards to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, the mission in Kandahar was beyond its means and it was unwittingly, perhaps naively, drawn into a major role.[171] He noted that the mission broke Canadians from the mold of the gentle peacekeeper; however, the intensity of the mission seems to have created a 'we've done our bit' mentality and as it has drawn back its legitimacy has been diminished.[172] A number of staff members who had worked on the Kandahar campaign noted that while the relationship with NATO had started to change it was the drawdown of Canada's Kandahar mission that signaled a different relationship with NATO. The Director of the International Military Staff Executive Coordinator and

[169] Interview 7, 4 November 2013.
[170] Interview 11, 5 November 2013.
[171] Interview 15, 6 November 2013.
[172] *Ibid*.

former assistant to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) explained that,

> DSACEUR, John McColl, he was livid with Canada for pulling out at the height of the surge in Kandahar. It was a key province and we had to find other people to backfill it and it caused all sorts of problems. It was a seminal moment I think, which amongst many of us we lost a certain degree of respect. [173]

As noted in the previous chapter, it was announced that Canada would take on a training role in Kabul. However, even this commitment was slow to be filled.[174] Overall, with regards to Canada, Afghanistan and the AWACS/AGS affair, he argued that there was "disappointment because the way it was done and the way it was handled."[175] With the de-prioritisation of Afghanistan as a policy priority, there was a clear effect on foreign policy behaviour. Canada losing respect or esteem is thus tied to a revision of its foreign policy behaviour, which, in turn flows from a more profound realignment of its foreign policy narrative. More fundamentally, a senior NATO official in operations suggested that Canadian policymakers were less inclined to invest in NATO as part of the calculus as to whether NATO serves Canada's security.[176] This was the key issue that many non-Canadian policymakers were curious about: did Canada still see value in NATO and were they willing to support the Alliance? Indeed, the rhetoric that had come out of Ottawa during the Afghanistan campaign about its commitment to NATO Allies reflected a lingering sense that Canada was not as invested in the Alliance.

Despite the criticism that was leveled towards Canada, there were a number of non-Canadian policymakers who were somewhat in disagreement with their colleagues about its contribution to the Alliance and offered alternative views. One senior NATO Official maintained that,

> [t]hey contribute to the budget only a certain percentage but they are not among the biggest contributors. They are not even among

[173] Interview 17, 7 November 2013.
[174] *Ibid*; Mike Blanchfield, "Canada Weighs End to Afghan Army Training After 2011," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 December 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-weighs-end-to-afghan-army-training-after-2011/article4196714/, accessed 14 October 2014.
[175] Interview 17, 7 November 2013.
[176] Interview 25, November 2013.

> the biggest military contributors, but still they do play an active role in the NAC [North Atlantic Council], which is quite surprising so to say, I think probably it's more, the explanation lies in their tradition, they're traditionally active, an active ally of this alliance irrespective of the practical commitment. In a way it's a kind of discrepancy between their political role and their practical role. It's not a criticism, I think there's a lot of merit in this.[177]

This speaks to the traditional 'punching above its weight' characteristic of the foreign policy narrative, regardless of how the actual rhetoric had changed. As representatives from two national delegations suggested, Canada was a principled member of the Alliance and while withdrawal from the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Airborne Warning And Command System (AWACS) had been disruptive, it remained a proactive and fiscally responsible voice in the North Atlantic Council.[178] As one member of the International Military Staff opined, while Canada's voice had been diminished by not participating in operations, it could still deliver capabilities on the upper end of NATO nations and there were high expectations when it came to Canada's contribution to the Alliance.[179] Moreover, he insisted that Canada's voice was important in acting as an alternative to the US and underscored the transatlantic element of the Alliance.[180] Indeed, there was a strong recognition among many of the interviewees of the importance of Canada as the *other* transatlantic ally in NATO. This constituted an important role for Canada in the view of many non-Canadian policymakers as it served to moderate the American view of NATO.

Others interviewed referenced peacekeeping as an important and enduring element of Canada's foreign policy behaviour, with one military official claiming, perhaps incorrectly, that the Canadian Forces were designed for peacekeeping.[181] One staff officer in NATO Operations referred to Canada's focus on UN Peacekeeping operations during the 1990s and thought that Canadian policymakers were increasingly focusing on the UN rather than NATO.[182] Others referred to the 'legend' of Canada's history with the UN while

[177] Interview 20, 7 November 2013.
[178] Interview 13, 5 November 2013; Interview 14, 5 November 2013.
[179] Interview 18, 7 November 2013.
[180] *Ibid*.
[181] Interview 19, 7 November 2013.
[182] Interview 15, 6 November 2013.

acknowledging that this was partly fiction and that its diplomacy was more pragmatic.[183] Staff Officer Erik Sandahl noted that with regards to Canada's peacekeeping tradition, "I think this is very specific to Canada. They're probably the only ones; I don't see any other country playing this role in different environments with the same level of commitment in a steady way."[184] Indeed, the peacekeeping and UN relationship formed a clear part of many non-Canadian policymakers' view of Canadian foreign policy behaviour.

Overall, while there was certainly criticism for the perceived changes in Canadian attitudes towards NATO, this was usually couched in a benevolent view of Canada more generally. Canada's sacrifices in Afghanistan were not unnoticed; similarly, its historic contribution to the Alliance was not forgotten.[185] As a senior NATO official in operations insisted, "the Canadians have a capital of sympathy," built on their reputation as being frank and honest diplomats.[186] Another interviewee speculated that the Canadians seemed less motivated by *realpolitik* and promoted good international citizenship.[187] Indeed, there was a relatively distinct narrative of Canadian foreign policy in relation to NATO with the country seen as a constructive, positive force within the Alliance with regards to European security and to a lesser extent, NATO operations. Moreover, Canadian diplomats were held in high esteem for their skills, regardless of the current relationship with the Alliance. Nonetheless, while the reaction to changes in Canada's foreign policy narrative was noticeable, it was not nearly as pronounced as with Canadian policymakers.

Part III: Conclusions

This chapter has explored two different aspects of Canada's foreign policy narrative, the first being the media's interpretation and transmission of that narrative. This clarifies how Canada's foreign policy narrative is articulated and which elements resonate with those outside of elite policymaking circles. The second aspect was the interpretation of Canadian foreign policy narrative rooted

[183] Interview 4, 16 October 2012.
[184] Interview 6, 17 October 2012.
[185] *Ibid*.
[186] Interview 4, 16 October 2012.
[187] Interview 3, 16 October 2012.

in the observation of diplomatic behaviour by non-Canadian policymakers. This was done in order to clarify how Canada's foreign policy narrative is interpreted by non-Canadian policymakers who do not have the same attachment to said narrative, but nonetheless, are influenced by it. Taken together, they can highlight the ways in which various policymakers' understanding of narrative affect their interpretation of behaviour. At the same time, the media affects policymakers' views of the state's narrative. Even more, the media is a vital part of the context in which one constructs said narrative. Media sources can chart how different foreign policy narratives are constructed and highlight the dynamic process by which narratives are negotiated and renegotiated between the public and political spheres.[188] Additionally, it can draw attention to disruptions in the continuum of the narrative of Canadian foreign policy and can push policymakers to better articulate shifts to foreign policy behaviour in terms of historical continuity.[189] In doing so, this constructs a certain role that Canada is *expected* to play, with specific associated behaviours.

This conclusion will first examine how the motivations driving the interpretations of the middle power narrative were articulated. In particular, this chapter highlighted that while the middle power and its associated interpretations are present, the motivations as defined by the ontological security research programme are not nearly as evident.[190] It will then link the narrative with Role Theory, before finally examining how these foreign policy behaviours were understood by the media and non-Canadian policymakers.

---

[188] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices," *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012); with regards to the construction of storylines see Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia," *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Jun. 2002), 601-628.

[189] For the agenda-setting function of the media see Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1972), 176-187. This role of the media and its impact on policymaking remains contested. See also Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr. 1999), 301-309.

[190] This lends further credence to the criticisms in Chapter 1 pointing to ontological security as a fundamentally individual phenomenon rather than one that can be ascribed to a state.

Motivations

With regards to the media, the use of the middle power label was fairly scarce throughout the duration of the Afghanistan mission and not particularly notable during the Libya mission either. When it was used, it was more as a shorthand way of referencing Canadian foreign policy tradition, rather than current foreign policy behaviour. As a result, its utility remains as an umbrella terminology encapsulating all Canadian foreign policy behaviour, alongside the different motivations for those actions. In examining the Afghanistan and Libya conflicts, it is useful to go into much more detail as a way to construct the individual understandings that reflect the middle power narrative.

As noted previously, this study draws on Steele's examination of ontological security in International Relations. He uses three historical examples to highlight alternative motivations for state action, i.e. Britain and the US Civil War for morality, Belgium in WWII for honour and NATO's actions in Kosovo for humanitarian.[191] This study has mapped these motivations on to the different Canadian governments as a way to understand how the differing interpretations of the middle power narrative shaped Canada's participation in NATO's operations in Afghanistan and Libya. As highlighted in the last chapter it is possible to discern Harper's morally defined motivations as opposed to the honour and humanitarian driven ones articulated by the Liberal Party under Chrétien and Martin. At the outset of this chapter the interest in perlocutionary discourse was suggested as a possible motivator for what could be considered moral foreign policy. However, in this case it was not evident that the morally defined roles were driven by internal shame, perlocutionary discourse from the media or non-Canadian policymakers. Instead, other internal motivations from the individual policymaker seem to have driven the creation of these roles.

What is most notable in examining the Canadian media however, is the level of introspection when examining the extent to which Canadian foreign policy had changed as well as the deeper concepts surrounding the myths of Canadian foreign policy. As noted previously, there is a strain of 'whither

[191] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 13.

Canada?' in commentary concerning Canada's place in the world and this is also evident in the media.[192] In part, there is an element of the shame previously described in Chapter 3 which informs some commentaries of Canada departing from its past foreign policy traditions.[193] While this is occurring outside of the policymakers, it still highlights that in shifting Canada's international behaviour, there was a friction with its interpreted historical narrative. In effect, this can be interpreted as the dynamic process by which a form of national Self is created through the interrogation of these traditions, although not in the sense previously implied in the International Relations literature. Rather than being a unitary Self, it is open to the interpretation and understanding of the individual policymaker. What becomes problematic here, however, is the differentiation of the motivation as outlined previously; honour, morality and humanitarian are much harder to clearly discern as, again, the media is often less concerned with explaining the internal motivations, i.e. *why* certain actions occur but rather exploring the context and continuity of those actions and whether they conform to the established narrative. When examining the Parliamentary language combined with the media analysis it is possible to then interpret differing motivations driving the different governments. However, when mapping the ontological security informed motivations the challenges of this approach become more visible. While it gives insight into the importance of narrative at the policymaker level, it is not apparent in the same way when examining Other actors in the foreign policy process. This helps to elaborate the ways in which these different components interact with each other across multiple dimensions and the ways in which they affect the policymaker at the individual level. In doing so it helps to further illuminate this study's constructivist FPA approach.

Narrative and Role Theoretical Analysis

Echoing much of what was explored in this chapter, Roland Paris applied Role Theory to explore the Harper government's foreign policy and its relationship

[192] The questioning of Canadian 'identity,' particularly as it relates to foreign policy has a long history as explored in Chapter 2.
[193] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 115.

with the narrative of Canada as a liberal internationalist.[194] While Paris eschews the middle power categorisation, many of the hallmarks of the liberal internationalist label are the same.[195] Paris is mainly concerned with public opinion, rather than elites and he finds that liberal internationalism is deeply embedded in the public imagination, despite the efforts of the Harper government to shift this; thus Role Theory in this case must account for the resistance from publics to top-down efforts.[196] While Paris' article does not examine the relationship to foreign policy behaviour in great depth, it is interesting to see that his findings are partly reflected in the responses from non-Canadian diplomats as well who expressed confusion and a clear preference for the liberal internationalist or in the case of this study a middle power-type Canada. Indeed, efforts to shift Canada's foreign policy behaviour were met with perplexity, although as noted, it does not have the same emotional resonance as it does for Canadians. One can interpret this as an attempt to reconcile the internal myth of Canada's role in the international system with the foreign policy behavioural changes that have occurred in the period from 2001-2011.

Given that this study examines the way in which narratives affect foreign policy behaviour Paris' study reflects the need to account for the way the media shapes the discussion of these interventions in the public sphere. In this circumstance, there was some critical interrogation of the role that Canada *should* play and whether involvement in Afghanistan and Libya were in the country's best interest. The outside perspective on Canadian foreign policy, both from outside the elite consensus as well as outside the institutions of Canadian foreign policy offer some interesting insight into the middle power narrative's interpretation. The outside accounts of Canadian foreign policy echo, but do not necessarily reflect the same concerns articulated in Parliamentary debates. Nonetheless, their focus largely remained more on the types of roles that Canada should play in those operations rather than whether they were worth being involved in more generally. As seen throughout this chapter, these roles tended

[194] Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307.
[195] *Ibid*, 277.
[196] *Ibid*, 306.

to favour an interpreted historic preference for peacekeeping, development and multilateral support rather than explicit combat.

In this regard, while Canadian policymakers may have a had a notable reaction to the reinterpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative away from the traditional middle power hallmarks, it does not necessarily have the same resonance for those on the outside of the policymaking process. As Derek Burney noted, this speaks to the fact that foreign policy issues rarely have the same impact among the electorate as domestic issues when it comes to elections.[197] The reference to middle power was used as a way to either describe Canadian foreign policy in the present or in the past, rarely accompanied by critical reflection. As such, regardless of media reporting and reflection among the Canadian electorate or negative responses from non-Canadian policymakers, Canadian policymakers in Ottawa had a much freer hand in defining the roles they felt best reflected Canadian foreign policy. If one steps back from the partisan characterisations of foreign policy, both Liberal and Conservative foreign policy share a focus on targeted, principled action informed by a conviction about the type of role Canada should play in the world. This validates the concerns raised in the academic critiques of the middle power label; it effectively acts as a container that can be shaped to suit the purpose of whoever is using it and thus retains its utility.[198] Indeed, Stephen Harper's conception of Canada as a proactive, moral middle power was driven by different motivations from the previous Liberal government's interpretations of that label.[199] It is however notable, that the conviction in this case is not necessarily reflective of the public attitude, but rather the political leadership. In part, this can be attributed to elite consensus as previously noted in that there was a lack of major

[197] Derek Burney, "Foreign Policy in the Election," *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affaris Institute*, April 2011, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Foreign%20Policy%20in%20the%20Election.pdf, accessed 5 November 2014.
[198] See David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[199] Steven Edwards, "'Canada's Back,' Harper Tells U.S.; Middle Powers Lead By Example, Prime Minister Says'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 September 2007, A1.

variation on foreign policy issues between the two main governing parties.[200] Indeed, aside from Iraq the public was not nearly as vocal as to whether Canada should be involved in Afghanistan or Libya. As such, while there is clearly the process of foreign policy change underway during the period from 2001-2011, it does not necessarily represent a disconnect from past traditions, at least for the Canadian public.

The pervasive image of Canada as the middle power peacekeeper endures as a subject referent point against which policymakers, both foreign and Canadian, then judge how far Canadian foreign policy has changed. Mythology or not, it becomes evident that the narrative of Canadian foreign policy had been established in a relatively stable, enduring form until the Harper government. This accounts for the perception of Canada's narrative in both the media and the interviews which largely revolved around the traditional middle power characteristics. The government's attempt to reinterpret Canada's foreign policy tradition sought to draw on an alternative reading of Canada's history, however, in doing so, it did not resonate at an emotional level with those receiving this narrative.[201] The Conservative government led by Stephen Harper fundamentally had a different subjective understanding of the Canadian foreign policy tradition. Nonetheless, the fact that neither party was entirely clear on their interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative can be seen as contributing to what Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson suggest was a weak and incoherent strategic narrative regarding Afghanistan.[202] While as noted previously, strategic narratives are used towards specific ends, in this case, this study is concerned with how they reflect wider issues concerning the disembedding of wider foreign policy narratives.[203] Although there was some behavioural change, the greater concern for the Conservative government was with the ways in which the actions

---

[200] Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215.
[201] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013), 112.
[202] Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson, "Shaping Public Attitudes Towards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives," *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec. 2011), 505-528.
[203] Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin, "Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives," *Working Paper No. 7*, (Feb. 2010) Brighton: Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex, 6.

were described, that is, their context rather than continuity with past Canadian behaviour.

Behavioural Links

As explored in this chapter, the explicit middle power label does not have as much widespread currency either inside or outside of Canada as it does in the academic literature. Indeed, the press was focused more on the tradition in Canadian foreign policy and tried, in particular, to examine Canada's foreign policy behaviours in Afghanistan in reference to this tradition. It is notable that by the time that the Libya mission occurred, the traditional components of Canadian foreign policy, be it the middle power, peacekeeping or Responsibility to Protect components were infrequently mentioned. Similarly, as noted already, when the term middle power was raised with interviewees, it elicited few responses along the lines of the Canadian usage. Indeed, there was some recognition of some of the previously referenced characteristics namely, a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. However, the middle power label was seen by some as a reflection of Canada's position *within* NATO alongside other nations such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.[204] The term, used in this context, still described a role that Canada played specifically in the context of NATO, however, did not entail the same definitional vagueness as it does when employed by the Canadian media or by Canadian policymakers. That said, it is also devoid of the related motives be they honour, humanitarian or moral; rather it is more fundamentally behavioural. This can be related to the fact that non-Canadian policymakers do not have the same emotional link that would be expected of Canadians and as such, disruption of a foreign policy narrative, while important, does not have the same impact.

This is not to imply that the awareness of Canada's foreign policy narrative did not exist amongst non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. As the Harper government sought to reshape the Canadian foreign policy narrative there

[204] Interview 2, 16 October 2012; Interview 4, 16 October 2012.

was a clear recognition not only in the media, but also amongst non-Canadian policymakers that the practice of Canadian foreign policy was changing. However, as noted previously, the concern over this was subordinated to a desire for stable behaviour towards NATO. Fundamentally it was the routinisation of behaviour that was of key concern. In terms of the middle power narrative, this proved much more problematic. A few interviewees used the term selectively, usually in relation to Canada's position within NATO, rather than as a broader label to characterise Canada's foreign policy behaviour. The influence of narratives in shaping foreign policy can be observed as a phenomenon relatively common within NATO and as such, reorientations of foreign policy are only occasionally remarked on. Indeed, the representative of the US had a much stronger opinion about foreign policy under the Harper government and several interviewees noted varying degrees of frustration.[205] However, with 28 member nations, each with its own domestic pressures and varying internal policymaking processes, members of the non-Canadian International Staff communicated a tendency to remain somewhat aloof and dispassionate towards the foreign policy narratives of the various member states.[206] Thus, with the process of foreign policy change underway, some non-Canadian policymakers were less concerned with the emotional component of motivation, but rather the practical side; *how* does this affect the day-to-day.[207] When talking of narratives in the Alliance, it is interesting to note that there are also institutional stories within NATO about different delegations which are not entirely connected to the national foreign policy narratives. While this goes beyond the scope of this study, it presents an interesting avenue to explore in future examinations of international

[205] Interview 10, 5 November 2013; Interview 17, 7 November 2013.
[206] Interview 14, 6 November 2013.
[207] With regards to foreign policy change there is a clear space where ontological security and constructivist FPA can contribute to this discussion. As a subjective selection see Walter Carlsnaes, "On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar. 1993), 5-30; Jakob Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar. 1999), 73-95; Frederik Doeser, "Leader-driven Foreign-policy Change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Nov. 2013), 582-597.

organisations and how delegations and international civil servants interact within them.[208]

Conversely, when speaking to non-Canadian interviewees it is possible to see the emphasis is not so much on Canada's sense of place among nations. Instead, there is more of a concern over the foreign policy behaviour, less so over motivation. Nonetheless, their interpretation of those actions is usually characterised by a recognition of the narrative behind foreign policy behaviour and that this narrative has value, more so for Canadians. In this case, despite their view that Canada's behaviour towards NATO had changed there still remained the impression that Canada was a positive, proactive, honest broker in the international system and an ally that could be relied on during kinetic operations.[209] Indeed, the understanding of Canada's middle power narrative was important as it generated expectations of specific roles and therefore behaviours within NATO. Similarly, the UN peacekeeping component of the Canadian narrative still shaped many views of Canada's foreign policy behaviour.[210] As Wilfried von Bredow observed, Canadians self-perception as peacekeepers remains significantly out of sync with the reality of what Canadian Forces actually do on the ground.[211] Given that this was also reflected in the responses of many non-Canadian policymakers underlines how pervasive the peacekeeping mythology remains inside and outside of Canada.

---

[208] See for example, Daryl Copeland, "Once Were diplomats: Can Canadian Internationalism Be Rekindled," *Canada in the World*, Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[209] Interview 13, 5 November 2013; Interview 14, 5 November 2013.
[210] Interview 16, 6 November 2013.
[211] Wilfried von Bredow, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Canadian Armed Forces," *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 180.

Chapter 5 – Conclusions

To conclude this examination, this last chapter will first briefly revisit the empirical findings which emerged from this study, specifically it will address the way in which Canadian policymakers were influenced by elements of the middle power narrative when executing foreign policy behaviour. As has been explored, the middle power narrative informed Canadian policymakers' decisions and thus contributed to Canada taking significant roles in the interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. Indeed, the middle power narrative is complex in that it contains elements of both a narrative and a role, however, with regards to Canadian foreign policy, it occupies a unique space in the FPA discipline. This chapter will then reflect on the theoretical components of this study addressing briefly some of the strengths and weaknesses of the ontological security-informed Role Theory approach adopted before turning to avenues for future research and future challenges to be addressed. The integration of some components of ontological security into this study's Role Theory-informed approach has illuminated how narratives translate into behaviour and helped to understand the role that the individual policymaker plays in this process.

Part I: Empirical Findings

As this study initially contended, Canada's participation in NATO's Afghanistan and Libya operations was driven in part by the interpretations of the middle power narrative by successive Prime Ministers. Through the analysis of a number of sources, this study sought to interpret differing ontological security-informed motivations driving each subsequent leader and how the roles they articulated shaped Canada's foreign policy behaviour. Each leader's understanding of this narrative was rooted in his interpretation of Canada's foreign policy history and as such sought to alter Canada's foreign policy behaviour to reflect this. Through the interpretivist, hermeneutic examination of the Parliamentary *Hansard* records and the media debate, this study has constructed a better understanding of not only how narratives and roles are linked; it has also through the interviews conducted in NATO headquarters, explored the ways in which they have shaped foreign policy behaviour. In doing so, it proved that it was possible to establish a link between narratives, roles and behaviours and as such, had a real effect on Canada's influence in NATO.

Chrétien and honour

The government's reaction in the wake of 9/11, while in keeping with Canada's foreign policy narrative as previously established by the Liberal Party, was fundamentally outward looking and publicly supportive of the United States, the response of a good ally. Nonetheless, emotions such as fear and anxiety should not be discounted as motivations either, given the nature of the attacks themselves.[1] As such the responses undertaken by Canada and other Western nations sought to reassure and reinforce different national roles. The push by the Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, David Wright, to invoke Article V in response to 9/11 was in keeping with the drive to reinforce national honour.[2] In utilising the mechanisms of NATO, this not only forced other nations to recognise Canada's commitment to the Alliance but also then created a role for Canada as a vital defender of international order. Moreover, invoking national honour required that Canada take sufficient action to support this and, as a result, deployment in a combat role to Afghanistan served as a way to maintain standing with its allies.[3] Taken together, these are all elements that easily fit within a broad middle power label. The problem with emphasising this honour-driven motivation for Canadian foreign policy behaviour became apparent when the United States invaded Iraq. It also required a response from the Canadian government in order to maintain continuity in the context of Canada's role as a defender of international order. This was a complex calculus that harks back to assertions made earlier in this study, namely that the 'essence of decision' lies at the domestic level. Policymakers would not take action in Iraq due to the mission's unpopularity among Canadian voters. In this circumstance it is clear that the Chrétien government felt that the possibility of domestic electoral punishment outweighed the threat of damaged relations with the United States and ultimately, the invasion itself did not mesh with their vision of Canada's

[1] Antony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 50; Richard Ned Lebow, *Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119.
[2] Edgar Buckley, "Invoking Article 5," *NATO Review* (Summer 2005), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html, accessed 10 October, 2014.
[3] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 66.

foreign policy tradition.[4] In the buildup to the invasion, Chrétien clearly articulated that Canada would again stand for international order through his criticism of the West and a perception that it was 'arrogant' and 'humiliating' towards the poorer members of the international system to ride roughshod over the United Nations.[5] Once again, this casts Canada as an honourable actor trying to uphold the norms of the international system, while also remaining in line with the Liberal Party tradition of the middle power peacekeeper.

Martin and humanitarian motivations

When it comes to Paul Martin's brief government there was a noticeable shift towards discussion of Africa and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Similarly, placing emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of Canadian foreign policy behavior in Afghanistan allowed Canada to stay out of the deteriorating situation in Iraq without betraying the role of a good ally. While there were certainly issues related to Canada's inability to support a deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously, the Martin government's emphasis on humanitarian action reinterpreted the narrative of Canada's international engagement differently. It defined Canada's international role as something other than a country that joined coalitions of the willing. Instead, Canada's foreign policy engagements could be examined against the humanitarian role by operating within the UN framework, better reflecting its traditional concerns and thus helped avoid deployment in Iraq. Nonetheless, the pressure on the Martin government from the US to assist in Iraq meant that its commitments in Afghanistan had to be realigned to not only assuage its ally, but also fulfill commitments already made, humanitarian or not.[6] Though this supported many of the traditional middle power peacekeeping components of Canada's foreign policy narrative, in doing so, it consigned Canada to taking over the Kandahar deployment. This fulfilled policymakers' conception of Canada's duty to the greatest degree possible, even if the new role

[4] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.
[5] Aaron Wherry, "Poverty, Terrorism and 9/11," *Maclean's*, 9 September 2011, http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/poverty-terrorism-and-911/, accessed 21 August 2014.
[6] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 181.

in Afghanistan did not necessarily match Canada's capabilities.[7] As a result, Canada also avoided the charges of tokenism by making a significant contribution to Afghanistan and thus was not shirking its duty as an ally, but rather fulfilling it. This also set the precedent in terms of participation in the Afghanistan mission for the following governments who sought to avoid the tokenism charge whilst also seeking the most international credit for the contribution.

The Martin government, in supporting the NATO mission in Afghanistan, as was noted previously, took over responsibility for Kandahar province, with perhaps some naïveté.[8] It was unclear at the time what would be required of Canada's deployment there. At the time these decisions were undertaken, focus was very much on the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the government had clearly prioritised this.[9] These actions were entirely consistent with the image of Canada as the good ally and furthermore supported the humanitarian image that Martin sought to project whilst maintaining a significant commitment to Afghanistan, as many other nations did at the time.[10] As noted previously, Minister of Defence Bill Graham also sought to emphasize that this expanded role in Afghanistan could incur casualties.[11] Though the Martin government sought to actively discard the middle power label, its actions nonetheless reflected the inherited

---

[7] A number of critical voices have been raised about Canada's contribution to the operations in Southern Afghanistan, particularly in relation to capabilities. See Sandy Gall, *War Against the Taliban: Why it All Went Wrong*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). Also critical of the blind optimism of Canadian policymakers in Kandahar was Sherard Cooper-Cowles, *Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign*, (London: HarperPress, 2012).

[8] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007); Matthew Willis, "Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives," *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 49-67; Bill Schiller, "The Road to Kandahar," *Toronto Star*, 8 September, 2006, http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2006/09/road-kandahar, accessed 20 Februrary, 2014; Interview 15, 6 November 2013.

[9] Government of Canada, "Canada Supporting Peacekeeping in Darfur: Past, Present, Future," *Department of Foreign Affairs,* December 4, 2012, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan_south_sudan-soudan_soudan_du_sud/support-appui.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 30 March, 2014. See also Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life In and Out of Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 392.

[10] While Canada maintained consistency with its foreign policy narrative, naïveté was not only limited to Canada but many NATO Allies in the scope of the what would be required in Afghanistan. "German General on the War: NATO's Naïveté in Afghanistan," *Spiegel Online*, 15 October 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-general-on-the-war-nato-s-naivete-in-afghanistan-a-584261.html, accessed 15 November 2014; for a comprehensive account of the lack of Western understanding in Afghanistan see Mike Martin, *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict*, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2014).

[11] Mike Blanchfield, "New Peacekeepers Meaner, Tougher: Contrasts with PM's promise," *National Post*, 22 December 2004, A7.

tradition associated with this narrative; as such, Canada balanced a role consistent with its past behaviour whilst shifting away from previous language.[12]

Harper and moral foreign policy

It is when seeking to define the Harper government's approach to foreign policy that it is possible to discern a distinct reinterpretation of the Canadian foreign policy narrative. As the exploration of the media demonstrated, there was a recognition that Stephen Harper was seeking to redefine the Canadian narrative as a whole; foreign policy appeared as more of an afterthought.[13] In addition to this, foreign policy had previously stood at arm's length from domestic policy and while not unrelated, often operated somewhat distantly from partisan politics. However, in this case, when trying to affix the moral motivation to the parameters of the Conservative Party foreign policy, it is difficult to differentiate this realm from the domestic sphere, more so than with previous governments. John Ibbitson has suggested "[i]f the question is: Is Stephen Harper's foreign policy motivated by principle or by electoral calculation, the answer is: Yes."[14] As some have posited, on taking office Harper was not overly concerned by foreign policy having scarcely traveled outside of Canada.[15] Thus, the Conservative Party's foreign policy, while a departure from the Liberal Party tradition in Canadian foreign policy, reflects more of a domestic calculus than an international strategy. In these circumstances, it is hard to ascribe a singular role to which Canada was directed but fundamentally, foreign policy reflected a clear focus on doing the morally right thing as interpreted by the government. This encompassed a range of behaviours, whether it be a foreign policy statement or action but generally eschewed quiet diplomacy and sought to clearly break with Canadian foreign policy traditions. This then led to Canadian policymakers acting in the role of the earnest, vocal defenders of a number of foreign policy issues such as the mission in Afghanistan, at least as long as it was domestically expedient to do so. In other circumstances such as the Libya operation, when the

[12] Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, (Ottawa, 2005), 15.
[13] John Ibbitson and Darrell I. Bricker, *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change In Canadian Politics, Business, And Culture And What It Means For Our Future*, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2013).
[14] John Ibbitson, *Stephen Harper*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), 2015, *Penguin Random House Ebook*, 24 September 2015.
[15] Gerald R. Schmitz, "Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government's Foreign Policy?," *Occasional Paper Series*, No. 67 (August 2013), Centre for International and Defence Policy, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University).

mission was again in keeping with many of the tenets of the middle power narrative, there was less conflict with the Canadian foreign policy narrative and ultimately Canadian military participation proved much less controversial. Indeed, as noted previously in Chapter 3, at times in Parliamentary debate, mention of Canada as a peacekeeping nation was studiously avoided by Conservative Party MPs, and Canada's military tradition was invoked when operations on the ground would have highlighted the discontinuity between the actual operation and the debate on mission renewal.[16] In the Libya operation however, while not overtly referring to the peacekeeping tradition, constructing it in terms of Responsibility to Protect and emphasising a UN mandate, rendered the mission much more palatable to Canadian policymakers more generally.[17]

Between these two operations, this created conflicting interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative between the Canadian policymakers in Ottawa and policymakers in NATO. The middle power narrative and its attendant behaviours were ingrained into the fabric of the Department of Foreign Affairs, CIDA and to a certain extent the Department of National Defence, civil service agencies all of which operated at arms length from the domestic level decision-making apparatus. As a result, they did not readily or easily adopt differing interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative. This created friction between the government elected to represent or put forth a specific agenda and the civil servants who carry out these tasks. The various government departments were exposed to this new Canadian foreign policy, but nonetheless, when discussing the institutional narrative as constructed by the staff, they tended to remain outward facing and concerned with Canada's role in the world instead of driven by a purely domestic calculus suggesting the resiliency of the previous foreign policy narrative. As noted in Chapter 3, the multilateralist, honest broker traditions previously considered central to the practice of Canada's middle power foreign policy, had been largely eschewed by the Conservative government in favour of a more instrumental and transactional approach.[18] As a result, this created confusion as to what the overarching aim of the CPC foreign policy

[16] See Chapter 3, pg. 172.
[17] See also Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, "The Harper Government's Messaging in the Build-up To the Libyan Intervention: Was Canada Different Than Its NATO Allies?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014), 176-188.
[18] Interview 24, 14 November 2013; Interview 26, 15 November 2013, Interview 21, 11 November, 2013.

actually was, both among Canadian policymakers and non-Canadian policymakers.

As a result, though Canada's foreign policy behaviour is justified in relation to its traditions as articulated by Canadian policymakers in Ottawa, the practice of diplomacy is a different exercise and, as discussed in this study, routine interactions remain important. Perhaps most vitally in this circumstance however, is that the reflexive interaction between Canadian policymakers in Ottawa and policymakers in NATO was not a major factor in the policymaking process.[19] During the Harper government diplomatic instructions flowed from Ottawa in a unidirectional fashion and rarely accounted for the perceptions or recommendations of policymakers in NATO. As a result, policymakers in NATO were then left somewhat adrift in the policymaking process as the government in Ottawa eschewed traditional Canadian diplomacy, ignoring the diplomatic component and instead announcing their foreign policy initiatives without extensive consultation. As a result, this disrupted the ways in which the narrative and behaviour interact with each other and in part, become disconnected. The interviews conducted in this study reflected, in part, how Canada's relationship with NATO chilled over the course of the past few years, particularly towards the end of the Afghanistan mission as the Conservative government sought to promote a different Canadian foreign policy narrative. With the significant re-interpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative by successive governments, most pronounced under Prime Minister Harper, it has become clear that Canadian influence within the Alliance is diminished as compared to the past.[20] Nonetheless, these interviews were conducted prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent NATO reassurance mission and it is necessary to recognise that in light of this, the Harper government reinforced Canada's military presence in the Alliance.[21] Whether this represents a profound and lasting change in the Canadian relationship with NATO remains to be seen, however, it nonetheless remains in keeping with the Harper government's

[19] Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Interpretive Theory," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002); Interview 27, 2 March 2014.
[20] Interview 23, 14 November 2013; Interview 26, 15 November 2013.
[21] Department of National Defence, *Operation Reassurance*, 13 November 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page, accessed 1 December 2014.

morally motivated foreign policy and instrumental view of NATO for pursuing its foreign policy preferences.

This does not mean however, that the middle power narrative and its associated influence have disappeared nor does it entail a permanent or dramatic change to Canada's foreign policy in the longer term. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 4, many of the middle power hallmarks continue to inform the image of Canadian foreign policy internationally.[22] As several of the interviews in this study demonstrated, Canada's international image still remains positive, although as a senior NATO official noted, part of this was founded in good will from Canada's past behaviour but this is shrinking over time.[23] Though Adam Chapnick has suggested that the idea of Canada as a middle power has disappeared from the Harper government's approach to foreign policy, its legacy lingers on in the way that many perceive of Canada's role in the world.[24] While the middle power label itself may have faded in policymaking circles, its utility as an academic concept in the study of Canadian foreign policy should not be quickly discarded, particularly when discussing the importance of narratives. The effect that it has had in shaping the outlook of Canadian diplomats as well as Canada's reputation internationally is an important component of the practice of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, recent publications such as career diplomat David Mulroney's 2015 book *Middle Power, Middle Kingdom* focuses on Canada's relationship with China highlights the enduring influence that this narrative continues to exert.[25] As this examination has highlighted, the re-interpretation of the Canadian foreign policy narrative had a direct impact on not only foreign policy behaviour, but also on the way this affected Canada's influence among its NATO Allies.

As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, the middle power characteristics continue to inform both Canadians' and non-Canadians' understandings of Canadian foreign policy. Despite the sustained challenge from the CPC to shift this, it remains powerfully entrenched in both the institution of Canadian

[22] Interview 12, 5 November 2013; Interview 13, 5 November 2013.
[23] Interview 26, 15 November 2013.
[24] Adam Chapnick, "Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013), 102-111.
[25] David Mulroney, *Middle Power, Middle Kingdom: What Canadians Need to Know About China in the 21st Century*, (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2015).

diplomacy and in the public imagination.[26] In this case the legacy of the 'middle power peacekeeper' could then be classified as a 'meta-narrative;' though not meant in the terms of the grand theories of International Relations, but rather as offering a hermeneutic understanding of a specific, national narrative of Canadian foreign policy.[27] As noted in the introduction, it is necessary to be comfortable with a degree of ambiguity in the interpretation undertaken in this study.[28] Nonetheless, this approach fails to fully capture the complexity of the ways in which many of the middle powers' constituent components form the foundation of the practice and understanding of Canadian foreign policy. To a certain degree this is being explored, as seen in David Bosold's examination of the middle power and how this narrative acts as a container into which one can fit Canadian foreign policy actions, however, this needs to go further than merely examining the construction of this narrative.[29] Recognising the post-modern critiques of meta-narratives it nonetheless helps to understand how future studies of Canadian foreign policy can and should be explored, as they need to interrogate, or at least acknowledge the presence of this narrative that informs the way in which policy is formulated and as a result has consequential ontological and epistemological ramifications.[30]

As a result, this national narrative does not require acceptance or even explicit recognition but instead is woven into the fabric of the institutions and their internal narratives. Fundamentally, the middle power narrative has moved beyond International Relations or foreign policy scholarship to become a way in which Canadian foreign policy, consciously or subconsciously, is established across a number of dimensions. As explored in this study, the middle power carries with it a number of related roles, however, this does not actually prescribe

---

[26] Heiki Harting and Smaro Kamboureli, "Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives and the Cultural Imagination in Canada," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol.78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 659-686; For a more recent examination of these attitudes at the domestic level see Timothy Gravelle, Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler and Harold D. Clarke, "Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support For Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014), 111-130.

[27] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 37.

[28] Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, "Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities Within the Art of Interpretation," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 (May 2006), 13

[29] David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[30] Jean-François Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition," *Modernity: Critical Concepts Vol. IV After Modernity*, Malcolm Waters, Ed., (London: Routledge, 1991).

what those roles entail. As such, one sees here the flexibility that allows a role preference to be articulated which is responsive to the dynamics of the foreign policy situation into a role position, as was the case in Afghanistan.[31] This informs the core assumptions about the nature of Canadian foreign policy behaviour as well as the Canadian foreign policy institutions, and is ingrained within the policymaking process itself. In relation to policymaking, this does not necessarily dictate the nature of the foreign policy behaviour, however, it did nonetheless require Canadian policymakers to articulate a course of action. The parameters of this action were then defined by the individual leader or elites depending on their view of what would be in keeping with Canada's foreign policy tradition and behaviours and as such they remained labile. This does not mean that there is absolute freedom of action for policymakers, however, as behaviours which fall outside of the broad historical parameters defined by Canada's foreign policy narrative can trigger introspection and if sufficiently divergent, potential electoral consequences. Thus the middle power constitutes the milieu in which preferences are generated and maintained, as well as establishing the ways in which future elites conceptualise their potential foreign policy choices.[32]

Part II: Observations on Theory

The theoretical approach undertaken in this study sought to integrate several competing methods of interpreting foreign policy narratives. The constructivist FPA approach offered an avenue to explore the individual level in which policymakers' preferences are shaped by their understandings of foreign policy narratives and history and in doing so, generate attendant roles. It was not the intention of this study to build a new theoretical construct but rather, speaking to Hudson's assertions about FPA, to aim to be integrative and bring together aligned approaches in such a way that they provide a more complete understanding of the phenomenon under examination.[33] Building on this, this study has attempted to integrate some of the admittedly flawed ontological

[31] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.
[32] Tom Keating, "Whither the Middle Power Identity? Transformations in Canadian Foreign Policy Milieus," *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[33] Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), 1–30.

security research programme as a way to further explore the dynamics by which narratives actually form the motivations which define national foreign policy roles. While it could have been possible to explore the topic along the lines outlined in Lebow's *Cultural Theory of International Relations*, this approach does not sufficiently engage with the empirical side of foreign policy. Instead it presents a much more theory-based understanding of a phenomenon whose implications go far beyond International Relations scholarship and ultimately should remain engaged and rooted in practical discussions of foreign policy. While this study has sought to remain grounded in foreign policy it should be acknowledged that in seeking to reconcile these different components, it offers an addition to the growing association between International Relations and FPA. Nonetheless, the key objective of this work was not only as an FPA examination but also to offer a contribution to the work being done on Canadian foreign policy. In particular, it aims to invigorate more creative and innovative approaches to the study of Canadian foreign policy, which as previously noted in Chapter 2, tend to rehash the same descriptive, issue-specific and theoretically limited themes repeatedly in the same ways.[34]

As noted in Chapter 2, there have been ongoing criticisms of the lack of theoretical innovation in the examination of Canadian foreign policy and this study has sought to expand on previous work examining the middle power narrative and its associated influence.[35] Indeed, the tropes that have informed the study of Canadian foreign policy remain intimately tied to policymakers and public understandings of Canada's foreign policy narrative. While this study has touched on many of the same themes explored in the Canadian foreign policy literature including the concern with Canada's place in the world, it has sought to do so through newer theoretical lenses. Moreover, it reflects many of the assertions put forward by David Bosold and Tom Keating in their examination of the middle power acting as a guidepost as well as the importance of

[34] David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), 773; David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Still Notable: Reassessing Theoretical 'Exceptions' in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014), 150

[35] *Ibid*.

understanding how others see Canada and its international role.[36] An increasing number of examinations have explored similar themes as this study. Indeed, Canada's foreign policy journal of note, *International Journal*, released two issues in 2014 exploring the field of Canadian foreign policy theory as well as further examining foreign policy under the Harper government.[37] The works examining the Harper government's foreign policy in particular are continuing to open up Canada's foreign policy tradition to greater scrutiny.[38]

Role Theory's utility in FPA

Ultimately, in examining this subject, the theoretical approach adopted in this study sought to address Valerie Hudson's central tenets of an FPA analysis, namely viewing foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented and actor-specific.[39] Indeed, the empirical work undertaken in this study alongside the constructivist FPA approach highlighted many of the key areas of existing scholarship outside of the usual Canadian foreign policy canon. By utilising Role Theory along with some components of the ontological security research programme, this has allowed some insight into the mechanisms through which narratives and behaviour interact. This has offered a way to understand how differing interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative and leaders' motivations thus led to differing foreign policy roles and, in turn, different foreign policy behaviours. In doing so, this has helped to shed light on the ways in which a foreign policy narrative translates into foreign policy behaviour. The roles that flow from the differing individual motivations inform the actions that policymakers aim to take at the international level. In doing so, this study's approach has introduced some of the

[36] David Bosold, "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Tom Keating, "Whither the Middle Power Identity? Transformations in Canadian Foreign Policy Milieus," *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[37] "New Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun. 2014); "Still Liberal Internationalists?," *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014).
[38] John Ibbitson and Darell Bricker, *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What It Means For Our Future*, (London: HarperCollins, 2013); Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics of Control*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010); Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism*, (Toronto: Douglas Gibson Books, 2006). See also David Carment and Joe Landry, "Transformation, Ambiguity, and Reversal: Harper's Foreign Policy Under the Microscope," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014).
[39] Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), 1–30.

concepts of FPA into the study of Canadian foreign policy whilst also offering an outside-in perspective on Canada's involvement in these conflicts through interviews with non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. As explored in Chapter 4 outside perspective is useful in that it offers a way in which to explore not only how Canadian policymakers see themselves and more importantly, describe their actions, but also how this is perceived by other actors involved in this interaction. Indeed, the process of policymaking is not unidirectional and was highlighted in the interviews with non-Canadian policymakers, many of whom noted that Canada's behaviour within NATO had changed. This helps to understand the reflexive interactions which form the practice of policymaking and help to situate foreign policy narratives within this process.

The individuals interviewed all had differing, personal interpretations of Canadian foreign policy and as a result, this study has had to fit these varying accounts into broader roles. Given the interpretivist approach this study utilised it was necessary to find common elements which allowed this, in this case it was founded in Canada's middle power narrative. In the discussions that took place, it was clear that there was a unifying component that linked both Canadian and non-Canadian expectations in terms of its foreign policy behaviour. In particular, there were a number of roles articulated by policymakers, founded in this narrative, which many saw Canada as neglecting or abandoning.

In this case the theoretical elements used help us to describe the disconnect that many policymakers expressed between their understanding of Canadian foreign policy and the actual behaviours. What is notable in these circumstances is the role of shame in shaping how narratives and behaviours are linked and in particular, how this had differing effects between governments. As was highlighted in Chapter 3, Canadian policymakers in NATO do not have the same freedom that policymakers in Parliament have to reshape policy and as such, there is a pronounced sense of concern over their relationship with NATO; in this context this is the shame that Steele describes, namely a radical disconnect between action and narrative.[40] As Lebow suggests when discussing ontological security, "[p]olicies at odds with these narratives and the values they encode can bring shame on officials if public opinion judges their behaviour incongruent

[40] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 54.

with their state's identity."[41] While relevant to policymakers, in relation to this study's analysis, individual shame pushes individuals to conform to expectations of the roles which are seen as their best selves, or in this case, the best representation of their national foreign policy. When falling short of the expectations levied by their selves and by other actors it forces an introspective examination of their own behaviour; actors seek to either rectify or justify this through foreign policy narrative.[42] In this reflexive process it is possible to understand how the use of these narratives which constitute such a central part of the foreign policy process actually then constitute and drive, in part, behavioural foreign policy change.

As the chart below highlights, this study has examined the gradual changes in motivations and by extension, the differing roles between different governments. In doing so it lends greater understanding to the ways in which foreign policy behaviours changed.

Government	**Primary Motivation (not exclusive)**	**Roles**	**Behaviour**	**Notable Consequences**
Chrétien (Liberal) 2001-2003	*Honour* – esteem seeking - focused on maintaining Canada's status in the world - continuity with past behaviours	- 'good' ally - upholder of international order - committed multilateralist and promotion of the 'peacekeeper' tradition	- military invasion of Afghanistan - refusal to join coalition of the willing in Iraq - support for future multinational effort in Afghanistan	- recognition from US and NATO Allies over role in Afghanistan - some friction with US over Iraq
Martin (Liberal) 2004-2005	*Humanitarian* – rectifying shame derived from past action/inaction - aims to correct errors in past foreign policy behaviours (Rwanda…)	- supporter of international humanitarian causes - aggressive defender of Canadian 'values' - committed multilateralist	- greater focus on Darfur - deployment of PRT to Kandahar along with military mission - escalation of the military mission in Afghanistan	- little change from previous government - greater visibility in NATO - commitment to an unforeseen long term kinetic mission in Afghanistan
Harper (CPC) 2006-2011	*Moral* – reconciling internal and external sources of shame - aims to correct past foreign policy actions seen as 'wrong' - is conflicted about international engagement that does not serve specific ends	- defender of Canadian interests and promoter of values - uncompromising moral actor in international affairs - stands without equivocation	- steadfast support for Canadian Forces in Kandahar with some caveats related to domestic support - support for international initiatives deemed to be in the Canadian interest with a notable change in policymaking priorities - acute sensitivity to domestic considerations at the expense of international commitments (inward looking)	- Diminishing visibility in NATO - Confusion from Allies over changes in behaviour - Gradually diminished influence in the Alliance - Distancing from traditional venues of Canadian influence (UN and associated fora)

[41] Richard Ned Lebow, *Cultural Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 63.
[42] *Ibid*, 565.

None of the individual motivations as explored previously (honour, moral or humanitarian) are mutually exclusive, but rather, must be interpreted by the individual studying them. As Steele suggests, it is possible to broadly categorise the ontological security informed relationship into humanitarian, honour, or morality-driven motivations as depending on the priorities articulated by these policymakers.[43] These motivations then carry with them associated roles – both preferential and positional, which policymakers then translate into foreign policy behaviours.[44] As the chart elaborated in Chapter 1 highlighted, one can see how foreign policy narratives translated into behaviour.



Indeed, the roles that were defined by the different governments were subject to pressure both from their own preferences as well as those dictated by capabilities. The leadership of Chrétien, Martin and Harper was critical in developing the different interpretations of Canada's foreign policy narrative and shaped, to a limited degree, Canada's participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions. Not only were middle power capabilities a consideration, but also the middle power tradition in the policymaking process. This highlights that the changes in interpretation of this narrative between the different governments can be linked to fundamental changes in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy in NATO headquarters. In this way one can see how the middle power narrative defines the broad scope of Canadian foreign policy behaviours.

Afghanistan and Libya both represent very different operations as undertaken by NATO and each operation was justified through different means,

[43] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* (London: Routledge, 2008), 44.
[44] Michael J. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993), 275.

however, Canada *had* to participate in some way in each one in order to satisfy policymakers that they were maintaining their own understandings of what Canada's foreign policy is. In this way, the theory utilised in this study has helped to highlight the ways in which narratives shape behaviour and provided a foundation on which to develop the empirical analysis that was undertaken.

Part III: Future avenues of exploration and refinement

The FPA framework utilised in this study helped to provide a deeper understanding of the reasons behind Canada's decision to take part in these interventions, particularly with regards to the examination of the individual level. It is not meant to invalidate other interpretations or examinations of these operations but rather to expand the understanding of how these operations relate to Canada's foreign policy narrative and behaviours. Indeed, there is also a clear synchronicity between this study and the work being done on strategic narratives, specifically, to examine how strategic narratives are embedded within broader foreign policy or national narratives and how this shapes the practice of policymaking and the policymaker.[45] Additionally, it also helped to highlight in a much more profound way, the importance of charting and exploring foreign policy change and how this relates to narratives. This was alluded to at several points, however, future constructivist FPA scholars may seek to develop this further and integrate ontological security as a way to examine and better understand the drivers and impact of foreign policy changes *within* states, particularly at the individual level, rather than just between different actors. Indeed, a refined ontological security research programme could offer some additional insight into *why* policymakers as individuals, feel the need to maintain a consistent foreign policy narrative and how this relates to broader individual self-identities.

Moreover, there is ample room to accommodate a post-structural dynamic through the examination of the Self-Other interaction which, though somewhat sidelined in this study, is worthy of deeper interrogation. Indeed, in examining how identities are negotiated within states there are a multitude of Selves and Others created in this process. Similarly, when looking at

[45] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 2013).

policymakers it could be useful in future examinations to try and draw out more on the dynamic between their interpreted national Self and how this affects interactions with Others in relation to the maintenance of their interpretation of wider national narratives. Indeed, while this study has looked at the individual level of policymaking, there could be even greater clarity still to the role of ontology at the individual level.[46] While the ontological security framework purports to do so, the mechanisms by which it examines this as noted in Chapter 1, namely the examination of the national Self and ascribing individual level motivations to it remain unconvincing. Instead it would benefit from integration into other cognitive approaches in FPA or International Relations more generally.

Indeed, the interpretivist approach employed in this study is both an interesting strength and weakness. Namely it gives the researcher the freedom to construct and explore a unique understanding of how events unfolded whilst opening constructivist FPA to greater insight into the individual level processes and motivations. That being said, it becomes difficult to assess the weight these different motivations have in shaping the actual policy responses, particularly without access to the leaders who formulated them. Motivations like shame, morality, honour, fear or anxiety are also intensely personal emotions and as such, whilst exploring them in the academic context, operationalising a study of their influence in foreign policy becomes deeply challenging. Future cognitive and psychological approaches as explored by other researchers such as Peter Hatemi, Rose McDermott, Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer could add a quantitative element to this research programme which would provide further elucidation to the decision-making process.[47] While the interviews undertaken for this study were illuminating and certainly provided insight into both the narrative underlying Canadian foreign policy as well as the actual way that policymaking practice reflects this narrative, they are as much reliant on the responses of the interviewees as they are on the researcher's ability to interpret

[46] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist−Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), 473-495.
[47] See Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer, "Thinking Alike? Salience and Metaphor Analysis as Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan. 2013), 39-56; Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott, "A Neurobiological Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis: Identifying Individual Differences in Political Violence," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr. 2012), 111-129.

them. Indeed, drawing out narratives and motivations driving foreign policy are difficult things to explore explicitly without overly affecting the responses. Nonetheless, it does give a deeper understanding as to how policymakers view the various pressures that drove Canada to get involved in NATO's Afghanistan and Libya operations and reasons why it contributed what it did. It does not mean that this is generalisable, as was noted in the introduction, but provides a launching point for similar inquiries in the future looking to explore and understand other Canadian foreign policy behaviours.

This study opens up a number of avenues to explore in deeper fashion related to the narrative inherent in Canadian foreign policy and will hopefully spark deeper critical interrogation of not only *how Canadians define themselves* but also *who they are perceived to be*. If policymakers are more cognisant of the narratives and emotions which inform and shape preferences for certain foreign policy behaviours this gives them more agency in not only defining future foreign policy actions but also in shaping and reflecting on these narratives. As was demonstrated in this study, this has important implications for Canada's ability to implement its foreign policy agenda and its international influence more generally. This also speaks to many of the central questions of FPA and should highlight this approach as a promising avenue of study for observers of Canadian foreign policy.[48] With the reinterpretation of Canada's foreign policy narrative during the Harper government there is ample material in which to conduct examinations of foreign policy, both past and present and engage the discipline with new approaches. This can help to navigate whether the changes to Canadian foreign policy that have occurred since 2001 have fundamentally affected Canada and Canadians. In doing so this would help to explore and chart not only how Canadian foreign policy has evolved but also hopefully spur a new, innovative phase of foreign policy creation in government. As noted previously, NATO remains a vital way in which Canada exercises international influence beyond what it would be able to do otherwise and fundamentally damaging this relationship could have longer-term ramifications for Canadian foreign policy. With the dramatic upheavals taking place in international affairs it is not enough to cling to foreign policy narratives or to reject these traditions altogether.

[48] Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," *Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium*, Ed. Jean A. Garrison, International Studies Review (2003) 5, 159.

Instead, it is necessary to start genuinely thinking and exploring innovative new avenues by which Canada can bring greater international influence to bear. Failing to do so could diminish Canada's ability to defend its interests and values internationally and ultimately, relegate Canada to international insignificance.

Bibliography

Primary Material

Interviews

See APPENDIX I for list of Interviews.

Government Reports, Testimony and Speeches

Axworthy, Lloyd. *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations*. New York, 24 Sept 1996.

Baird, John. "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly." *Government of Canada*, 26 September 2011. Accessed 7 August 2014. http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011030.aspx?lang=eng.

Canada, "Canada Reaches Historic Trade Agreement with the European Union," *Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Act*, 18 October 2013, Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/en/news/ceta-aecg/canada-reaches-historic-trade-agreement-european.

Canada. "Canada supporting peacekeeping in Darfur: Past, Present, Future." *Department of Foreign Affairs,* December 4, 2012. Accessed 30 March 2014. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan_south_sudan-soudan_soudan_du_sud/support-appui.aspx?lang=eng.

Canada, *Broadcasting Act*, S.C. 1991 c. 11, accessed 13 November 2014. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-9.01/FullText.html.

Canada. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World Overview*, Ottawa, 2005.

Canada. *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review.* Ottawa, 1995, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.

Canada. *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 2008. Accessed 13 October 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page.

Canada. *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Ottawa, 1997.

Canada, Hansard.

House of Commons Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 137, No. 79, (17 September

2001)

House of Commons Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 137, No. 133, (28 January 2002)

House of Commons Debate, 38th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 138, No. 71, (17 March 2003)

House of Commons Debate, 38th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 140, No. 150, (15 November 2005)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 6, (10 April 2006)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 25, (17 May 2006)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 136, (19 April 2007)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 141, (26 April 2007)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 142, No. 53, (25 February 2008)

House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 142, No. 66, (13 March 2008)

House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 144, No. 34, (26 March 2009)

House of Commons Debate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 144, No. 128, (December 10, 2009)

House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 145, No. 104, (25 November 2010)

House of Commons Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 145, No. 145, (21 March 2011)

House of Commons Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 146, No. 270, (14 June 2011)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 140, Iss. 18, (18 September, 2001)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 139, Iss. 116, (28 May, 2002)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 140, Iss. 18, (19 November, 2002)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 140, Iss. 36, (13 February, 2003)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 140, Iss. 72, (19 June, 2003)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 141, Iss. 31, (21 April, 2004)

Senate Debate, 37th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 141, Iss. 35, (29 April, 2004)

Senate Debate, 38th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 142, Iss. 83, (18 July, 2005)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 14, (16 May, 2006)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 15, (17 May, 2006)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 17, (30 May, 2006)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 40, (25 October, 2006)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 41, (26 October, 2006)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 75, (27 February, 2007)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 93, (3 May, 2007)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 94, (8 May, 2007)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, Iss. 108, (14 June, 2007)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 144, Iss. 18, (29 November, 2007)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 144, Iss. 35, (26 February, 2008)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 144, Iss. 47, (8 April, 2008)

Senate Debate, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 144, Iss. 35, (26 February, 2008)

Senate Debate, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 146, Iss. 5, (3 February, 2009)

Senate Debate, 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol. 146, Iss. 73, (25 November, 2009)

Senate Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 147, Iss. 51, (28 September, 2010)

Senate Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 147, Iss. 68, (23 November, 2010)

Senate Debate, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol. 147, Iss. 96, (22 March, 2011)

Senate Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 148, Iss. 19, (18 October, 2011)

Senate Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 148, Iss. 8, (16 June, 2011)

Senate Debate, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 148, No. 31, (22 November, 2011)

Canada, "House of Commons Bills that did not receive Royal Assent,"Accessed 1 October 2015. http://www.Parlgc.ca/Parlinfo/compilations/houseofcommons/legislation/billsbyresults.aspx?Parl=&BillResult=03d93c58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb .

Canada. John Manley. *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*. January, 2008.

Canada. Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, House of Commons, 22 September 2006. Appendix to 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol. 143, No. 32, (September 28, 2006)

Canada. Ministers Cannon, MacKay and Oda Announce Canada's New Role in Afghanistan. Accessed 20 November 2014. Archived at: http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news communiques/2010/364.aspx?lang=eng.

Cannon, Lawrence. Address by Minister Cannon at Carleton University, 23 February, 2009. Accessed 1 December 2014. http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2009/55.aspx?view=d.

Cohen, Andrew. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *House of Commons*, 22 November, 2001, 1025.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Punching Above Its Weight: 1939-1968." 9 September, 2011. Accessed 20 November 2014. http://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/photos/punching-jouer.aspx?menu_id=39&view=d.

Department of National Defence, "Archived - Operation MOBILE," Accessed 24 November 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op mobile.page.

Department of National Defence, "*Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan*." Accessed 24 November 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/afg-timeline.page.

Department of National Defence. "Deputy-Chief of Defence Staff Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison Provides a Briefing on Operations of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan." In *National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces*, 13 March, 2002. Accessed 14 April 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=deputy-chief-of-defence-staff-vice-admiral-greg-maddison-provides-a-briefing-on-operations-of-canadian-forces-in-afghanistan/hnmx1bi4.

Department of National Defence, *Operation Reassurance*, 13 November 2014. Accessed 1 December 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations abroad/nato-ee.page.

Leslie, Lt. Gen. Andrew. Department of National Defence. *Report on Transformation 2011*. Ottawa, July 2011.

EKOS, *EKOS/CBC/SRC/Toronto Star/La Presse Poll Presentation to Media Partners*, Ottawa 21 Feb 2003, Accessed 14 March 2013. http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/21feb2003.pdf.

Gates, Robert. "Future of NATO," Security and Defense Agenda, July 2011.

Gotlieb, Alan. *Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy*. Memorial Lecture. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2004.

Granatstein, Jack L. "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through tighter ties with the U.S." *Benefactors Lecture*, Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 21 Oct 2003.

---. "Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada?" Policy Paper. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2013.

Harper, Stephen. "A Conversation with Stephen Harper," Council on Foreign Relations, September 25, 2007. Accessed 20 November 2014. http://www.cfr.org/canada/conversation-stephen-harper-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p14315.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *Responsibility to Protect*. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, 2001.

Kilgour, David. "Canada and the Fight Against Terrorism." *Remarks to the l'Institut diplomatique et des relations internationals, Algiers, Algeria*, 13 January 2002. Accessed 20 November 2014. http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/algerenglish.htm.

NATO. *ISAF Mandate*. 29 April 2009. Accessed 24 March 2013. http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html.

--. "NATO E-3A Component Celebrates 10,000 Flight Hours in Support of Afghanistan Operation." Accessed 11 October, 2014. http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/stories/story_074.htm.

---. "Operation Achilles Making Progress." *ISAF-NATO Press Releases*, 8 March, 2007, PR# 2007-160. Accessed 14 November 2014, www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/03-march/pr070308-160.html.

Norway. Norwegian Mission to the EU, "Norway signs co-operative arrangement with EDA" 8 June 2009. Accessed 15 August 2012.

http://www.eunorway.org/ARKIV/newsarchives/Norway_signs_co_operative_arrangement_with_EDA/

Riddell, R.G. "The Role of Middle Powers in the United Nations." Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 48/140, 1948.

Schmitz, Gerald R. *Canadian Policy Toward Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: Issues, Prospects, Options*. Publication No. 2010-26-E. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2010.

Trudeau, Pierre Elliot. Washington Press Club, 25 March 1969 archived online at http://www.cbc.ca/canadaus/pms_presidents1.html.

United Nations, *Human Development Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

United Nations, *Security Council resolution 1970 (2011)*, 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011). Accessed 26 February 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6ce9742.html

United Nations, *Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]*, 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011). Accessed 26 February 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d885fc42.html,

United States. Office of the United States Trade Representative, "U.S.-Canada trade facts," *Executive Office of the President*, accessed 3 November 2014. http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada.

Veterans Affairs Canada, "The Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan," *Remembrance*. Accessed 11 June 2014. http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/Afghanistan.

Wikileaks, "Scenesetter: Secretary Chertoff's Visit to Ottawa, March 17, 2005," 05OTTAWA774_a.

Secondary Material

Books and Reports

Aggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Foreign Policy," *ARENA Working Paper*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1999. Accessed 10 November 2014. http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm.

---. "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis." In *The European Union's Roles in International Politics*, edited by Ole Egström, Michael Smith. London: Routledge, 2006.

Alden, Chris and Amnon Aran. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

Andrew, Arthur. *The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1993.

Auerswald, David P. and Stephen M. Saideman, "NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Association Meeting*. Toronto: 2009.

Axworthy, Lloyd. "Canada and Antipersonnel Landmines: the Case for Human Security as a Foreign Policy Priority." In *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

Bercuson, David. "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September." In *Canada Among Nations: Coping With the American Colossus; September 11: Consequences for Canada*, edited by David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Kent Roach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

---. *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the murder in Somalia*, Toronto: McClleland and Stewart, 1996.

Bercuson, David and Barry Cooper. *Deconfederation: Canada without Quebec*. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991.

Bevir, Mark and R.A.W. Rhodes. "Interpretive Theory." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd ed., edited by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker. London: Palgrave, 2002.

Bloom,William. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Bosold, David. "Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?" *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, Eds. Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Botero, Giovanni. *The Reason of State.* Book I, Section I, Translated by D.P. Waley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956.

Bothwell, Robert. *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*. Toronto: UBC Press, 2007.

von Bredow, Wilfried. "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Canadian Armed Forces," *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, eds. Nik Hynek and David Bosold, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Breuning, Marijke. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Browning, Christopher. *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland*. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008.

Burnham, Peter et al. *Research Methods in Politics*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.

Bratt, Duane. "Afghanistan: Why did we go? Why did we stay? Will we leave?" *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

---. "Mr. Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan and the Return of "High Politics" in Canadian Foreign Policy." Canadian Political Science Association, 2007.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Campbell, David. "Foreign Policy and Identity: Hobbesian Strategies." In *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. II, edited by Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini. London: Sage, 2011.

---. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1992.

Carment, David and Joe Landry, "Transformation, Ambiguity, and Reversal: *Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014): 107-110.

Carment, David, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer. "Introduction: is Canada now irrelevant?" In *Canada Among Nations: Coping With the American Colossus; September 11: Consequences for Canada*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. *Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan*, London: Bloomsbury, 2012.

Charbonneau, Bruce and Wayne S. Cox, Eds. *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11*. Toronto: UBC Press, 2010.

Chrétien, Jean. *My Years as Prime Minister*, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

Clarkson, Stephen. "The Choice to be Made." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

---. "The Choices That Were Made and Those That Remain" In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Cohen, Andrew. *The Unfinished Canadian: The People We Are*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008.

Converse, Philip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* David Apter, ed., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1964.

Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993.

Cooper-Cowles, Sherard. *Cables from Kabul: The inside story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign*, London: HarperPress, 2012.

Copeland, Daryl. "The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity." In *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

---. "Once Were Diplomats: Can Canadian Internationalism Be Rekindled?" In *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Coulon, Jocelyne and Michel Liegois. *Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping: The Future of a Tradition*. Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010.

Creighton, Donald. *Canada's First Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Dewitt, David and John Kirton. *Canada as a Principal Power*. Toronto: John Wiley, 1983.

Donaghy, Greg and Stephane Roussel. *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar.* London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004.

Dorn, Walter A. "Canada's Honourable Role as a Peacekeeping Nation." In *Afghanistan and Canada: Is There an Alternative to War?*, edited by Lucia Kowaluk and Steven Staples. London: Black Rose Books, 2009.

Eayrs, James. *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.

English, John. "In the Liberal Tradition: Lloyd Axworthy and Canadian Foreign Policy." In *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Entman, Robert. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*. London: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Flockhart, Trine. NATO and the (Re)constitution of Roles: "Self," "We," and "Other"? In *Role Theory in International Relations*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hans W. Maull. London: Routledge, 2011.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 379, London: Routledge, 2006.

Furlong, Paul and David Marsh, "A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science," *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2010.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method,*1960. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.

Gall, Sandy. *War Against the Taliban: Why it All Went Wrong*, London: Bloomsbury, 2012

Gecelovsky, Paul."The Prime Minister and the Parable: Stephen Harper and Personal Responsibility Internationalism." *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Giddens, Antony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of Theory of Structuration*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984.

Granatstein, Jack, Ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969.

---. *Whose War is it? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World*? Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007.

Grant, George. *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1965.

Habermas, Jurgen. *Theory of Communicative Action*, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Vol. 1. Translated by T. McCarthy. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1981.

Hart, Michael. *Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations*. Toronto: UBC Press, 1995.

Hawes, Michael D. *Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite?* Toronto: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson.1927. Reprint. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Heinbecker, Paul. *Getting back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada*. 2nd ed. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011.

Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.* New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Hermann, Margaret G. and Charles F. Hermann. "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry." In *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, edited by Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini. London: Sage, 2011.

Holbraad, Carsten. *Middle Powers in International Politics*. London: Macmillan Press, 1984.

Holmes, John W. *The Better Part of Valour*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.

---. "Most Safely in the Middle." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. London: Oxford University Press, 2011.

---. *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957*, Vol. 1 (1979) and Vol. 2 (1982). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Hynek, Nik and David Bosold. *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, edited by Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Ibbitson, John. *Open and Shut: Why America has Barack Obama and Canada has Stephen Harper*. London: McClelland and Stewart, 2009.

---. *Stephen Harper,* Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015, *Penguin Random House E-book*, 24 September 2015.

Ibbitson, John and Darell Bricker. *The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What It Means for Our Future*. London: HarperCollins, 2013.

Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience*. London: Penguin, 1997.

Janis, Irving. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

Janis, Irving and Leon Mann. *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*. New York: Free Press, 1977.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Katzenstein, Peter. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

---. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. http://www.ciaonet.org /book/katzenstein/katz01.html.

Keating, Tom."Multilateralism and Canadian Foreign Policy: A Reassessment," Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003. Accessed 10 November 2014. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Multilateralism%20and%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Policy%20-A%20Reassessment.pdf.

---. "Whither the Middle Power Identity? Transformations in Canadian Foreign Policy Milieus." In *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, edited by Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kierkegaard, Søren. *The Concept of Dread*. Translated by W. Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Kirton, John. "Canada as Principal Power 2010." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and new ideas*, 2nd Ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

---. "The Ten Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and new ideas*, 2nd Ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Kratochwil, Freidrich. *Rules, Norms and Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Kubálková, Vendulka. “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism.” In *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, edited by Vendulka Kubálková. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001.

Lang, Anthony. *Agency and Ethics: the Politics of Military Intervention*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002.

Lebow, Richard Ned. *Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

---. *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

---. *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

---. *Identity and International Relations (Book forthcoming)*, Draft chapter, 2014.

Lennox, Patrick. *At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada's Place in the World*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009.

Le Prestre, Philippe G. *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997.

Lyotard, Jean-François. “The Postmodern Condition,” *Modernity: Critical Concepts Vol. IV After Modernity*, Malcolm Waters, Ed., London, Routledge, 1991.

MacRae, Rob.“International Policy Reviews in Perspective.” In *Canada in the World 2004: Setting Priorities Straight*. London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.

MacKay, Ian and Jamie Swift. *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012.

MacLennan, Hugh. *Two Solitudes*. Toronto: Collins, 1945.

Martin, Lawrence. *Harperland: The Politics of Control*. Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010.

Martin, Mike. *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict*, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2014.

Martin, Paul. *Hell or High Water: My life in and out of politics*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008.

McSweeney, Bill. *Security, Identity, and Interests*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Michaud, Nelson. "Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-making: Inspiration or Hindrance?" In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and new Ideas*, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mintz, Alex and Karl DeRouen Jr. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O'Laughlin and Laura Roselle. *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, London: Routledge, 2013.

Mitrany, David. *The Progress of International Government*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1933.

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*, *7th ed.* Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005.

---. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

Molot, Maureen Appel. "Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Mulroney, David. *Middle Power, Middle Kingdom: What Canadians Need to Know About China in the 21st Century*, Toronto: Allen Lane, 2015.

Neack, Laura. "Linking State Type with Foreign Policy Behaviour." *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, London: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. *Moral Man and Immoral Society: a study in ethics and politics*, London: Scribner, 1934.

Nossal, Kim Richard. " 'Middlepowerhood' and 'Middlepowermanship' in Canadian Foreign Policy." In *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, edited by Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Nye, Joseph. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

---. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

---. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

O'Neill, Barry. *Honor, Symbols and War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Onuf, Nicholas. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

Ostrander, Susan A. "Surely You're Not in This Just to Be Helpful: Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three Studies of Elites." In *Studying Elites using Qualitative Methods*, edited by Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber. Sage Focus Edition, London: Sage, 1995.

Perlin, George C. *The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1979.

Pratt, Cranford, Ed. *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*. London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.

Reid, Escott, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945 1946*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983.

---. "The Art of the Almost Impossible: Unwavering Canadian Support for the emerging Atlantic Alliance." In *NATO's Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s*, edited by Nicholas Sherwen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Rempel, Roy. *Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy has Undermined Sovereignty*. London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.

Roussel, Stéphane. *Culture stratégique et politique de défense: l'expérience canadienne*. Montreal: Athena Editions, 2004.

Schulzinger, Robert. "Memory and Understanding in U.S. Foreign Relations," *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Shannon, Vaughan and Paul A. Kowert Eds. *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2012.

Sjolander, Claire Turenne, Heather Smith and Deborah Stienstra, Eds. *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Sloan, Elinor C. *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America*. London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.

Smith, Heather A. and Claire Turenne Sjolander Eds. *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy* Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Snyder, Jack. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. RAND Corporation, 1977.

Spencer, Robert A. *Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Stairs, Denis et al. *In The National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World*. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2004.

Steele, Brent J. *Ontological Security in International Relations.* London: Routledge, 2008.

Stein, Janice Gross. "Psychological Explanations of International Conflict." In *Handbook of International relations,* edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth Simmons. London: Sage, 2002.

Stein, Janice Gross and Eugene Lang. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar.* Toronto: Viking, 2007.

Strom, Kaare. *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Tomlin, Brian W., Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Vromen, Ariadne. "Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, edited by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker. 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2010.

Walker, Stephen G. "Part I." *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States Leaders and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2011.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.

---. *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Welsh, Jennifer. *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*. Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004.

Wells, Paul. *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism*. Toronto: Douglas Gibson Books, 2006.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Articles, Working Papers and Book Chapters

"2 Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan." *CBC News,* 11 April, 2007. Accessed 17 March 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/2-canadian-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan-1.634068.

"6 Canadian soldiers killed in roadside bombing in Afghanistan." *CBC News,* 8 April 2007. Accessed 17 March 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/6-canadian-soldiers-killed-in-roadside-bombing-in-afghanistan-1.641512.

"54% of Canadians Oppose Afghan Mission: EKOS Poll." *CBC News: Canada*, 16 July, 2009. Accessed 7 April 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/54-of-canadians-oppose-afghan-mission-ekos-poll-1.859617.

"500 Soldiers to stay in Kabul after NATO stint." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 February, 2004: A5.

Adamson, Rondi. "Is Gen. Hillier setting the right tone for our military?" *Toronto Star*, 7 August, 2005: A16

"Afghan Detainee Contempt Motion Won't Spark Vote: MP." *CBC Politics*, 2 March 2010. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghan-detainee-contempt-motion-won-t spark-vote-mp-1.974740.

Aggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy." *ARENA Working Paper,* No. 8 (1999) University of Oslo. Accessed 15 March 2013. http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers1999/wp99_8.htm.

Alberts, Sheldon. "Riding on America's shoulders." *National Post*, 28 January 2003: A12.

"Allies Urged to Find New Roles in Afghanistan." *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 December 2007. Accessed 8 July 2014. http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=db873558-2d99-443c-b893-324093905103.

"Analysis: Is Harper Trying to Increase Canada's Military Might?" *CBC News*, 25 November, 20122. Accessed 10 January 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/11/24/f-military-canada.html.

Anderson, Antony. "Pearson and the Myth of Neutrality Canada's Ruthless Pragmatist." *Toronto Star*, 5 November 2006: D04.

Antoniades, Andreas, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin. "Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives." *Working Paper No. 7* (Feb. 2010) Brighton: Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex.

Aubry, Jack. "Canadians Doubt Success of Afghanistan Mission: Poll; Half say Canada's World Reputation Enhanced." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 June 2007: A5.

---. "Most Say Truth Likely Won't Emerge from Afghan Abuse Probe: Poll…" *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 2003: A3.

Axworthy, Lloyd. "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership." *International Security*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Spring 1997): 183-196.

---. "Canada to the rescue: Forget the military, Lloyd Axworthy says. We can lead in other ways." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 September 2001: A19.

Axworthy, Lloyd and Allan Rock. "World Leaders Must Call R2P What It Is." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 2011: A9.

Axworthy, Thomas S. "An Independent Canada in a Shared North America: Must We Be in Love or Will an Arranged Marriage Do?" *International Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2004): 761-782.

Ayed, Nahlah . "Our Troops Expected in Kabul This Week." *The Montreal Gazette*, 30 December 2001: A1.

"Baird Criticizes UN in Speech to General Assembly." *CBC News*. 1 October, 2012. Accessed 10 January 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/10/01/pol-baird-united-nations-monday.html.

Barnett, Michael J. "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1993): 271-296.

Barry, Donald. "Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 215-245.

Barry, Donald and Duane Bratt. "Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-US Security Relations." *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008): 63-89.

Banerjee, Nipa. Interview with the Canadian Press, "Questions swirl as Canada winds down military effort in Afghanistan," *Toronto Star*, 10 March, 2014. Accessed 28 November 2014. http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/03/10/questions_swirl_as_canada_winds_down_military_effort_in_afghanistan.html.

Beeby, Dean. "Troops Poorly Prepared for Africa, Report Says." *The Globe and Mail*, 10 October, 2005: A4.

Behringer, Ronald M. "Middle Power leadership on the Human Security Agenda," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (September 2005): 305-342.

Bellamy, Alex J. " The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention." *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2008): 615-639.

Bercuson, David. "Canada Faces Afghan Mission Creep." *National Post*, 26 December 2003: A23.

---. "Up From the Ashes: The Re-Professionalisation of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair." *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009): 31-39.

Bercuson, David J., J.L. Granatstein and Nancy Mackie. *Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan*. Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (October 2011). Accessed 17 July 2012. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Lessons%20Learned.pdf.

Berenskoetter, Felix and Bastian Giergerich. "From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the end of the Cold War." *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010): 407-452.

Bernard, Prosper Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *American Review of Canadian Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2 (August 2006): 233–261.

Berzins, Chris. "Did we really invent peacekeeping…" *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 October 2006: A11.

Bevir, Mark and R.A.W. Rhodes. "Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices." *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012): 201-208.

Black, David R. and Claire Turenne Sjolander. "Multilateralism Re-constituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy." *Studies in Political Economy*, Vol. 49 (Spring 1996): 7-36.

Black, David R. and Heather A. Smith. "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1993): 745-774.

Black, David R. and Heather A. Smith. “Still Notable: Reassessing Theoretical "Exceptions" in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature.” *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (March 2014): 133-151.

Blanchfield, Mike. “Canada’s Tortuous Path to a new Foreign Policy.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 2005: A1.

---. “Afghanistan ‘Debate’ Stirs No Dissent: Canadians Divided, but Politicians Stay United Behind Mission.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 April 2006: A1.

---. “Canada weighs end to Afghan army training after 2011,” 6 December 2009, *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 14 October 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-weighs-end-to-afghan-army-training-after-2011/article4196714/.

---.“Canadians Oppose Tough, New Role for the Military, Poll shows: Respondents Prefer 'Old-fashioned' Peacekeeping to Hunting Terrorists.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 August 2005: A4.

---. “Foreign Policy Review Delayed to ‘Get It Right’: Pettigrew Aide Blames Changing World; Critic Says Report Sent for Dose of ‘Pizzazz.’” *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 2005: A5.

---. “It’s Back to Afghanistan: 2,000 Peacekeepers. Decision Makes It All But Certain Canada Won’t Send Troops to a War in Iraq.” *The Montreal Gazette*, 13 February 2003: A1.

---. “‘Early in, early out’ is new plan to keep peace,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 March 2001: A9.

---. “New Peacekeepers Meaner, Tougher: Contrasts with PM’s Promise.” *National Post*, 22 December 2004: A7.

Blavoukos, Spyros and Dmitris Bourantonis. “Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: An Eclectic Approach.” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 20, No. 10 (January 2014): 1-18.

“Bombing mission looks easy. But remember Kosovo?” *Toronto Star*, 23 March, 2011: A16.

Boone, Jon. “Afghanistan Poll Legitimacy Fears as Taliban Violence Keeps Voters Away,” *Guardian UK*, 20 August 2009. Accessed 6 March 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/20/afghanistan-elections-taliban-attack-voters.

Bouldin, Matthew. “Keeper of the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations.” *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sept. 2003): 265-275.

Bosold, David.“Canada as a Middle, Model, or Civilian Power: What's in a Name?” In *Canada's Foreign Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, edited by Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Boucher, Jean-Christophe. “Selling Afghanistan: A discourse analysis of Canada’s military intervention, 2001-2008,” *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009): 717-733.

---. “Yearning for a Progressive Research Program in Canadian Foreign Policy.” *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (March 2014): 213-228.

Bow, Brian. “Anti-Americanism in Canada: Before and After Iraq.” *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (October 2008): 341-359.

---. “Measuring Canadian foreign policy,” *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (June 2014): 229-232.

Breuning, Marijke. “Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995): 235-254.

Bremmer, Klaus and Cameron G. Thies. “The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 11, No. (July 2015), 273-293.

Brewster, Murray “We See Soldiers as Peacekeepers, Poll Finds.” *Toronto Star*, 6 September 2008: A17.

Bryden, Joan. “65% Happy With the Level of Foreign Activity: Canadians Support Status Quo on Aid, Peacekeeping: Poll.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 July, 2001: A3.

Buckley, Edgar. “Invoking Article 5.” *NATO Review* (Summer 2005). Accessed 10 October 2010. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html.

Burney, Derek. “Foreign Policy in the Election,” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, April 2011. Accessed 5 November 2014. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Foreign%20Policy%20in%20the%20Election.pdf.

Campbell, Michael. “Canadians are Sold on Empty Moralizing.” *Vancouver Sun*, 21 April 2005: D3.

“Canada, 10 Years Later; How the Tragedy of 9/11 Made us a Bolder, Braver, Prouder Nation.” *National Post*, 10 September, 2011: A20.

"Canada Has Critical Role to Play in Reforms." *Toronto Star*, 11 September, 2005: A11.

"Canada Imposes Wide Range of Sanctions Against Libya," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 February 2011. Accessed March 26 2013. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-imposes-wide-range-of-sanctions-against-libya/article568609/.

"Canada PM Issues Afghan Ultimatum." *BBC News.* 31 January, 2008. Accessed 9 April 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7219415.stm.

Canadian Press. "Alleged Afghan Prison Torture Controversy Slips Quietly into History Books." 10 March, 2014. Accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/alleged-afghan-prison-torture-controversy-slips-quietly-into-history-books-1.2567308

---. "Canada Has a 'Moral' Duty to Stay in Afghanistan: PM," 3 October 2007. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=ffa4b8eb-57e3-4b85-8d94-c95111bda5c0.

"Canada Weighs End to Afghan Army Training After 2011." *The Globe and Mail*, 6 December 2009. Accessed 14 October 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-weighs-end-to-afghan-army-training-after-2011/article4196714/.

"Canada's Military Contribution in Libya." *CBC News*. 20 October, 2011. Accessed 11 June 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-s-military contribution-in-libya-1.996755.

"Canada's Reputation Worsens: Global Poll." *CBC News*, 11 Feburary, 2010. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-s-reputation-worsens-global-poll-1.892750.

Canadian Press. "John Baird Blasts 'Hateful' Russian Anti-Gay Law." *CBC News*, 1 August 2013. Accessed 7 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-blasts-hateful-russian-anti-gay-law-1.1355767.

"Canadian troops may be heading for Afghanistan." *CBC News,* 6 December 2001*,* Accessed 23 October 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-troops-may-be-heading-for-afghanistan-1.258638/.

Cantir, Cristian and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, No. 1 (January 2012): 5-24.

CanWest News Service. "Martin Government Cleared Detainees Deal: Memos." *Edmonton Journal*, 3 May 2007. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=84b483cf-765f-4700-ba6c-19655539885f&sponsor.

Carlsnaes, Walter. "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly*,Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep. 1992): 245-270.

---. "On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 1993): 5-30.

Catilinac, Amy. "Identity Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq," *Politics and Policy*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 2007): 58-100.

Chafetz, Glenn, Hillel Abramson and Suzette Grillot. "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1996): 727-757.

Chapnick, Adam. "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011." *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 137-154.

---."The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2000): 188-206.

---. "The Gray Lecture and Canadian Citizenship in History." *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007): 443-457.

---."The Middle Power," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*. Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1999):73-82.

---. "Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013): 102-111.

---. "Peace, Order and Good Government: The 'Conservative' Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2005), 635-650.

---. "Where Have All of Canada's Diplomatic Historians Gone?" *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer 2010): 725-737.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist−Constructivist Divide." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997): 473-495.

Clark, Campbell. "Baird Underlines Israel Support with Controversial East Jerusalem Visit." *The Globe and Mail*, 1 April 2013. Accessed 7 July 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/baird-underlines-israel-support-with-controversial-east-jerusalem-visit/article11048090/.

---. "Part 2: Canadians Pick Peacekeeping Over Combat." *The Globe and Mail*, 25 October, 2010. Accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/part-2-canadians-pick-peacekeeping-over-combat/article1215629/.

---. "Evacuations Move Quickly, Decision on Sanctions Doesn't." *The Globe and Mail*, 24 February, 2011: A4.

---. "For Canadians, Peacekeeping a Priority over Combat Roles; Poll Shows Public Mood Against Another Mission Like That in Afghanistan." *The Globe and Mail*, 25 October, 2010: A1.

---. "Deep Cuts to Military Mark Reversal for Harper." *The Globe and Mail*, 29 March 2013. Accessed 12 October 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-for-harper/article4097823/.

---. "Naval Mission Signals Ottawa's Hardening Stance on Libyan Crisis." *The Globe and Mail*, 3 March, 2011: A11.

Claxton, Brooke. "The Place of Canada in the Post-War Organisation." *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 10 (Nov. 1944): 409-421.

Cobb, Chris. "Afghanistan: Canada Prides Itself as a Nation of Peacekeepers…" *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 March, 2006: B1.

---. "Coasting on Pearson's Prize." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December, 2007: A6.

---. "Taking a Measuring of War…"*Ottawa Citizen*, 21 June 2007: A7

Cohen, Andrew. "The Ghost of Canada Past…" *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 December, 2001: A15

---. "Liberal Luck is All Bad Now." *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 April, 2005: A12.

Cohen, Tobi. "Conservatives Quietly Hammer out Foreign Policy Plan…" *The Montreal Gazette*, 17 August, 2011: A4.

Cooper, Andrew. "In Search of Niches: Saying "Yes" and Saying "No" in Canada's International Relations." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995): 1-13

Cooper, Andrew F. and Bessma Momani, "The Harper government's messaging in the build-up to the Libyan intervention: Was Canada different than its NATO allies?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2: 176-188.

Corelli, Rae, Luke Fisher and Stefan Lovgren. "'Early In, Early Out: Canadian Peacekeeping is Changing as Ottawa Backs Away from Open-Ended Missions," *Maclean's,* 25 June 2001; 26: 1-13.

Cotler, Irwin. "The Urgent Need for R2P; The World Needs to Follow its Own Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in Libya." *National Post*, 26 February, 2011: A25.

Coticchia Fabrizio and Carolina de Simone, "The War That Wasn't There? Italy's "Peace Mission" in Afghanistan, Strategic Narratives and Public Opinion," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online Version published June 2014, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fpa.12056/.

Cox, Robert W. "A Canadian Dilemma: The United States or the World." *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2005): 667-684.

---. "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order." *International Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1989): 823-862.

Coyne, Andrew. "Harper's Patriot Games: Arctic Sovereignty is Just One Way the Tories Can Reclaim the Flag." *Maclean's,* 8 September, 2008: 22+, *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.

---."PM's Decision Means Moral Free Ride is Over." *National Post*, 19 March 2003: A1.

Croft, Stuart. "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain's Muslims." *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 2012): 219-235.

Crowley, Brian Lee. "Some Things are Worth Dying For." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 July, 2011: B7.

Cudmore, James. "Budget 2014: Military Wings Clipped Again." *CBC News*, 11 February 2014. Accessed 4 November 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/budget-2014-military-wings-clipped-again-1.2532827.

Curry, Bill. "The End of Gadhafi's Rule; the Beginning of a New Tougher Canada." *The Globe and Mail*, 23 August, 2011: A3.

---."A Struggle for Canadian Hearts and Minds; Saying People don't Support 'Warlike' Mission…" *The Globe and Mail*, 18 January, 2006: A13.

Dallaire, Romeo. “A Call to Arms for Peace…” *Toronto Star*, 20 April, 2007: A19.

Dallaire, Romeo and Hugh Segal. “How Canada can help Libya…” *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 February, 2011: A13.

“The Dangers in Afghanistan.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 September 2005: A14.

David, Charles-Philippe and Stéphane Roussel. “"Middle Power Blues": Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War.” *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 1998): 131-156.

Den Tandt, Michael. “NDP demands answers on Afghanistan; O'Connor Responds by Calling Critics Anti-Military.” *The Globe and Mail*, 11 April, 2006: A4.

---. “Canadians Get Behind Deployment.” *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March, 2006: A1.

DiManno, Rosie. “Was the Mission Worth It? Absolutely…”*Toronto Star*, 9 July, 2011: A1.

Dimitriu, George and Beatrice de Graaf, “Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Narratives, Elite Responsiveness and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006-2010,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online Version published June 2014, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fpa.12070/abstract.

Doeser, Federik. “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish ‘Footnote Policy.’” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 2011): 222-241.

---. “Leader-Driven Foreign-Policy Change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War.” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (November 2013): 582-597.

Dunfield, Allison. “Canadians Helped Take Prisoners in Afghanistan.” *The Globe and Mail*, 29 January, 2002. Accessed 10 November 2014. www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canadians-helped-take-prisoners-in-afghanistan/article1171819/**.**

Edwards, Steven. “Canada's Back,' Harper Tells U.S.; Middle Powers Lead by Example, Prime Minister Says.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 September, 2007: A1.

---.“Harper to Address UN Assembly Today: Prime Minister's Speech will Emphasize Canada's Commitment to Fighting Terrorism.” *Vancouver Sun*, 21 September, 2006: A15.

---. “World Comes to N.Y. to Ponder UN’s Future: Security Nightmare.” *National Post*, 12 September, 2005: A8.

Entman, Robert. “Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power.” *Journal of Communication*, Journal of Communication, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 2007): 163-173.

Fagan, Drew. “Canada in the World: Heading Back Up?” *The Globe and Mail*, 15 April 2003: A17.

“Fewer Canadians ‘Strongly Approve’ of Afghan Mission: Survey,” *CBC News*, 9 November, 2006. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/fewer-canadians-strongly-approve-of-afghan-mission-survey-1.605606.

Fife, Robert and Tim Naumetz. “Troops to Help in Mideast, PM Vows: But Forces Spread Too Thin to Fill Peacekeeping Role, Top Officers Warn.” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 31 May, 2003: A1.

Fisher, Matthew. “Canadian to Lead NATO in Afghanistan: Prestigious Appointment: Lord Robertson Praises Canada’s Strong Contribution.” *CanWest News Service*, 27 September, 2003: A6.

---. “We Played Vital Role, General Says; Holding Kandahar Will be Legacy Left by Canadian Forces.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June, 2010: A6.

---. “Canadians Prepare for Offensive in Afghanistan: General Will Oversee Kandahar Troops. Public 'Doesn't Have Full Understanding of What We're Getting Into: Commander.” *The Montreal Gazette*, 7 November, 2005: B6.

“Fixing Canadian Foreign Policy.” *National Post*, 20 April 2005: A20.

Fletcher, Joseph F., Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove. “Losing Heart: Declining Support and the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec. 2009): 911-937.

Fong, Petti. “Determining Canada's Role in a Post 9/11 World: Jennifer Welsh Thinks Now is the Time to Enter the Discussion.” *Vancouver Sun*, 9 October, 2004: D20.

Foot, Richard. “Canada's Top General Wins Over the Public as Champion of the Military...” *Vancouver Sun*, 27 January, 2007: I9.

---. “‘Moral’ Support for Afghan Mission: PM.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 July, 2007: A5.

Franke, Ulrich and Ulrich Roos. "Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the State Personhood Debate by Means of a Pragmatist Ontological Model for International Relations Theory." *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2010): 1057-1077.

François, Isabelle. "NATO and the Arab Spring," *Transatlantic Current*, No. 1, Oct. 2011.

Fraser, Graham. "Author Lays Out Global Vision of Foreign Policy." *The Toronto Star*, 3 October 2004: A09.

---. "A Change in Emphasis." *Toronto Star*, 22 July, 2006: F01.

---. "Foreign Policy Blending Values and Interests." *Toronto Star*, 22 April, 2006: F02.

---. "Massacre Looming in Darfur: Dallaire." *Toronto Star*, 21 September, 2004: A10.

---. "Ottawa Boosts Aid Effort for Darfur." *Toronto Star*, 8 May, 2005: A22.

---. "What a Difference 50 Years Make on War Front." *Toronto Star*, 27 January, 2002: A11.

Frensley, Nathalie and Nelson Michaud. "Public Diplomacy and Motivated Reasoning: Framing Effects on Canadian Media Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy Statements." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 2006): 201-222.

Fulford, Robert. "Fantasy Informs Our Foreign Policy," *National Post*, 7 September, 2002: A18.

Gardner, Dan. "You Can't Fight This Myth." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 July, 2006: A15.

Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009): 77-93.

Geddes, John. "Harper's Next Big Five: the Tories' Priorities for this Fall Won't be as Simple as the Last Ones." *Maclean's*, 10 September, 2007, 24+, *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014

Geddes, John and Paul Wells. "What You Don't Know about Stephen Harper: His Backroom Battles, Diplomatic Scraps, Betrayals and Secret Insecurities: Behind the Scenes of Five Years in Power." *Maclean's* 7 February, 2011: 14+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.

Gee, Marcus. “Are We Mice or Men?” *The Globe and Mail*, 17 May, 2006: A17.

---.“The Price of a Pearson.” *The Globe and Mail*, 24 November 2004: A27.

Gelber, Lionel. “Canada’s New Stature.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24 (October 1945 July 1946): 277-289.

“German General on the War: NATO's Naïveté in Afghanistan,” 15 October 2008, *Speigel Online*. Accessed 15 November 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-general-on-the-war-nato-s-naivete-in-afghanistan-a-584261.html

Gibson, Gordon. “Whatever Happened to Speaking Softly?...” *The Globe and Mail*, 2 November, 2009: A19.

Glavin, Terry. “Ignoring Afghanistan; The War has Become the One Issue That None of the Parties Want to Talk About. Why?” *National Post*, 13 September, 2008: A26.

Goar, Carol. “The Old Equlibirium is Gone.” *Toronto Star*, 11 April, 2003: A30.

---. “Pearson’s Goal Consistently Ignored.” *Toronto Star*, 13 June, 2007: AA06.

Goldfarb, Martin. “Stephen Harper Has Injected Moral Principle into Canadian diplomacy.” *National Post*, 17 January 2014. Accessed 15 July 2014. http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/17/martin-goldfarb-stephen-harper-has-injected-moral-principle-into-canadian-diplomacy/.

Goodspeed, Peter. “Sowing Seeds of Defeat: Good Intentions of a 'Humanitarian War' are Often Lost, Strategist Says.” *National Post*, 9 April, 2011: A21.

Gordon, James. “NDP Questions Afghan Mission.” *National Post*, 18 January, 2006: A6.

Gray, Colin S. ‘National Style in Strategy: The American Example’. *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn 1981): 21-47.

Gravelle, Timothy, Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler and Harold D. Clarke. “Foreign policy beliefs and support for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014): 111-130.

Gregg, Allan. “Making Peace,” *The Globe and Mail*, 2 August, 2007: A11.

Gustavsson, Jakob. “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1999): 73-95.

Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International relations." *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000): 147-182.

Gwyn, Richard. "Our Choice: Engagement or Isolation." *Toronto Star*, 12 February, 2008: A2.

---. "Steering Our Own Course." *Toronto Star*, 22 September, 2002: A15.

Hadekel, Peter. "PM Has Shot at Ending Fickle Foreign Policy." *The Montreal Gazette*, 31 January, 2005: A12.

Haglund, David G. " In Considerable Doubt? Canada and the Future of NATO." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2011): 1-18.

---. "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo) Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy." *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1999): 211-235.

---. "Relating to the Anglo-sphere: Canada, 'Culture', and the Question of Military Intervention." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005): 179-198.

---. "What Good is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept." *International Journal*, Vol. 59 (Summer 2004): 479-502.

Hampson, Fen Osler and Derek Burney. "How Obama Lost Canada: Botching Relations With the United States' Biggest Trading Partner," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 3, Accessed 21 November 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada,

Hanes, Alison. "Remember the Past: Graham." *The Montreal Gazette*, 26 March, 2002: A8.

Harper, Stephen and Stockwell Day. "Canadians Stand With You." *Wall Street Journal*, 28 March, 2003. Accessed 27 February 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB104881540524220000.

Härting, Heike and Smaro Kamboureli. "Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives and the Cultural Imagination in Canada." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol.78, No. 2 (Spring 2009): 656-686.

Hatemi, Peter and Rose McDermott. "A Neurobiological Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis: Identifying Individual Differences in Political Violence." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 2012): 111-129.

Hay, Colin. "Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of Public Administration." *Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011): 167-182.

Heartfield, Kate. "The Libyan Quagmire." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 June, 2011: A12.

Heinbecker, Paul. "Security Council Failure was of Canada's Own Making." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 October, 2010: A17.

"Helping Afghanistan will Protect Canada, Says Top Soldier." *CBC News*, 15 July, 2005. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/helping-afghanistan-will-protect-canada-says-top-soldier-1.558828.

---. "It's not Just the Drought Treaty. Canada is Vanishing from the United Nations." *The Globe and Mail*, 1 April, 2013. Accessed 21 November 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/its-not-just-the-drought-treaty-canada-is-vanishing-from-the-united-nations/article10600939/.

Henry, Sean. "Exploding the Myth of Peacekeeping." *National Post*, 7 July, 2011: A14.

Hermann, Margaret G. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001): 47-81.

Hildebrandt, Timothy, Courtney Hillbrecht, Peter M. Holm and Jon Pevehouse. "The Domestic Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (June 2012): 1-24.

Holsti, K.J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970): 233-309.

Holsti, Ole. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec 1992): 439-466.

Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 171-200.

Horgan, Colin. "Canada's Afghan Detainee Scandal Gets Constitutional." *Guardian*, 28 April 2010. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/28/canada-afghanistan.

Houghton, David Patrick. "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007): 24-45.

Howorth, Joylon and Jean Monnet. " NATO and ESDP: Institutional Complexities and Political Realities," *Politiques Étrangere*, No. 4, 2009.

Hudson, Valerie. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005): 1-30.

Huysmans, Jeffrey. "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier." *European Journal of International relations,* Vol. 4 (1998): 226-255.

Hynek, Nikola. "Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and Promises." *Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005): 33-43.

Hynek, Nik and David Bosold. "A history and genealogy of the freedom-from fear doctrine." *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 2009): 143-158.

Ibbitson, John. "Army Will Soon Have Just 500 Available Troops." *The Globe and Mail*, 14 January 2004: A1.

---. "The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada's Foreign Policy." *CIGI Papers*, No. 29 (April 2014), Accessed 21 November 2014, http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_29.pdf.

---. "Commons Fully Backs Deployment; Support Conditional on Oversight of Operation, Further Consultation if Mission Exceeds Three Months." *The Globe and Mail*, 22 March 2011: A19.

---. "How Kandahar Fits into PM's View of Canada." *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March, 2006: A4.

---. "One Date isn't a Relationship." *The Globe and Mail*, 14 March, 2002: A21.

Ibbitson, John and Daniel LeBlanc. "Canada Turns Commitment into Clout…" *The Globe and Mail*, 21 October, 2011: A3.

iCasualties.org. "OEF: Afghanistan, Canada." http://icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx.

Ignatieff, Michael. "Getting Iraq Wrong." *New York Times Magazine*, 5 August, 2007. Accessed 20 February 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?pagewanted=all.

International Institute of Strategic Studies. *Military Balance 2012*, Vol.111, No. 1 (2011).

International Institute of Strategic Studies. *Military Balance 2012*, Vol.112, No. 1 (2012).

Ivison, John. "Canada's New Foreign Policy Strategy Comes with Risks." *National Post*, 24 November, 2011. http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/11/24/john-ivison-canadas-new-role-in-the-struggle-between-good-and-bad-has-its-risks/.

---. "PM's More Muscular Foreign Policy; 'Those Who Talk the Talk ... Must Walk the Walk'." *National Post*, 25 November, 2011: A4.

Janigan, Mary. "Why are We in Afghanistan?," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 September, 2005: F3.

Jefferess, David. "Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Mythology of Canada as Peacekeeper." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009): 709-725.

Kaarbo, Juliet. "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2003), 155-202.

---."Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policymaking Process." *The Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 1998): 243-263.

Keller, Patrick."Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*.Vol. 54, No. 3 (June-July 2012): 95-110.

Kenna, Kathleen. "Afghanistan Sees Limited Duties for Peacekeepers." *Toronto Star*, 20 December 2001: A10.

Kennedy, Mark. "Liberals Deny Canada Has Lost U.S. Respect: Americans Appreciate Our Overseas Efforts: Pettigrew." *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 November 2004: A4.

Keung, Nicholas. "New Immigrants to See Canada's Darker Side." *The Toronto Star*, 12 November, 2009: A30.

Kinsella, Elizabeth Anne. "Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities Within the Art of Interpretation." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 (May 2006): 1-16.

Kinnvall, Catarina. "Globalisation and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004):741-767.

Kinsman, Jeremy. "Let's Just Call it a Decade and Move On." *CBC News*, 30 December 2009. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/let-s-just-call-it-a-decade-and-move-on-1.857397.

Kirton, John. "Vulnerable America, Capable Canada: Convergent Leadership for an Interconnected World." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol.18, No. 1 (March 2012): 133-144.

Knox, Paul. "What Does the Canadian Military Have to Prove?" *The Globe and Mail*, 9 January, 2002: A9.

Koring, Paul. "Blue Helmets Cast Aside, Canada Keeps the Peace No More." *The Globe and Mail*, 7 June, 2012. Accessed 8 June 2012. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/blue-helmets-cast-aside-canada-keeps-the-peace-no-more/article4240950/.

---. "Canadians Split on Mission, but Strongly Support Troops." *The Globe and Mail*, 23 February, 2007: A18.

---. "Martin Vows to Ease Darfur's Suffering." *The Globe and Mail*, 23 February, 2005: A1.

---. "PM Will Name Hillier to Top Defence Post, Sources Say; Ex-Commander of International Forces Outspoken on Need to Modernize Military." *The Globe and Mail*, 13 January 2005: A4.

Kreps, Sarah. "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010): 191-215.

"Jean Chrétien v Paul Martin: Now It's Really War." *The Economist*, 6 June, 2002. Accessed 10 November 2014. http://www.economist.com/node/1169236.

Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968): 454-479.

Jockel, Joseph T. and Joel Sokolsky. "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa In, Expenses Down, Criticism Out…and the Country Secure." *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2009): 315-336.

Jung, Karsten. "Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests Through Peacekeeping." *European University Studies*, Vol. 575, No. 31, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009.

Kinnvall, Catarina. "Globalisation and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security." *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004): 741-767.

Kreps, Sarah. "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6 (2010): 191-215.

Krolikowski, Alanna. "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International relations and Chinese Nationalism." *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008): 109-133.

Laghi, Brian. "Eggleton Plays Down Combat Role for Troops." *The Globe and Mail*, 16 November, 2001: A1.

---. "Majority Opposed to Afghan Mission." *The Globe and Mail*, 24 February, 2006: A1.

Lang, Eugene and Eric Morse. "What next for Canada's tough new army?..." *The Toronto Star*, 28 March, 2010: A17.

Lawless, Michael J. "Canada and NATO: A Starving Fish in an expanding pond," *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2006: 6-14.

Leblanc, Daniel. "JTF2 to Hunt al-Qaeda; Canada's Top Soldier Announces Mission to Root Out 'Murderers' in Afghanistan." *The Globe and Mail*, 16 July, 2005: A1.

Lebow, Richard Ned "Identity and International Relations." *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 2008): 473-489.

Legault, Josee. "Debate Was a Sham: The Quick Vote on Extending Mission in Afghanistan Was Cynical and a Distortion of the Democratic Process." *The Montreal Gazette*, 19 May, 2006: A25

Lee, Jeff. "Canada's Short-Handed Military Unsuitable for Terrorist Fight…" *Vancouver Sun*, 18 September, 2001: A4.

"Limited Fallout Over Canadian Cables." *Toronto Star*, 2 December, 2010: A23.

Lock, Edward. "Redefining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation." *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 2010): 685-708.

Lupovici, Amir."Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel's Unilateral Steps Towards the Palestinians*." Review of International Studies,* Vol. 38, No. 4 (October 2012): 809-833.

Lynch, Colum."Foreign Policy: Why Canada Is At Odds With The UN : NPR." *NPR.org*, 19 October, 2010. Accessed 29 November 2012. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130665959.

MacLeod, Ian. “Top Tory questions role in Libya; 'Does anyone know where it will lead?' Burney asks.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 March, 2011: A11.

MacDonald, L. Ian. “Afghanistan Debate? Bring It On!: Let's See Where the Liberals, Bloc and NDP Stand on our Commitment to Continuing the Mission.” *The Montreal Gazette*, 17 May 2006: A27.

---. “A General Warning: General Hillier's Comments were Intended as a Wake up Call for a Smug Canadian Public That Doesn't Think Terror Could Strike Close to Home.” *The Montreal Gazette*, 26 July 2005: A19.

Mackenzie, Lewis. “Rick Hillier’s right, so back off,” *The Globe and Mail*, 1 August 2005: A11.

---. “We Can't Answer the Battle Cry; Our Infantry Ranks Are So Diminished That Canada's Combat Role in Afghanistan Has to End,” *The Globe and Mail*, 28 May 2009: A19.

Mackrael, Kim. “Canada has lost international stature, Chrétien says,” *The Globe and Mail,* 12 Mar 2003. Accessed 20 March 2013. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-has-lost-international-stature-chrtien-says/article9707000/.

Mahoney, Jill. “’We Have Brought Them Home’: 16,000 Attend Memorials for Fallen Soldiers.” *The Globe and Mail*, 29 April, 2002: A1.

Maloney, Sean. “Canada's Reality in Kandahar.” *Toronto Star*, 22 January 2006: A12.

Manners, Ian. “European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security.” COPRI Working Papers, 2001. Accessed 20 March 2013. http://www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/wps/mai04/mai04.pdf.

Martin, Don. “Afghan Plan Carved in Paper.” *National Post*, 22 February, 2008: A1.

---.“Martin’s Reign of Error.” *National Post*, 21 May, 2005: A1.

---. “Tories Ready the Blame for Possible UN Loss.” *National Post*, 9 October, 2010: A13.

Martin, Lawrence. “It's Only Been a Decade, but the Conservative Way is Redefining Us.” *The Globe and Mail*, 19 November, 2009: A19.

Mason, Christopher. “After Deadly Week, Canada Debates Role in Afghanistan.” *New York Times*, 23 April, 2007. Accessed 17 March 2014.

www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/world/americas/23canada.html?fta=y&_r=0.

Massie, Justin. "Making Sense of Canada's "Irrational" Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures." *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (June 2009): 625-646.

Massie, Justin. "United West, Divided Canada? Transatlantic (Dis)unity and Canada's Atlanticist Strategic Culture." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2010): 118-138.

Mattes, Michael and Brett Ashley Leeds. "Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (September 2014), forthcoming.

Mayeda, Andrew and Richard Foot. "Pressure lands on Harper, Dion; Positions Must Dovetail or We Vote. PM Urged to Step Up, While Liberals Draw Ridicule for Peacekeeping Proposal." *The Montreal Gazette*, 23 January, 2008: A4.

McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1972): 176-187.

McDermott, Rose. "The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 2004): 691-706.

McDonough, David S. "Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 13, No. 4 (2011) Accessed 10 August 2012, http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/425.

---. "Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada'sInternational Security Policy?" *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 620-641.

---. "The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada's International Security Policy." *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 620-641.

McQuaig, Linda. "A Peace Plank for Ignatieff." *Toronto Star*, 5 May, 2009: A15.

---. "Keep Pearson Out of It." *Toronto Star*, 5 February 2008: A06.

---. "Our Reputation for Promoting Peace, is at Risk, Says Linda McQuaig." *Toronto Star*, 19 March, 2006: A16.

McSweeney, Bill. "Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: a Response to Buzan and Waever." *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 1998): 137-140.

Mérand, Frédéric. "NATO, ESDP and Transatlantic Security: Where does Canada fit?" *Policy Paper*, Montreal: Université de Montreal. Accessed 22 August 2012. http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/Merand-PolicyPaper-esdp.pdf

Mérand, Frédéric and David Haglund, "Transatlantic Relations in the new strategic landscape: Implications for Canada," *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Winter 2010-2011): 23-38.

Mérand, Frédéric and Antoine Vandenmoortele, "Europe's Place in Canadian Strategic Culture (1949-2009), *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 2011): 419-438.

Mildner, Stormy-Annika. "Junior partner Canada: Transatlantic trade relations under Germany's EU presidency," *International Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 646-663.

Mitchell, Anthony. "Canada Leads Way in Darfur Pledges: $134 million U.S. for Peacekeeping. African Union Plans to Increase its Troops in Western Sudan to More than 12,300." *The Montreal Gazette*, 27 May, 2005: A16.

Mitzen, Jennifer. "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities, and Ontological Security." *Journal of European Public Law*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006): 270-285.

---. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2006): 341-370.

Moore, Oliver. "Canadians Have 'Obligation' To Step In…" *The Globe and Mail*, 1 December, 2008: A12.

Moravscik, Andrew. "Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?" *European Union Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2001): 219-249.

Morrison, Alex. "Pearsonian Peacekeeping: Does It Have a Future or Only a Past?" *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2003). Accessed 16 September 2012, http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/349/544.

Mulroney, Brian. "Fight the Good Fight: Canada has a Historic and Moral Duty to Support the Founding Principles of the United Nations…" *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 October, 2001: A19.

Murray, Robert W. and John McCoy. "From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy." *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2010): 171-188.

Myers, Kevin. "Salute to a Brave and Modest Nation." *National Post*, 26 April, 2002: A1.

Natanczyk, General Walter. "The Canadian Forces in 2010 and 2011 – Looking Back and Looking Forward." *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 2011). Accessed 14 November 2014, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo11/no2/03natynczyk-eng.asp

"NATO Needs to 'Step Up' in Afghanistan, Says MacKay after U.S. Talks." *CBC News*, 20 September 2007. Accessed 8 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nato-needs-to-step-up-in-afghanistan-says-mackay-after-u-s-talks-1.641391.

Naumetz, Tim. "750 More Canadian Troops Heading to War: Alberta-Based Soldiers to be Under U.S. Command in Afghanistan." *Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 2002: A1.

Neack, Laura. "Delineating State Groups through Cluster Analysis." *The Social Science Journal*. Vol. 30, No. 3 (1993): 347-371.

---. "UN Peace-keeping: In the interest of Community or Self." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (May 1995): 181-196.

Neufeld, Mark. "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power." *Studies in Political Economy*, Vol. 48 (Autumn 1995): 7-29.

Neumann, Iver. "Self and Other in International relations," *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol.2, No.1 June 1996: 139-174.

"No Canadian Troops to Iraq: Martin," *CBC News*, 14 October 2004. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/no-canadian-troops-to-iraq-martin-1.484113.

Nickerson, Michael. "The Not-so-civil Servant and the 'Scumbags' Who Hate Us." *The Globe and Mail*, 20 July, 2005: A15.

Nossal, Kim Richard. "Don't Talk About the Neighbours: Canada and the Regional Politics of the Afghanistan Mission." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2011): 9-22.

---. "Old Habits and New Directions Indeed." *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (June 2014): 253-257.

---. "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International* Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 1998-99): 88-105.

O'Connor, Gordon et al. "WHEREAS the Government of Afghanistan Has Requested International Assistance..." *The Globe and Mail*, 27 Februray, 2006: A15.

Opperman, Kai and Alexander Spencer. "Thinking Alike? Salience and Metaphor Analysis as Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2013): 39-56.

Ørvik, Nils. "Canadian Security and 'Defence Against Help.' *Survival*, Vol. 26 (Jan-Feb 1984): 26-31.

"Our Place in the World: is the Harper Government's Recent Foreign Policy Record a Sign That it has Lost its Way?" *Maclean's*, 1 Nov. 2010: 26+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 20 Aug. 2014

Palmer, Glenn, Tamar London and Patrick Regan. "What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behaviour in Parliamentary Democracies." *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January-March 2004): 1-24.

Pannell, Ian. "Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed." *BBC News*, 18 August 2009. Accessed 6 March 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8207315.stm.

Paris, Roland. "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era." *International Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 2014): 274-307.

Patriquin, Martin. "Bogus Peacekeeping." *Maclean's,* 17 August 2009. Accessed 20 February 2014. http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/07/17/%E2%80%98bogus%E2%80%99-peacekeeping/.

Patterson, Molly and Kristen Renwick Monroe. "Narrative in Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1, (June 1998): 315-331.

Pedwell, Terry. "Canadians Take Over Kandahar Patrols," *Canadian Press*, 11 August, 2005: A10.

---."Harper, Baird Fan Out in NYC to Push Canada's Efforts on Maternal, Child Health." *Maclean's*, 25 September, 2013. Accessed 7 July 2014. http://www.macleans.ca/news/harper-baird-fan-out-in-nyc-to-push-canadas-efforts-on-maternal-child-health/.

Peffley, Mark and John Hurwitz. "Models of Attitude Constraint in International Affairs." *Political Behaviour*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1993): 61-90.

Perreaux, Les. "Afghan Mission Named Top Story of 2006." *The Globe and Mail*, 2 January, 2007: A4.

"PM Pledges $5M for Libya Aid," *CBC News*, 2 March, 2011. Accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pm-pledges-5m-for-libya-aid-1.1026741?ref=rs.s

"Policy Cost Canada UN Seat: Ex-ambassador." *CBC News,* 13 Oct 2013. Accessed 29 November 29, 2012. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/13/policy-cost-canada-103.html.

Pratt, Cranford. "Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Counter-Consensus." *International Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1983/1984): 99-135.

Pratt, David. "Canadian Grand Strategy and Lessons Learned." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (April 2008): 61-78.

Pugliese, David. "About-face: Defence spending is usually not a hot topic during Canadian elections," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 December 2005: B1.

---. "We're Number 63: Canada Slides in UN Mission Contributions; Peacekeeping 'Abandoned,' Policy Group Says." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 December, 2009: A5.

Putnam, Robert J. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.

Radwanski, Adam. "Second Reading: Reconsidering Taliban Jack," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 September, 2007. Accessed 10 March 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/second-reading/reconsidering-taliban-jack/article784295/.

Reguly, Eric. "The Canadian Myth's Roman Holiday is Nearly Done." *The Globe and Mail*, 1 July, 2009: A8.

Richler, Noah. "And Now We are Warriors: Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping in the Country that Invented It?" *Maclean's*, 26 May 2008: 43+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.

Richter, Andrew. "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbour: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment," Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 2005): 471-502.

Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. "Peace Comes at a Price." *The Globe and Mail*, 10 January 2004: A21.

Riley, Susan. "Foreign Affairs Minister Martin." *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 November 2004: A12.

Ringsmose, Jens and Berit Kaja Børgeson. "Shaping Public Attitudes Yowards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives." *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2011): 505-528.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1991): 479-512.

Robinson, Paul. "The Afghan War has Altered Canada's Values…" *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 July 2011: A11.

Robinson, Piers. "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies*, Vol.25, No. 2 (April 1999): 301-309.

Roggio, Bill. "Three Days of Operation Mountain Thrust in Kandahar." *Long War Journal*, 14 June 2006. Accessed 12 March 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/06/three_days_of_operat.php.

Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Laughlin. "Strategic Narrative: A new means to understand soft power." *Media, War and Conflict*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (April 2014): 70-84.

Roselle, Laura. "Strategic narratives of war: fear of entrapment and abandonment during protracted conflict," presented at the Standing Group of International Relations, Stockholm, 2010, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Strategic%20Narratives%20of%20War.pdf.

Rumelili, Bahar. "Identity and Desecuritisation: the Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological Security and Physical Security." *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Advance online publication (20 September 2013): 1-23.

Salutin, Rick. "Think 11/11, Then Think Rebranding." *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November, 2009: A25.

Saunders, Doug. "How Harper's European Spring Turned Sour..." *The Globe and Mail*, 16 May, 2009: F1.

Scheufele, Dietram A. "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects." *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1999): 104-122.

Schiller, Bill. "The Road to Kandahar," 8 September, 2006, *Toronto Star*. Accessed 20 February 2014. http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2006/09/road-to-kandahar.

Schmitz, Gerald R. "Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government's Foreign Policy?" *Occasional Paper Series*, No. 67 (August 2013), Centre for International and Defence Policy. Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University.

Schönwälder, Gerd. "Principles and Prejudice: Foreign Policy under the Harper Government." *Centre for International Policy Studies*, No. 24 (June 2014). Accessed 15 July 2014. http://cips.uottawa.ca/publications/principles-and-prejudice-foreign-policy-under-the-harper-government/.

Schwarz, Daniel. *CBC News*, "What Kind of Military Can Canada Afford?," 12 November 2012. Accessed February 17 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/1.1230004

Searing, D.D. "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (1991): 1239-1260.

Segal, Hugh. "Leaving Never-land: Canada Has a Place in the World, but We Must Decide Where That is and How Much to Pay to Get There," *Ottawa Citizen*: A15.

"Senior Soldier Moving to New Posting Future of the Military: 'Canada Has an Enormously Competent Army'..." *Toronto Star*, 16 June, 2010: A6.

Siddiqi, Haroon. "Profound Policy Shift Carried Out by Stealth." *Toronto Star*, 16 April, 2006: A15.

Sharpe, B. Gen.(ret.) G.E. "Observations on the Association between Operational Readiness and Personal Readiness in the Canadian Forces." *Defence R&D Canada*, 31 March 2006. Accessed 14 November 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473037.

Smol, Robert. "Lest We Forget the Cost of Peacekeeping," *CBC News*, 14 July 2009. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/lest-we-forget-the-cost-of-peacekeeping-1.801072.

Simpson, Jeffrey. "Canada's Help: Who are We Kidding?" *The Globe and Mail*, September 19, 2001: A15.

---. "Manley Wants Us to Play a Game of Chicken with NATO." 23 January. 2008, *The Globe and Mail*: A17.

---. "Our Afghan Mission Must Be Rooted in Realism." *The Globe and Mail*, 15 March, 2006: A17.

---. "So, Really, How do We Engage the Bushites?" *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April: 2002: A17.

Sjolander, Claire Turenne and Heather A. Smith. "Practice, Purpose, and Perils of List-making: A Response to John Kirton's '10 most important books on Canadian foreign policy'". *International Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2010): 751-762.

Sjolander, Claire Turenne. "Two Solitudes? Canadian Foreign Policy / Politique Étrangere Du Canada." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan 2007): 101–108.

Spector, Norman. "To Understand the UN Vote, Listen to Jean Chrétien." *The Globe and Mail*, 13 October, 2010, accessed 10 March 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/second-reading/to-understand-the-un-vote-listen-to-jean-chretien/article4328895/.

Stackhouse, John. "Sovereignty is Canada's Top Priority in the North, Baird Tells Davos Forum." *The Globe and Mail*, 23 January 2013. Accessed 7 July, 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/sovereignty-is-canadas-top-priority-in-the-north-baird-tells-davis-forum/article16470142/.

Stairs, Denis. "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2003): 240-256.

Stewart, Brian. "The Sad, Unlamented End of UN Peacekeeping." *CBC News*, 23 April, 2009. Accessed 10 July 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-sad-unlamented-end-of-un-peacekeeping-1.791833.

"Still Waiting." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 March, 2005: A12.

"Taliban Jack: How the NDP Lost its Way on the Afghan War." *Vancouver Sun*, 26 February, 2008. Accessed 10 March 2014. http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/story.html?id=7f644573-dd8c-4e31-99fe-2ea0489031fc.

Thakur, Ramesh and William P. Maley. "The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?" *Global Governance*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 1999): 273-302.

Thies, C.G. and Marijke Breuning. "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International relations through Role Theory." In *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No.1 (Jan. 2012): 1–4.

Thompson, Graham. "Canadian Troops Face PR Nightmare in Afghanistan: Military's Killings of Innocent Afghans Damages Effort to Win Over People." *The Vancouver Sun*, 20 February, 2007: A9.

Thorne, Stephen. "Troops Told of Afghan Dangers." *Toronto Star*, 18 July, 2003: A1.

"To Achieve the Purpose of the Afghan Debate." *The Globe and Mail*, 7 April, 2006: A14.

"Tories Blame PM's Dithering for Foreign Policy Delay." *National Post*, 22 February, 2005: A6.

Travers, James. "A Military at War with Peacekeeping; Canadian Forces Want More Than Just to Keep the Peace." *Toronto Star*, 24 February, 2007: F01.

---."PM Must Sell War at Home." *Toronto Star*, 14 March, 2006: A17.

---. "Old Image Benefits Canadians Abroad." *Toronto Star*, 25 March, 2006: F02.

---. "To Be on World Stage, Canada Must Act." *Toronto Star*, 1 March, 2003: E2.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: the Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia." *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (June 2002): 601-628.

Valpy, Michael. "The Ballad of the Blue Beret…" *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November, 2006: F4.

---. "Invisible No More; Canadians are Reimagining Their Country as a Military Nation, Embraced the Culture of the Warrior." *The Globe and Mail*, 21 November, 2009: F1.

---. "The Myth of Canada as Global Peacekeeper…" *The Globe and Mail*, 28 February, 2007: A8.

---. "This is Stephen Harper's War." *The Globe and Mail*, 18 August, 2007. Accessed 14 November 2014, http://ctv.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070818.wwshuffle18/tech/Technology/Technology/&id=RTGAM_20070818_wwhuffle18.

---. "Warriors Once More, We Struggle With What It Means," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November, 2008: A4

Wagenaar, Hendrik. "Dwellers on the Threshold of Practice: the Interpretivism of Bevir and Rhodes." *Critical Policy Studies*, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012): 85-99.

Walkom, Thomas. "As the Old World Order Passes Away, Canada Can Only Sit and Watch." *Toronto Star*, 15 February, 2003: E05.

---. "War Shifts Canada's Military Expectations." *Wall Street Journal*, 17 April, 2012. Accessed 14 November 2014 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203750404577173330113550946.html

Ward, John. "Goodbye to Peacekeeping: Canadians Cling to Nice-Guy Image, but it's a Tougher World Where War has New Meanings." *The Montreal Gazette*, 25 March, 2007: A17.

---. "Rejuvenated Army Poised for Overseas Missions, Hillier Says." *The Globe and Mail*, 20 May, 2005: A1.

Ward, Olivia. "How Canada Lost Credibility." *Toronto Star*, 29 January, 2005: A22.

Wattie, Chris. "Beginning of the End' for Mission in Bosnia: Canadians Gone by Fall." *National Post*, 24 March, 2004: A8.

---. "Canadians Want More Active Role for Military, Poll Finds: Willing to Commit Troops to Dangerous Assignments." *National Post*, 4 November, 2004: A4.

Wells, Paul. "Harper's Canadian Revolution: the Prime Minister isn't Just Fighting an Election. He's Bent on Reorienting the Nation." *Maclean's*, 29 September, 2008: 18+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.

---. "Foreign Policy? What's That all About?" *Maclean's*, 18 February, 2008: 14. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 19 Aug. 2014.

Welsh, Jennifer. "Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP." *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2011): 255-262.

Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994): 384-396.

Wherry, Aaron. "Poverty, terrorism and 9/11," 9 September 2011, *Maclean's*, Accessed 21 August 2014. http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/poverty-terrorism-and-911/

White, Patrick. “Canada's Kandahar Legacy Rests on a Shift in Strategy, But is There Enough Time?” *The Globe and Mail*, 2 January, 2010: A1.

Whittington, Les. “People Don’t Care About Afghan Detainee Issue: Harper.” *Toronto Star*, 5 January 2010. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/01/05/people_dont_care_about_afghan_detainee_issue_harper.html.

Whyte, Kenneth. “How He Sees Canada's Role in the World and Where He Wants to Take the Country: Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Conversation with Kenneth Whyte.” *Maclean's* 4 July, 2011: 16+. *Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly*. Web. 5 June 2014.

Willis, Matthew. “Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives,” *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (8 December 2011).

---. “An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission: The Origins of Kandahar 2005,” *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), 979-1000.

Wood, Donna E. and Amy Verdun. “Canada and the European Union: A Review of the Literature from 1982 to 2010,” *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Winter 2010-2011): 9-23.

Wood, Owen. “Canada: The World’s Peacekeeper,” *Canada’s Military*. CBC News in Depth, 30 Oct 2003. Accessed 3 April 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/worldspeacekeeper.htm.

Yaffe, Barbara. “Blame Game Begins as Canada Loses Out on UN Security Council Seat.” *Vancouver Sun*, 13 October. 2010: A1.

---. “Canada Needs to Find its Place in the World.” *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 February, 2008: A10.

---. “Harper Given Good Marks, Free Advice on Foreign Policy.” *Vancouver Sun*, 13 May, 2006: C7.

York, Geoffrey. “Peacekeeping Passes Canada By; Country Turns its Back on Effort Once Seen as a 'Defining Characteristic' of Nation.” *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October, 2010: A14.

Zaller, John and Dennis Chiu. “Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945-1991.” *Political Communication*, Vol.13, No. 4, (1996): 385-405.

Zarakol, Ayşe. “Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Crimes: Turkey and Japan.” *International Relations*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2010): 3-23.

Zerbesias, Antonia. "My Canada Includes War, Environmental Degradation and Lost Causes." *Toronto Star*, 31 March 2010. Accessed 10 October 2014. http://www.thestar.com/life/2010/03/31/zerbisias_my_canada_includes_war_environmental_degradation_and_lost_causes.html.

Zyla, Benjamin."NATO and Post-Cold War Burden Sharing: Canada "the Laggard"?" *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2009): 337-359.

Blogs

Cooper, Andrew F. " How Hollywood Sees Us: Argo as a Lens into Perceptions of the Canadian Role in the World." (blog). *Worlds of Global Governance*, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2 Nov 2012. http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/worlds-of-global-governance/how-hollywood-sees-us-argo-lens-perceptions-of-canadian-role-world.

Dey, Anouk."A Brief History of Canada and the International Criminal Court" (blog). *Dispatch*, Canada International Council, 12 April 2012, http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/a-brief-history-of-canada-and-the-icc/.

Television and Radio

Global Television. *Foreign Fields.* 10 September, 2003.

Richler, Noah. "Fighting for Peace" *Ideas with Paul Kennedy*, CBC Radio, 21 May 2008.

Theses

Bays, Jonathan. *From fire-proof house to middle power: narrative, identity and Canadian foreign policy, 1939-1956,* PhD Thesis: University of Oxford, 1999.

Bezglasnyy, Anton. *Middle Power Theory, Change and Continuity in the Asia-Pacific*, M.A. Thesis: University of British Columbia, 2010.

APPENDIX I: Interviews in chronological order

Interview 1: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 16 October 2012.

Interview 2: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 16 October 2012.

Interview 3: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 16 October 2012.

Interview 4: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 16 October 2012.

Interview 5: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 17 October 2012.

Interview 6: Erik Sandahl - French, NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 17 October 2012.

Interview 7: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 4 November 2013.

Interview 8: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 4 November 2013.

Interview 8: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 4 November 2013.

Interview 9: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 4 November 2013.

Interview 10: Senior US official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 5 November 2013.

Interview 11: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 5 November 2013.

Interview 12: Canadian NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 5 November 2013.

Interview 13: Member of a national delegation, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 5 November 2013.

Interview 14: Member of a national delegation, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 5 November 2013.

Interview 15: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 6 November 2013.

Interview 16: NATO Staff Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 6 November 2013.

Interview 17: Commodore Simon Hardern - UK, Director, IMS ExCO, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 7 November 2013.

Interview 18: Senior Staff Officer, International Military Staff, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 7 November 2013a.

Interview 19: Senior Staff Officer, International Military Staff, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 7 November 2013b.

Interview 20: Senior NATO Official, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 7 November 2013.

Interview 21: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 11 November, 2013.

Interview 22: Senior Canadian Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 13 November 2013.

Interview 23: Senior Canadian Defence Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 14 November 2013

Interview 24: Canadian Official, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 14 November 2013.

Interview 25: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 14 November 2013.

Interview 26: Senior NATO Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium: 15 November 2013.

Interview 27: Canadian Diplomat, London: 2 March 2014.

APPENDIX II – Acronyms

AGS – Allied Ground Surveillance

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System

BQ – Bloc Québécois

CA – Canadian Alliance

CBC – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency

CPC – Conservative Party of Canada

DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; also, DFATD – Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (as of 2013)

DPPC – Defence Planning Policy Committee

EU – European Union

FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

JTF2 – Joint Task Force 2

LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender

MP – Member of Parliament

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NDP – New Democratic Party

NRC – National Role Conception

OPC – Operations Policy Committee

OUP – Operation Unified Protector

PMO - Prime Minister's Office

UN – United Nations

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution